Polling The Public About Social Media Policies Turns Up Nothing Particularly Useful

from the say-what-now? dept

Someone emailed to call my attention to some new survey results out of the University of South Florida’s Center for Cybersecurity, which contained public opinion polls about internet regulation (and gas prices, but that’s a bit outside our wheelhouse). The key part that was highlighted to me was:

More than half of Floridians (52%) say that platforms such as Twitter are “private spaces” that should be regulated only by private companies. Far less (28%) view such platforms as “public squares” where government should regulate content

And, of course, that’s interesting, because the Florida government, led by Ron DeSantis, eagerly passed a law to argue the exact opposite. Of course, that law has since been tossed out (by two separate courts, no less) as unconstitutional.

So, for all the talk of how this content moderation law was to help Floridians, it sure seems like most Floridians don’t really want DeSantis dictating social media content moderation policies either.

Of course, as you dig deeper into the data… it gets less interesting, not more.

First off, the survey design here is awful. To an embarrassing degree. The question regarding government regulation of the internet frames the question as meaning that if the government regulated social media it would do so in a manner forcing sites to remove “false, misleading, or hateful” content which is literally the exact opposite of what Florida’s social media regulation actually does. It compels sites to keep that content up.

Both of these approaches are equally unconstitutional, but it’s weird to frame the regulatory push as only going in one direction, when in the very state where this poll is taking place, the actual regulatory attempts are exactly the opposite kind of unconstitutional.

The Center also polled the Floridian public what it thought about Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter and his ideas of what Twitter should do, and it includes the line that 50% of responses believe Twitter should “only limit offensive content if it’s illegal.” The breakdown here is also kinda weird:

Of course, that’s not so simple. Nearly all offensive content is not illegal. And… the respondents seem to recognize this, because just a few questions later they’re asked if Twitter should remove content deemed “false/misleading” and “harmful/dangerous to individuals or groups” and in both cases, respondents overwhelmingly said such content should be removed.

They were also asked if social media platforms “have a responsibility to restrict content that is false/misleading” and overwhelmingly people agreed.

But, most of that content is not illegal.

So, according to this, Twitter should only remove content that is illegal, but also not only should remove lots of perfectly legal content, but indeed has a responsibility to do so.

Perhaps this survey really says more about people’s understanding of what speech is legal than really how social media platforms should act.

For what it’s worth the survey’s strongest point of agreement seems to be that Twitter needs to work on its bot problem… and again, I don’t get that. It seems like a narrative issue, rather than reality. Elon Musk has made “bots” and “spam” a central theme of his whole takeover experience, but the vast majority of Twitter users don’t run into many bots or spam. The biggest accounts do, but most accounts don’t.

And since this question on the actual survey was framed as eliminating “non-human accounts,” that’s also weird, because many, many “non-human” accounts are actually quite useful. Some are informative — like bots that tweet earthquake reports or weather forecasts. Some are just entertaining, tweeting out random trivia or artwork. It’s the spam accounts that are a problem, but not all bots/non-human accounts are spam, and not many users really have to deal with that much spam.

So, the only thing this survey really seems to show is that you don’t learn much from polling random people about social media policies. Except maybe (1) they don’t understand how the 1st Amendment works and (2) they have been suckered by a narrative about bots.

Filed Under: , , , , , ,
Companies: twitter, usf

Rate this comment as insightful
Rate this comment as funny
You have rated this comment as insightful
You have rated this comment as funny
Flag this comment as abusive/trolling/spam
You have flagged this comment
The first word has already been claimed
The last word has already been claimed
Insightful Lightbulb icon Funny Laughing icon Abusive/trolling/spam Flag icon Insightful badge Lightbulb icon Funny badge Laughing icon Comments icon

Comments on “Polling The Public About Social Media Policies Turns Up Nothing Particularly Useful”

Subscribe: RSS Leave a comment
168 Comments
Ehud Gavron (profile) says:

Illegal content?

It’s the current fad to claim content is unlawful (‘illegal’).

Content is just data. What is unlawful is people doing things that create that content, make it available to others, distribute it, etc.

Laws are written to enable prosecution of people who violate them, not inanimate objects or data. The only exception is the one made-up by LEOs to steal cash in civil fofeiture.

Darkness Of Course (profile) says:

Ah, I smell the confusion of the ignoratti once again

I recall one of the Faux short term presenters (a gun toting blonde woman, iirc) saying Google had to let her spiel on YouTube because she looked up the company on the web, and it’s a “public” company.

Nobody could convince her that a public company wasn’t also a public square.

There are courses, and even books on how to do a proper survey – aren’t there?
Or were they hidden away by the Illuminati?

Anonymous Coward says:

Re:

I recall one of the Faux short term presenters (a gun toting blonde woman, iirc) saying Google had to let her spiel on YouTube because she looked up the company on the web, and it’s a “public” company.

Because of course “publicly traded” means “publicly owned”. Faux News sounds like the right place for her.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Internet Law: Cases and Materials

I reading Eric Goldman’s primer. If I am going to wipe out the completely broken caselaw, which is associated with 47 U.S. Code § 230, I have to understand the thinking of bad guys that want to exempt a social medium platform

  1. from civil rights, public accommodation, and common carriage anti-discrimination law and
  2. from libel law.

I have drawn two conclusions from my work in law and in engineering.

  1. It is almost useless to seek comprehension of law among non-lawyers.
  2. It is even more useless to seek comprehension of technology from users.

I sent the following email to Eric.

The book inspired me to go back and to reread Prager’s complaint. It wasn’t very good.

Why do you think Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961) does not apply to Google or YouTube?

[Every social medium platform is] physically and financially an integral part of a public [establishment (the Internet)], built and maintained with public funds…

There is a reason for patent law to reference a PHOSITA and for an expert report or expert testimony often to be required in a patent litigation. A user rarely understands anything.

Someone [Samuel Alito] needs to be chastised.

Cyberspace is different from the physical world…

[See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 198 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2017).]

Gag me with a spoon. I have a short lecture for a judge or an attorney, who believes the Internet is non-physical, operates by magic, or is otherwise supernatural.

Anonymous Coward says:

Re:

[Every social medium platform is] physically and financially an integral part of a public [establishment (the Internet)], built and maintained with public funds…

Twitter is not only maintained by private funds (income from advertising), but if it was to close down tomorrow, the rest of the World Wide Web and the Internet it runs on would still be there, meaning that Twitter isn’t integral to it at all. Well done on disproving your own argument that Twitter (or any other website) is a common carrier.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Don't Bother to Read the Decision -- Just Look Stupid

If the restaurant (analogous to Twitter) in the Wilmington Parking Garage (analogous to the Internet) shut down, the parking garage would have continued to operate.

