I put two short articles on Quora to explain why a 2022 Social Medium Platform does not come close to meeting the Section 230 definition of an Interactive Computer Service (ICS).
The definition of an ICS is a matter of law. SCOTUS can rule in any Section 230 litigation that a 2022 Social Medium Platform is not a Section 230 ICS, and everybody wins.
When SCOTUS wants, it can be extremely picky with respect to the text of a statute as the ruling of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), indicates.
Section 230 caselaw is a judicial coup against the American public. This coup takes away Constitutional rights of the American public (1st Amendment, 9th Amendment, and 14th Amendment) and unconstitutionally confers 1st Amendment rights on wealthy message common carrier megacorporations to the harm of the US political system as I argue in Martillo v. Twitter [22-532].
SCOTUS does not have to respect precedents, and it's attachment to a legal stance can be eroded.
Dred Scott (chattel slavery, white supremacy) was overturned.
Lochner (ban on labor legislation) was overturned.
Plessy (segregation) was overturned.
Roe (mostly unlimited right to abortion) was overturned.
Vitiating Section 230 immunity should be much easier. SCOTUS has never ruled on Zeran-based caselaw.
SCOTUS now has my blanket consent for amicus briefs in 22-532.
A Medium Corp takes my argument seriously and has hired an "award-winning brief writer and experienced oral advocate" to oppose my petition. I wonder whether Musk's commitment to free speech extends to CRA protected groups. So far Facebook and LinkedIn, which are two extremely discriminatory social medium platforms, have been trying to ignore my litigation.
Please take a look at the two short articles on the meaning of ICS. I studied with top linguistics scholars at Harvard and MIT. In the petition's argument for a grant of cert, I applied the legal knowledge that I acquired while I worked with the pre-Breakup AT&T legal department.
[I am also running a fundraiser: The Ninth Amendment Challenge to Social Medium Abuse. I have raised approximately $4,000.]
A depraved Ziø relative, who is in transition from the Dark Side (genocidal racial supremacist Ziø belief) to the Light Side (anti-genocide, anti-racism, anti-Ziø ideology, support of Palestine, and support of Palestinians), tells me that Gadde is on the take from the Ziø Lobby to suppress a pro-Palestine user and his content. Gadde and her relatives seem to support the most viciously anti-Muslim Indian politics.
It is hardly surprising that a TechDirt white racist dummy, who supports discrimination by a social medium platform, considers her to be a great defender of free speech.
It is hard to be more vile and disgusting than a TechDirt white racist nitwit that supports discrimination by a social medium platform.
Only a tech-illiterate and legally clueless white racist dummy calls hosting speech.
Excerpts from Petition II for Writ of CertiorariHosting is Bailment Not Speech
The following question and answer clarify why hosting is bailment and not speech.
Question: Does a notice board accessible to passing members of the public – by being in the entrance of a supermarket for example – offer a common carriage service? If not, how does Twitter differ from that in function, other than by being a service attached to a network that offers public access?
Answer: The described public notice board is a material board to which a member affixes a material message. The material board provides neither message switching nor message common carriage. Twitter provides store-and-forward message switching as well as message common carriage among users. Twitter temporarily stores a message in a backend database system (hosting or bailment) while the message is on the way to an end-user by means of message common carriage.
Discussion: The question confuses the frontend model (a pure concept or abstract idea{1}) with a material notice board. The frontend model makes it easier for an end user to interact with Twitter’s system.
In other words, Twitter’s system has no similarity whatsoever to the material notice board and the question shows a lack of comprehension of Internet technology.{2}
Hosting is not speech of a social medium platform. Hosting is bailment, and from the standpoint of common carriage law, storing digital personal literary property in a backend server of the social medium platform hardly differs from temporary storage of a paper letter in a satchel at a USPS sorting location or at a FedEx office until the paper letter can be sent on its way to its destination by common carriage.
Notes
1 Abstract idea in this context has some similarity to the abstract idea exception to patent eligibility. A discussion of confusion of virtual reality with physical reality can be found in Joachim’s Reply to Twitter’s Appellee’s Brief , which can be found in PACER or via its QR code in Appendix E – QR Codes (p. lviii).
2 The terminology of full-stack software engineering is somewhat confusing. A software engineer generally uses the Model-View-Controller design pattern to design a web or cloud service. The end user invokes a browser on his end host (a laptop or mobile computing device) to access the service. A single page application is frontend social medium platform software that runs in a web browser to access the service of the social medium platform – an older design might use Jakarta (or Java) Server Pages, but such a design does not affect the argument. A mobile device typically runs a mobile app (provided by the social medium platform) to complete the common carriage service, which the social medium platform's backend provides.
State Action (Proxying)
The action (proxying) of a non-government actor (proxy) becomes inextricably linked with the government
if the action of the non-government actor can only be considered unequivocally an expression of government policy,
if the non-government actor is supported by the government, or
if the non-government actor supports the government within a government facility or establishment.
Items [2] and [3] become problematic when the proxy action, which the non-government proxy{1} undertakes, could not constitutionally or legally be undertaken by the government.
Jawboning comes under item [1] and does not create a situation of state action.{2}
when the non-government actor has strong means to pushback or
when the non-government actor can show that it undertook the action in question before the government started jawboning.
Eagle Coffee Shop of Burton{3} came under item [3] because it paid rent to the government and in effect made the state government complicit in violation of Amendment XIV.
Suppose Delaware had allowed the Eagle Coffee Shop to use government space for free. Then the issue would have come under list item [2].
The Supreme Court points out in Perry{4} that the school email system is not, by tradition or by government designation, a forum for public communication.
In contrast, the government created the Internet to be a forum for public communication, and partial privatization does not change that designation.
A social medium platform discriminates in government supported networks and systems
like a state college, library, or public school network,
like a state ISP to wit NYSERNET,
like a community ISP to wit Chattanooga EBP, and
like a federally funded broadband link.
[The government funds a tremendous number of Internet end host devices. In pre-breakup days AT&T always defended itself against the possibility of becoming a state actor by making sure to own its entire network including customer premises equipment.]
