Last month you probably saw the story about how somebody used a (sloppy) deepfake of Joe Biden in a bid to try and trick voters into staying home during the Presidential Primary. It wasn’t particularly well done; nor was it clear it reached all that many people or had much of an actual impact.
But it clearly spooked the government. FCC robocall enforcement is generally fairly feckless for reasons we’ve well discussed (short version: having strict enforcement and rules might upset corporate American debt collectors and marketing departments that use many of the same tactics as robocall scammers).
But in this case it took all of a week or two before the FCC, in cooperation with state AGs, had tracked down the culprit: a “veteran political consultant working for a rival candidate” by the name of Steve Kramer. In comments to NBC, Kramer make it rather clear that he doesn’t really quite understand the width and breadth of the tornado dumpster fire about to fall on his head:
“In a statement and interview with NBC News, Kramer expressed no remorse for creating the deepfake, in which an imitation of the president’s voice discouraged participation in New Hampshire’s Democratic presidential primary. The call launched several law enforcement investigations and provoked outcry from election officials and watchdogs.
“I’m not afraid to testify, I know why I did everything,” he said an interview late Sunday, his first since coming forward. “If a House oversight committee wants me to testify, I’m going to demand they put it on TV because I know more than them.”
While U.S. regulators are pretty feckless about robocall enforcement (especially if you’re a large company that might prove difficult to defeat in court), they’re going to nail a small fry like this to a tree in the town square to make a point.
Kramer, a well known player in Albany politics who helped the short-lived Ye campaign, appears to believe he’ll be able to tap dance around his coming legal woes by insisting that he was some kind of avante garde revolutionary or activist:
“Kramer claimed he planned the fake robocall from the start as an act of civil disobedience to call attention to the dangers of AI in politics. He compared himself to American Revolutionary heroes Paul Revere and Thomas Paine. He said more enforcement is necessary to stop people like him from doing what he did.
“This is a way for me to make a difference, and I have,” he said in the interview. “For $500, I got about $5 million worth of action, whether that be media attention or regulatory action.”
Indeed.
How much of a kick to the crotch Kramer will experience is hard to parse out, but he’s not going to have fun. The usually fairly feckless FCC is making a precedent-shifting change for his “act of civil disobedience,” declaring AI-generated robocalls illegal under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which they already use to combat robocalls.
Usually the FCC (technically the FTC) sucks at collecting robocall fines because scammers (and legit companies) spoof their numbers and identities, making them hard to track down. In this case, Kramer is openly bragging about what he did, so I’d imagine the fine will be very large and hard to avoid.
For reference, right-wing propagandists Jacob Wohl and Jack Burkman were fined $5,134,500 for 1,141 illegal robocalls the duo made in a bid to confuse and mislead state voters. I’d suspect that this fine will be bigger. Kramer will also likely face a litany of lawsuits, and whatever additional charges the federal government can drum up to make an example of him. Which he claims is what he wanted, so enjoy.
As we noted last week, the Supreme Court put on hold the injunction issued by the 5th Circuit regarding the administration’s efforts to influence how social media companies deal with misinformation. As you’ll recall, Louisiana and Missouri and a variety of nonsense peddlers all sued the Biden administration, claiming that their 1st Amendment rights were violated by the administration’s actions.
The district court ruling in the case was mostly batshit crazy, taking things completely out of context and literally adding words to quotes to make it seem like people said stuff they absolutely did not. But, if you make up quotes that are not accurate, then you can claim that the White House was engaged in “censorship.” The 5th Circuit reviewed the decision and recognized it went way too far, and trimmed it way back, saying that many of the defendants shouldn’t be there (including many that the plaintiffs insisted were core to the issue), that 9 of the 10 prohibitions were too broad, and even the remaining prohibition needed to be trimmed back.
However, even the 5th Circuit’s ruling was weird. It did not clearly explain what made certain things “coercive” vs. “persuasive,” and the lack of specificity meant that it was useless in explaining to anyone what was and what was not permitted. Somewhat like the lower court ruling, the 5th Circuit ruling also took a number of quotes out of context, and the quotes shown in the ruling… are confusing. The 5th Circuit makes no effort to even explain who made the quotes or what they were in reference to. It also lumps together all of the social media platforms as if they were a single entity.
And so the White House went to the Supreme Court shadow docket, which put the 5th Circuit injunction on hold until midnight today. Just to be clear what’s going on, procedurally: the White House is in the process of doing a full appeal to the Supreme Court, which would allow for full briefing (including, I’m sure, a metric ton of amicus brief filings) and oral arguments. This process is just to see if the injunction the 5th Circuit issued last week is put on hold, or put into practice, until that case is decided on. The White House wants it put on hold. The states/nonsense peddlers want it to go into effect. As I noted in my coverage of the 5th Circuit ruling, I actually don’t think it’s that bad if it goes into effect, but I’m also sure that nonsense peddlers will use it to cause mischief, accusing many non-coercive government actions of being coercive and violating the injunction.
On Wednesday the plaintiffs in the case (Missouri, Louisiana, various nonsense peddlers) filed their brief. Yesterday, the White House filed its response. Separately there were some amicus briefs filed, though none are… um… good. Some are preposterously stupid and embarrassing. But given that the stay only exists until tonight, we’ll just focus on the main two filings.
The states/nonsense peddlers simply keep playing the same hand that has been successful to date. For example, they misquote the email Rob Flaherty sent to Facebook, suggesting it’s proof that the White House was pressuring the company to take down content:
“Things apparently became tense between the White House and Facebook after that, culminating in Flaherty’s July 15, 2021 email to Facebook, in which Flaherty stated: ‘Are you guys fucking serious? I want an answer on what happened here and I want it today.’”
Except, as we’ve shown, that email was about a problem with Facebook limiting the number of followers that the POTUS account had, and had literally nothing to do with content moderation questions:
Also, the part that the states are quoting above is from the district court ruling and not the 5th Circuit injunction, which is what is on appeal. Which is… kinda weird. Basically, the states are trying to pretend that the 5th Circuit adopted the district court’s ruling, when it mostly did not.
Beyond that, there really isn’t much new in this filing beyond just saying “look, the district court ruling was right! censorship censorship!”
The White House’s response is better than I expected, honestly. It points out the ridiculousness of the standing argument by the plaintiffs (at this point, technically now respondents due to how the process works):
Respondents’ opposition underscores the remarkable breadth of the decision below. Respondents insist that any individual or entity can establish standing to challenge any government action affecting speech by any third party merely by asserting a generalized desire to hear that speech — a proposition that would effectively abolish Article III’s limitations in free-speech cases. Respondents acknowledge that the Fifth Circuit’s decision transforms private social-media platforms’ content moderation into state action subject to the First Amendment — and thus subjects the platforms to suits compelling them to distribute speech they would prefer not to host. And respondents do not deny that the injunction installs the district court as the overseer of the Executive Branch’s communications with and about the platforms, exposing thousands of government employees to the threat of contempt should the court conclude that their statements run afoul of the Fifth Circuit’s novel and vague definition of state action.
As I mentioned, above, with the states leaning so heavily on the district court’s ruling, rather than the 5th Circuit’s it creates some oddities, which the White House calls out:
Respondents also offer little or no defense of the Fifth Circuit’s key legal holdings, including its expansive understanding of the sort of “coercion” and “significant encouragement” that transform private conduct into government action. Instead, respondents repeatedly seek to plug the holes in the Fifth Circuit’s legal analysis by invoking the district court’s factual findings, which they insist must be deemed to be “established as fact.” Opp. 2. But the government vigorously disputed those findings below and the Fifth Circuit declined to rely on many of them — presumably because they are unsupported or demonstrably erroneous. Respondents’ presentation to this Court paints a deeply distorted picture by pervasively relying on those debunked findings. And respondents’ unwillingness to defend the Fifth Circuit’s holdings that the findings it did credit are sufficient to establish coercion and significant encouragement only further confirms that those holdings are wrong.
Also, the White House notes that the states/nonsense peddlers point to harms to third parties who are not party to the suit as evidence of standing, but that makes no sense:
Respondents do not and could not contend that a sweeping injunction restricting the Executive Branch’s communications with all social media platforms about all content posted by all users is necessary to prevent any direct injury to respondents themselves. Instead, they invoke purported harms to third parties who have not sought judicial relief and are not parties to this suit. Those harms to non-parties are not a valid basis for injunctive relief at all; they certainly do not justify allowing a novel and profoundly disruptive injunction to take effect before this Court has the opportunity to review it.
This is all correct.
The annoying thing here is that this issue of government jawboning is an important one, and there should be clear limits to it. The government can try to persuade, but it cannot coerce. But where is that line? In the past I’ve said that the Bantam Books case and the Backpage v. Dart cases were really useful in limiting the government’s ability to pressure private entities to censor. But there are strong arguments that neither case set out a clear, applicable standard.
In this case, I’m uncomfortable with the overall arguments of both sides. The White House wants to push the line on what is and what is not coercive too far to the permissive side. I don’t think it should go as far as they want. But the states/nonsense peddlers are taking a much more ridiculous line, saying that basically government officials can do nothing (unless they’re Republican, in which case they can do anything).
But, as of right now, we don’t have a clear judicial standard on where that line is drawn.
This case is an opportunity to set such a standard, but given (1) the nonsense being peddled by the plaintiffs, (2) the ridiculously problematic district court ruling, (3) the unexplainable vagueness in the 5th Circuit ruling, and (4) the partisan nature of the Supreme Court… I’m not at all sure that this case is going to lead to a clear and applicable standard.
This is frustrating. One would hope that the Supreme Court would allow the stay to remain in place and allow for a full briefing/hearing on the issues here. It’s a complex case, but the docket is mostly full of FUD and nonsense, which is not a great start for finding where the proper line is.
We’re going to go slow on this one, because there’s a lot of background and details and nuance to get into in Friday’s 5th Circuit appeals court ruling in the Missouri v. Biden case that initially resulted in a batshit crazy 4th of July ruling regarding the US government “jawboning” social media companies. The reporting on the 5th Circuit ruling has been kinda atrocious, perhaps because the end result of the ruling is this:
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED with respect to the White House, the Surgeon General, the CDC, and the FBI, and REVERSED as to all other officials. The preliminary injunction is VACATED except for prohibition number six, which is MODIFIED as set forth herein. The Appellants’ motion for a stay pending appeal is DENIED as moot. The Appellants’ request to extend the administrative stay for ten days following the date hereof pending an application to the Supreme Court of the United States is GRANTED, and the matter is STAYED.
Affirmed, reversed, vacated, modified, denied, granted, and stayed. All in one. There’s… a lot going on in there, and a lot of reporters aren’t familiar enough with the details, the history, or the law to figure out what’s going on. Thus, they report just on the bottom line, which is that the court is still limiting the White House. But it’s at a much, much, much lower level than the district court did, and this time it’s way more consistent with the 1st Amendment.
