Actual malice is not necessary to render a racist pro-genocide social medium platform liable for libel of Palestinians and of pro-Palestine activists, but I have the evidence of actual malice anyway. Every racist pro-genocide social medium platform that perpetrates libel by active curating will crash and burn -- good riddance! I remember how the racist pro-genocide pro-libel participants in this forum made fun of my complaint when the District Court kicked it up to a higher court because the legal nitwits in this forum don't understand legal jargon.
And the odds favor my anti-racist anti-discrimination anti-libel anti-genocide argument and not pro-genocide pro-discrimination racists that support coverup of ongoing genocide by racist pro-genocide social medium platforms.
Netchoice, LLC v. Paxton, No. 21A720 (U.S. May. 31, 2022) reinstated the stay 5-4. It's highly probable that of the five Justices in the majority, at least one wants to see more litigation in the lower courts before reviewing the case and making up his mind. It only takes one Justice to join the four Justices, who are uncomfortable with § 230, and every racist discriminatory pro-genocide libelous social medium platform is toast -- good riddance!
Somehow my case is still before the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. A District Court almost never underrules a higher Court. Dismissal without prejudice is legal jargon for kicking a litigation to a higher Court that can either ignore or overrule the caselaw. The racist pro-discrimination pro-defamation pro-genocide nitwit does not understand legal language -- no surprise there.
Someone did not read Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., undefined (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May. 24, 1995). This case shows the inadequacy of the libel law in 1995. § 230 was meant to address this inadequacy, but no one in 1996 conceived of aggregate libel by means of active curation. This oversight makes § 230 unconstitutional.
I am arguing that depraved evil white racial supremacist European Zionist colonial settler anti-Jews put the Zionist genocide into operation in Dec 1947 a year after the international community banned genocide and made anti-genocide just cogens. I can identify top managers, who worked at each of the Defendants in my litigation and who specifically initiated a program of defending the Zionist state from a charge of genocide by defaming Palestinians by means of aggregate libel that resulted from removing any content (active curation) that defended Palestinians. By the doctrine of respondeat superior, each social medium platform is responsible for the libel by active curation and will be be bankrupted.
I was replying to this statement.
A social media platform is only responsible for its own speech.I pointed out that libel liability does not pertain only to one's own speech. A publisher can be liable for the speech of someone that the publisher publishes. I am not arguing that the racist genocide-supporting social medium platform is a publisher and therefore libel for the content it distributed. I am arguing that the social medium platform is an active curator that intentionally creates an aggregate libel by a specific defamatory program of active curation. I am not putting the racist genocide-supporting social medium platform in the role of a publisher or a speaker. I am putting the social medium platform in the role of an active curator -- a role that the social medium platform admits. If § 230 gives the social medium platform immunity to intentional aggregate libel by active curation, § 230 is unconstitutional and the social medium platform is bankrupted by the compensation it will have to pay to its victims. If § 230 does not give the social medium platform immunity to intentional aggregate libel by active curation, the plaintiff class prevails and the social medium is bankrupted by the compensation it will have to pay to its victims. The Plaintiff prevails either way, and a stake is driven through the heart of every racist genocide-supporting social medium platform. SCOTUS loves to make this sort of holding in an issued opinion.
§ 230 was intended to tell Courts that an Interactive Computer Service was like a distributor or like a passive conduit even if it had the superficial appearance of a publisher. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., undefined (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May. 24, 1995) discusses the issue in passing. In the general case, a 1996 ISC server software interacted with the ISC software on a user's PC to reformat the text that appeared on a user's computer screen. It looked a lot like publishing even though there was no human involvement. When a 2022 social medium platform actively curates and when I find numerous statements of intent from Zionists among members of social medium platform management, the social medium platform ceases to be a passive conduit. This text
any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable...refers to the occasional removal of an obscene text or violent picture. It does not refer the conscious and concerted effort (active curation) of a genocide-supporting group to defame its victims and to prevent the victims from defending themselves from the defamation. Racist discriminatory genocide-legitimizing and genocide-normalizing active curation is practically the definition of common law libel per se, for which a plaintiff has a Constitutional right to file a lawsuit. It will be hard for a defendant to overcome the prima facie case of libel by active curation, and there is more than 50% likelihood that SCOTUS will find § 230 unconstitutional without possibility of Constitutionality by narrowing the interpretation of the statute.