The government cannot
participate in an action,
benefit from an action,
support an action, or
compel an action
by a non-government actor (really proxy) if the action is unconstitutional or illegal if the government undertakes the action. Every social medium platform is forbidden by state action doctrine from
abridging user Amendment I rights,
public accommodation discrimination,
civil rights discrimination (Amendment XIV violation), and
common carriage discrimination (Amendment IX violation{5}).
While a private entity can host an open forum for discussion in its private space and abridge the speech of visitors to its forum, a private entity cannot host an open forum for discussion within the public square of the Internet{6} and abridge the freedom of speech of visitors without committing an action
that is inextricably intertwined with the state and
that thus violates Amendment I rights of the visitors.
The situation, which obtains in Hudgens v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976), is vastly different because the North DeKalb Shopping Center was not a government-designated public forum.
In a nutshell, a social medium platform holds out an open forum in the government-designated public forum of the Internet. The social medium platform becomes a state proxy by holding out an open forum in a public forum. According to State Action Doctrine, the social medium platform violates Amendment I by abridging the freedom of speech of the public.
Summary
The belief in Internet exceptionalism seems to create self-reinforcing judicial psychosis. A social medium platform is the role model for Constitutional violation, statutory violation, common law violation, and nasty discrimination.
Notes
1 Actor suggests agent and some sort of official relationship status. Proxy implies far less.
2 Plaintiff Prager made a weak argument for State Action in Prager Univ. v. Google LLC. Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020) cites Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019) despite the lack of similarity between the two cases have little similarity. The Halleck precedent is irrelevant to the violations that every social medium platform is committing. While MCA/MNN is a cable caster, which specializes in a narrow range of content and which operates in a private network, a social medium platform provides a racist highly exclusionary open forum in a state-created, state-supported, and probably mostly state-owned or state-supported public network. In many cases, the US and state governments make extensive use of the exclusionary open private forum that a racist and antisemitic social medium platform like Twitter, Facebook, or LinkedIn have created within the designated public forum of the Internet. See Mat Ford, “Why Isn’t the Supreme Court on Twitter?”, The New Republic, June 25, 2020, URI: https://newrepublic.com/article/158288/supreme-court-twitter.
3 Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961).
4 Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981)
5 A diehard supporter of discrimination by a social medium platform may argue for limiting Amendment IX to a transportation means that existed in the late 18th century. Amendment II is not limited to 18th century weaponry and firearms.
6 The Internet is a state-supported place of public accommodation for resource sharing, for research, for discussion, for exhibition, and for entertainment; or the Internet is state-designated public forum.
I explain that the Internet is a state-sponsored place of public accommodation within the meaning of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
I demonstrate that a 2022 Social Medium Platform does not meet the Section 230 definition of an Interactive Computer System (ICS).
I correctly apply State Action Doctrine to a 2022 Social Medium Platform.
I am the only Section 230 litigation plaintiff that understands the technology of a social medium platform. I would not mind some help in covering the costs (estimates have ranged from $4K to $10K†), which are associated with petitioning SCOTUS.
See 9th Amendment Challenge to Social Medium Abuse.
Even more I want to find an attorney,
who is admitted to practice before SCOTUS and
who can file the case electronically.
While success with such a petition is unlikely, I have provided expert technology consulting to AT&T, McDermott, and Proskauer. My clients have always prevailed in a case in which I was involved. I can provide the same preparation to an attorney that represents me in Martillo v. Twitter.
Notes
†The main expense comes from retyping court documents. I have used PDF conversion software to lower this expense. In a few days, my fundraiser raised over $2,100 (and I doubt that any contributor knew what bailment was before he read the fundraiser). I can pay for the cost of filing myself, but I am trying to mobilize those angry a Social Medium Platform. The fun really starts when I return the litigation to District Court -- something that I can do at any time.
Support for discrimination by a social medium platform constitutes depraved anti-American anti-Constitution white racism that must be buried just as "separate but equal" and Jim Crow were buried. It is hard to be more disgusting than a white racist TechDirt microbrain supporter of white racial discrimination by a social medium platform.
A social medium platform is not like a common carrier.
A social medium is a message common carrier.
A social medium platform has no First Amendment right to discriminate against a user or against his content, but a user has a Ninth Amendment right to non-discriminatory message common carriage.
Here is an originalist argument that will persuade Justice Brett Kavanaugh: Petition to SCOTUS for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (Martillo v. Twitter).
Please help the legal battle against white racist discrimination by a social medium platform: 9th Amendment Challenge to Social Medium Abuse.
Martillo v. Twitter is an excellent companion both
to Moody v. NetChoice, No. 22-277 (U.S. Supreme Court), Petition for Certiorari, Opening September 23, 2022, and also
to both
Gonzalez v. Google LLC, No. 21-1333 (U.S Supreme Court), Petition for Certiorari, Opening April 4, 2022, and also
Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, No. 21-1496 (U.S. Supreme Court), Petition for Certiorari, Opening May 26, 2022.
There is overlap among all four cases, which are complementary. The petitioner of Moody litigates from the standpoint of a state that wishes to regulate to prevent abuse of the public while the petitioner of Martillo litigates from the standpoint of an abused member of the public. Both the common carrier status of a social medium platform and also the scope of § 230 immunity are addressed by Martillo and relevant to Gonzalez and to Taamneh.[1] Martillo also briefly addresses issues of selective prosecution and of selective enforcement of US criminal anti-genocide and anti-terrorism law by the US DOJ.
Martillo makes an Originalist argument, which opposes:
common carriage discrimination by a social medium platform,
civil rights discrimination by a social medium platform,
public accommodation discrimination by a social medium platform, and
unconstitutional abridgment of user speech by a social medium platform, which is a state proxy (actor) that creates an open forum within the state-established, state-supported, and state-designated public forum, which is the Internet.
The case will not stop at SCOTUS but will return to District Court in a class action that will seek penalties from the class of discriminatory social medium platforms.
Martillo lays out the case
with arguments that are comprehensible to the public and
with arguments that the pre-Breakup AT&T legal department might have made on the basis of extensive knowledge of common carriage law.
Here is an example of an argument that is directed to the lay public and that is informed by knowledge of Internet technology.
Hosting is Bailment Not Speech
The following question and answer clarify why hosting is bailment and not speech.