Well done on proving that you are a clueless nitwit and dummy!

Try reading the opinion of the Court of Appeals next time.

Anonymous Coward says:

Re: Re: Re:

If the restaurant (analogous to Twitter) in the Wilmington Parking Garage (analogous to the Internet) shut down, the parking garage would have continued to operate.

Proving that the restaurant isn’t integral to the garage’s function for parking. Funny how your “rebuttal” just destroyed your case. Again.

“Well done on proving that you are a clueless nitwit and dummy!”

Why are you talking about yourself like that? Self-flagellation is so medieval.

Try reading the opinion of the Court of Appeals next time.

Yes, you definitely should. Especially where such decisions as you believe back your fallacious arguments were either narrowed or outright struck down.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:2 Learn to Read English

The restaurant was integrated into the garage (integrally within the garage) just as a social medium platform is integrated in the vast establishment or facility of the Internet (integrally within the Internet).

How familiar are you with the thinking of the Justices of the Supreme Court?

I have read practically every opinion of SCOTUS since 2000. I know all the current justices that studied at Harvard or at Yale. I had a long talk with one current Justice (before appointment) on precisely this issue.

If you want to show that you are neither a nitwit nor an ignoramus wrt the law, you demonstrate by sound legal reasoning that the precedent of Burton does not apply.

Raziel says:

Re: Re: Re:3

If you want to show that you are neither a nitwit nor an ignoramus wrt the law, you demonstrate by sound legal reasoning that the precedent of Burton applies. After all, I’m not the ignoramus that had my ass handed to me for arguing that a private company is restricted by the 1st Amendment.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:4 Hard to Be More of a Nitwit or of an Ignoramus than Raziel is

Raziel is the nincompoop that has read neither Burton nor the main filings of Martillo v. Twitter.

If Raziel had some living brain cells and had read Burton, he would realize that a dismissal at the level of the federal district court or of the state superior court means little. Burton was dismissed by the Delaware Superior Court. The Delaware Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, and the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, but William Burton prevailed — where it counts — at SCOTUS, which handed Eagle Coffee Shoppe it’s ass on a platter with coffee.

If clueless Raziel had read any of the filings in Martillo v. Twitter, he would know that I did not argue violation of my First Amendment Rights. After reviewing Burton as well as the 1661 cases that cite Burton, I have decided to add a count of First Amendment violation to the New or Amended Class Action Complaint for Martillo v. Twitter.

Burton is easy to find on the web with the correct citation that I provide below:

Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961).

It can be painful to use PACER. This Quora post, whose title is Status of Martillo v. Twitter, 21–6916 [U.S.], 21-1921 [1st Circuit], provides links to the main filings of Martillo v. Twitter.

My filings could be better. In the next round, I will have real heavyweight legal muscle that will compose the documents. The petition to SCOTUS for writ of certiorari before judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was a way to let SCOTUS know that the litigation is wending its way through the legal system.

We are holding a horse race. Who will reach SCOTUS first:

  1. Texas,
  2. Florida,
  3. Ohio, or
  4. Martillo?

A plurality of petitions can be joined, and my legal theory is best — especially when the right attorney presents it.

In the next round, I expect

  1. that a three judge district court panel will adjudicate the New/Amended Class Action Complaint and
  2. that the verdict will be appealed directly to SCOTUS.

Martillo v. Twitter may be able to pull ahead of the other three cases.

Every major social medium platform is walking dead.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:6 A Clown Continuing to Pontificate Without Reading the Rulings and Opinions!

Four SCOTUS Justices were willing to let HB20 — a law of which I don’t think much — go into effect even though there was by many if not most standards hardly enough briefing yet associated with the case.

Section 230 was a reaction to Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., undefined (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May. 24, 1995), which found Prodigy liable for libel because it removed a few posts (not systematic active curation) while Compuserve was not liable because it had failed to remove any UGC. See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

Systematic active moderation provides a cause for a complaint for liable. Current Section 230 caselaw unconstitutionally eliminates the Constitutional right to sue for liable.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (my Circuit) has already come close to eviscerating the precedent of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964). See Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2009), which applies a specific Massachusetts definition for actual malice.

A social medium platform uses Section 230 to assert a license for active curation of content even though active curation is nowhere enabled by Section 230. Such active curation seems to create a cause for a Palestinian or for an anti-Zionist Jew like me to bring a complaint for group libel against every social medium platform because every social medium platform aggregates and intensifies harmful content about us (e.g., a vacuous accusation of antisemitism) while it removes us or our content so that we cannot respond to group libel. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).

While subsequent SCOTUS caselaw may seem to overrule Beauharnais, Justice Thomas has suggested that SCOTUS should revisit its libel caselaw. See Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. S. Poverty Law Ctr., No. 21-802 (U.S. Jun. 27, 2022), McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 203 L. Ed. 2d 247 (2019), and Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424 (2021). Justice Gorsuch also dissented from denial of certiorari in the last case.

Justice Thomas is on a roll. See Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019). I will add a count for group libel in my New/Amended Class Action Complaint.

The other Justices are less aligned with Thomas and with Gorsuch on overruling Sullivan, but the odds definitely favor narrowing Section 230 libel caselaw and bankrupting every social medium platform. Top management at these vile firms is at risk for far more than losing jobs in a bankruptcy.

Here is the definition of libel.

Libel is a method of defamation expressed by print, writing, pictures, signs, effigies, or any communication embodied in physical form that is injurious to a person’s reputation, exposes a person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or injures a person in his/her business or profession.

I don’t see where it says that a complaint for libel can be brought only against a party that is either a publisher or an author. Systematic active curation of content is more than enough grounds for filing a complaint for (group) libel.

So laugh on as every social medium platform burns to the ground!

Anonymous Coward says:

Re: Re: Re:7 Try not to trip over those clownshoes you're wearing

“So laugh on as every social medium platform burns to the ground!”

I’ll file that right alongside “Prenda will appeal and they
will win!”

This is comedy gold however, fucking can’t even tell the difference between Libel and liable.

“Current Section 230 caselaw unconstitutionally eliminates the Constitutional right to sue for liable.”

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:8 Typo -- Big Deal

If someone knows too little to contribute meaningfully to a discussion, he focuses on trivialities.

Legal terminology and autocorrection is a constant struggle.

I could not count how many times I have correctly typed mens rea, which is then autocorrected to men’s rea, which I must then correct back to mens rea.

