While approximately half of the state jurisdictions (e.g., Massachusetts and Pennsylvania) put telegraph service into the category of a common carriage as early as 1865 and before, other jurisdictions were resistant to such categorization because a telegraph service delivered a true copy and not the original message. (See The Law of Telegraphs and Telegrams [1865].) While the issue of true copy still exists for voice telephony (POTS either analog or digital, some cell phone technology, ISDN, and DMI but not VOIP), I pointed out in Martillo v. Twitter that a social medium platform provides end-to-end transport of the electronic signals of digital personal literary property. Digital personal literary property is carried end-to-end according to analysis, which is consistent with caselaw of Title 17 (copyright law) and with caselaw of Title 35 (patent law). All the Massachusetts common law of common carriage applies to message common carriage of digital personal literary property -- whether by telegraph or through the Internet -- as long as the request for common carriage is placed from Massachusetts until SCOTUS rules otherwise. Don't bet on such a ruling coming down from SCOTUS on high any time soon! Meanwhile, down here in Boston, I am waiting while the clerks of the Court of Appeals research several hundred years of caselaw because I emphasized the two separate issues both of conveyance of personal literary property and also of message common carriage of digital personal literary property.
At 00:37 -- is the sole of a foot or the sole of a shoe being swallowed?
Massachusetts has regulated the end loop of an interstate (or an intrastate) phone call by means of Commonwealth common carriage law as far back as the 1940s at least. The FCC has declined to regulate the end loop of the service of a social medium platform. The Tenth Amendment kicks in. I addressed the message common carriage of digital personal literary property. Such message common carriage is a beast, which is completely different from telecommunications common carriage even if a message common carrier makes use of telecommunications common carriage. The federal district court agreed with my analysis of the situation. Since the 1980s I was working on AT&T cases, which were presented to the FCC. If FedEx, which is an interstate message common carrier and not based in Massachusetts, denies message common carriage service in Massachusetts, FedEx violates Massachusetts common carriage law. Thirteen judges have reviewed my case so far -- a bit weird I admit and perhaps an indication of the sensitivity of the issues I raised. Not one has expressed a peep against this analysis.
I applied diversity jurisdiction to bring an Original Complaint in Massachusetts federal district court against six social medium defendants for violation of Massachusetts common carriage law because each defendant was a common law Commonwealth message common carrier according to Commonwealth caselaw, which goes back to 1849.
Four SCOTUS Justices were willing to let HB20 -- a law of which I don't think much -- go into effect even though there was by many if not most standards hardly enough briefing yet associated with the case. Section 230 was a reaction to Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., undefined (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May. 24, 1995), which found Prodigy liable for libel because it removed a few posts (not systematic active curation) while Compuserve was not liable because it had failed to remove any UGC. See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Systematic active moderation provides a cause for a complaint for liable. Current Section 230 caselaw unconstitutionally eliminates the Constitutional right to sue for liable. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (my Circuit) has already come close to eviscerating the precedent of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964). See Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2009), which applies a specific Massachusetts definition for actual malice. A social medium platform uses Section 230 to assert a license for active curation of content even though active curation is nowhere enabled by Section 230. Such active curation seems to create a cause for a Palestinian or for an anti-Zionist Jew like me to bring a complaint for group libel against every social medium platform because every social medium platform aggregates and intensifies harmful content about us (e.g., a vacuous accusation of antisemitism) while it removes us or our content so that we cannot respond to group libel. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). While subsequent SCOTUS caselaw may seem to overrule Beauharnais, Justice Thomas has suggested that SCOTUS should revisit its libel caselaw. See Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. S. Poverty Law Ctr., No. 21-802 (U.S. Jun. 27, 2022), McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 203 L. Ed. 2d 247 (2019), and Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424 (2021). Justice Gorsuch also dissented from denial of certiorari in the last case. Justice Thomas is on a roll. See Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019). I will add a count for group libel in my New/Amended Class Action Complaint. The other Justices are less aligned with Thomas and with Gorsuch on overruling Sullivan, but the odds definitely favor narrowing Section 230 libel caselaw and bankrupting every social medium platform. Top management at these vile firms is at risk for far more than losing jobs in a bankruptcy. Here is the definition of libel.
Libel is a method of defamation expressed by print, writing, pictures, signs, effigies, or any communication embodied in physical form that is injurious to a person's reputation, exposes a person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or injures a person in his/her business or profession.I don't see where it says that a complaint for libel can be brought only against a party that is either a publisher or an author. Systematic active curation of content is more than enough grounds for filing a complaint for (group) libel. So laugh on as every social medium platform burns to the ground!