Question: Does a notice board accessible to passing members of the public – by being in the entrance of a supermarket for example – offer a common carriage service? If not, how does Twitter differ from that in function, other than by being a service attached to a network that offers public access?
Answer: The described public notice board is a material board to which a member affixes a material message. The material board provides neither message switching nor message common carriage. Twitter provides store-and-forward message switching as well as message common carriage among users. Twitter temporarily stores a message in a backend database system (hosting or bailment) while the message is on the way to an end-user by means of message common carriage.
Discussion: The question confuses the frontend model (a pure concept or abstract idea[2]) with a material notice board. The frontend model makes it easier for an end user to interact with Twitter’s system.
In other words, Twitter’s system has no similarity whatsoever to the material notice board and the question shows a lack of comprehension of Internet technology.[2]
Hosting is not speech of a social medium platform. Hosting is bailment, and from the standpoint of common carriage law, storing digital personal literary property in a backend server of the social medium platform hardly differs from temporary storage of a paper letter in a satchel at a USPS sorting location or at a FedEx office until the paper letter can be sent on its way to its destination by common carriage. A message common carrier has no First Amendment right to discriminate against a user (customer) either with respect to carriage or with respect to bailment.
Notes
[1] If Twitter, Google, and Facebook (Meta) provide common carriage and have not been consistently violating common carriage law, they would have been able to defend themselves in Gonzalez v. Google LLC and in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh by asserting common carrier status.
[2] Abstract idea in this context has some similarity to the abstract idea exception to patent eligibility. A discussion of confusion of virtual reality with physical reality can be found in Appendix G – Reply to Twitter’s Appellee’s Brief (p. lxxv).
[3] The terminology of full-stack software engineering is somewhat confusing. A software engineer generally uses the Model-View-Controller design pattern to design a web or cloud service. The end user invokes a browser on his end host (a laptop or mobile computing device) to access the service. A single page application is frontend social medium platform software that runs in a web browser to access the service of the social medium platform – an older design might use Jakarta (or Java) Server Pages, but such a design does not affect the argument. A mobile device typically runs a mobile app (provided by the social medium platform) to complete the common carriage service, which the social medium platform's backend provides.
I often have difficulty with understanding the POV of a depraved white racist microbrain.
And yet, here you are, worrying about what (you think) I want so much that you have to insult me as if you think that will ever shut me up.
A depraved white racial supremacist TechDirt dummy, who supports racial discrimination by a social medium platform, helps me sharpen my legal arguments by showing me in detail his twisted and perverted logic.
The social medium platform-related caselaw, which denies a social medium platform is a place of public accommodation, is confused and consists of a plethora of cartoon litigation.
The Memorandum Opinion of the Noah[1] Court was correct in denying that the virtual forum[2] (chat room) was a place in the sense of the CRA. Plaintiff Noah’s error in presenting his case was metaphorically equivalent to confusing a movie (not a place) with the movie theater (a place), where the movie is exhibited. If Plaintiff Noah had focused on AOL’s temporarily assembled place of public accommodation[3] for exhibition and for entertainment, he might have had a good argument that AOL was violating § 2000a by allowing other users to create an environment hostile to Muslims, who constitute a protected class under § 2000a.
Lewis v. Google LLC, No. 20-16073 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2021) is vicariously embarrassing to read and only has the virtue of non-precedential status. In this decision, the audience is confused with the movie theater.[4]
The Internet is a state-supported establishment that has a definite identifiable structure that can be mapped to locations all over the planet. The Internet has premises that have buildings with grounds or appurtenances throughout the United States of America. The premises of the Internet may temporarily include premises of a user, whose device connects to the Internet. Since the 1950s the Internet, which has evolved from the ARPANET, was intended to become a place of accommodation for resource sharing. Now it is public. The US government has established and supports[5] the Internet as a place of public accommodation within the definition that 42 U.S. Code § 2000a provides. The operative phrase in the statute is “Establishments affecting interstate commerce or supported in their activities by State action as places of public accommodation.” Such a phrase is a simile.[6] A state-supported establishment need only be (functionally) like a place. For example, § 2000a desegregated a state-established state-supported public drinking fountain even though it does not fit into the example list that § 2000a contains.
Because every social medium platform is and functions within the Internet, every social medium platform comes under 42 U.S. Code § 2000a(b)(4):
any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.
A social medium platform may not discriminate against the groups, which § 2000a specifies, and Facebook (Meta) has already made a legal admission of such discrimination.[7]
Notes
[1] Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003).
[2] The virtual forum (virtual conference room or virtual meeting room) interaction abstraction is an elementary instance of a virtual reality.
[3] Plaintiff Noah entered the temporarily assembled “movie theater” by means of his program-executing device.
[4] A Court, which considers Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994), to be relevant to a § 230 litigation can only believe (in the most generous possible inference) that the Internet operates by magic.
[5] Here is an example of US government support: “Internet for All” at https://www.internetforall.gov/.
[6] See Richards v. United States, 369 US 1, 9 (1962), quoted in Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993) at 1269 ("[W]e must always be cognizant of the fact that 'the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.'").
[7] Human Rights Due Diligence of Meta’s Impacts in Israel and Palestine, https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/report-view/meta-human-rights-israel-palestine.
An email service backend, a social medium backend, a blog backend, and a mailing list backend all provide some form of common carriage.
If there is little to no difference between these services, that means that one of them is a common carrier/public forum/state actor, then they ALL are. Do you agree? If not, why not?
An email system is only rarely configured to be either a place of public accommodation or a public forum. My corporate email network is not so configured.
The Internet is a state-supported place of public accommodation and is also a state-designated public forum,
Entities within the Internet must conform to Title II of the 1964 CRA.
A private entity, which creates an open forum within a public forum, becomes a state proxy and cannot do anything which the government cannot do -- otherwise it's a trivial strategy of exclusion for a state to put the private entity in charge of the public forum or of a piece of it.
Email and social media have very little in common from any standpoint. They’re both online, both involve speech, but that’s where the similarities end.
If a backend developer changes the access of data table rows corresponding to a user's email sent box and if a frontend developer changes the UI presentation of the email sent box in the frontend Single Page Application, the email sent box becomes a Facebook user's wall or a Twitter user's home Tweet page.