Naughty Autie says:

Re: Re: Re:7

Systematic active moderation provides a cause for a complaint for [libel].

Since when? Nowhere does the law say that sending bots after spam accounts (for example) isn’t protected under Section 230.

Current Section 230 caselaw unconstitutionally eliminates the Constitutional right to sue for [libel].

Funny, the only thing created by the caselaw is being unable to sue people for spreading defamatory statements, which doesn’t eliminate the right to sue for libel, it only keeps it so you can sue the originator of the defamation, but no one else. Are you deliberately obtuse or is it a fashion statement?

A social medium platform uses Section 230 to assert a license for active curation of content even though active curation is nowhere enabled by Section 230.

No it doesn’t. Under the defintion of the term, Twitter doesn’t actively curate anything.

Such active curation seems to create a cause for a Palestinian or for an anti-Zionist Jew like me to bring a complaint for group libel against every social medium platform because every social medium platform aggregates and intensifies harmful content about us (e.g., a vacuous accusation of antisemitism) while it removes us or our content so that we cannot respond to group libel.

Because there is no ‘group libel’. Each member of the Twitterati is an individual, so you have to sue them individually, not go after the company with the deep pockets. The passive aggregation you’re complaining about isn’t a call for submissions, and therefore doesn’t meet the definition of active curation.

See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).

I did that and found that it doesn’t apply to your case. I repeat: are you deliberately obtuse or is it a fashion statement?

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:8 Twitter Removes Pro-Palestine Content and Pro-Palestine Users All The Time

Supporters of discrimination and libel by a social medium platform can screech all they want, but author libel and publisher libel do not exhaust the category of libel.

Section 230 neither says nor implies anything about another form of libel. Caselaw, which eliminates ability to sue for libel is facially unconstitutional unless there is a Constitutional Amendment that eliminates the ability to sue for libel.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:6 Denial of Cert After Judgment is Almost the Final Song from Fat SCOTUS

The rules are somewhat more complex, but in most cases such denial of cert is the end. Martillo v. Twitter will probably follow a different path to SCOTUS.

All the litigation is at least a year (probably two years) away from reaching SCOTUS. We will all be sitting at Belshazzar’s Feast. Belshazzar is any and every social medium platform. SCOTUS is on high and will be writing on the wall by granting cert or by deliberating on direct appeal from a district court panel.

מנא מנא תקל ופרסין

We don’t need Daniel to prophesy in order to extrapolate the future

  1. for active curation,
  2. for user removal, or
  3. for section 230

just as we did not need Daniel to prophesy the future for Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Not a Common Carrier But a State Actor

If the clueless ignoramus had read the ruling, he would understand that the issue was state action doctrine and the 14th Amendment.

If the racist nitwit and bigoted supporter of discrimination by a social medium platform were capable of rational thought, he would realize that the logic of this case applies to state action doctrine and the 1st Amendment.

Anonymous Coward says:

Re:

[Every social medium platform is] physically and financially an integral part of a public [establishment (the Internet)], built and maintained with public funds…

This simply isn’t true. While there may be parts of the Internet that are owned and maintained by the US government, not all of it is. In fact, I expect at this time, most of the backbone and most of the data centers are privately owned. And Burton could only conceivably apply if a social media platform operated on a part of the Internet that the government controlled. For example, if Twitter’s servers resided in a data center owned and maintained by the government, or if Twitter was renting resources on servers owned and maintained by the government (as in a government owned version of AWS), then perhaps one could make the argument that Burton applied.

While I can’t say for sure that Twitter is dependent on government-owned resources in the manner I describe above, I find it extremely unlikely that it is. Therefore, Burton does not apply.

Cyberspace is different from the physical world…

One may often use real-world analogies to help people understand cyberspace, and in many cases a real-world analogy may indeed be applicable. However, the physical and digital worlds do differ in a number of ways.

To keep the topic on social media, for example, there is simply no physical analog to social media that is sufficiently similar to cover all the bases, simply due to the massive size of the service. One comparison might be the message board that you could find at a grocery store, where anyone could just walk in and post a note to the board. It would not be difficult for the store manager to periodically walk over to the board and review it for inappropriate posts. However, could the manager do the same if the board was a square mile in size? Consider if each post on Twitter was printed on a 3×5 index card. I suspect even a square mile wouldn’t be big enough to accommodate it.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Almost a Legally Sound Argument

Anonymous coward is getting closer to a legally sound argument. Burton was a 6-3 decision, but 4 Justices rejected or had a serious problem with applying State Action Doctrine. If I were representing a bad guy (a social medium platform), I would mine the concurrence and the dissent to sharpen the argument against applying State Action Doctrine. This SCOTUS has no problem with overturning its own caselaw — a tendency that works for and against all parties that come before SCOTUS.

It’s pointless for a bad guy to argue that the US government did not build the initial version of the Internet, I am an expert on the history of the Internet, and I have a stable of experts
1. that are better than I am and
2. that can account for every last dime (slight exaggeration) through 1984.

It’s far from obvious that Burton requires that funding, maintenance, management, and expansion be totally under the control of a governmental organization. SCOTUS will probably only require that the control or the funding be substantial — not a high bar.

Each bad guy has made a legal error that neither a public phone company nor a cable company ever made.

For example, AT&T (in the days of POTS) and Comcast always owned their own network/distribution system right down to the CPE (Customer Premises Equipment). Like many corporations and members of the public, I built my own pieces of the structure, facility, or establishment of the Internet.

I can strongly argue that a social medium platform not only sponges off the federal government but also off the public including me. Maybe the argument for applying State Action Doctrine is even stronger. I am unsure, but I know eight Justices, and I have studied Amy Coney Barrett. She seems to have a predilection for an argument that pushes the boundary. (This predilection is unusual in one so conservative.)

For arguing State Action Doctrine, I don’t need a physical analogy. The Internet is a physical public facility for resource sharing just as the Wilmington structure or establishment was a physical public facility for parking a car.

For me, litigation is a Gesamtkunstwerk, and I will bury the social medium class with charges that include:
1. First Amendment violation under State Action Doctrine,
2. unconstitutionality of Section 230 without considerable narrowing of its reach,
3. incorrectness of considering a 2022 social medium platform to be a 1996 Interactive Computer Service (I understand the technology),
4. violation of Section 230 (argument in the alternative — allowed in a civil case),
5. violation of Title II of the CRA of 1964,
6. violation of civil rights law,
7. libel according to Massachusetts libel law, which does not require a perpetrator of libel to be a speaker or publisher,
8. violation of Massachusetts common law common carriage law, which does not require a state common carrier to be a statutory federal common carrier.