The real summary is this: the appeals court ditched nine out of the ten “prohibitions” that the district court put on the government, and massively narrowed the only remaining one, bringing it down to a reasonable level (telling the U.S. government that it cannot coerce social media companies, which, uh, yes, that’s exactly correct).
But then in applying its own (perhaps surprisingly, very good) analysis, the 5th Circuit did so in a slightly weird way. And then also seems to contradict the [checks notes] 5th Circuit in a different case. But we’ll get to that in another post.
Much of the reporting on this suggests it was a big loss for the Biden administration. The reality is that it’s a mostly appropriate slap on the wrist that hopefully will keep the administration from straying too close to the 1st Amendment line again. It basically threw out 9.5 out of 10 “prohibitions” placed by the lower court, and even on the half a prohibition it left, it said it didn’t apply to the parts of the government that the GOP keeps insisting were the centerpieces of the giant conspiracy they made up in their minds. The court finds that CISA, Anthony Fauci’s NIAID, and the State Department did not do anything wrong and are no longer subject to any prohibitions.
The details: the state Attorneys General of Missouri and Louisiana sued the Biden administration with some bizarrely stupid theories about the government forcing websites to take down content they disagreed with. The case was brought in a federal court district with a single Trump-appointed judge. The case was allowed to move forward by that judge, turning it into a giant fishing expedition into all sorts of government communications to the social media companies, which were then presented to the judge out of context and in a misleading manner. The original nonsense theories were mostly discarded (because they were nonsense), but by quoting some emails out of context, the states (and a few nonsense peddlers they added as plaintiffs to have standing), were able to convince the judges that something bad was going on.
As we noted in our analysis of the original ruling, they did turn up a few questionable emails from White House officials who were stupidly trying to act tough about disinformation on social media. But even then, things were taken out of context. For example, I highlighted this quote from the original ruling and called it out as obviously inappropriate by the White House:
Things apparently became tense between the White House and Facebook after that, culminating in Flaherty’s July 15, 2021 email to Facebook, in which Flaherty stated: “Are you guys fucking serious? I want an answer on what happened here and I want it today.”
Except… if you look at it in context, the email has nothing to do with content moderation. The White House had noticed that the @potus Instagram account was having some issues, and Meta told the company that “the technical issues that had been affecting follower growth on @potus have been resolved.” A WH person received this and asked for more details. Meta responded with “it was an internal technical issue that we can’t get into, but it’s now resolved and should not happen again.” Someone then cc’d Rob Flaherty, and the quote above was in response to that. That is, it was about a technical issue that had prevented the @potus account from getting more followers, and he wanted details about how that happened.
So… look, I’d still argue that Flaherty was totally out of line here, and his response was entirely inappropriate from a professional standpoint. But it had literally nothing to do with content moderation issues or pressuring the company to remove disinformation. So it’s hard to see how it was a 1st Amendment violation. Yet, Judge Terry Doughty presented it in his ruling as if that line was about the removal of COVID disinfo. It is true that Flaherty had, months earlier, asked Facebook for more details about how the company was handling COVID disinfo, but those messages do not come across as threatening in any way, just asking for info.
The only way to make them seem threatening was to then include Flaherty’s angry message from months later, eliding entirely what it was about, and pretending that it was actually a continuation of the earlier conversation about COVID disinfo. Except that it wasn’t. Did Doughty not know this? Or did he pretend? I have no idea.
Doughty somehow framed this and a few other questionably out of context things as “a far-reaching and widespread censorship campaign.” As we noted in our original post, he literally inserted words that did not exist in a quote by Renee DiResta to make this argument. He claimed the following:
According to DiResta, the EIP was designed to “get around unclear legal authorities, including very real First Amendment questions” that would arise if CISA or other government agencies were to monitor and flag information for censorship on social media.
Except, if you read DiResta’s quote, “get around” does not actually show up anywhere. Doughty just added that out of thin air, which makes me think that perhaps he also knew he was misrepresenting the context of Flaherty’s comment.
Either way, Doughty’s quote from DiResta is a judicial fiction. He inserted words she never used to change the meaning of what was said. What DiResta is actually saying is that they set up EIP as a way to help facilitate information sharing, not to “get around” the “very real First Amendment questions,” and also not to encourage removal of information, but to help social media companies and governments counter and respond to disinformation around elections (which they did for things like misleading election procedures). That is, the quote here is about respecting the 1st Amendment, not “getting around” it. Yet, Doughty added “get around” to pretend otherwise.
He then issued a wide-ranging list of 10 prohibitions that were so broad I heard from multiple people within tech companies that the federal government canceled meetings with them on important cybersecurity issues, because they were afraid that any such meeting might violate the injunction.
So the DOJ appealed, and the case went to the 5th Circuit, which has a history of going… nutty. However, this ruling is mostly not nutty. It’s actually a very thorough and careful analysis of the standards for when the government steps over over the line in violating the 1st Amendment rights by pressuring speech suppression. As we’ve detailed for years, the line is whether or not the government was being coercive. The government is very much allowed to use its own voice to persuade. But when it is coercive, it steps over the line.
The appeals court analysis on this is very thorough and right on, as it borrows the important and useful precedents from other circuits that we’ve talked about for years, agreeing with all of them. Where is the line between persuasion and coercion?
Next, we take coercion—a separate and distinct means of satisfying the close nexus test. Generally speaking, if the government compels the private party’s decision, the result will be considered a state action. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004. So, what is coercion? We know that simply “being regulated by the State does not make one a state actor.” Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1932. Coercion, too, must be something more. But, distinguishing coercion from persuasion is a more nuanced task than doing the same for encouragement. Encouragement is evidenced by an exercise of active, meaningful control, whether by entanglement in the party’s decision-making process or direct involvement in carrying out the decision itself. Therefore, it may be more noticeable and, consequently, more distinguishable from persuasion. Coercion, on the other hand, may be more subtle. After all, the state may advocate—even forcefully—on behalf of its positions
It points to the key case that all of these cases always lead back to, the important Bantam Books v. Sullivan case that is generally seen as the original case on “jawboning” (government coercion to suppress speech):
That is not to say that coercion is always difficult to identify. Sometimes, coercion is obvious. Take Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). There, the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality—a state-created entity—sought to stop the distribution of obscene books to kids. Id. at 59. So, it sent a letter to a book distributor with a list of verboten books and requested that they be taken off the shelves. Id. at 61–64. That request conveniently noted that compliance would “eliminate the necessity of our recommending prosecution to the Attorney General’s department.” Id. at 62 n.5. Per the Commission’s request, police officers followed up to make sure the books were removed. Id. at 68. The Court concluded that this “system of informal censorship,” which was “clearly [meant] to intimidate” the recipients through “threat of [] legal sanctions and other means of coercion” rendered the distributors’ decision to remove the books a state action. Id. at 64, 67, 71–72. Given Bantam Books, not-so subtle asks accompanied by a “system” of pressure (e.g., threats and followups) are clearly coercive.
But, the panel notes, that level of coercion is not always present, but it doesn’t mean that other actions aren’t more subtly coercive. Since the 5th Circuit doesn’t currently have a test for figuring out if speech is coercive, it adopts the same tests that were recently used in the 2nd Circuit with the NRA v. Vullo case, where the NRA went after a NY state official who encouraged insurance companies to reconsider issuing NRA-endorsed insurance policies. The 2nd Circuit ran through a test and found that this urging was an attempt at persuasion and not coercive. The 5th Circuit also cites the 9th Circuit, which even more recently tossed out a case claiming that Elizabeth Warren’s comments to Amazon regarding an anti-vaxxer’s book were coercive, ruling they were merely an attempt to persuade. Both cases take a pretty thoughtful approach to determining where the line is, so it’s good to see the 5th Circuit adopt a similar test.
For coercion, we ask if the government compelled the decision by, through threats or otherwise, intimating that some form of punishment will follow a failure to comply. Vullo, 49 F.4th at 715. Sometimes, that is obvious from the facts. See, e.g., Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 62–63 (a mafiosi-style threat of referral to the Attorney General accompanied with persistent pressure and follow-ups). But, more often, it is not. So, to help distinguish permissible persuasion from impermissible coercion, we turn to the Second (and Ninth) Circuit’s four-factor test. Again, honing in on whether the government “intimat[ed] that some form of punishment” will follow a “failure to accede,” we parse the speaker’s messages to assess the (1) word choice and tone, including the overall “tenor” of the parties’ relationship; (2) the recipient’s perception; (3) the presence of authority, which includes whether it is reasonable to fear retaliation; and (4) whether the speaker refers to adverse consequences. Vullo, 49 F.4th at 715; see also Warren, 66 F.4th at 1207.
So, the 5th Circuit adopts a strong test to say when a government employee oversteps the line, and then looks to apply it. I’m a little surprised that the court then finds that some defendants probably did cross that line, mainly the White House and the Surgeon General’s office. I’m not completely surprised by this, as it did appear that both had certainly walked way too close to the line, and we had called out the White House for stupidly doing so. But… if that’s the case, the 5th Circuit should really show how they did so, and it does not do a very good job. It admits that the White House and the Surgeon General are free to talk to platforms about misinformation and even to advocate for positions:
Generally speaking, officials from the White House and the Surgeon General’s office had extensive, organized communications with platforms. They met regularly, traded information and reports, and worked together on a wide range of efforts. That working relationship was, at times, sweeping. Still, those facts alone likely are not problematic from a First-Amendment perspective.
So where does it go over the line? When the White House threatened to hit the companies with Section 230 reform if they didn’t clean up their sites! The ruling notes that even pressuring companies to remove content in strong language might not cross the line. But threatening regulatory reforms could:
That alone may be enough for us to find coercion. Like in Bantam Books, the officials here set about to force the platforms to remove metaphorical books from their shelves. It is uncontested that, between the White House and the Surgeon General’s office, government officials asked the platforms to remove undesirable posts and users from their platforms, sent follow-up messages of condemnation when they did not, and publicly called on the platforms to act. When the officials’ demands were not met, the platforms received promises of legal regime changes, enforcement actions, and other unspoken threats. That was likely coercive
Still… here the ruling is kinda weak. The panel notes that even with what’s said above the “officials’ demeanor” matters, and that includes their “tone.” To show that the tone was “threatening,” the panel… again quotes Flaherty’s demand for answers “immediately,” repeating Doughty’s false idea that that comment was about content moderation. It was not. The court does cite to some other “tone” issues, but again provides no context for them, and I’m not going to track down every single one.