The definition of a statutory federal telecommunications common carrier is irrelevant in state court. The federal district court accepted my argument, which asserts that every social medium platform is a commonwealth message common carrier as every company, which has offered telegraph service in Massachusetts, has been since 1849. There are some differences among the states, most of whom agree with Massachusetts. Texas, Florida, Ohio, and Massachusetts are for the most part on the same page.
Raziel is the nincompoop that has read neither Burton nor the main filings of Martillo v. Twitter. If Raziel had some living brain cells and had read Burton, he would realize that a dismissal at the level of the federal district court or of the state superior court means little. Burton was dismissed by the Delaware Superior Court. The Delaware Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, and the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, but William Burton prevailed -- where it counts -- at SCOTUS, which handed Eagle Coffee Shoppe it's ass on a platter with coffee. If clueless Raziel had read any of the filings in Martillo v. Twitter, he would know that I did not argue violation of my First Amendment Rights. After reviewing Burton as well as the 1661 cases that cite Burton, I have decided to add a count of First Amendment violation to the New or Amended Class Action Complaint for Martillo v. Twitter. Burton is easy to find on the web with the correct citation that I provide below:
Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961).It can be painful to use PACER. This Quora post, whose title is Status of Martillo v. Twitter, 21–6916 [U.S.], 21-1921 [1st Circuit], provides links to the main filings of Martillo v. Twitter. My filings could be better. In the next round, I will have real heavyweight legal muscle that will compose the documents. The petition to SCOTUS for writ of certiorari before judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was a way to let SCOTUS know that the litigation is wending its way through the legal system. We are holding a horse race. Who will reach SCOTUS first:
Anonymous coward is getting closer to a legally sound argument. Burton was a 6-3 decision, but 4 Justices rejected or had a serious problem with applying State Action Doctrine. If I were representing a bad guy (a social medium platform), I would mine the concurrence and the dissent to sharpen the argument against applying State Action Doctrine. This SCOTUS has no problem with overturning its own caselaw -- a tendency that works for and against all parties that come before SCOTUS. It's pointless for a bad guy to argue that the US government did not build the initial version of the Internet, I am an expert on the history of the Internet, and I have a stable of experts 1. that are better than I am and 2. that can account for every last dime (slight exaggeration) through 1984. It's far from obvious that Burton requires that funding, maintenance, management, and expansion be totally under the control of a governmental organization. SCOTUS will probably only require that the control or the funding be substantial -- not a high bar. Each bad guy has made a legal error that neither a public phone company nor a cable company ever made. For example, AT&T (in the days of POTS) and Comcast always owned their own network/distribution system right down to the CPE (Customer Premises Equipment). Like many corporations and members of the public, I built my own pieces of the structure, facility, or establishment of the Internet. I can strongly argue that a social medium platform not only sponges off the federal government but also off the public including me. Maybe the argument for applying State Action Doctrine is even stronger. I am unsure, but I know eight Justices, and I have studied Amy Coney Barrett. She seems to have a predilection for an argument that pushes the boundary. (This predilection is unusual in one so conservative.) For arguing State Action Doctrine, I don't need a physical analogy. The Internet is a physical public facility for resource sharing just as the Wilmington structure or establishment was a physical public facility for parking a car. For me, litigation is a Gesamtkunstwerk, and I will bury the social medium class with charges that include: 1. First Amendment violation under State Action Doctrine, 2. unconstitutionality of Section 230 without considerable narrowing of its reach, 3. incorrectness of considering a 2022 social medium platform to be a 1996 Interactive Computer Service (I understand the technology), 4. violation of Section 230 (argument in the alternative -- allowed in a civil case), 5. violation of Title II of the CRA of 1964, 6. violation of civil rights law, 7. libel according to Massachusetts libel law, which does not require a perpetrator of libel to be a speaker or publisher, 8. violation of Massachusetts common law common carriage law, which does not require a state common carrier to be a statutory federal common carrier. When I direct litigation, I have a policy of total legal war. I intend to obliterate every social medium platform for its outrageous torts, breaches, and violations, and I don't have to prevail on every charge to force a private social medium platform into bankruptcy.
The restaurant was integrated into the garage (integrally within the garage) just as a social medium platform is integrated in the vast establishment or facility of the Internet (integrally within the Internet). How familiar are you with the thinking of the Justices of the Supreme Court? I have read practically every opinion of SCOTUS since 2000. I know all the current justices that studied at Harvard or at Yale. I had a long talk with one current Justice (before appointment) on precisely this issue. If you want to show that you are neither a nitwit nor an ignoramus wrt the law, you demonstrate by sound legal reasoning that the precedent of Burton does not apply.