When I direct litigation, I have a policy of total legal war. I intend to obliterate every social medium platform for its outrageous torts, breaches, and violations, and I don’t have to prevail on every charge to force a private social medium platform into bankruptcy.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:2 Nothing is Wrong With § 230 -- The Caselaw is Garbage

If Appellate Judges were issuing decision based on sound legal reasoning, there would be no problem, but too many Judges are issuing ideological decisions.

§ 230 is completely reasonable.

It applies only to a 1996 ICS (an internet on-ramp as AOL was in 1996). A 2022 social medium platform does not meet the definition of an ICS in § 230.

§ 230 tells us that an ICS bears only distributor liability.

§ 230 (c)(2)(A) tells us the following.

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—

any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected…

The key phrases are “voluntary” and “good faith”.

Zionist anti-Jews apply coordinated pressure for the removal of pro-Palestine users and of pro-Palestine content. Removal because of pressure is not voluntary.

Violation of federal public accommodation statutes and of federal civil rights statutes as well as violation of state common carriage statutes provides prima facie evidence of bad faith.

The above issues belong to the Original Complaint. The New/Amended Class Action Complaint will add many more counts as well as a large plaintiff class and a defendant class the consists of all social medium platforms.

Every US social medium platform is toast.

Ehud Gavron (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:2 Common Carrier

Twitter is not a common carrier.

I’ve argued a complaint about common carriage vs Time Warner Telecom in front of the FCC.

Call me a troll if it makes you happy. The facts don’t change, and I’ve been there, done that, and got the shirt. Also Blue Duck Tavern.

Google is not a common carrier. Youtube is not a common carrier. Let me switch it around:

NOBODY is a common carrier who isn’t DELIVERING YOUR DATA from point A to point Z for a price, or does so for others.

…it’s a destination, not a route.

Neither of those are part of the criteria. Check out:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/common_carrier

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:3 Twitter is Not a Statutory Federal Telecommunications Common Carrier

The definition of a statutory federal telecommunications common carrier is irrelevant in state court.

The federal district court accepted my argument, which asserts that every social medium platform is a commonwealth message common carrier as every company, which has offered telegraph service in Massachusetts, has been since 1849.

There are some differences among the states, most of whom agree with Massachusetts. Texas, Florida, Ohio, and Massachusetts are for the most part on the same page.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:5 Nope, Never!

I applied diversity jurisdiction to bring an Original Complaint in Massachusetts federal district court against six social medium defendants for violation of Massachusetts common carriage law because each defendant was a common law Commonwealth message common carrier according to Commonwealth caselaw, which goes back to 1849.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:7 More Comic Relief from Anonymous Coward

The Original Complaint was dismissed because the District Court incorrectly ruled that there was no monetary claim. I may refile any time. I appealed because I am trying to persuade the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to provide a comprehensive interpretation of § 230 — something the First Circuit has never done.

If the First Circuit agrees with me, it will be much easier to crowd-fund the litigation, and there will be a circuit split that will persuade SCOTUS to grant cert.

Ehud Gavron (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:5 It's possible

I don’t think I’m disingenuous, and usually I provide links to stuff I saw so it’s “more than just an opinion.” Some people don’t care for my style, but you can rest assured I’m not trolling.

As for reading halfway through a paragraph, I usually read the entire posts as they come in.

But enough about me.

Ehud Gavron (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:3 Wex, Cornell, the CFRs, and why this is one big rabbit hole

TL;DR – The whole common carrier worm-can is all about attempting to regulate something without passing laws addressing that same something. The regulation has multiple goals, and “net neutrality” is today’s buzzword.

When discussing the law, it’s important to read the law.

Cornell does have good online resources, but the link (above) was to something penned by the “Wex Definitions Team” which, a click later, shows to be some former and some current law students. It’s not the law. It’s not written by a lawyer. It’s not even written by a law-prof.

Still sticking with Cornell, here’s the relevant section from the Code of Federal Regulations:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/47/chapter-I/subchapter-B

What makes a common carrier … various tests.

There are many litmus tests. One previously mentioned is that carriage of YOUR stuff TOMORROW may not necessarily be on the same terms as carriage of MY stuff TODAY. Clearly my 15% off all FedEx shipments from my business are at a different set of terms than yours. FedEx is not a common carrier.

A second one is that common carriers do not have individual carriage contracts with their user (“clients”). I have not signed anything with the USPS and yet daily they deliver my mail, and take my outbound mail with them. The USPS is a common carrier.

Really this is all about a subset of people wanting to regulate sites forcing them to carry content the site doesn’t want to carry.

Unfortunately, this is just a big red herring. It doesn’t matter if a company provides common carriage. What matters is whether or not they are subject to governmental regulations. It would be convenient in these days of obstructionism and inability to pass legislation if EXISTING legislation already on the books was applicable, and COULD be applied to areas that need regulating.

In 2015 when the FCC decided ISPs were common carriers and could be regulated under Title II of the Communication Act of 1934, and as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, there were (and still are) many who said this was not right, and that it was PURPOSEFUL OVERREACH to regulate an industry that appears largely immune to regulation.

I’ll avoid the obvious rabbit hole of how 1934 law or 1996 amended law has anything to do with web-based services that would not exist for years or decades thereafter. Google was formed in 1998 as a search engine company. That is not an ISP. Twitter was formed in 2006 as a communication platform. It is not an ISP.

Great explanation and writeup at senate.gov:
https://tinyurl.com/54n6yabe

Summary:

Let’s unwind the stack.
Some people have feelings that some platforms unfairly censor some content.
They want to regulate those platforms and require them to publish content the site chooses not to.
The FCC tried to say that ISPs are subject to its purview.
The people above are trying to say that those platforms are ISPs and therefore subject to the FCC purview.
End result: if all those assumptions are true, then the FCC can force those platforms to carry and publish content anathematic to those platforms’ desires.

Anonymous Coward says:

Re: Re: Re: Less stand up more three ring circus.

“When I direct litigation, I have a policy of total legal war. I intend to obliterate every social medium platform for its outrageous torts, breaches, and violations, and I don’t have to prevail on every charge to force a private social medium platform into bankruptcy.”

Careful you don’t trip over those clown shoes bro.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Internet Law: Cases and Materials

I am reading Eric Goldman’s primer. If I am going to wipe out the completely broken caselaw, which is associated with 47 U.S. Code § 230, I have to understand the thinking of bad guys that want to exempt a social medium platform

  1. from civil rights, public accommodation, and common carriage anti-discrimination law and
  2. from libel law.