Next, the court says we can tell that the White House’s statements were coercive because: “When officials asked for content to be removed, the platforms took it down.” Except, as we’ve reported before, that’s just not true. The transparency reports from the companies show how they regularly ignored requests from the government. And the EIP reporting system that was at the center of the lawsuit, and which many have insisted was the smoking gun, showed that the tech companies “took action” on only 35% of items. And even that number is too high, because TikTok was the most aggressive company covered, and they took action on 64% of reported URLs, meaning Facebook, Twitter, etc., took action on way less than 35%. And even that exaggerates the amount of influence because “take action” did not just mean “take down.” Indeed, the report said that only 13% of reported content was “removed.”
So, um, how does the 5th Circuit claim that “when officials asked for content to be removed, the platforms took it down”? The data simply doesn’t support that claim, unless they’re talking about some other set of requests.
One area where the court does make some good points is calling out — as we ourselves did — just how stupid it was for Joe Biden to claim that the websites were “killing people.” Of course, the court leaves out that three days later, Biden himself admitted that his original words were too strong, and that “Facebook isn’t killing people.” Somehow, only the first quote (which was admittedly stupid and wrong) makes it into the 5th Circuit opinion:
Here, the officials made express threats and, at the very least, leaned into the inherent authority of the President’s office. The officials made inflammatory accusations, such as saying that the platforms were “poison[ing]” the public, and “killing people.”
So… I’m a bit torn here. I wasn’t happy with the White House making these statements and said so at the time. But they didn’t strike me as anywhere near going over the coercive line. This court sees it differently, but seems to take a lot of commentary out of context to do so.
The concern about the FBI is similar. The court seems to read things totally out of context:
Fourth, the platforms clearly perceived the FBI’s messages as threats. For example, right before the 2022 congressional election, the FBI warned the platforms of “hack and dump” operations from “state-sponsored actors” that would spread misinformation through their sites. In doing so, the FBI officials leaned into their inherent authority. So, the platforms reacted as expected—by taking down content, including posts and accounts that originated from the United States, in direct compliance with the request.
But… that is not how anyone has described those discussions. I’ve seen multiple transcripts and interviews of people at the platforms who were in the meetings where “hack and dump” were discussed, and the tenor was more “be aware of this, as it may come from a foreign effort to spread disinfo about the election,” coming with no threat or coercion — just simply “be on the lookout” for this. It’s classic information sharing.
And the platforms had reason to be on the lookout for such things anyway. If the FBI came to Twitter and said “we’ve learned of a zero day hack that can allow hackers into your back end,” and Twitter responded by properly locking down their systems… would that be Twitter “perceiving the messages as threats,” or Twitter taking useful information from the FBI and acting accordingly? Everything I’ve seen suggests the latter.
Even stranger is the claim that the CDC was coercive. The CDC has literally zero power over the platforms. It has no regulatory power over them and now law enforcement power. So I can’t see how it was coercive at all. Here, the 5th Circuit just kinda wings it. After admitting that the CDC lacked any sort of power over the sites, it basically says “but the sites relied on info from the CDC, so it must have been coercive.”
Specifically, CDC officials directly impacted the platforms’ moderation policies. For example, in meetings with the CDC, the platforms actively sought to “get into [] policy stuff” and run their moderation policies by the CDC to determine whether the platforms’ standards were “in the right place.” Ultimately, the platforms came to heavily rely on the CDC. They adopted rule changes meant to implement the CDC’s guidance. As one platform said, they “were able to make [changes to the ‘misinfo policies’] based on the conversation [they] had last week with the CDC,” and they “immediately updated [their] policies globally” following another meeting. And, those adoptions led the platforms to make moderation decisions based entirely on the CDC’s say-so—“[t]here are several claims that we will be able to remove as soon as the CDC debunks them; until then, we are unable to remove them.” That dependence, at times, was total. For example, one platform asked the CDC how it should approach certain content and even asked the CDC to double check and proofread its proposed labels.
So… one interpretation of that is that the CDC was controlling site moderation practices. But another, more charitable (and frankly, from conversations I’ve had, way more accurate) interpretation was that we were in the middle of a fucking pandemic where there was no good info, and many websites decided (correctly) that they didn’t have epidemiologists on staff, and therefore it made sense to ask the experts what information was legit and what was not, based on what they knew at the time.
Note that in the paragraph above, the one that the 5th Circuit uses to claim that the platform polices were controlled by the CDC, it admits that the sites were reaching out to the CDC themselves, asking them for info. That… doesn’t sound coercive. That sounds like trust & safety teams recognizing that they’re not the experts in a very serious and rapidly changing crisis… and asking the experts.
Now, there were perhaps reasons that websites should have been less willing to just go with the CDC’s recommendations, but would you rather ask expert epidemiologists, or the team who most recently was trying to stop spam on your platform? It seems, kinda logical to ask the CDC, and wait until they confirmed that something was false before taking action. But alas.
Still, even with those three parts of the administration being deemed as crossing the line, most of the rest of the opinion is good. Despite all of the nonsense conspiracy theories about CISA, which were at the center of the case according to many, the 5th Circuit finds no evidence of any coercion there, and releases them from any of the restrictions.
Finally, although CISA flagged content for social-media platforms as part of its switchboarding operations, based on this record, its conduct falls on the “attempts to convince,” not “attempts to coerce,” side of the line. See Okwedy, 333 F.3d at 344; O’Handley, 62 F.4th at 1158. There is not sufficient evidence that CISA made threats of adverse consequences— explicit or implicit—to the platforms for refusing to act on the content it flagged. See Warren, 66 F.4th at 1208–11 (finding that senator’s communication was a “request rather than a command” where it did not “suggest[] that compliance was the only realistic option” or reference potential “adverse consequences”). Nor is there any indication CISA had power over the platforms in any capacity, or that their requests were threatening in tone or manner. Similarly, on this record, their requests— although certainly amounting to a non-trivial level of involvement—do not equate to meaningful control. There is no plain evidence that content was actually moderated per CISA’s requests or that any such moderation was done subject to non-independent standards.
Ditto for Fauci’s NIAID and the State Department (both of which were part of nonsense conspiracy theories). The Court says they didn’t cross the line either.
So I think the test the 5th Circuit used is correct (and matches other circuits). I find its application of the test to the White House kinda questionable, but it actually doesn’t bother me that much. With the FBI, the justification seems really weak, but frankly, the FBI should not be involved in any content moderation issues anyway, so… not a huge deal. The CDC part is the only part that seems super ridiculous as opposed to just borderline.
But saying CISA, NIAID and the State Department didn’t cross the line is good to see.
And then, even for the parts the court said did cross the line, the 5th Circuit so incredibly waters down the injunction from the massive, overbroad list of 10 “prohibited activities,” that… I don’t mind it. The court immediately kicks out 9 out of the 10 prohibited activities:
The preliminary injunction here is both vague and broader than necessary to remedy the Plaintiffs’ injuries, as shown at this preliminary juncture. As an initial matter, it is axiomatic that an injunction is overbroad if it enjoins a defendant from engaging in legal conduct. Nine of the preliminary injunction’s ten prohibitions risk doing just that. Moreover, many of the provisions are duplicative of each other and thus unnecessary.
Prohibitions one, two, three, four, five, and seven prohibit the officials from engaging in, essentially, any action “for the purpose of urging, encouraging, pressuring, or inducing” content moderation. But “urging, encouraging, pressuring” or even “inducing” action does not violate the Constitution unless and until such conduct crosses the line into coercion or significant encouragement. Compare Walker, 576 U.S. at 208 (“[A]s a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position.”), Finley, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view . . . .”), and Vullo, 49 F.4th at 717 (holding statements “encouraging” companies to evaluate risk of doing business with the plaintiff did not violate the Constitution where the statements did not “intimate that some form of punishment or adverse regulatory action would follow the failure to accede to the request”), with Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, and O’Handley, 62 F.4th at 1158 (“In deciding whether the government may urge a private party to remove (or refrain from engaging in) protected speech, we have drawn a sharp distinction between attempts to convince and attempts to coerce.”). These provisions also tend to overlap with each other, barring various actions that may cross the line into coercion. There is no need to try to spell out every activity that the government could possibly engage in that may run afoul of the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights as long the unlawful conduct is prohibited.
The eighth, ninth, and tenth provisions likewise may be unnecessary to ensure Plaintiffs’ relief. A government actor generally does not violate the First Amendment by simply “following up with social-media companies” about content-moderation, “requesting content reports from social-media companies” concerning their content-moderation, or asking social media companies to “Be on The Lookout” for certain posts.23 Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to show that these activities must be enjoined to afford Plaintiffs full relief.
The 5th Circuit, thankfully, calls for an extra special smackdown Judge Doughty’s ridiculous prohibition on any officials collaborating with the researchers at Stanford and the University of Washington who study disinformation, noting that this prohibition itself likely violates the 1st Amendment:
Finally, the fifth prohibition—which bars the officials from “collaborating, coordinating, partnering, switchboarding, and/or jointly working with the Election Integrity Partnership, the Virality Project, the Stanford Internet Observatory, or any like project or group” to engage in the same activities the officials are proscribed from doing on their own— may implicate private, third-party actors that are not parties in this case and that may be entitled to their own First Amendment protections. Because the provision fails to identify the specific parties that are subject to the prohibitions, see Scott, 826 F.3d at 209, 213, and “exceeds the scope of the parties’ presentation,” OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 616 (5th Cir. 2017), Plaintiffs have not shown that the inclusion of these third parties is necessary to remedy their injury. So, this provision cannot stand at this juncture
That leaves just a single prohibition. Prohibition six, which barred “threatening, pressuring, or coercing social-media companies in any manner to remove, delete, suppress, or reduce posted content of postings containing protected free speech.” But, the court rightly notes that even that one remaining prohibition clearly goes too far and would suppress protected speech, and thus cuts it back even further:
That leaves provision six, which bars the officials from “threatening, pressuring, or coercing social-media companies in any manner to remove, delete, suppress, or reduce posted content of postings containing protected free speech.” But, those terms could also capture otherwise legal speech. So, the injunction’s language must be further tailored to exclusively target illegal conduct and provide the officials with additional guidance or instruction on what behavior is prohibited.
So, the 5th Circuit changes that one prohibition to be significantly limited. The new version reads:
Defendants, and their employees and agents, shall take no actions, formal or informal, directly or indirectly, to coerce or significantly encourage social-media companies to remove, delete, suppress, or reduce, including through altering their algorithms, posted social-media content containing protected free speech. That includes, but is not limited to, compelling the platforms to act, such as by intimating that some form of punishment will follow a failure to comply with any request, or supervising, directing, or otherwise meaningfully controlling the social-media companies’ decision-making processes.
And that’s… good? I mean, it’s really good. It’s basically restating exactly what all the courts have been saying all along: the government can’t coerce companies regarding their content moderation practices.
