How Does This End?

Failures

from the what-comes-after-institutions-fail dept

The acceleration of institutional breakdown in America has reached a point where we must confront a sobering reality: the constitutional system, as designed, may no longer possess the internal mechanisms to save itself. When judges face impeachment threats for ruling against the administration, when court orders are openly defied, and when Fox News hosts declare that a president “doesn’t have the luxury of following the law,” we’ve moved beyond policy disagreements to questioning whether law applies to power at all.

The traditional American narrative assumes our institutions are self-correcting—that checks and balances naturally restore equilibrium when power overreaches. But this theory assumes all actors accept the legitimacy of those checks and balances. What happens when they don’t? What happens when power simply refuses to be balanced?

We are witnessing the answer in real time: institutional capture, norm erosion, and the systematic dismantling of accountability mechanisms. The Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and significant portions of federal agencies are being transformed into instruments of personal power rather than constitutional governance. Meanwhile, DOGE stands as a parallel government structure, implementing radical changes without congressional oversight or judicial review.

A particularly dangerous dynamic is now in motion: the “point of no return” for key figures in the administration. As Elon Musk, Trump family members, and others become increasingly implicated in potentially illegal activities, their incentive to preserve democratic processes diminishes proportionally. The more their personal legal and financial survival depends on maintaining power, the more willing they become to take extraordinary measures to keep it.

So how does this end? Three interlinked forces represent the most likely path toward preserving constitutional governance, though none functions within “regular order” as traditionally understood.

The first is institutional resistance. While many institutions have been compromised, pockets of resistance persist. Career civil servants, military leaders committed to constitutional oaths, and judges willing to rule against power despite personal risk represent the first line of defense. This resistance does not function through formal channels—those are increasingly captured—but through what might be called “constitutional guerrilla warfare”: selective non-compliance, strategic leaks, and informal networks maintaining democratic practices despite official pressure.

The military’s continued neutrality remains the most critical institutional barrier to full-scale authoritarianism. Unlike other agencies, the military’s culture of constitutional fidelity runs deep, and its leadership has maintained distance from partisan pressure. But this cannot be taken for granted—targeted appointments and pressure campaigns could erode this independence over time.

The second force is civil society mobilization. When institutional resistance weakens, civil society must strengthen. Mass mobilization, whether through protests, strikes, or coordinated action, creates costs for authoritarian overreach that cannot be ignored. This goes beyond traditional partisan activism to broad, cross-ideological defense of basic democratic principles.

What makes the current moment different from normal political contestation is that the fight is no longer primarily about policy outcomes—it’s about whether constitutional governance continues to exist at all. This creates the potential for unusual coalitions of traditional conservatives committed to institutions, progressives worried about rights erosion, and business interests concerned about stability.

Mobilization alone cannot restore constitutional order, but it can make authoritarianism costlier and provide critical support to institutional resisters facing immense pressure.

The third force is international pressure. The United States does not exist in isolation. Its democratic health affects global stability, security alliances, and economic relations. As democratic erosion accelerates, international actors have increasing incentives to apply pressure for democratic restoration.

This pressure takes multiple forms: diplomatic isolation, economic consequences, intelligence community cooperation with democracy defenders, and strategic support for pro-democracy forces within the United States. While foreign intervention in U.S. affairs raises legitimate concerns, so does a nuclear-armed superpower falling into authoritarian chaos.

Canada’s response to Trump’s hostile posture and tariffs represents an early example of this dynamic. Rather than capitulating to economic pressure, Canada under Mark Carney has shown remarkable resolve in maintaining democratic principles while imposing targeted countermeasures.

If these three forces fail to check authoritarian consolidation, darker possibilities emerge. We might see true institutional collapse, where key democratic institutions cease functioning as independent entities, becoming mere extensions of executive power. Elections might continue but would be manipulated to ensure predetermined outcomes. Courts would make politically determined rulings. Media would be effectively controlled through legal harassment, ownership changes, and direct intimidation.

Or we might face a constitutional crisis—a direct confrontation between branches of government leading to a legitimacy vacuum, with competing power centers each claiming constitutional authority. This could involve disputed election results, military intervention in civilian matters, or state governments refusing to recognize federal authority.

Most disturbing is the possibility of widespread violence—where political violence moves from isolated incidents to coordinated campaigns, potentially triggering counter-violence and civil conflict. This could emerge from state-sanctioned crackdowns on opposition, militant resistance to authoritarian measures, or breakdown of monopoly on legitimate force.

None of these scenarios is inevitable, but all become more likely as constitutional boundaries continue to erode. The path from democratic backsliding to irreversible breakdown is rarely linear—it involves threshold effects where multiple small violations suddenly produce catastrophic failure.

The uncomfortable reality is that restoring constitutional governance may require methods outside traditional processes. When those processes themselves have been compromised, relying exclusively on them becomes self-defeating.

This doesn’t mean abandoning constitutional principles—quite the opposite. It means recognizing that extraordinary measures may be necessary to restore those principles when normal channels have been blocked. Just as Lincoln took extraordinary actions to preserve the Union, preserving American democracy may require actions that stretch conventional understanding of institutional roles.

Two plus two equals four. There are twenty-four hours in a day. And the constitutional system, as currently functioning, may not possess the internal mechanisms to save itself. This isn’t defeatism—it’s a necessary recognition that preservation of constitutional democracy may require strategies beyond those envisioned by the framers for a system not yet captured by authoritarian forces.

The end of this story hasn’t been written. But understanding the gravity of our situation is the precondition for writing an ending in which American democracy survives, however transformed by the crisis it now faces.

“Every nation gets the government it deserves.” — Joseph de Maistre

Mike Brock is a former tech exec who was on the leadership team at Block. Originally published at his Notes From the Circus.

Filed Under: authoritarianism, constitutional crisis, coup, democracy, institutions