I have drawn two conclusions from my work in law and in engineering.

  1. It is almost useless to seek comprehension of law among non-lawyers.
  2. It is even more useless to seek comprehension of technology from users.

I sent the following email to Eric.

The book inspired me to go back and to reread Prager’s complaint. It wasn’t very good.

Why do you think Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961) does not apply to Google or YouTube?

[Every social medium platform is] physically and financially an integral part of a public [establishment (the Internet)], built and maintained with public funds…

There is a reason for patent law to reference a PHOSITA and for an expert report or expert testimony often to be required in a patent litigation. A user rarely understands anything.

Someone [Samuel Alito] needs to be chastised.

Cyberspace is different from the physical world…

[See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 198 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2017).]

Gag me with a spoon. I have a short lecture for a judge or an attorney, who believes the Internet is non-physical, operates by magic, or is otherwise supernatural.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

Ehud Gavron (profile) says:

Re: Re: Anonymous speech

Read my response above.

There’s no “your response” above. You’re just another anonymous poster.

ThorsProvoni has posted some great analysis… some of beyond my sheperdizing skills with LN… but you’ll note he doesn’t say “read my response above” as if he gets to assign all readers homework. He made it clear what in EG’s writeup he was replying to.

Anonymous opinion is protected on TD, and that’s a good thing. An AC telling people to “read above” — too precious for words.

You know who gets to assign homework to 100% of all TD readers? It’s the closed set of {not you}.

Anonymous Coward says:

Re: Re: Re:

There’s no “your response” above. You’re just another anonymous poster.

ThorsProvoni has posted some great analysis…

I always suspected you’re nothing but a troll with an account. Thank you for giving me the evidence I needed to make a positive assertion that’s exactly what you are.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

Ehud Gavron (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:2 Suspicions of a moron

I[sic] always suspected…

There’s no topic here about “Please list the suspicions you’ve had.

…you’re nothing but a troll with an account.

There’s no topic here about “Please opine on whether people here are an under-bridge dwelling species, and whether or not they possess login privileges to an Internet forum.

Thank you for giving me the evidence I needed…

Evidence isn’t anything that was “given” to you nor anything you used to “need” nor need at any point. Really all you need is a nice long nap and a staycation at a rehabilitation facility where they focus on your complex. Fortunately I’m not a doctor so the Goldwater Rule doesn’t apply here. However, mom said that when people say “thank you” I say “you’re welcome.” You’re welcome. Get help.

to make a positive assertion that’s exactly what you are
That’s a thing, I’m sure.

Milk. Bed. Nap. Inpatient facility.

Today is a big day. You get to realize your ramblings are absurd and you need help. Enjoy your day.

Lostinlodos (profile) says:

Eminent domain?

Unless when Republicans lead congress in 2003, they choose to use ED to take control of TwitFaceTuber for the “betterment of the whole”…

Private company. Private localised censors. Fuck off and die elsewhere. You’re bleeding on the nice green grass and that makes me angry. Blood attracts all sorts of problematic wildlife. Social media already is infected with progressives, pretenders, fakes, penis pills, and fake coin NFTs. And trolls, oh the trolls.

Buy it, steal it, or sod off! 2020 is over. The public no longer cares about legally-protected private localised censorship.

Ehud Gavron (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re: Assumptions

You assume everyone uses a full keyboard with a desktop.
You assume people don’t run Mint on mobiles.
You assume your assumptions are infallible.

Not at all.

The PTB should know the changes adopted this weekend are negatively impacting the “View in thread” option.

To help in that process, I do volunteer that
– I use Debian based Linux, mostly Mint then Ubuntu then straight up Deb.
– I use laptops primarily made by Dell

I provide this feedback so that the “issue” can be known to the devs (yes, Techdirt is still working with JP on the WP setup).

Don’t let your hatred of people stop you from criticizing those who try to help or better our online environment.

In the words of Mr. Piper, may he rest in peace:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wp_K8prLfso&ab_channel=NathanYoder

Lostinlodos (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:2

I wasn’t directing at you. I use MacOS, Darwin, and Dragonfly primarily.

The point was multifaceted.
I use an old iPhone as my keyboard (BT) for some parallels work so I don’t need to switch the keyboard back and forth. Phone directly to the HV, keyboard always on MacOS.

Many phones can run Linux with a bit of work. And I have mint on an x86 tablet.

Not to mention I can browse this site via iTerm using iSh on my iPhone and Moz text browser.
Technically that’s using the SUS core and not iOS, so Arm BSD.

AC needs to do a little understanding in how real world computing works and not just the consumer eou system before they make crazy claims about typos.

Lostinlodos (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:5

Sailfish is another popular one, though paid. ChromOS, Fire, Micro,

On the Unix side there’s miniDragon, PhoneBSD, Organic, and DarPhone.

And if using higher end devices, AC may need to do a bit of looking. Have a Sony or Lenovo? LG? Chances are your running non android.
Same thing on ultra low end devices.
WebOS and Sailfish are the two largest portable device OS not Apple or Android.

Ignorance is bliss. Lmao 🤣

nasch (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:6

Have a Sony or Lenovo? LG? Chances are your running non android.

The Xperia line (which I think is all Sony phones?) appear to be Android.

https://www.sony.com/electronics/support/articles/SX243901

This 2017 article indicates Lenovo is using stock Android for all future smartphones:

https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2017/8/4/16094460/lenovo-stock-android-k8-note-future-smartphone-vibe-pure-ui

The most recent LG phone (they’re not making phones or tablets anymore) runs Android.

https://www.androidauthority.com/lg-g8x-thinq-review-1047523/#id-software-1047523

If you have info on manufacturers releasing phones with something other than iOS or Android in North America or Europe (I know there are some, probably many, in Asia) I would be interested to see it. It would be great to see one or two additional big competitors. I doubt 30 or 40 tiny ones will have any effect on the market, which given the Linux landscape seems pretty likely.

Ehud Gavron (profile) says:

Interstate and states

The definition of a statutory federal telecommunications common carrier is irrelevant in state court.

For things that are not interstate, that’s right.

Intrastate communication is not in the FCC’s purvey, but interstate communication is.

For practical purposes, FB, Google, IG, YT, etc. provide interstate services, and if there WAS a definition they’d belong under, it would be an FCC federal one, not a state-by-state basis.

That’s not just Constitutional law, but also the Interstate Commerce Act of 1987. See e.g. https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Interstate_Commerce_Act_Is_Passed.htm#:~:text=On%20February%204%2C%201887%2C%20both,%E2%80%9D%E2%80%94to%20regulating%20railroad%20rates.