The court also makes it clear that CISA, NIAID, and the State Department are excluded from this injunction, though I’d argue that the 1st Amendment already precludes the behavior in that injunction anyway, so they already can’t do those things (and there remains no evidence that they did).
So to summarize all of this, I’d argue that the 5th Circuit got this mostly right, and corrected most of the long list of terrible things that Judge Doughty put in his original opinion and injunction. The only aspect that’s a little wonky is that it feels like the 5th Circuit applied the test for coercion in a weird way with regards to the White House, the FBI, and the CDC, often by taking things dramatically out of context.
But the “harm” of that somewhat wonky application of the test is basically non-existent, because the court also wiped out all of the problematic prohibitions in the original injunction, leaving only one, which it then modified to basically restate the crux of the 1st Amendment: the government should not coerce companies in their moderation practices. Which is something that I agree with, and which hopefully will teach the Biden administration to stop inching up towards the line of threats and coercion.
That said, this also seems to wholly contradict the very same 5th Circuit’s decision in the NetChoice v. Paxton case, but that’s the subject of my next post. As for this case, I guess it’s possible that either side could seek Supreme Court review. It would be stupid for the DOJ to do so, as this ruling gives them almost everything they really wanted, and the probability that the current Supreme Court could fuck this all up seems… decently high. That said, the plaintiffs might want to ask the Supreme Court to review for just this reason (though, of course, that only reinforces the idea that the headlines that claimed this ruling was a “loss” for the Biden admin are incredibly misleading).
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has backed off of its ill-advised opposition to right to repair after presumably getting an earful from reformers and the Biden administration.
This past June, NHTSA issued guidance advising the auto industry to basically ignore Massachusetts’ new right to repair law, which required that all modern vehicle systems be accessible via a standardized, transparent platform allowing owners and repair shops to access vehicle data via a mobile device. The industry’s justification: the new law would harm consumer privacy and security:
“While NHTSA has stressed that it is important for consumers to continue to have the ability to choose where to have their vehicles serviced and repaired, consumers must be afforded choice in a manner that does not pose an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety.”
Except that’s… not true. Not only was the NHTSA’s intervention not helpful and not based in fact, it effectively undermined the Biden Administration’s claims it supports extremely popular right to repair reforms. It also undermined Massachusetts voters, whose representatives had approved the law 75-25.
An auto-industry lawsuit had already delayed implementation of the law. The industry also ran ads falsely claiming it would somehow aid sexual predators. That right to repair reform will harm consumer privacy and security in a litany of terrible ways is the standard argument for repair monopolists like the auto industry, though a recent FTC report found that the lion’s share of those claims simply weren’t true.
According to 404 Media (a new tech news outlet created from Motherboard folks fleeing the Vice bankruptcy mess), the NHTSA is backtracking from its June announcement. In a letter to MA Assistant AG Eric Haskell, the NHTSA said it found a way to “advance our mutual interest in ensuring safe consumer choice for automotive repair and maintenance. NHTSA strongly supports the right to repair.”
Right to repair activists like PIRG’s Nathan Proctor tell 404 Media the damage has already been done:
“We strongly support the goals the agency puts forward—to protect repair choice and maintain safety. However, as it stands, the agency has achieved neither goal,” he said. “Instead, it has allowed a proliferation of serious safety and monopolization issues to continue without meaningful resistance. Let’s hope this new letter signals a change in approach. We don’t plan to stop our work until cars not only are safe, but also enjoy the full slate of Right to Repair protections.”
While the NHTSA doesn’t seem in any rush to hold Tesla meaningfully accountable for the growing pile of corpses created by Tesla’s undercooked and clearly misrepresented “full self driving” car technology, it somehow found the time to undermine a hugely popular, grass roots reform effort. Great job.
Of course that’s how regulatory capture works. Repair monopolists like John Deere, Apple, and the auto industry seed the landscape with all kinds of bullshit about how being able to affordably and easily repair things you fucking own is somehow diabolically dangerous. Captured lawmakers, regulators, and governors then use those claims to either prevent right to repair laws from passing (see: California), or to undermine them if they already have (see: New York).
Well, this is not surprising, but unfortunate. With the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) to be debated in a Congressional hearing on Thursday, the White House had President Joe Biden come out and give a full throated endorsement of the horrible, dangerous, bill that will damage privacy and harm children.
We’ve got to hold — we’ve got to hold these platforms accountable for the national experiment they’re conducting on — on our children for profit.
Later this week, senators will debate legislation to protect kids’ privacy online, which I’ve been calling for for two years. It matters. Pass it, pass it, pass it, pass it, pass it.
I really mean it. Think about it. Do you ever get a chance to look at what your kids are looking at online?
But that’s not even remotely close to accurate about anything. Remember, the Republicans have been quite vocal about how they support KOSA because they know they can use it to suppress LGBTQ voices. They flat out said that they believe that “keeping trans content away from children is protecting kids.”
This is why so many people are up in arms about KOSA. It’s not about “protecting” kids privacy at all. It’s about giving the government more control over kids. The nature of the bill will require more data collection, not less. It will create serious 1st Amendment concerns by holding companies potentially liable if kids face harm that can be (indirectly) traced back to anything they found online.
This bill is not about privacy, because it will put private data at risk.
This bill is not about kids’ safety, because it will put their safety at risk.
It is not about parental oversight, because it takes those issues out of the hands of parents.
It is not about helping kids, because it’s going to shield kids from useful information that has literally saved lives.
The Republicans seem to know all this and are embracing it for these reasons. Which leaves a big question open: why are the Democrats supporting it at all?
So we wrote about Judge Terry Doughty’s somewhat questionable ruling preventing the Biden White House from communicating with tech companies or researchers regarding certain areas of disinformation. As we noted, there were some good elements in the ruling, reminding government officials of the 1st Amendment restrictions on coercion in attempting to silence protected speech.
But there were also plenty of extremely problematic elements to the ruling, including the lack of any clear standard by which the government might determine what is allowed and what is forbidden. As we noted, the injunction bars the government from talking about some things, but has exceptions for a bunch of other things. Except, it seems pretty clear that every example that Doughty cited as a problematic example could easily fit into the exceptions he outlined. And that’s a recipe for serious chilling effects on protected speech.
Even worse, we noted that Doughty literally inserted words into a quote to make it say something it never said. He flat out falsified a quote from a Stanford researcher, pretending she said they had set up the Election Integrity Partnership to “get around” the 1st Amendment, when the actual quote from her does not say anything about “getting around” the 1st Amendment, but was literally a statement of fact regarding the 1st Amendment limits on the government’s ability to do things.
Also, I had highlighted how there were emails from Rob Flaherty in the White House that I felt went too far, in angrily demanding that tech companies “explain” certain decisions they had made. At no point should a government official demand an explanation from a media organization about its editorial choices. But, as others have pointed out, the context of Flaherty’s angry email was totally misrespresented by Doughty. His demand for an explanation was not (as implied in the filings) about why certain accounts hadn’t been actioned/removed/etc. but rather about a bug in Facebook’s recommendation engine that removed the President’s account, limiting its growth.
Now… I still think that Flaherty’s email was a massive overreach. The President’s account has no inherent right to be regularly recommended by any recommendation engine, but the context here shows that it had zero to do with trying to take down or moderate accounts. In the context of the judge’s decision, you’d never know that all.
Either way, we’d already seen real world problems stemming from this decision as various government officials were cancelling important meetings with tech companies that had nothing whatsoever to do with content moderation or censorship, because of a fear that it would be seen to violate the law.
The DOJ quickly appealed the ruling, and asked Judge Doughty for a stay on the injunction until the appeal was heard. Granting such a stay is generally seen as standard practice. The plaintiffs in the case filed a brief opposing the stay, and even though the court told the plaintiffs that their filing was deficient (for a small technical reason) Judge Doughty issued his ruling rejecting the request for the stay before the plaintiffs even filed their corrected motion. You can see that the rejection is document number 301 in the docket, where the corrected opposition was document number 303, filed after the motion was already ruled on.
As with Doughty’s original ruling, the ruling rejecting the stay is filled with a lot of misleading and hyperbolic language. He insists that his ruling could not possibly cause harm, because of the exceptions he listed out (ignoring that every single example of speech he complained about easily and obviously fits into those exceptions):
The Preliminary Injunction also has several exceptions which list things that are NOT prohibited. The Preliminary Injunction allows Defendants to exercise permissible public government speech promoting government policies or views on matters of public concern, to inform social-media companies of postings involving criminal activity, criminal conspiracies, national security threats, extortion, other threats, criminal efforts to suppress voting, providing illegal campaign contributions, cyber-attacks against election infrastructure, foreign attempts to influence elections, threats against the public safety or security of the United States, postings intending to mislead voters about voting requirements, procedures, preventing or mitigating malicious cyber activity, and to inform social-media companies about speech not protected by the First Amendment.
Anyway, even the notoriously ridiculous 5th Circuit found Doughty’s move here to be a step too far, very quickly rejected his refusal to grant a stay, and did so in his stead. They also expedited the case to speed up the process.
IT IS ORDERED that this appeal is EXPEDITED to the next available Oral Argument Calendar.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a temporary administrative stay is GRANTED until further orders of the court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellants’ opposed motion for stay pending appeal is deferred to the oral argument merits panel which receives this case.
That’s the entirety of the ruling, but basically the injunction is put on hold. For the time being, the government can again talk to social media companies and researchers. Of course, they cannot talk to them about “censorship” because that has always been barred by the 1st Amendment. At least for the time being, though, they should be free to talk to them about legitimate, non-problematic efforts towards harm reduction.
One has to think that Donald Trump judicial appointee Judge Terry Doughty deliberately waited until July 4th (when the courts are closed) to release his ruling on the requested preliminary injunction preventing the federal government from communicating with social media companies. The results of the ruling are not a huge surprise, given Doughty’s now recognized pattern of being willing to bend over backwards as a judge in support of Trumpist culture war nonsense in multiple cases in his short time on the bench. But, even so, there are some really odd things about the ruling.
As you’ll recall, Missouri and Louisiana sued the Biden administration, arguing that it had violated the 1st Amendment by having Twitter block the NY Post story about the Hunter Biden laptop. But that happened before Joe Biden took office, and it’s also completely false. While it remains a key Trumpist talking point that this happened, every bit of evidence from the Twitter Files has revealed that the government had zero communications with Twitter regarding the NY Post’s story.
Still, Doughty does what Doughty does, and in March rejected the administration’s motion to dismiss with a bonkers, conspiracy-theory laden ruling. Given that, it wasn’t surprising that he would then grant the motion for a preliminary injunction. But, even so, there are some surprising bits in there that deserve attention.