But let’s pretend you’re right: so what? From every other standpoint, there is no similarity, and the protocol has never been what decided how the law is applied.
Yes, we get back to the law.
If an entity holds out carriage to the public under standard terms for a fee, the entity provides common carriage.
bhull242 can drool nonsense endlessly, but every social medium platform is a message common carrier of digital personal literal property and of other intellectual property.
I don't care about degrees. I did work for IBM when I was 10 back in the 60s. The management was so impressed that IBM gave my prep school free access to an IBM 7094 II.
It is pure ignorance to refer to speaking or to publishing of a social medium platform.
Because of the way HTTP works, no one ever receives personal literary property or other intellectual property from a social medium user without first requesting it via a sequence of HTTP requests.
Twitter is a message common carrier that does the Internet equivalent of mass-mailing (a common carriage service).
A common carrier has no Amendment I rights with respect to the merchandise or property that it transports or holds in bailment during transport.
A member of the public has an Amendment IX right to non-discriminatory common carriage from every social medium platform.
The Internet is established by the state as a place of public accommodation as well as a state-supporter state-designated public forum.
Every social medium platform comes under Title II of the CRA.
Because every social medium platform provides an open forum within a public forum, every social medium platform is a state proxy (less clearly a state actor). Every social medium platform violates the Constitution whenever it abridges the freedom of speech of the public.
Such a despicable ignorant racist dumb-dumb always looking for a way to legitimize, to normalize, and to justify racial discrimination by a social medium platform.
Email and social media differ in one significant respect, with email you address your email to a recipient, and if you want to send it to multiple recipient, you send a copy addressed to each recipient. When you open you mailbox, you are only shown emails that were addressed to you.
Addressing is a non-issue from the standpoint of common carriage law.
Mail explorers have existed forever, and I receive lots of emails from mailing lists. Such email is not addressed to me by the originator.
With social media you send you content to the social media service, with no recipient, and granting them the right to show it to whoever asks for it. When you open a social media app, you are given an interface that show items from people you have befriended, or tags you have chosen to follow.
You are just pointing out the barter for common carriage. A social medium platform really does not work much differently from a mail Listserv or from an email service.
The two service are different, and do not substitute for each other. For example, no company would send you persona;l notifications about say bills and payments using social media, but rather to your email. A company will announce new products and sales and other company news on social media.
I have received bills on LinkedIn, which is a social medium platform.
I receive sales literature and company news both by means of email service and by means of a social medium platform.
With Email the sender decides who will receive their content, while with social media the user decides whose content they will look at. They may have common technologies, but they are no more similar in actual use than a diesel powered truck and a diesel powered train.
For many tasks, a diesel-powered truck and a diesel-powered are completely interchangeable just as an email service, a blog service, a mail Listserv, and a social medium platform are completely interchangeable for many uses.
If I use a mail exploder, I have no idea where my email goes.
Both a diesel-powered truck and also a diesel-powered train can be used for common carriage, and the technologies of both differ little to a technology expert like me. I could build either from scratch.
Anonymous Clown is nothing more than a shit-for-brains white racist dummy, who tries to use any ridiculous argument to legitimize, to normalize, and to justify racial discrimination by a social medium platform.
Such discrimination is completely unlawful from the standpoint of common carriage law and violates my Ninth Amendment Right to non-discriminatory common carriage.
Back in the late 80s and early 90s tech nitwit user-losers used to get into religious wars over the virtues of bridging in comparison with routing. I asserted
that bridging or routing was whatever a given designer said it was and
that there was no a priori way to distinguish one system of path selection in a network from the other.
I received tremendous grief for the assertion, but I was completely correct as I am with respect to email service, social medium platform service, a blog service, and a mailing list service.
An email service backend, a social medium backend, a blog backend, and a mailing list backend all keep mail/posts and replies/comments in a backend database. There are a few slight differences in distribution and public access. The front end of each service makes each service look different, but the protocols neither differ much (if at all) nor do the data exchanges between a frontend and its backend differ much (if at all).
In a modern architecture like Jamstack, it's extremely easy to swap one frontend for another.
What is Jamstack?
Jamstack, previously stylized as JAMStack, stands for JavaScript, API and Markup and was first coined by Mathias Biilmann, CEO of Netlify in 2015. In Jamstack websites, the application logic typically resides on the client side, without being tightly coupled to the back end server.
So I have to ask the ignorant white racist dummy why he believes there is much difference among the four services I listed.
I doubt even another humaniform SLUG would have an interest in mating with a depraved white racist genocide-supporting shit-for-brains humaniform slug like Stephen T. Stone. Thus he may not have undergone apophallation and still has a penis.
No evidence indicates shit-for-brains depraved white racist Stephen T. Stone even knows what bailment is.
I have produced the citations -- the long-established right kind,
to which the 9th Amendment applies and
which this SCOTUS seems to love.
Shit-for-brains white racist Stephen T. Stone remains silent.
A social medium platform must obey the law. A social medium platform is an obvious message common carrier of digital personal literary property. There is no speech hosting with a social medium platform just as there is no speech hosting with an email service. The backends and protocols used are practically identical. A social medium front-end and an email front-end can easily be interchanged. In both cases (a social medium platform and an email service), each service only provides bailment of digital personal literary property on a backend server.
An email service provides message common carriage. A social medium platform provides message common carriage. The public has a Constitutional right to non-discriminatory common carriage (9th Amendment). Common carriage law is the origin of anti-discrimination law. Penalty for violation of common carriage law should be and often is draconian.
From Federal Register / Vol. 44, No. 181 / Monday, September 17, 1979 / Notices p. 53790.
The FCC concluded the following, which holds true whether or not the FCC decides to regulate an email service or a social medium platform.
[17] Not only is the proposed service [USPS E-Com (email)] "communications by wire or radio;" it is also a common carrier activity.
Stephen T. Stone is just another white racist user-loser that spouts nonsense about technology and law in his hate-filled effort to guarantee that a social medium platform can continue to discriminate against either a non-white or a non-European.
Tear Apart the Petition If You Can
SCOTUS docketed my petition. It should be easy to shred if I understand nothing.