Ehud

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Incorrect -- There Is a Reason I Am in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Massachusetts has regulated the end loop of an interstate (or an intrastate) phone call by means of Commonwealth common carriage law as far back as the 1940s at least.

The FCC has declined to regulate the end loop of the service of a social medium platform. The Tenth Amendment kicks in.

I addressed the message common carriage of digital personal literary property. Such message common carriage is a beast, which is completely different from telecommunications common carriage even if a message common carrier makes use of telecommunications common carriage. The federal district court agreed with my analysis of the situation.

Since the 1980s I was working on AT&T cases, which were presented to the FCC.

If FedEx, which is an interstate message common carrier and not based in Massachusetts, denies message common carriage service in Massachusetts, FedEx violates Massachusetts common carriage law.

Thirteen judges have reviewed my case so far — a bit weird I admit and perhaps an indication of the sensitivity of the issues I raised. Not one has expressed a peep against this analysis.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re: Twitter and A Medium Corp Tried to Claim That Complaint Was Dismissed With Prejudice

Yet these two corporations had to eat their words because the Distric Court did not dismiss with prejudice.

The District Court dismissed because it did not want to underule existing caselaw even if the existing caselaw were erroneous.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has never taken a position on 47 U.S. Code § 230(c)(2)(A) but seems open to the argument that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
used the logical fallacy, which is called denial of the antecedent, to reach its decision in Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).

Such crap is like crabgrass in the legal lawn. If it’s not eradicated, it takes over, but every time it’s pulled out, it appears somewhere else.

Do you know what denial of the antecedent is? Can you provide a simple example?

A Court of Appeals welcomes an opportunity to rule in this sort of situation. Law journals will write about the opinion for the next 50 years at least.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:7 You say tomayto -- I say tomahto

Both phrases, Dunning-Kruger Effect and Dunning-Kruger Syndrome are used.

A syndrome is group of symptoms which consistently occur together, or a condition characterized by a set of associated symptoms that may manifest itself as an effect.

An effect causes (something) to happen. Something could be a group of symptoms that manifest themselves as a syndrome.

Of course, we have already established that Anonymous Coward does not have a competent command of English.

Anonymous Coward says:

Re: Re: Re:2

Do you know what denial of the antecedent is? Can you provide a simple example?

The overturning of Roe v. Wade. Nothing at all like your situation, however, since there is no precedent to be overturned in your case. Do you want to be laughed off this site as hard as you were laughed out of court?

Lostinlodos (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:4

Zeran is a very different set of legal processes than RvW.
In Roe the Judicial branch violated separation by creating a ‘right’ where one did. It exist. Creating (and limiting) rights is the power of the legislature.

Regardless of any person’s thoughts on abortion: Roe is unconstitutional. The current court addressed that and corrected it.

Anger over the decision is misplaced. The legislature failed to address abortion. Be mad at every member of congress who didn’t do so. From them to right now, today!

At the moment, absent federal law, the states will make their own.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:5 The Zeran Court of Appeals Ruled on the Basis of Logicl Fallacy

Can we say denial of the antecent?

As bad as Roe was, 1973 SCOTUS did not come to its ruling on the basis of logical fallacy.

Zeran is a logical abomination like Byrne v. Boadle and contains nothing that even remotely resembles sound legal reasoning.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:7 Denial of the Antecedent

Explanation That I put before SCOTUS

The simple statement of the inverse fallacy is the following.
(p → q)
∴ (q → p)

The above form is sometimes called affirmation of the consequent.

Zeran applied the inverse fallacy in contrapositive form.
(p → q)
∴ (¬p → ¬q)

In this form the inverse fallacy is sometimes called denial of the antecedent.

In the Zeran appellate decision,

 1. p represents  “a social medium ICS is accused of defamation or of a similar act”, 
 2. ¬p represents “a social medium ICS is not accused of defamation or of a similar act”, 
 3. q represents “a social medium ICS is not a publisher”, and
 4. ¬q represents “a social medium ICS is a publisher”.

The decision assumes the following principles with respect to publisher liability and editorial discretion.

 1. A non-publisher has no liability and no unfettered editorial discretion.
 2. A publisher has liability and unfettered editorial discretion.

The Zeran decision combines the inverse fallacy with 47 U.S. Code § 230 (c)(1) to yield the following.

 1. If a social medium ICS is accused of defamation or of a similar act, the social medium ICS has no publisher’s liability [for libel or slander, which is present in third party content].
 2. If a social medium ICS is not accused of defamation or of a similar act, the social medium ICS has a publisher’s unfettered editorial discretion [to remove a user or his content].

The above fallacious interpretation of a clause within a statute is not judicial but is ideological and seems to be a covert possibly unconscious attempt unjustifiably to inject net neutrality into the federal statute even though Congress never legislated net neutrality into this statute. If the federal judiciary interprets the law on the basis of the inverse fallacy, the federal judiciary violates the U.S. Constitution Article I Section I by legislating and teaches the public that the inverse fallacy is a reasonable basis of law.[1]

Note

[1] Both the Appellant’s Brief (p. 30a) and also the Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Reconsideration (p. 144a). contain a more detailed discussion of the use of logical fallacy in creating § 230 caselaw.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:8 Garbled List Ungarbled

[Here is the list that the comment system garbled.]

The Zeran decision court combines the inverse fallacy with 47 U.S. Code § 230 (c)(1) to yield the following.

  1. If a social medium ICS is accused of defamation or of a similar act, the social medium ICS has no publisher’s liability [for libel or slander, which is present in third party content].
  2. If a social medium ICS is not accused of defamation or of a similar act, the social medium ICS has a publisher’s unfettered editorial discretion [to remove a user or his content].
ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:10 Editorial Discretion and § 230

§ 230 makes no mention of unfettered editorial discretion by a 1996 ICS, which in any case cannot be equated with a 2022 social medium platform.

The whole concept of unfettered editorial discretion by an ICS belongs to caselaw,

  1. which is not based on sound legal reasoning and
  2. which is unconstitutional federal judicial legislating according to Article I Section 1 of the US Constitution.

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:5 Without Federal Regulation of the End Loop, a State Makes its Own Rules, Regulations, and Laws!

The FCC has declined to regulation the end loop of the service of social medium platform. The duty falls to state.

Aside: it is hard to assert that enacting a law wrt a medical procedure is within the enumerated powers of the federal government.

bhull242 (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:6

The FCC has declined to regulation the end loop of the service of social medium platform. The duty falls to state.