There are elements of the ruling that are good and could be useful, some that are bad, and some that are just depressingly ugly. Let’s break them down, bit by bit.
The Good
There are legitimate concerns about government intrusions into private companies and their 1st Amendment protected decisions. I still think that the best modern ruling on this is Backpage v. Dart, in which then appeals court Judge Richard Posner smacked Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart around for his threats to credit card companies that resulted in them refusing to accept transactions for Backpage.com. There are some elements of that kind of ruling here, but the main difference was in that case, the coercive elements by Dart were clear, and here, many (but not all) are made up fantasyland stuff.
There were some examples in the lawsuit that did seem likely to cross the line, including having officials in the White House complaining about certain tweets and even saying “wondering if we can get moving on the process of having it removed ASAP.” That’s definitely inappropriate. Most of the worst emails seemed to come from one guy, Rob Flaherty, the former “Director of Digital Strategy,” who seemed to believe his job in the White House made it fine for him to be a total jackass to the companies, constantly berating them for moderation choices he disliked.
I mean, this is just totally inappropriate for a government official to say to a private company:
Things apparently became tense between the White House and Facebook after that, culminating in Flaherty’s July 15, 2021 email to Facebook, in which Flaherty stated: “Are you guys fucking serious? I want an answer on what happened here and I want it today.”
So having a ruling that highlights that the government should not be pressuring websites over speech is good to see.
Also, the ruling highlights that lawmakers threatening to revoke or modify Section 230 as part of the process of working the refs at these social media companies is a form of retaliation. This is a surprising finding, but a good one. We’ve highlighted in the past that politicians threatening to punish companies with regulatory changes in response to speech should be seen as a 1st Amendment violation, and had people yell at us (on both sides) about that. But here, Judge Doughty agrees, and highlights 230 reform as an example (though he’s a lot more credulous that 230 reform attempts between Republicans and Democrats are aligned).
With respect to 47 U.S.C. § 230, Defendants argue that there can be no coercion for threatening to revoke and/or amend Section 230 because the call to amend it has been bipartisan. However, Defendants combined their threats to amend Section 230 with the power to do so by holding a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and in holding the Presidency. They also combined their threats to amend Section 230 with emails, meetings, press conferences, and intense pressure by the White House, as well as the Surgeon General Defendants. Regardless, the fact that the threats to amend Section 230 were bipartisan makes it even more likely that Defendants had the power to amend Section 230. All that is required is that the government’s words or actions “could reasonably be interpreted as an implied threat.” Cuomo, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 114. With the Supreme Court recently making clear that Section 230 shields socialmedia platforms from legal responsibility for what their users post, Gonzalez v. Google, 143 S. Ct. 1191 (2023), Section 230 is even more valuable to these social-media platforms. These actions could reasonably be interpreted as an implied threat by the Defendants, amounting to coercion.
Cool. So, government folks, both in Congress and in the White House, should stop threatening to remove Section 230 as punishment for disagreeing with the moderation choices of private companies. That’s good and it’s nice to have that in writing, even if I’d be hard pressed to believe that most of the discussions on 230 are actual threats.
The Bad
Doughty seems incredibly willing to include perfectly reasonable conversations about how to respond to actually problematic content as “censorship” and “coercion,” despite there being little evidence of either in many cases (again, in some cases, it does appear that some folks in the administration crossed the line).
For example, it’s public information (as we’ve discussed) that various parts of the government would meet with social media not for “censorship” but to share information, such as about foreign trolls seeking to disrupt elections with false information, or about particular dangers. These meetings were not about censorship, but just making everyone aware of what was going on. But conspiracy-minded folks have turned those meetings into something they most definitely are not.
Yet Doughty assumes all these meetings are nefarious.
In doing so, Doughty often fails to distinguish perfectly reasonable speech by government actors that is not about suppressing speech, but rather debunking or countering false information — which is traditional counterspeech. Now, again, when government actors are doing it, their speech is actually less protected (Posner’s ruling in the Dart case details this point), but so long as their speech is not focused on silencing other speech, it’s perfectly reasonable. For example, the complaint detailed some efforts by social media companies to deboost the promotion of the Great Barrington Declaration. One of the points in the lawsuit was that Francis Collins had emailed Anthony Fauci about how much attention it was getting, saying “there needs to be a quick and devastating published take down of its premises.” And Fauci responded:
The same day, Dr. Fauci wrote back to Dr. Collins stating, “Francis: I am pasting in below a piece from Wired that debunks this theory. Best, Tony.”
Doughty ridiculously interprets Collins saying “there needs to be a… take down of its premises” to mean “we need to get this taken off of social media.”
However, various emails show Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits through evidence that the motivation of the NIAID Defendants was a “take down” of protected free speech. Dr. Francis Collins, in an email to Dr. Fauci told Fauci there needed to be a “quick and devastating take down” of the GBD—the result was exactly that.
But that’s clearly not what Collins meant in context. By a “quick and devastating published take down” he clearly meant a response. That is: more speech, debunking the claims that Collins worried were misleading. That’s why he said a “published take down.” Note that Doughty excises “published” from his quote in order to falsely imply that Collins was telling Fauci they needed to censor information.
And then Fauci continued to talk publicly about his concerns about the GBD, not urging any kind of censorship. And Doughty repeats all of those points, and still pretends the plan was “censorship”:
Dr. Fauci and Dr. Collins followed up with a series of public media statements attacking the GBD. In a Washington Post story run on October 14, 2020, Dr. Collins described the GBD and its authors as “fringe” and “dangerous.” Dr. Fauci consulted with Dr. Collins before he talked to the Washington Post. Dr. Fauci also endorsed these comments in an email to Dr. Collins, stating “what you said was entirely correct.”
On October 15, 2020, Dr. Fauci called the GBD “nonsense” and “dangerous.” Dr. Fauci specifically stated, “Quite frankly that is nonsense, and anybody who knows anything about epidemiology will tell you that is nonsense and very dangerous.” Dr. Fauci testified “it’s possible that” he coordinated with Dr. Collins on his public statements attacking the GBD.
Social-media platforms began censoring the GBD shortly thereafter. In October 2020, Google de-boosted the search results for the GBD so that when Google users googled “Great Barrington Declaration,” they would be diverted to articles critical of the GBD, and not to the GBD itself. Reddit removed links to the GBD. YouTube updated its terms of service regarding medical “misinformation,” to prohibit content about vaccines that contradicted consensus from health authorities. Because the GBD went against a consensus from health authorities, its content was removed from YouTube. Facebook adopted the same policies on misinformation based upon public health authority recommendations. Dr. Fauci testified that he could not recall anything about his involvement in seeking to squelch the GBD
Nothing in that shows coercion. It shows Fauci expressing an opinion on the accuracy of the statements in the GBD. That social media companies later chose to remove some of those links is wholly disconnected from that.
Indeed, under this theory, if a social media company wants to get government officials in trouble, all it has to do is remove any speech that a government official tries to respond to, enabling a lawsuit to claim that it was removed because of that response. That… makes no sense at all.
I mean, the conversation about the CDC is just bizarre. Whatever you think of the CDC, the details show that social media companies chose to rely on the CDC to try to understand what was accurate and what was not regarding Covid and Covid vaccines. That’s because a ton of information was flying back and forth and lots of it was inaccurate. As social media companies were hoping for a way to understand what was legit and what was not, it’s reasonable to ask an entity like the CDC what it thought.
Much like the other Defendants, described above, the CDC Defendants became “partners” with social-media platforms, flagging and reporting statements on social media Defendants deemed false. Although the CDC Defendants did not exercise coercion to the same extent as the White House and Surgeon General Defendants, their actions still likely resulted in “significant encouragement” by the government to suppress free speech about COVID-19 vaccines and other related issues.
Various social-media platforms changed their content-moderation policies to require suppression of content that was deemed false by CDC and led to vaccine hesitancy
Yeah, the companies did this because they (correctly) figured that the CDC — whose entire role is about this very thing — is going to be better at determining what’s legit and what’s dangerous than their own content moderation team. That’s a perfectly rational decision, not “censorship”. But Doughty doesn’t care.
Similarly, regarding the Hunter Biden laptop story — which we’ve debunked multiples times here — it’s now well established that the government had no involvement in the decision by social media companies to lower the visibility of that story for a short period of time. Incredibly, Doughty argues that the real problem was that the FBI didn’t tell social media companies that their concerns were wrong. Really:
The FBI’s failure to alert social-media companies that the Hunter Biden laptop story was real, and not mere Russian disinformation, is particularly troubling. The FBI had the laptop in their possession since December 2019 and had warned social-media companies to look out for a “hack and dump” operation by the Russians prior to the 2020 election. Even after Facebook specifically asked whether the Hunter Biden laptop story was Russian disinformation, Dehmlow of the FBI refused to comment, resulting in the social-media companies’suppression of the story. As a result, millions of U.S. citizens did not hear the story prior to the November 3, 2020 election. Additionally, the FBI was included in Industry meetings and bilateral meetings, received and forwarded alleged misinformation to social-media companies, and actually mislead social-media companies in regard to the Hunter Biden laptop story. The Court finds this evidence demonstrative of significant encouragement by the FBI Defendants.
So… despite so many parts of this lawsuit complaining about the government having contacts with social media, here the court says the real problem was that the FBI should have told the companies not to moderate this particular story? So, basically “don’t communicate with social media companies, except if your communication boosts the storylines that will help Donald Trump.”
Also, the idea that what social media companies did resulted in “millions of U.S. citizens” not hearing the story prior to the election is bullshit. As we’ve covered in the past, actual analysis showed that the attempts by Facebook and Twitter to deboost that story (very briefly — only for one day in the case of Twitter) actually created a Streisand Effect that got the story more attention than it was likely to get otherwise.
Over and over again in the ruling, Doughty highlights how the social media companies often explained to White House officials that they would not remove or otherwise take action on various accounts because they did not violate policies. That is consistent with everything we’ve seen, showing that the companies did not feel coerced, and if anything, often mocked the government officials for over-reacting to things online.
Indeed, as we’ve detailed, the actual evidence shows that the companies very, very rarely did anything in response to these flags. The report from Stanford showed that they only took action on 35% of flagged content, and those numbers were skewed by TikTok being much more aggressive. So Twitter/Facebook/YouTube took action on way less than 35%. And, by “take action,” they mostly just added more context (i.e., more speech, not suppression). The only things that were removed were obviously problematic content like phishing and impersonation.
But Doughty basically ignores all that and insists there’s evidence of coercion, because some companies took action. And now he’s saying that the government basically can’t flag any of this info.
This also means that in situations where useful information sharing to prevent real harm could occur, this preliminary injunction now blocks it. And we’re already seeing some of that with the State Department canceling meetings with Facebook in response to this ruling (I’ve heard that other meetings between the government and companies have also been canceled, including ones that are deliberately focused on harm reduction, not on “censorship.”)