If the clueless ignoramus had read the ruling, he would understand that the issue was state action doctrine and the 14th Amendment. If the racist nitwit and bigoted supporter of discrimination by a social medium platform were capable of rational thought, he would realize that the logic of this case applies to state action doctrine and the 1st Amendment.
If the restaurant (analogous to Twitter) in the Wilmington Parking Garage (analogous to the Internet) shut down, the parking garage would have continued to operate. Well done on proving that you are a clueless nitwit and dummy! Try reading the opinion of the Court of Appeals next time.
I am reading Eric Goldman's primer. If I am going to wipe out the completely broken caselaw, which is associated with 47 U.S. Code § 230, I have to understand the thinking of bad guys that want to exempt a social medium platform
The book inspired me to go back and to reread Prager's complaint. It wasn't very good. Why do you think Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961) does not apply to Google or YouTube?[Every social medium platform is] physically and financially an integral part of a public [establishment (the Internet)], built and maintained with public funds…There is a reason for patent law to reference a PHOSITA and for an expert report or expert testimony often to be required in a patent litigation. A user rarely understands anything. Someone [Samuel Alito] needs to be chastised.Cyberspace is different from the physical world...[See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 198 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2017).] Gag me with a spoon. I have a short lecture for a judge or an attorney, who believes the Internet is non-physical, operates by magic, or is otherwise supernatural.
I reading Eric Goldman's primer. If I am going to wipe out the completely broken caselaw, which is associated with 47 U.S. Code § 230, I have to understand the thinking of bad guys that want to exempt a social medium platform
The book inspired me to go back and to reread Prager's complaint. It wasn't very good. Why do you think Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961) does not apply to Google or YouTube?[Every social medium platform is] physically and financially an integral part of a public [establishment (the Internet)], built and maintained with public funds…There is a reason for patent law to reference a PHOSITA and for an expert report or expert testimony often to be required in a patent litigation. A user rarely understands anything. Someone [Samuel Alito] needs to be chastised.Cyberspace is different from the physical world...[See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 198 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2017).] Gag me with a spoon. I have a short lecture for a judge or an attorney, who believes the Internet is non-physical, operates by magic, or is otherwise supernatural.
Thanks to the unconstitutional and inapplicable 47 U.S. Code § 230 (Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material) as well as the legally unreasonable and unconstitutional § 230 caselaw, Facebook and any other similarly depraved and evil racist, discriminatory, and genocide-supporting social medium platform can do anything it wants.
Now perhaps you can understand why it is so important to obliterate every depraved and evil social medium platform that like Facebook is destroying the American political, legal, and social system. After 5 months A Medium Corp. finally seems to have realized that I filed a lawsuit, whose counts are based on
The US patent system encourages incremental invention. If I build a hangprinter and some part of it meets every limitation of US 11,230,032, my hangprinter infringes. Suppose I can find a device that was publicly available before the effective filing date of 11,230,032. In that case, the patent is invalid, and I can argue invalidity in an Article III court or before the PTAB. I might also be able to challenge on grounds of obviousness. In the case of 11,230,032, it's usually easy to avoid a means+function limitation, and this patent has two such limitations. I used to work for a successful company that built third-party non-infringing versions of patented adapter cards. We analyzed a patented adapter card and found a way to construct a non-infringing functionally equivalent adapter card. Our adapter card was invariably cheaper and superior to the patented proprietary adapter card. Necessity is the mother of invention. The patent system encourages competitive invention.
Lazy people (and lazy corporations) whine about the patent system.
I did not study the patent in detail. I did notice the following. The 1st and 3rd limitations of claim 1, which is the only independent claim, are in means+function format, which makes the patent claims extremely specific and narrow. It is probably easy to avoid infringing this patent, and if not, there is a high probability that the claims are indefinite (and thus invalid) according to 35 U.S. Code § 112 - Specification.
Zionist leaders have openly proclaimed the goal of replacement genocide since 1881. Guess what! Genocide and material support to terrorists (perpetrators of genocide) are violations of US federal statutory criminal law. It is prima facie evidence of bad faith to suppress discussion both
any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable...SCOTUS hates selective enforcement/prosecution, which tears the heart out of the US legal system.
My litigation is before the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and A Medium Corp just added to its team a litigator, who is experienced in public accommodation and civil rights law. It took 5 months, but Medium's legal team seems to have realized that the Deefendants were highly exposed with respect to Reconstruction civil rights statutes. A litigation that raises a challenge to existing caselaw on grounds of Constitutional law, of violation of basic logic, and of statutory conflict often makes multiple visits to SCOTUS. I've been on this road many times before.
Did Burton Lose His Case Because the Superior Court Dismissed and both the Appeals Court and also the State Supreme Court Affirmed?
It ain't over until the fat SCOTUS sings!