Technological Development Has Sunset Section 230
I put two short articles on Quora to explain why a 2022 Social Medium Platform does not come close to meeting the Section 230 definition of an Interactive Computer Service (ICS).
- So What was a 1996 § 230 Access Software Provider?
- What Is an Interactive Computer Service by Careful Grammatical and Syntactic Analysis?
The definition of an ICS is a matter of law. SCOTUS can rule in any Section 230 litigation that a 2022 Social Medium Platform is not a Section 230 ICS, and everybody wins. When SCOTUS wants, it can be extremely picky with respect to the text of a statute as the ruling of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), indicates. Section 230 caselaw is a judicial coup against the American public. This coup takes away Constitutional rights of the American public (1st Amendment, 9th Amendment, and 14th Amendment) and unconstitutionally confers 1st Amendment rights on wealthy message common carrier megacorporations to the harm of the US political system as I argue in Martillo v. Twitter [22-532]. SCOTUS does not have to respect precedents, and it's attachment to a legal stance can be eroded.- Dred Scott (chattel slavery, white supremacy) was overturned.
- Lochner (ban on labor legislation) was overturned.
- Plessy (segregation) was overturned.
- Roe (mostly unlimited right to abortion) was overturned.
Vitiating Section 230 immunity should be much easier. SCOTUS has never ruled on Zeran-based caselaw. SCOTUS now has my blanket consent for amicus briefs in 22-532. A Medium Corp takes my argument seriously and has hired an "award-winning brief writer and experienced oral advocate" to oppose my petition. I wonder whether Musk's commitment to free speech extends to CRA protected groups. So far Facebook and LinkedIn, which are two extremely discriminatory social medium platforms, have been trying to ignore my litigation. Please take a look at the two short articles on the meaning of ICS. I studied with top linguistics scholars at Harvard and MIT. In the petition's argument for a grant of cert, I applied the legal knowledge that I acquired while I worked with the pre-Breakup AT&T legal department. [I am also running a fundraiser: The Ninth Amendment Challenge to Social Medium Abuse. I have raised approximately $4,000.]My Litigation Could Wipe Out Twitter
Despite Musk's avowed free speech policy, Twitter has basically told me to bring it on. You can read the current draft at: petition to SCOTUS for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. You can read a short summary at 9th Amendment Challenge to Social Medium Abuse.
Musk Fires a Corrupt Racist Twitter Manager
A depraved Ziø relative, who is in transition from the Dark Side (genocidal racial supremacist Ziø belief) to the Light Side (anti-genocide, anti-racism, anti-Ziø ideology, support of Palestine, and support of Palestinians), tells me that Gadde is on the take from the Ziø Lobby to suppress a pro-Palestine user and his content. Gadde and her relatives seem to support the most viciously anti-Muslim Indian politics. It is hardly surprising that a TechDirt white racist dummy, who supports discrimination by a social medium platform, considers her to be a great defender of free speech. It is hard to be more vile and disgusting than a TechDirt white racist nitwit that supports discrimination by a social medium platform.
Common Carrier Refusal to Transport is Not Free Speech But a Violation of Common Carriage Law
Only a tech-illiterate and legally clueless white racist dummy calls hosting speech. Excerpts from Petition II for Writ of Certiorari Hosting is Bailment Not Speech The following question and answer clarify why hosting is bailment and not speech. Question: Does a notice board accessible to passing members of the public – by being in the entrance of a supermarket for example – offer a common carriage service? If not, how does Twitter differ from that in function, other than by being a service attached to a network that offers public access? Answer: The described public notice board is a material board to which a member affixes a material message. The material board provides neither message switching nor message common carriage. Twitter provides store-and-forward message switching as well as message common carriage among users. Twitter temporarily stores a message in a backend database system (hosting or bailment) while the message is on the way to an end-user by means of message common carriage. Discussion: The question confuses the frontend model (a pure concept or abstract idea{1}) with a material notice board. The frontend model makes it easier for an end user to interact with Twitter’s system. In other words, Twitter’s system has no similarity whatsoever to the material notice board and the question shows a lack of comprehension of Internet technology.{2} Hosting is not speech of a social medium platform. Hosting is bailment, and from the standpoint of common carriage law, storing digital personal literary property in a backend server of the social medium platform hardly differs from temporary storage of a paper letter in a satchel at a USPS sorting location or at a FedEx office until the paper letter can be sent on its way to its destination by common carriage. Notes 1 Abstract idea in this context has some similarity to the abstract idea exception to patent eligibility. A discussion of confusion of virtual reality with physical reality can be found in Joachim’s Reply to Twitter’s Appellee’s Brief , which can be found in PACER or via its QR code in Appendix E – QR Codes (p. lviii). 2 The terminology of full-stack software engineering is somewhat confusing. A software engineer generally uses the Model-View-Controller design pattern to design a web or cloud service. The end user invokes a browser on his end host (a laptop or mobile computing device) to access the service. A single page application is frontend social medium platform software that runs in a web browser to access the service of the social medium platform – an older design might use Jakarta (or Java) Server Pages, but such a design does not affect the argument. A mobile device typically runs a mobile app (provided by the social medium platform) to complete the common carriage service, which the social medium platform's backend provides. State Action (Proxying) The action (proxying) of a non-government actor (proxy) becomes inextricably linked with the government
- if the action of the non-government actor can only be considered unequivocally an expression of government policy,
- if the non-government actor is supported by the government, or
- if the non-government actor supports the government within a government facility or establishment.
Items [2] and [3] become problematic when the proxy action, which the non-government proxy{1} undertakes, could not constitutionally or legally be undertaken by the government. Jawboning comes under item [1] and does not create a situation of state action.{2}- when the non-government actor has strong means to pushback or
- when the non-government actor can show that it undertook the action in question before the government started jawboning.
Eagle Coffee Shop of Burton{3} came under item [3] because it paid rent to the government and in effect made the state government complicit in violation of Amendment XIV. Suppose Delaware had allowed the Eagle Coffee Shop to use government space for free. Then the issue would have come under list item [2]. The Supreme Court points out in Perry{4} that the school email system is not, by tradition or by government designation, a forum for public communication. In contrast, the government created the Internet to be a forum for public communication, and partial privatization does not change that designation. A social medium platform discriminates in government supported networks and systems- like a state college, library, or public school network,
- like a state ISP to wit NYSERNET,
- like a community ISP to wit Chattanooga EBP, and
- like a federally funded broadband link.