Again, so much of this seems to be based on a very, very broad misunderstanding of the nature of investigating the flow of mis- and disinformation online, and the role of government in dealing with that. As we’ve discussed repeatedly, much of the information sharing that was set up around these issues involved things where government involvement made total sense: helping to determine attempts to undermine elections through misinformation regarding the time and place of polling stations, phishing attempts, and other such nonsense.
But, this ruling seems to treat that kind of useful information sharing as a nefarious plan to “censor conservatives.”
The Ugly
Judge Doughty seems to believe every nonsense conspiracy around regarding the culture war and false claims of social media deliberately stifling “conservatives.” This is despite multiple studies showing that they actually bent over backwards to allow conservatives to regularly break the rules to avoid claims of bias. I mean, this is just nonsense:
What is really telling is that virtually all of the free speech suppressed was “conservative” free speech. Using the 2016 election and the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government apparently engaged in a massive effort to suppress disfavored conservative speech. The targeting of conservative speech indicates that Defendants may have engaged in “viewpoint discrimination,” to which strict scrutiny applies
First of all, this isn’t true. The court is only aware of such speech being moderated because that’s all the plaintiffs in this case highlighted (often through exaggeration). Second, many of the contested actions happened under the Trump administration, and it would make no sense that a Republican administration would be seeking to suppress “conservative” speech. Third, the whole issue is that the companies were choosing to hold back dangerous false information that they feared would lead to real world harms. If it was true that such speech came more frequently from so-called “conservatives,” that’s on them. Not the government.
And that results in the details of the injunction, which are just ridiculously broad and go way beyond reasonable limits on attempts by the government to impact social media content moderation efforts.
Again, here, Doughty twists reality by viewing it through a distorted, conspiracy-laden prism. Take, for example, the following:
According to DiResta, the EIP was designed to “get around unclear legal authorities, including very real First Amendment questions” that would arise if CISA or other government agencies were to monitor and flag information for censorship on social media.
So, this part is really problematic. DiResta DID NOT SAY that EIP was an attempt to “get around” unclear legal authorities. Her full quote does not say that at all:
So, as with pretending that Collins told Fauci they had to “take down” content, when he meant provide more info that responds to it, here Doughty has put words in DiResta’s mouth. Where she’s explaining the reasons why the government can’t be in the business of flagging content, as there are “very real First Amendment questions,” Doughty, falsely, claims she said this was an attempt to “get around” those questions. But it’s not.
This is actually showing that those involved were being careful not to violate the 1st Amendment and to be cognizant of the limits the Constitution placed on government actors. Given the “very real First Amendment questions” that would be raised by having government officials highlighting misinformation to social media companies, groups like Stanford IO could make their analysis and pass it off to social media companies without the natural concerns of that information coming from government actors. In other words, Stanford’s involvement was not as a “government proxy,” but rather to provide useful information to the companies without the problematic context of government (and, again, Stanford’s eventual report on this stuff showed that the companies took action on only a tiny percentage of flagged content, and most of those were things like phishing attempts and impersonation — not anything to do with political speech).
It’s not “getting around” anything. It’s recognizing what the government is forbidden from doing.
If you look at the full context of DiResta’s quote, she’s actually making it clear that the reason Stanford decided to set up the EIP project was because the government shouldn’t be in that business, and that it made more sense for an academic institution to be tracking and highlighting disinformation for the sake of responding to it (i.e., not suppress it, but respond to it).
Yet, Doughty goes off on some nonsense tangent, winding himself up about how this is just the tip of the iceberg of some giant censorship regime, which is just laughable:
Plaintiffs have put forth ample evidence regarding extensive federal censorship that restricts the free flow of information on social-media platforms used by millions of Missourians and Louisianians, and very substantial segments of the populations of Missouri, Louisiana, and every other State. The Complaint provides detailed accounts of how this alleged censorship harms “enormous segments of [the States’] populations.” Additionally, the fact that such extensive examples of suppression have been uncovered through limited discovery suggests that the censorship explained above could merely be a representative sample of more extensive suppressions inflicted by Defendants on countless similarly situated speakers and audiences, including audiences in Missouri and Louisiana. The examples of censorship produced thus far cut against Defendants’ characterization of Plaintiffs’ fear of imminent future harm as “entirely speculative” and their description of the Plaintiff States’ injuries as “overly broad and generalized grievance[s].” The Plaintiffs have outlined a federal regime of mass censorship, presented specific examples of how such censorship has harmed the States’ quasi-sovereign interests in protecting their residents’ freedom of expression, and demonstrated numerous injuries to significant segments of the Plaintiff States’ populations.
Basically everything in that paragraph is bullshit.
Anyway, all that brings us to the nature of the actual injunction. And… it’s crazy. It basically prevents much of the US government from talking to any social media company or to various academics and researchers studying how information flows or how foreign election interference works. Which is quite a massive restriction.
But, really, the most incredible part is that the injunction pretends that it can distinguish the kinds of information the government can share with social media companies from the kinds it can’t. So, for example, the following is prohibited:
specifically flagging content or posts on social-media platforms and/or forwarding such to social-media companies urging, encouraging, pressuring, or inducing in any manner for removal, deletion, suppression, or reduction of content containing protected free speech;
urging, encouraging, pressuring, or inducing in any manner social-media companies to change their guidelines for removing, deleting, suppressing, or reducing content containing protected free speech;
emailing, calling, sending letters, texting, or engaging in any communication of any kind with social-media companies urging, encouraging, pressuring, or inducing in any manner for removal, deletion, suppression, or reduction of content containing protected free speech;
But then, it says the government can communicate with social media companies over the following:
informing social-media companies of postings involving criminal activity or criminal conspiracies;
contacting and/or notifying social-media companies of national security threats, extortion, or other threats posted on its platform;
contacting and/or notifying social-media companies about criminal efforts to suppress voting, to provide illegal campaign contributions, of cyber-attacks against election infrastructure, or foreign attempts to influence elections;
informing social-media companies of threats that threaten the public safety or security of the United States;
exercising permissible public government speech promoting government policies or views on matters of public concern;
informing social-media companies of postings intending to mislead voters about voting requirements and procedures;
informing or communicating with social-media companies in an effort to detect, prevent, or mitigate malicious cyber activity;
But here’s the thing: nearly all of the examples actually discussed fall into this exact bucket, but the plaintiffs (AND JUDGE DOUGHTY) pretend they fall into the first bucket (which is now prohibited). So, is sharing details of some jackass posting fake ways to vote “informing social media companies of posting intended to mislead voters about voting requirements” or is it “specifically flagging content or posts on social-media platforms and/or forwarding such to social-media companies urging, encouraging, pressuring, or inducing in any manner for removal, deletion, suppression, or reduction of content containing protected free speech“?
It seems abundantly clear that nearly all of the conversations were about legitimate information sharing, but nearly all of it is interpreted by the plaintiffs and the judge to be nefarious censorship. As such, the risk for anyone engaged in activities on the “not prohibited” list is that this judge will interpret them to be on the prohibited list.
And that’s why government officials are now calling off important meetings with these companies where they were sharing actual useful information that they can no longer share. I’ve even heard some government officials say they’re even afraid to post to social media out of a fear that that would violate this injunction.
Also, this is completely fucked up. Among the prohibited activities is having people in the government talk to a wide variety of researchers who aren’t even parties to this lawsuit.
collaborating, coordinating, partnering, switchboarding, and/or jointly working with the Election Integrity Partnership, the Virality Project, the Stanford Internet Observatory, or any like project or group for the purpose of urging, encouraging, pressuring, or inducing in any manner removal, deletion, suppression, or reduction of content posted with social-media companies containing protected free speech
That should be a real concern, as (again) a key thing that the EIP did was connect with election officials who were facing bogus election claims, giving them the ability to share that info and move to debunk false information and provide more accurate information. But, under this ruling, that can’t happen.
If you wanted to set up a system that is primed to enable foreign interference in elections, you couldn’t have picked a better setup. Nice work, everyone.
Anyway, it’s no surprise that the US government has already moved to appeal this ruling. But, if you think the appeals court is going to save things, remember that Louisiana federal rulings go up to the 5th Circuit, which is the court that decided that Texas’s compelled speech law was just dandy.
Of course, in many ways, this ruling conflicts with that one, in that Texas’s social media law is actually a much more active attempt by government to force social media companies to moderate in the manner it wants. But the one way they are consistent is that both rulings support Trumpist delusions, meaning there’s a decent chance the 5th Circuit blesses the nonsense parts of this one.
Again, the good parts of the ruling shouldn’t be ignored. And many government officials do need a clear reminder of the boundaries between coercion and persuasion. But, all in all, this ruling goes way too far, interprets things in a nonsense manner, and creates an impossible-to-comply-with injunction that causes real harm not just for the users of social media, but actual 1st Amendment interests as well.
I have to admit that I’d lost track of the whole White House IP Czar position. Officially, the “Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator” or IPEC, the job was created by the “Pro-IP Act” in 2008, and we warned that the whole thing was an attempt to turn the White House into Hollywood’s private copyright police force. The first IPEC didn’t come until after President Obama was elected, and while he was in office, there were two IPECs who served under him, with somewhat mixed results. The first one, got off to a rocky start, but was willing to listen to non-maximalist opinions, and eventually produced some more balanced reports on “IP enforcement.”
His second czar kicked off his job with a scary speech, misusing a bunch of stats to imply that “intellectual property laws” were directly responsible for anything “protected by” those laws.
But… after that… not much happened? I have no idea if Trump even had an IPEC. And, apparently it wasn’t a huge priority for Biden either. In 2022 the required report from IPEC was released, but it’s from “the office of the IPEC” and as far as I can tell, there was no human being who was actually the IPEC at that time. Even as some copyright-maximalist lobbyists would publicly whine about how Biden needed to nominate someone for the job, he’s only just done so now. Not surprisingly, but disappointingly, he’s pulled someone directly out of Hollywood, continuing the unfortunate revolving door between the legacy entertainment industries and the US government when it comes to roles around copyright policy.
Remember, copyright law, under the Constitution, is required to benefit the public. The monopoly rights grants under copyright are only a means to benefiting the public, not the ends themselves. Tragically, too many in Hollywood believe that the copyrights and the gatekeepers who control them are what’s important and should be the main beneficiaries. They often care little about whether or not they benefit the public. This does not mean that anyone from Hollywood will automatically support copyright maximalism — I’ve met enough people from those companies with a more open mind — but it certainly should lead to some amount of skepticism.