Unless Congress expressly prohibits it, which it has with §230, at least with regards to this sort of thing. Or if it is interstate or international commerce, which is exclusively governed by the federal government according to the Constitution.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re: Links -- Yeah, Right!

Deliberations in camera are not posted to the web and not supposed to be available to the public in any way.

Don’t you remember how freaked SCOTUS was when Alito’s draft of Dobbs was made public? SCOTUS is still freaked.

I had to call in a lot of favors to find out what has been happening, and I only found a lower bound on the number of judges.

When a party accuses a Court of Appeals of reaching a ruling by means of logical fallacy and when the party is correct (as I am), the whole US judicial system is freaked out because the use of logical fallacy at such a high level can destroy the legal system.

So what is denial of the antecedent?

Example Proposition

If I am in Ann Arbor, I am in Michigan.

Logical Fallacy: Denial of the Antecedent

If I am not in Ann Arbor, I am not Michiga.

Zeran is legal garbage!

The Zeran Court of Appeals arrived at its ruling by applying denial of the antecedent.

See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:2 Why So Many Freaked Out

There are over 300 cases, which cite Zeran, and I demonstrated by basic propositional calculus that Zeran is based on logical fallacy.

Not only did the Zeran panel violate the rules of logic, but it committed the most fundamental Constitutional violation.

A federal judge does not make law!

ARTICLE I SECTION I

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:4 What is Federal Caselaw?

Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence in Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019). He addresses the nature of caselaw in the federal context. If one reads and tries to understand this concurrence, he will appear less ignorant and less stupid when he discusses US legal issues.

Justice Thomas is not an unchallenged authority on the nature of federal caselaw, but he is at present the dominant SCOTUS authority. Even those authorities, who disagree with Justice Thomas, must consider a precedent to be total crap if the precedent is like Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) based in logical fallacy.

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: The Law of Telegraphs and Telegrams (1865)

While approximately half of the state jurisdictions (e.g., Massachusetts and Pennsylvania) put telegraph service into the category of a common carriage as early as 1865 and before, other jurisdictions were resistant to such categorization because a telegraph service delivered a true copy and not the original message. (See The Law of Telegraphs and Telegrams [1865].)

While the issue of true copy still exists for voice telephony (POTS either analog or digital, some cell phone technology, ISDN, and DMI but not VOIP), I pointed out in Martillo v. Twitter that a social medium platform provides end-to-end transport of the electronic signals of digital personal literary property. Digital personal literary property is carried end-to-end according to analysis, which is consistent with caselaw of Title 17 (copyright law) and with caselaw of Title 35 (patent law).

All the Massachusetts common law of common carriage applies to message common carriage of digital personal literary property — whether by telegraph or through the Internet — as long as the request for common carriage is placed from Massachusetts until SCOTUS rules otherwise. Don’t bet on such a ruling coming down from SCOTUS on high any time soon!

Meanwhile, down here in Boston, I am waiting while the clerks of the Court of Appeals research several hundred years of caselaw because I emphasized the two separate issues both of conveyance of personal literary property and also of message common carriage of digital personal literary property.

Anonymous Coward says:

Re: Re:

I lied in Martillo v. Twitter that a social medium platform provides end-to-end transport of the electronic signals of digital personal literary property.

FTFY. YW.

Digital personal literary property is carried end-to-end according to analysis, which is consistent with caselaw of Title 17 (copyright law) and with caselaw of Title 35 (patent law).

By the ISP, which Twitter is not. Twitter is the recipient of tweets, not the carrier of them. You’ll be arguing next that any business receiving mail from customers is the USPS.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re: One Common Carrier Can Serve Another Common Carrier

Learn to read the statutes.

Just as the telephone network served telegraph service message common carriage, an ISP serves the message common carriage of a 2022 social medium platform. Common carriage can be layered just like networking protocols.

MGL c. 159 s. 1

Every common carrier of merchandise or other property shall receive, transport and forward all property offered for such purposes by other such carriers as promptly, faithfully and impartially, at as low rates of charge, and in a manner and on terms and conditions as favorable to the carrier offering such property, as he on the same day and at the same place receives, forwards and transports, in the ordinary course of business, property of a like description offered by persons other than such carriers. Such carrier shall not discriminate against any particular person or subject him to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. The supreme judicial or superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce this section.

[Even though the statute was enacted in 1859, it fits exactly to the operation of a 2022 social medium platform. I explained to the panel in gory detail the nature of the operation of a social medium platform. The panel now understands exactly how the social medium platform receives, forwards, and transports digital personal literary property from one user computing device to another user computing device — even if AC remains clueless about the operation.]

Anonymous Coward says:

Re: Re: Re:2

Every common carrier of merchandise or other property shall receive, transport and forward all property offered for such purposes by other such carriers as promptly,

Social media has never met that criteria because it does not accept all offered messages, and does not forward it to the destination. Terms of service limit what social media will carry, and most posts do not have an associated destination.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:3 Learn Something About Contract Law

It is a meaningless stipulation in a carrier’s contract to demand that a message must meet ill-defined “community standards”. No US or state court considers a contract clause to be valid if the clause asserts that a carrier may commit discrimination in public accommodation, in civil rights, or in common carriage.

[Likewise all restrictive covenants in contracts for conveyance of real estate are invalid and not considered valid contractual terms.]

See Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph, 154 U.S. 1, 14 S. Ct. 1098 (1894) for an example of a valid contractual stipulation. The WU contract stated that if one did not pay for REPEATED transmission, WU would not bear liability for a transmission error. Primrose did not pay for REPEATED transmission.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:2 Typo 1869, Not 1859

The Massachusetts common carrier statute (c. 159 s. 1) was enacted in 1869 and perfectly fits what a social medium platform does.

Amazing, isn’t it? Not really.

In 1846 the first commercial telegraph line completed. The Magnetic Telegraph Company’s lines ran from New York to Washington and carried digital personal literary property from one site to another. The service was hardly different from the service that a social medium platform carries out.

The aggregate of 19th century telegraph companies constituted the Victorian Internet.

The law is already in place to slap down every social medium platform.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:4 The Litigation Continues, and Anonymous Coward Provides Comic Relief

Every time Anonymous Coward asserts that I was laughed out of court when I wasn’t, he tells the world to consider him to be a fool.