[The government funds a tremendous number of Internet end host devices. In pre-breakup days AT&T always defended itself against the possibility of becoming a state actor by making sure to own its entire network including customer premises equipment.] The government cannot- participate in an action,
- benefit from an action,
- support an action, or
- compel an action
by a non-government actor (really proxy) if the action is unconstitutional or illegal if the government undertakes the action. Every social medium platform is forbidden by state action doctrine from- abridging user Amendment I rights,
- public accommodation discrimination,
- civil rights discrimination (Amendment XIV violation), and
- common carriage discrimination (Amendment IX violation{5}).
While a private entity can host an open forum for discussion in its private space and abridge the speech of visitors to its forum, a private entity cannot host an open forum for discussion within the public square of the Internet{6} and abridge the freedom of speech of visitors without committing an action- that is inextricably intertwined with the state and
- that thus violates Amendment I rights of the visitors.
The situation, which obtains in Hudgens v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976), is vastly different because the North DeKalb Shopping Center was not a government-designated public forum. In a nutshell, a social medium platform holds out an open forum in the government-designated public forum of the Internet. The social medium platform becomes a state proxy by holding out an open forum in a public forum. According to State Action Doctrine, the social medium platform violates Amendment I by abridging the freedom of speech of the public. Summary The belief in Internet exceptionalism seems to create self-reinforcing judicial psychosis. A social medium platform is the role model for Constitutional violation, statutory violation, common law violation, and nasty discrimination. Notes 1 Actor suggests agent and some sort of official relationship status. Proxy implies far less. 2 Plaintiff Prager made a weak argument for State Action in Prager Univ. v. Google LLC. Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020) cites Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019) despite the lack of similarity between the two cases have little similarity. The Halleck precedent is irrelevant to the violations that every social medium platform is committing. While MCA/MNN is a cable caster, which specializes in a narrow range of content and which operates in a private network, a social medium platform provides a racist highly exclusionary open forum in a state-created, state-supported, and probably mostly state-owned or state-supported public network. In many cases, the US and state governments make extensive use of the exclusionary open private forum that a racist and antisemitic social medium platform like Twitter, Facebook, or LinkedIn have created within the designated public forum of the Internet. See Mat Ford, “Why Isn’t the Supreme Court on Twitter?”, The New Republic, June 25, 2020, URI: https://newrepublic.com/article/158288/supreme-court-twitter. 3 Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961). 4 Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981) 5 A diehard supporter of discrimination by a social medium platform may argue for limiting Amendment IX to a transportation means that existed in the late 18th century. Amendment II is not limited to 18th century weaponry and firearms. 6 The Internet is a state-supported place of public accommodation for resource sharing, for research, for discussion, for exhibition, and for entertainment; or the Internet is state-designated public forum.§ 230 is where (a) comprehension of basic logic, (b) technological expertise, and (c) understanding of English all go to die.
I am impressed by the policy arguments against the shield that a social medium platform erroneously claims Section 230 gives the social medium platform, but I doubt that policy arguments will sway SCOTUS. Justice Thomas and maybe all SCOTUS wants Section 230 to be challenged on the basis of US law that bans discrimination either in common carriage or in public accommodation In Petition II for Writ of Certiorari, I go above and beyond Justice Thomas’ specification.
- I give SCOTUS Originalism in spades.
- I explain that the Internet is a state-sponsored place of public accommodation within the meaning of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
- I demonstrate that a 2022 Social Medium Platform does not meet the Section 230 definition of an Interactive Computer System (ICS).
- I correctly apply State Action Doctrine to a 2022 Social Medium Platform.
I am the only Section 230 litigation plaintiff that understands the technology of a social medium platform. I would not mind some help in covering the costs (estimates have ranged from $4K to $10K†), which are associated with petitioning SCOTUS. See 9th Amendment Challenge to Social Medium Abuse. Even more I want to find an attorney,- who is admitted to practice before SCOTUS and
- who can file the case electronically.
While success with such a petition is unlikely, I have provided expert technology consulting to AT&T, McDermott, and Proskauer. My clients have always prevailed in a case in which I was involved. I can provide the same preparation to an attorney that represents me in Martillo v. Twitter. Notes †The main expense comes from retyping court documents. I have used PDF conversion software to lower this expense. In a few days, my fundraiser raised over $2,100 (and I doubt that any contributor knew what bailment was before he read the fundraiser). I can pay for the cost of filing myself, but I am trying to mobilize those angry a Social Medium Platform. The fun really starts when I return the litigation to District Court -- something that I can do at any time.Content Moderation by a Social Medium Platform is a Ninth Amendment Violation
Support for discrimination by a social medium platform constitutes depraved anti-American anti-Constitution white racism that must be buried just as "separate but equal" and Jim Crow were buried. It is hard to be more disgusting than a white racist TechDirt microbrain supporter of white racial discrimination by a social medium platform.
A Social Medium Platform Has No First Amendment Rights!
A social medium platform is not like a common carrier. A social medium is a message common carrier. A social medium platform has no First Amendment right to discriminate against a user or against his content, but a user has a Ninth Amendment right to non-discriminatory message common carriage. Here is an originalist argument that will persuade Justice Brett Kavanaugh: Petition to SCOTUS for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (Martillo v. Twitter). Please help the legal battle against white racist discrimination by a social medium platform: 9th Amendment Challenge to Social Medium Abuse. Martillo v. Twitter is an excellent companion both
- Gonzalez v. Google LLC, No. 21-1333 (U.S Supreme Court), Petition for Certiorari, Opening April 4, 2022, and also
- Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, No. 21-1496 (U.S. Supreme Court), Petition for Certiorari, Opening May 26, 2022.
