I don't pay attention to an Anonymous Clown.
If I put some documents in a Hebrew-addressed mailer,
The backend of every major social medium platform uses a Single-Page Application to communicate with a frontend browser that runs on a desktop or on a laptop.
I explain in the Original Complaint.
The First Circuit of the Court of Appeals has never bought into Zeran, which is based in logical fallacy while MCA is a cablecaster for a cable network. The fundamental controversy of Halleck has no similarity to the controversy of social medium platform discrimination with respect to:
Not only is Burton relevant, but Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn, 460 U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983) may be even more onpoint. Here is an interesting passage.
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed. At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks which "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-536 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 115; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). A second category consists of public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university meeting facilities); City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meeting); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal theater). Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum. Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest. Widmar v. Vincent, supra, at 269-270.My wife and I can almost certainly argue that the Arpanet/Internet was a designated public forum before privatization, which was only partial. ISPs became federally-regulated telecommunications common carriers -- no First Amendment problem there. Partial privatization of the Internet served inextricably to intertwine a social medium platform with the federal government so that a social medium platform became a state actor and may not "[abridge] the freedom of speech" within the Internet. In addition, a social medium platform remains a common carrier and a place of public accommodation for numerous purposes covered by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A white racist like Stephen T. Stone can babble incoherently about hosting speech, but a common carrier often stores property at an intermediate location before forwarding it to its next destination. Calling such temporary storage hosting is not going to enable a social medium platform to escape common carriage law, and a Court is likely to consider such a nonsense argument to be legal admission of bad faith (or even of dishonesty) on the part of the social medium platform. We are discussing a controversy in equity. A party before a Court of Equity must approach the Court with clean hands or the Court will discount arguments of the party. McMahon left notes about bringing
Now that I have informed SCOTUS of the logical fallacy in the Zeran ruling of the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, it is unlikely that SCOTUS will ever uphold Zeran-based caselaw. Forestalling affirmation of Zeran-based caselaw is only a small first step in taking down every social medium platform that discriminates against non-whites and non-Europeans. McMahon appears to have thought the whole strategy through even if he did not explain all the details to me before he died. He made me promise to follow the whole plan to the bitter end if he died during the litigation.
I read through 2020 09 17 Cox Wyden FCC Reply Comments Final[2]. I don't disagree with anything the authors say, but there is no indication that tells us the authors understand the huge differences between a 1996 ICS and a 2022 Social Medium Platform. In the end SCOTUS will reach a ruling on the basis of the text. If SCOTUS needs more information, SCOTUS will try to determine the intent of Congress as a whole at the time of enactment and will not pay attention to the claims of individual authors decades later. The problem of § 230 lies with Zeran-based caselaw and with treating a 2022 social medium platform like a 1996 ICS. I analyzed § 230 before I started the litigation. A 2022 social medium platform is not a 1996 ICS as it is defined in § 230. Here is my analysis.
I intend to bring every white racist supporter of social medium platform discrimination to tears.
We have only one post office in the USA. Suppose we had 50 state post offices in the US, but a state post office could only deliver
There is a specialized vocabulary for these special cases.
Even in 1869 the General Court of Massachusetts understood that one carrier could make use of another carrier. MGL c.159 s.1
Every common carrier of merchandise or other property shall receive, transport and forward all property offered for such purposes by other such carriers as promptly, faithfully and impartially, at as low rates of charge, and in a manner and on terms and conditions as favorable to the carrier offering such property, as he on the same day and at the same place receives, forwards and transports, in the ordinary course of business, property of a like description offered by persons other than such carriers. Such carrier shall not discriminate against any particular person or subject him to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. The supreme judicial or superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce this section.Anonymous Clown is too ignorant and stupid to understand that one envelope can contain another envelope. Twitter message common carrier software puts a tweet (the message) into an HTTP message envelope. This HTTP message envelope is handed to system software, which puts the HTTP message envelope (the packet data) into a TCP/IP packet envelope. The TCP/IP packet envelope is used by at least one ISP to deliver the TCP/IP packet envelop to the destination computing device. System software delivers the HTTP message envelope contained in the TCP/IP packet envelop to a listening application. Except for the initial HTTP GET/RESPONSE handshake of a listening browser or app, which extracts Twitter message common carrier software from the HTTP RESPONSE, the destination computing device can't do anything with the HTTP message envelop except discard it unless Twitter message common carrier software is running on the destination computing device. ISP software enables the packet common carriage of the TCP/IP packet envelope. Twitter software enables the message common carriage of the HTTP message envelope. Twitter is a common carrier of an HTTP message envelope, which Twitter software puts into a TCP/IP packet envelope so that the ISP can perform TCP/IP packet common carriage of the TCP/IP packet envelope, which contains the HTTP message envelope, which Twitter common carriage software carries end-to-end. Anonymous Clown is too ignorant and too stupid for words. I understood protocol/envelope layering when I was programming an IBM 7090 in grammar school. Does Anonymous Clown know as much as a 7 year old? Apparently not. BTW, Eric Goldman is clueless with respect to this technology and with respect to this type of common carriage. His legal area is creative intellect property law and trademark law (Title 17 and Title 15). I see nothing, which evidences that he has expertise in Title 35 (inventive intellectual property law) or in Title 47 (transmission technology). His CV suggests that he does not have the qualifications to take the patent bar examination.
I write frontends and backends. There are a good number of online courses that explain frontend and backend development. Such online courses are self-evidently beyond the comprehension of Anonymous Coward/Anonymous Nitwit. I am preparing such a presentation for my legal team. Unfortunately, because I am a party in Martillo v. Twitter, I cannot provide an expert report or expert testimony on subject.
Twitter provides common carriage of a tweet, about which an ISP knows nothing. Twitter provides common carriage of a tweet
Twitter provides common carriage of a tweet, about which an ISP knows nothing. Twitter provides common carriage of a tweet
See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
Once a social medium platform serves its software/web page to the user's computing device in response to the initial HTTP GET request, software of the social medium platform performs digital message common carriage between the social medium platform's server and user's computing device. The point is simple, and only someone semi-educated in the technology seems unable to comprehend this trivial point. James P. Schuck,
I meant. Do you accept that a business can offer a service, which is common carriage, and a service, which is not common carriage? [Quasi-Common Carriage]?
Physical Presence is Defined by Statute Not by an Ignorant Geek
It the old days when the RBOCs (now ILECs) belonged to AT&T, an RBOC had a physical presence wherever it provided service or rented equipment and paid taxes according to its income from the end loop. Likewise for cable providers although the cable provider model was somewhat simpler than the telephone service provider model. Today, a streaming medium platform downloads software to end user's computing device and provides service by means of the general purpose hardware, which has been transformed into CPE by means of the software download. If the statute is correctly written, there is no reason that a streaming medium service should not be taxable as a cable provider or an RBOC was taxable.