The bio of the person Biden has chosen at least does not suggest someone who is willing to recognize and support the important roles of fair use and the public domain in enabling creativity and innovation:
Deborah Robinson is an attorney with extensive experience protecting intellectual property rights on a global scale. Her career includes leadership roles as a corporate attorney and in public service as a prosecutor. As head of intellectual property enforcement at Paramount Global (formerly ViacomCBS), Robinson developed and implemented anti-piracy protocols to protect music, television, digital, and consumer-products properties. She built the global content protection group, amassed evidence for criminal prosecutions and directed civil litigation matters. She also coordinated regularly with social media and app platforms to create specialized enforcement workflows and forged alliances among several trade associations and industry coalitions.
Prior to joining Paramount Global, Robinson spent five years protecting music creators’ rights at the Recording Industry Association of America and seven years as an Assistant District Attorney for the city of Philadelphia.
This is not the bio of someone who is out there trying to protect the rights of the public, generally speaking. It’s someone who is protecting the profits of corporations against actual artists and the public.
But, who knows, perhaps she will surprise us. But I’m not holding my breath.
Freedom of speech and association include the right to choose one’s communication technologies. Politicians shouldn’t be able to tell you what to say, where to say it, or who to say it to.
So we are troubled by growing demands in the United States for restrictions on TikTok, a technology that many people have chosen to exchange information with others around the world. Before taking such a drastic step, the government must come forward with specific evidence showing, at the very least, a real problem and a narrowly tailored solution. So far, the government hasn’t done so.
Nearly all social media platforms and other online businesses collect a lot of personal data from their users. TikTok raises special concerns, given the surveillance and censorship practices of its home country, China. Still, the best solution to these problems is not to single-out one business or country for a ban. Rather, we must enact comprehensive consumer data privacy legislation. By reducing the massive stores of personal data collected by all businesses, TikTok included, we will reduce opportunities for all governments, China included, to buy or steal this data.
Many people choose TikTok
TikTok is a social media platform that hosts short videos. It is owned by ByteDance, a company headquartered in China. It has 100 million monthly users in the United States, and a billion worldwide. According to Pew, 67% of U.S. teenagers use Tiktok, and 10% of U.S. adults regularly get news there. Many users choose TikTok over its competitors because of its unique content recommendation system; to such users, social media platforms are not fungible.
If the government banned TikTok, it would undermine the free speech and association of millions of users. It would also intrude on TikTok’s interest in disseminating its users’ videos—just as bookstores have a right to sell bookswritten by others, and newspapers have a right to publish someone else’s opinion.
In a First Amendment challenge, courts would apply at least “intermediate scrutiny” to a TikTok ban and, depending upon the government’s intentions and the ban’s language, might apply “strict scrutiny.” Either way, the government would have to prove that its ban is “narrowlytailored” to national security or other concerns. At the very least, the government “must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural.” It also must show a “close fit” between the ban and the government’s goals, and that it did not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary.” So far, the government has not publicly presented any specific information showing it can meet this high bar.
Any TikTok ban must also contend with a federal statute that protects the free flow of information in and out of the United States: the Berman Amendments. In 1977, Congress enacted the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which limited presidential power to restrict trade with foreign nations. In 1988 and 1994, Congress amended IEEPA to further limit presidential power. Most importantly, the President cannot “regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly,” either “any…personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value,” or the import or export of “any information or informational materials.” Banning TikTok would be an indirect way of prohibiting information from crossing borders. Rep. Berman explained:
The fact that we disapprove of the government of a particular country ought not to inhibit our dialog with the people who suffer under those governments…We are strongest and most influential when we embody the freedoms to which others aspire.
A TikTok ban would cause further harms. It would undermine information security if, for example, legacy TikTok users could not receive updates to patch vulnerabilities. A ban would further entrench the social media market share of a small number of massive companies. One of these companies, Meta, paid a consulting firm to orchestrate a nationwide campaign seeking to turn the public against TikTok. After India banned TikTok in 2020, following a border dispute with China, many Indian users shifted to Instagram Reels and YouTube Shorts. Finally, a ban would undermine our moral authority to criticize censorship abroad.
The 2020 TikTok ban
In 2020, former President Trump issued ExecutiveOrders banning TikTok and WeChat, another Chinese-based communications platform. EFF filed two amicusbriefs in support of challenges to these bans, and published threeblogposts criticizing them.
A federal magistrate judge granted a preliminary injunction against the WeChat ban, based on the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on their First Amendment claim. The court reasoned that the government had presented “scant little evidence,” and that the ban “burden[ed] substantially more speech than is necessary.”
This year, Rep. McCaul (R-TX) filed the federal “DATA Act” (H.R. 1153). A House committee approved it on a party-line vote.
The bill requires executive officials to ban U.S. persons from engaging in “any transaction” with someone who “may transfer” certain personal data to any foreign person that is “subject to the influence of China,” or to that nation’s jurisdiction, direct or indirect control, or ownership. The bill also requires a ban on property transactions by any foreign person that operates a connected software application that is “subject to the influence of China,” and that “may be facilitating or contributing” to China’s surveillance or censorship. The President would have to sanction TikTok if it met either criterion.
It is doubtful this ban could survive First Amendment review, as the government has disclosed no specific information that shows narrow tailoring. Moreover, key terms are unconstitutionally vague, as the ACLU explained in its opposition letter.
The bill would weaken the Berman Amendments: that safeguard would no longer apply to the import or export of personal data. But many communication technologies, not just TikTok, move personal data across national borders. And many nations, not just China, threaten user privacy. While the current panic concerns one app based in one country, this weakening of the Berman Amendments will have much broader consequences.
The Restrict Act
Also this year, Sen. Warner (D-VA) and Sen. Thune (R-SD), along with ten other Senators, filed the federal “RESTRICT Act.” The White House endorsed it. It would authorize the executive branch to block “transactions” and “holdings” of “foreign adversaries” that involve “information and communication technology” and create “undue or unacceptable risk” to national security and more.
Two differences between the bills bear emphasis. First, while the DATA Act requires executive actions, the RESTRICT Act authorizes them following a review process. Second, while the DATA Act applies only to China, the RESTRICT Act applies to six “foreign adversaries” (China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela), and can be expanded to other countries.
The RESTRICT Act sets the stage for a TikTok ban. But the government has publicly disclosed no specific information that shows narrow tailoring. Worse, three provisions of the bill make such transparency less likely. First, the executive branch need not publicly explain a ban if doing so is not “practicable” and “consistent with … national security and law enforcement interests.” Second, any lawsuit challenging a ban would be constrained in scope and the amount of discovery. Third, while Congress can override the designation or de-designation of a “foreign adversary,” it has no other role.
Coercing ByteDance to sell TikTok
The Biden administration has demanded that ByteDance sellTikTok or face a possible U.S. ban, according to the company. But the fundamental question remains: can the government show that banning TikTok is narrowly tailored? If not, the government cannot use the threat of unlawful censorship as the cudgel to coerce a business to sell its property.
The context here is review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) of ByteDance’s ownership of TikTok. The CFIUS is a federal entity that reviews, and in the name of national security can block, certain acquisitions of U.S. businesses by foreign entities. In 2017, ByteDance bought TikTok (then called Musical.ly), and in 2019, CFIUS began investigating the purchase.
In response, TikTok has committed to a plan called “Project Texas.” The company would spend $1.5 billion on systems, overseen by CFIUS, to block data flow from TikTok to ByteDance and Chinese officials. Whether a TikTok ban is narrowly tailored would turn, in part, on whether Project Texas could address the government’s concerns without the extraordinary step of banning a communications platform.
This is disappointing. Students use TikTok to gather information from, and express themselves to, audiences around the world. Professors use it as a teaching tool, for example, in classes on media and culture. College-based news media write stories about TikTok and use that platform to disseminate their stories. Restrictions on each pose First Amendment problems.
These exclusions will often be ineffective, because TikTok users can switch their devices from Wi-Fi to cellular. This further reduces the ability of a ban to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Moreover, universities are teaching students the wrong lesson concerning how to make fact-based decisions about how to disseminate knowledge.
Government officials may be at greater risk of espionage than members of the general public, so there may be heightened concerns about the installation of TikTok on government devices. Also, government has greater prerogatives to manage its own assets and workplaces than those in the private sector. Still, infosec policies targeting just one technology or nation are probably not the best way to protect the government’s employees and programs.
The real solution: consumer data privacy legislation
There are legitimate data privacy concerns about all social media platforms, including but not limited TikTok. They all harvest and monetize our personal data and incentivize other online businesses to do the same. The result is that detailed information about us is widely available to purchasers, thieves, and government subpoenas.
Consider location data brokers, for example. Our phone apps collect detailed records of our physical movements, without our knowledge or genuine consent. The app developers sell it to data brokers, who in turn sell it to anyone who will pay for it. An anti-gay group bought it to identify gay priests. An election denier bought it to try to prove voting fraud. One broker sold data on who had visited reproductive health facilities.
If China wanted to buy this data, it could probably find a way to do so. Banning TikTok from operating here probably would not stop China from acquiring the location data of people here. The better approach is to limit how all businesses here collect personal data. This would reduce the supply of data that any adversary might obtain.
Well, this is unfortunate. Back in May of last year we wrote about how Missouri and Louisiana had sued the Biden administration, claiming “censorship” over social media based on a bunch of convoluted and nonsensical claims, most of which were about events that happened during the Trump administration.
We noted that, when viewed in the most forgiving light, the best we could make of the ridiculously poorly plead account was that they were trying to make a jawboning argument, saying that some of the administrations comments (mostly about reforming or repealing Section 230) acted as a de facto threat to social media to get those companies to silence speech. As we’ve gone into great detail about before, the Biden administration has, at times, gone stupidly close to the 1st Amendment line, but we hadn’t seen how they’d gone past it. And the initial complaint was so poorly done, and so focused on being a political document (it was brought by then Missouri Attorney General Eric Schmitt, who happily used it to grandstand on his way to being elected a US Senator last year, which is his current job), that it didn’t come close to making this argument coherently.
Also, what’s weird about the argument is that Republicans over the last few years have been angrier about Section 230, and have been louder about their threats to repeal it.
Even worse, many of the examples the complaint claimed were proof of “censorship” by the Biden administration were issues like the false claims that it tried to censor the story about the Hunter Biden laptop (which even the Twitter Files confirmed was not blocked by Twitter on behalf of any request from either the government or the Biden campaign, which wasn’t even the government anyway). The complaint also talked about Twitter’s decision to block sharing regarding the (now considered more credible) “lab leak” theory, though again, that happened during the Trump administration, not the Biden one. (Update: it turns out this argument is even dumber than I thought since it was Facebook, not Twitter who banned discussions about a “lab leak” theory).
Throughout the Fall last year, then AG/Senatorial candidate Schmitt used the case to release extremely misleading and misrepresented documents to bolster the still unproven claim of the Biden administration conspiring with social media companies to silence speech. Indeed some journalists even fell for it.