There is overlap among all four cases, which are complementary. The petitioner of Moody litigates from the standpoint of a state that wishes to regulate to prevent abuse of the public while the petitioner of Martillo litigates from the standpoint of an abused member of the public. Both the common carrier status of a social medium platform and also the scope of § 230 immunity are addressed by Martillo and relevant to Gonzalez and to Taamneh.[1] Martillo also briefly addresses issues of selective prosecution and of selective enforcement of US criminal anti-genocide and anti-terrorism law by the US DOJ. Martillo makes an Originalist argument, which opposes:- common carriage discrimination by a social medium platform,
- civil rights discrimination by a social medium platform,
- public accommodation discrimination by a social medium platform, and
- unconstitutional abridgment of user speech by a social medium platform, which is a state proxy (actor) that creates an open forum within the state-established, state-supported, and state-designated public forum, which is the Internet.
The case will not stop at SCOTUS but will return to District Court in a class action that will seek penalties from the class of discriminatory social medium platforms. Martillo lays out the case- with arguments that are comprehensible to the public and
- with arguments that the pre-Breakup AT&T legal department might have made on the basis of extensive knowledge of common carriage law.
Here is an example of an argument that is directed to the lay public and that is informed by knowledge of Internet technology. Hosting is Bailment Not Speech The following question and answer clarify why hosting is bailment and not speech. Question: Does a notice board accessible to passing members of the public – by being in the entrance of a supermarket for example – offer a common carriage service? If not, how does Twitter differ from that in function, other than by being a service attached to a network that offers public access? Answer: The described public notice board is a material board to which a member affixes a material message. The material board provides neither message switching nor message common carriage. Twitter provides store-and-forward message switching as well as message common carriage among users. Twitter temporarily stores a message in a backend database system (hosting or bailment) while the message is on the way to an end-user by means of message common carriage. Discussion: The question confuses the frontend model (a pure concept or abstract idea[2]) with a material notice board. The frontend model makes it easier for an end user to interact with Twitter’s system. In other words, Twitter’s system has no similarity whatsoever to the material notice board and the question shows a lack of comprehension of Internet technology.[2] Hosting is not speech of a social medium platform. Hosting is bailment, and from the standpoint of common carriage law, storing digital personal literary property in a backend server of the social medium platform hardly differs from temporary storage of a paper letter in a satchel at a USPS sorting location or at a FedEx office until the paper letter can be sent on its way to its destination by common carriage. A message common carrier has no First Amendment right to discriminate against a user (customer) either with respect to carriage or with respect to bailment. Notes [1] If Twitter, Google, and Facebook (Meta) provide common carriage and have not been consistently violating common carriage law, they would have been able to defend themselves in Gonzalez v. Google LLC and in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh by asserting common carrier status. [2] Abstract idea in this context has some similarity to the abstract idea exception to patent eligibility. A discussion of confusion of virtual reality with physical reality can be found in Appendix G – Reply to Twitter’s Appellee’s Brief (p. lxxv). [3] The terminology of full-stack software engineering is somewhat confusing. A software engineer generally uses the Model-View-Controller design pattern to design a web or cloud service. The end user invokes a browser on his end host (a laptop or mobile computing device) to access the service. A single page application is frontend social medium platform software that runs in a web browser to access the service of the social medium platform – an older design might use Jakarta (or Java) Server Pages, but such a design does not affect the argument. A mobile device typically runs a mobile app (provided by the social medium platform) to complete the common carriage service, which the social medium platform's backend provides.Please Don't Shut up!
I often have difficulty with understanding the POV of a depraved white racist microbrain.
A depraved white racial supremacist TechDirt dummy, who supports racial discrimination by a social medium platform, helps me sharpen my legal arguments by showing me in detail his twisted and perverted logic.How the Internet is a Place of Public Accommodation
The social medium platform-related caselaw, which denies a social medium platform is a place of public accommodation, is confused and consists of a plethora of cartoon litigation. The Memorandum Opinion of the Noah[1] Court was correct in denying that the virtual forum[2] (chat room) was a place in the sense of the CRA. Plaintiff Noah’s error in presenting his case was metaphorically equivalent to confusing a movie (not a place) with the movie theater (a place), where the movie is exhibited. If Plaintiff Noah had focused on AOL’s temporarily assembled place of public accommodation[3] for exhibition and for entertainment, he might have had a good argument that AOL was violating § 2000a by allowing other users to create an environment hostile to Muslims, who constitute a protected class under § 2000a. Lewis v. Google LLC, No. 20-16073 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2021) is vicariously embarrassing to read and only has the virtue of non-precedential status. In this decision, the audience is confused with the movie theater.[4] The Internet is a state-supported establishment that has a definite identifiable structure that can be mapped to locations all over the planet. The Internet has premises that have buildings with grounds or appurtenances throughout the United States of America. The premises of the Internet may temporarily include premises of a user, whose device connects to the Internet. Since the 1950s the Internet, which has evolved from the ARPANET, was intended to become a place of accommodation for resource sharing. Now it is public. The US government has established and supports[5] the Internet as a place of public accommodation within the definition that 42 U.S. Code § 2000a provides. The operative phrase in the statute is “Establishments affecting interstate commerce or supported in their activities by State action as places of public accommodation.” Such a phrase is a simile.[6] A state-supported establishment need only be (functionally) like a place. For example, § 2000a desegregated a state-established state-supported public drinking fountain even though it does not fit into the example list that § 2000a contains. Because every social medium platform is and functions within the Internet, every social medium platform comes under 42 U.S. Code § 2000a(b)(4):
A social medium platform may not discriminate against the groups, which § 2000a specifies, and Facebook (Meta) has already made a legal admission of such discrimination.[7] Notes [1] Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003). [2] The virtual forum (virtual conference room or virtual meeting room) interaction abstraction is an elementary instance of a virtual reality. [3] Plaintiff Noah entered the temporarily assembled “movie theater” by means of his program-executing device. [4] A Court, which considers Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994), to be relevant to a § 230 litigation can only believe (in the most generous possible inference) that the Internet operates by magic. [5] Here is an example of US government support: “Internet for All” at https://www.internetforall.gov/. [6] See Richards v. United States, 369 US 1, 9 (1962), quoted in Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993) at 1269 ("[W]e must always be cognizant of the fact that 'the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.'"). [7] Human Rights Due Diligence of Meta’s Impacts in Israel and Palestine, https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/report-view/meta-human-rights-israel-palestine.Not "declined to carry"
I meant "declined to regulate" and then could not post the correction.