The case remains under consideration by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and even if the Appeals Court affirms the dismissal, it might recommend that I restructure my complaint and refile — unlikely because I have a right to file an Amended Complaint.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:3 Twitter Has Not Challenged Any Factual Matter I Have Alleged About Twitter Service

Twitter’s whole argument is based on unsound §230 caselaw and blithering ignorance of Commonwealth common carriage statutes and caselaw. To be honest, I have a tendency to feel vicariously embarrassed when I read the Twitter filings. The filings from A Medium Corp. were much more competently written as I would expect from Nutter.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Learn How Common Carriage Works!

When a Massachusetts customer orders merchandise from Amazon Whole Foods and goes to pick it up, Amazon Whole Foods is a supermarket.

When the customer orders delivery, Amazon Whole Foods is not only a supermarket but is also a common carrier of merchandise and so regulated according to Massachusetts common law and statutes of common carriage.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:2 Common Carriage of Mass Messaging, Junk SMS messaging, Mass Mailing, or Mass E-Mailing

I have no obligation to read mass messaging, junk SMS messaging, mass mailing, or mass e-mailing. All are examples of message common carriage according to the common law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Please don’t babble like a nitwit about an ISP. The District Court was invoked via diversity jurisdiction. (Do you know what that means?) It decides the issue according to Massachusetts law and not according to the federal statutory law of a telecommunications common carrier.

I have already prevailed on this issue.

See Mt. Tom Motor Line, Inc. v. McKesson Robbins, Inc., 325 Mass. 45, 89 N.E.2d 3 (Mass. 1949). Have you read the ruling. It’s short.

The distinction between a common carrier and a private or contract carrier has been frequently stated. Houle v. Lewonis, 245 Mass. 254. Haddad v. Griffin, 247 Mass. 369. Dion v. Drapeau, 254 Mass. 186. Commonwealth v. Boston Maine Transportation Co. 282 Mass. 345, 349. A common carrier is one who holds himself out as furnishing transportation to any and all members of the public who desire such service in so far as his facilities enable him to perform the service, while a contract carrier does not furnish transportation indiscriminately but furnishes it only to those with whom he sees fit to contract. Paine Furniture Co. v. Acme Transfer Storage Co. 290 Mass. 195. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175. Steele v. General Mills, Inc. 329 U.S. 433. Ace-High Dresses, Inc. v. J.C. Trucking Co. Inc. 122 Conn. 578. Trudeau v. Pacific States Box Basket Co. 20 Wn.2d 561. This difference is recognized in § 2 of G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 159B, as appearing in St. 1938, c. 483, § 1, as amended, the chapter regulating the transportation for hire of goods by motor vehicles. A carrier may be a common carrier as to one part of its business and a special or contract carrier in another part. Terminal Taxicab Co. Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, 241 U.S. 252. Commonwealth v. Boston Maine Transportation Co. 282 Mass. 345, 349. Rugg v. Davis, 320 Mass. 388, 391.

The software of a social medium platform transports digital literary property to and from a user computing device and a server of the social medium platform (message common carriage of digital literary property, not federal statutory telecommunications transmission common carriage of data signals).

I dispute with the defendants over the Massachusetts statutory penalty ($50-$500) for each denial of common carriage that occurs because of suspension by a social medium platform.

MGL c. 159 s. 1

Every common carrier of merchandise or other property shall receive, transport and forward all property offered for such purposes by other such carriers as promptly, faithfully and impartially, at as low rates of charge, and in a manner and on terms and conditions as favorable to the carrier offering such property, as he on the same day and at the same place receives, forwards and transports, in the ordinary course of business, property of a like description offered by persons other than such carriers. Such carrier shall not discriminate against any particular person or subject him to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. The supreme judicial or superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce this section.

MGL c. 159 s. 2

Every such carrier who wilfully neglects or refuses to comply with the preceding section shall forfeit not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, to the person offering the property for transportation.

Anonymous Coward says:

Re: Re: Re:3

A common carrier is one who holds himself out as furnishing transportation to any and all members of the public who desire such service in so far as his facilities enable him to perform the service, while a contract carrier does not furnish transportation indiscriminately but furnishes it only to those with whom he sees fit to contract.

And Twitter furnishes “transportation” only to those who A) have an account, and B) haven’t violated the site’s ToS. Way to destroy your own argument. Again.

Anonymous Coward says:

Re: Re: Re:

When the customer orders delivery, Amazon Whole Foods doesn’t automagically become a common carrier. They’ve contracted with that individual customer to deliver groceries only from their own store, not from anywhere. Hell, Uber Eats is closer to being a common carrier than Amazon Whole Foods is, yet no one bothers to argue they are (except you, perhaps) because they don’t deliver from every store and restaurant.

Ehud Gavron (profile) says:

Open mike night

A couple more zingers like that and you’ve got a pretty good set for open mike night.

I’m pretty sure Mike is open that night. Yup, just called him. He says good to go after 2200.

…and I will bury the social medium class with charges that include:

Nobody will be burying anyone here and today.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQaoPaKf3ts&ab_channel=EvilDead%3ATheGame

This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.

Ehud Gavron (profile) says:

Re: I do so hate small keyboard, small screens, and whatever else is in the way of great communication.

And now with a full keyboard and a screen that doesn’t require readers…

The Hebrew. What is it you wanted to say? It didn’t stand on its own.

I’m not trying to criticize I’m offering to help. It’s what we do אחי.

E

Ehud Gavron (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re: Aramaic

Modern Hebrew is not my strong suit.

If it was Hebrew… but it’s alleged Aramaic. Unfortunately (or not) it’s not really Aramaic. It’s on a UGC site and nowhere else, and it doesn’t follow the rules of Aramaic writing. (Yeah, seriously.)

As a fan of UGC it’s not really my place to say that made up shit should be removed… because hey, what if some Aramaic scholar come along with a different perspective than I have… and he/she said “No no that’s all legit.” Until then however, it’s not.

It’s easy to take the ex-president’s words and show them to be a farce. It’s a lot more difficult when couched in a dead language.that very very few of us have studied… and as time goes, we get fewer in number, and knowledge is lost.

And all the while the anonymous coward horde keeps thinking it makes a difference. All it does is lower the S/N ratio.

Mana mana?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTXyXuqfBLA&ab_channel=JustinCaise

E

Add Your Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Have a Techdirt Account? Sign in now. Want one? Register here

Comment Options:

Make this the or (get credits or sign in to see balance) what's this?

What's this?

Techdirt community members with Techdirt Credits can spotlight a comment as either the "First Word" or "Last Word" on a particular comment thread. Credits can be purchased at the Techdirt Insider Shop »

Follow Techdirt

Techdirt Daily Newsletter

Techdirt Deals
Techdirt Insider Discord
The latest chatter on the Techdirt Insider Discord channel...
Loading...