Still, as more and more papers were filed in the case, which now has a docket with well over 200 entries, it meant that perhaps the states would be able to drag the case out. And… that’s exactly what’s happened.
The ruling starts out badly, and then gets progressively more unhinged, taking conspiracy theories and nonsense claims that have been rejected in basically every other court, and saying “yup, sure, that sounds reasonable.”
Much of the ruling focuses on whether or not the two states even have standing to bring these claims. The court says they do, because they have “adequately” argued “injury-in-fact.” The reasons why are, frankly, boring and not worth getting into. This is also true of a few private plaintiffs who are involved in the lawsuit: in this case some well known peddlers of misleading information who were banned from Twitter, which they insist happened because of the Biden administration.
The White House pointed out (reasonably) that those still don’t qualify for standing because Twitter’s private moderation actions are not traceable to the White House because the White House had nothing to do with them. Here, the court gets, well, stupid. The judge more or less accepts conspiracy theory nonsense that the White House pressured Twitter to silence voices:
Here, however, Plaintiffs have alleged the full picture: a cohesive and coercive campaign by the Biden Administration and all of the Agency Defendants to threaten and persuade social media companies to more avidly censor so-called “misinformation.” Thus, while the Changizi plaintiffs may have left gaps in their pleadings, Plaintiffs in the current case have not. Plaintiffs have alleged, as described in detail above, a “ramping up” in censorship that directly coincides with the deboosting, shadow-banning, and account suspensions that are the subject of the Amended Complaint. And these are not mere generalizations: Plaintiffs made specific allegations showing a link between Defendants’ statements and the social-media companies’ censorship activities. While Plaintiffs acknowledge that some censorship existed before Defendants made the statements that are the subject of this case, they also allege in detail an increase in censorship, which is tied temporally to the Defendants’ actions. Thus, Plaintiffs here provide the allegations that may have been missing in the Changizi complaint.
Further, the Defendants’ reliance on Hart v. Facebook Inc., No. 22-CV-00737-CRB, 2022 WL 1427507 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2022), is also misplaced. As in the above cases, the plaintiffs in Hart sought redress for censorship of their viewpoints on social-media platforms like Twitter and Facebook. However, the Hart court found that the plaintiff’s allegations were simply too “vague” and “implausible” to fairly connect the government officials to the actions of the social-media companies. Id. at 5. But as this Court has repeatedly noted, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint simply cannot be characterized as “vague.” Instead, Plaintiffs have carefully laid out the alleged scheme of censorship and how Defendants are specifically connected to and involved with it.
This reads like motivated reasoning by a judge very, very interested in justifying a result rather than showing any actual coercion.
Having said that the plaintiffs have standing, the court moves on to the 1st Amendment claims, and in a move not surprising given what’s said above, suggests that they’re legit. But does so in a weird way. After first running through the various precedents regarding jawboning, including the very recent 9th Circuit ruling that said government flagging content to Twitter is not coercive, Judge Doughty says the Biden administration’s public statements, which included no actual threats or hints at threats, were coercive!
Here, Plaintiffs have clearly alleged that Defendants attempted to convince social-media companies to censor certain viewpoints. For example, Plaintiffs allege that Psaki demanded the censorship of the “Disinformation Dozen” and publicly demanded faster censorship of “harmful posts” on Facebook. Further, the Complaint alleges threats, some thinly veiled and some blatant, made by Defendants in an attempt to effectuate its censorship program. One such alleged threat is that the Surgeon General issued a formal “Request for Information” to social-media platforms as an implied threat of future regulation to pressure them to increase censorship. Another alleged threat is the DHS’s publishing of repeated terrorism advisory bulletins indicating that “misinformation” and “disinformation” on social-media platforms are “domestic terror threats.” While not a direct threat, equating failure to comply with censorship demands as enabling acts of domestic terrorism through repeated official advisory bulletins is certainly an action social-media companies would not lightly disregard. Moreover, the Complaint contains over 100 paragraphs of allegations detailing “significant encouragement” in private (i.e., “covert”) communications between Defendants and social-media platforms.
The Complaint further alleges threats that far exceed, in both number and coercive power, the threats at issue in the above-mentioned cases. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege and link threats of official government action in the form of threats of antitrust legislation and/or enforcement and calls to amend or repeal Section 230 of the CDA with calls for more aggressive censorship and suppression of speakers and viewpoints that government officials disfavor. The Complaint even alleges, almost directly on point with the threats in Carlin and Backpage, that President Biden threatened civil liability and criminal prosecution against Mark Zuckerburg if Facebook did not increase censorship of political speech. The Court finds that the Complaint alleges significant encouragement and coercion that converts the otherwise private conduct of censorship on social media platforms into state action, and is unpersuaded by Defendants’ arguments to the contrary.
Again, at the time we noted that much of what the administration said was stupid, and they should stop their jawboning. But Judge Doughty’s reading of it as coercive seems… bizarrely wrong. I mean, if that’s accurate, then how do we judge Donald Trump’s much more aggressive threats to repeal Section 230 if social media websites didn’t moderate the way he wanted to?
The Biden Administration notes that none of their public statements about disinformation included anything anywhere near a threat, but the judge doesn’t care.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs allege only “isolated episodes in which federal officials engaged in rhetoric about misinformation on social media platforms” and that the Complaint is “devoid” of any “enforceable threat” to “prosecute.” Further, they argue that it “is unclear how the alleged comments about amending [Section 230 of the CDA] or bringing antitrust suits could be viewed as ‘threats’ given that no Defendant could unilaterally take such actions.” The Court is unpersuaded by these arguments for several reasons. First, as explained above, any suggestion that a threat must be enforceable in order to constitute coercive state action is clearly contradicted by the overwhelming weight of authority. Moreover, the Complaint alleges that the threats became more forceful once the Biden Administrative took office and gained control of both Houses of Congress, indicating that the Defendants could take such actions with the help of political allies in Congress. Additionally, the Attorney General, a position appointed by and removable by the President, could, through the DOJ, unilaterally institute antitrust actions against social-media companies.
Again, this seems almost certainly backwards as a matter of precedent. And, if it’s accurate, I can’t wait to see how these same courts judge cases in the next GOP administration that will almost certainly go much, much further.
The ruling then gets even dumber. Despite every other court laughing away any claim that seeks to make social media companies like Twitter “state actors,” here the Court says that in this case, there is “joint action” that makes them state actors. This is again, simply wrong. It’s backwards. It’s silly. Again, the judge points to the recent 9th Circuit case that gets it right, and says “but this is different because I say so.”
Recently, in O’Handley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found no joint action where government officials flagged certain tweets as misinformation. There, the plaintiff alleged the “conspiracy approach” to joint action which requires “the plaintiff to show a ‘meeting of the minds’ between the government and the private party to ‘violate constitutional rights.’” 2023 WL 2443073, at *7 (quoting Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983)). The court noted that, because the “only alleged interactions are communications between the OEC and Twitter in which the OEC flagged for Twitter’s review posts that potentially violated the company’s content-moderation policy,” the plaintiff “allege[d] no facts plausibly suggesting either that the OEC interjected itself into the company’s internal decisions to limit access to his tweets and suspend his account or that the State played any role in drafting Twitter’s Civic Integrity Policy.” Id. at *8. The court described the relationship between the state officials and Twitter as a permissible “arms-length” relationship. Id. at *8 (citing Mathis v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 75 F.3d 498 (9th Cir. 1996)). For the reasons explained below, the allegations here are distinguishable from those in O’Handley.
Here, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged joint action, entwinement, and/or that specific features of Defendants’ actions combined to create state action. For example, the Complaint alleges that “[o]nce in control of the Executive Branch, Defendants promptly capitalized on these threats by pressuring, cajoling, and openly colluding with social-media companies to actively suppress particular disfavored speakers and viewpoints on social media.” Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Fauci, other CDC officials, officials of the Census Bureau, CISA, officials at HHS, the state department, and members of the FBI actively and directly coordinated with social-media companies to push, flag, and encourage censorship of posts the Government deemed “Mis, Dis, or Malinformation.”
These allegations, unlike those in O’Handley, demonstrate more than an “arms-length” relationship. Plaintiffs allege a formal government-created system for federal officials to influence social-media censorship decisions. For example, the Complaint alleges that federal officials set up a long series of formal meetings to discuss censorship, setting up privileged reporting channels to demand censorship, and funding and establishing federal-private partnership to procure censorship of disfavored viewpoints. The Complaint clearly alleges that Defendants specifically authorized and approved the actions of the social-media companies and gives dozens of examples where Defendants dictated specific censorship decisions to social-media platforms. These allegations are a far cry from the complained-of action in O’Handley: a single message from an unidentified member of a state agency to Twitter.
I mean, basically all of that is wrong. The discussions were not coordinating “censorship.” But, among the crowd of fools that are pushing this nonsense, it’s now taken as fact. Gullible fools suckered in by their own disinformation.
There’s also a lot of complete nonsense about Section 230 in the ruling, including this:
Plaintiffs’ injuries could be redressed by enjoining Defendants from engaging in the above-discussed “other factors” that have twisted Section 230 into a catalyst for government-sponsored censorship
But that makes a huge false assumption that Section 230 has been “a catalyst for government-sponsored censorship,” which remains not shown anywhere.
The judge also makes a hop, skip, and logical mental leap, to claim that because Twitter (a private company) engaged its own private property rights to remove certain content that it felt violated its rules… this is prior restraint:
Because Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are targeting particular views taken by speakers on a specific subject, they have alleged a clear violation of the First Amendment, i.e., viewpoint discrimination. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, by placing bans, shadow-bans, and other forms of restrictions on Plaintiffs’ social-media accounts, are engaged in de facto prior restraints, another clear violation of the First Amendment. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged their First Amendment claims.
I mean, under this kind of ruling, any government would have massive, unchecked power to force any private property owner to host any speech they want, by publicly complaining about the content, because according to this judge, at that point, if the website chooses to moderate that speech, it must be because of state action.
That’s ridiculous.
The only part of the motion to dismiss that’s granted is a very narrow part requesting an injunction directly against President Biden. But everything else targeting the administration is allowed to stand. Of course, any appeal out of this court will go up to the 5th Circuit, which is somewhat famous for its motivated reasoning in cases like these. So there’s a decent chance this ruling stands.
Again, the White House never should have said what it said and shouldn’t have even suggested it was telling social media companies how to moderate. And I’m now doubly furious because if they’d just shut the fuck up, we wouldn’t have this terrible ruling on the books. But, now we do.
Of course, it’ll be fun when there’s another Trump or DeSantis administration and they find out they’re bound by the same rules, and merely commenting on content moderation choices is seen as coercive…