Transivity and Indentity in Law
An email service backend, a social medium backend, a blog backend, and a mailing list backend all provide some form of common carriage.
An email system is only rarely configured to be either a place of public accommodation or a public forum. My corporate email network is not so configured. The Internet is a state-supported place of public accommodation and is also a state-designated public forum, Entities within the Internet must conform to Title II of the 1964 CRA. A private entity, which creates an open forum within a public forum, becomes a state proxy and cannot do anything which the government cannot do -- otherwise it's a trivial strategy of exclusion for a state to put the private entity in charge of the public forum or of a piece of it.bhull242 is Internet-Tech-Clueless
bhull242 is good for comic relief.
If a backend developer changes the access of data table rows corresponding to a user's email sent box and if a frontend developer changes the UI presentation of the email sent box in the frontend Single Page Application, the email sent box becomes a Facebook user's wall or a Twitter user's home Tweet page. Yes, we get back to the law. If an entity holds out carriage to the public under standard terms for a fee, the entity provides common carriage. bhull242 can drool nonsense endlessly, but every social medium platform is a message common carrier of digital personal literal property and of other intellectual property.What's bhull242's tech specialty? Refrigerators?
I don't care about degrees. I did work for IBM when I was 10 back in the 60s. The management was so impressed that IBM gave my prep school free access to an IBM 7094 II.
A Social Medium Platform Does Neither Speaking Nor Publishing of Intellectual Property in Bailment
It is pure ignorance to refer to speaking or to publishing of a social medium platform. Because of the way HTTP works, no one ever receives personal literary property or other intellectual property from a social medium user without first requesting it via a sequence of HTTP requests.
Common Carrier and Mass Mailing
Twitter is a message common carrier that does the Internet equivalent of mass-mailing (a common carriage service). A common carrier has no Amendment I rights with respect to the merchandise or property that it transports or holds in bailment during transport. A member of the public has an Amendment IX right to non-discriminatory common carriage from every social medium platform. The Internet is established by the state as a place of public accommodation as well as a state-supporter state-designated public forum. Every social medium platform comes under Title II of the CRA. Because every social medium platform provides an open forum within a public forum, every social medium platform is a state proxy (less clearly a state actor). Every social medium platform violates the Constitution whenever it abridges the freedom of speech of the public.
Once again Anonymous Clown Shows Utter Technological Clueless of a White Racist User Loser
Such a despicable ignorant racist dumb-dumb always looking for a way to legitimize, to normalize, and to justify racial discrimination by a social medium platform.
Addressing is a non-issue from the standpoint of common carriage law. Mail explorers have existed forever, and I receive lots of emails from mailing lists. Such email is not addressed to me by the originator. You are just pointing out the barter for common carriage. A social medium platform really does not work much differently from a mail Listserv or from an email service. I have received bills on LinkedIn, which is a social medium platform. I receive sales literature and company news both by means of email service and by means of a social medium platform. For many tasks, a diesel-powered truck and a diesel-powered are completely interchangeable just as an email service, a blog service, a mail Listserv, and a social medium platform are completely interchangeable for many uses. If I use a mail exploder, I have no idea where my email goes. Both a diesel-powered truck and also a diesel-powered train can be used for common carriage, and the technologies of both differ little to a technology expert like me. I could build either from scratch. Anonymous Clown is nothing more than a shit-for-brains white racist dummy, who tries to use any ridiculous argument to legitimize, to normalize, and to justify racial discrimination by a social medium platform. Such discrimination is completely unlawful from the standpoint of common carriage law and violates my Ninth Amendment Right to non-discriminatory common carriage.A Reprise of the Bridge Router Wars
Back in the late 80s and early 90s tech nitwit user-losers used to get into religious wars over the virtues of bridging in comparison with routing. I asserted
- that bridging or routing was whatever a given designer said it was and
- that there was no a priori way to distinguish one system of path selection in a network from the other.
I received tremendous grief for the assertion, but I was completely correct as I am with respect to email service, social medium platform service, a blog service, and a mailing list service.I'm a full stack engineer -- one of the first. What are the credentials of white racist dummy PaulT?
An email service backend, a social medium backend, a blog backend, and a mailing list backend all keep mail/posts and replies/comments in a backend database. There are a few slight differences in distribution and public access. The front end of each service makes each service look different, but the protocols neither differ much (if at all) nor do the data exchanges between a frontend and its backend differ much (if at all). In a modern architecture like Jamstack, it's extremely easy to swap one frontend for another.
So I have to ask the ignorant white racist dummy why he believes there is much difference among the four services I listed.Fixing a Minor Omission to Clarify How Vile White Racist Stephen T. Stone Really Is
Some clarification.
No evidence indicates shit-for-brains depraved white racist Stephen T. Stone even knows what bailment is. I have produced the citations -- the long-established right kind,- to which the 9th Amendment applies and
- which this SCOTUS seems to love.
Shit-for-brains white racist Stephen T. Stone remains silent. A social medium platform must obey the law. A social medium platform is an obvious message common carrier of digital personal literary property. There is no speech hosting with a social medium platform just as there is no speech hosting with an email service. The backends and protocols used are practically identical. A social medium front-end and an email front-end can easily be interchanged. In both cases (a social medium platform and an email service), each service only provides bailment of digital personal literary property on a backend server. An email service provides message common carriage. A social medium platform provides message common carriage. The public has a Constitutional right to non-discriminatory common carriage (9th Amendment). Common carriage law is the origin of anti-discrimination law. Penalty for violation of common carriage law should be and often is draconian. From Federal Register / Vol. 44, No. 181 / Monday, September 17, 1979 / Notices p. 53790. The FCC concluded the following, which holds true whether or not the FCC decides to regulate an email service or a social medium platform. [17] Not only is the proposed service [USPS E-Com (email)] "communications by wire or radio;" it is also a common carrier activity. Stephen T. Stone is just another white racist user-loser that spouts nonsense about technology and law in his hate-filled effort to guarantee that a social medium platform can continue to discriminate against either a non-white or a non-European.