A publisher can by its editorial choices become liable for the writing of someone it publishes. When a social medium platform in bad faith creates an aggregate liable by active curating in bad faith it becomes liable for this libel and manages to vitiate any immunity that § 230 might but probably does not give it. We will see within less than a year how the various involved Courts rule. At present, there are 10 involved Courts. It only takes one anti-social medium platform ruling affirmed by SCOTUS to kill every vile racist, discriminatory, libelous, genocide-supporting social medium platform. The odds don't look good. I'm good legal strategist because I calculate odds. Racist pro-discrimination pro-libel pro-genocide supporters of § 230 don't calculate the odds because they are bigoted fanatics. BTW, after 5 months of litigation, A Medium Corp finally realized that I was making a public accommodation/civil rights discrimination case and put an experienced civil rights litigator on its team. The situation is almost funny.
I hardly ever loose. There is evidence indicating that four Justices are uncomfortable with § 230. Here are my arguments for the Amended Complaint.
§230 refers to "[restricting] access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable", but if the material only defends against the (aggregate) liable, which the social medium platform is maliciously disseminating, the burden is upon the social medium platform to overcome the prima facie case of bad faith. I already have a full library that shows pro-Palestine material, which each racist pro-genocide social medium platform removes, only defends against the libel. I can convince a jury and bankrupt each social medium platform as it deserves and save the USA from racist pro-discrimination pro-defamation pro-genocide supporters of the abomination. which is the social medium platform of 2022.
When a newspaper decides not to publish one text, it's editorial discretion, a one-off, and not the issue. In active curation as practiced by a racist discriminatory genocide-supporting social medium platform like each of the 6 defendants in my case, the active curator makes a decision to facilitate 3rd parties to post content that altogether constitute libel while the active curator removes all opposing content -- to the harm of the party suffering the libel, which may only arise from the aggregate of the facilitated content. That conscious decision to enable and to distribute the aggregated libel becomes itself libelous speech,
You have to find another argument. Active curation is a form of expression, i.e., speech.
You have to make a Constitutional argument. No statute can immunize a social medium platform that libels by active curation (its own speech). Sometimes a Court might narrow the interpretation of a statute to find a way to render it Constitutional, but such narrowing won't happen in this case.
No statute can immunize a social medium platform,
Every US citizen has a Constitutional right to sue for libel (common law right existent at the time of ratification). Such a right cannot be negatived without a Constitutional amendment. (Don't hold your breath while you wait for such a Constitutional amendment.) If active curating (a form of the social medium platform's own speech) occasions an act of libel, 47 U.S. Code § 230 is unconstitutional if it immunizes a social medium from the consequences of its own libelous speech. Once SCOTUS declares § 230 unconstitutional (at least four Justices seem poised to do so), my plaintiff class will on remand prevail and bankrupt the social medium platform. If § 230 does not immunize a social medium platform from the consequences of its own libelous speech in the form of active curating, my plaintiff class will prevail against a social medium platform and bankrupt the social medium platform without the detour to SCOTUS. Either way, my litigation will be the magic bullet that destroys § 230. Every abomination, which is a social medium platform, will die to the benefit of the Republic, and the good guys will defeat the pro-discrimination, pro-defamation, pro-genocide racists, who live for § 230.
47 U.S. Code § 230 provides no immunity to such a complaint that seeks compensation for a tort of libel by active curation. I was discussing the issue with patent professionals on the Patently-O blog in Supreme Court Continues Preliminary Injunction of HB20 – with dissent. The opinions of patent lawyers are interesting because many understand the technology, which underlies the Internet/WWW. The patent professionals generally agreed that § 230 gave a 2022 social medium platform an unconstitutional license to defame because active curating of content is a mechanism of defamation as a 2020 social medium platform uses it according to § 230 (c)(2)(A) along with the limited immunity § 230 (c)(1). So how does active curating lead to defamation? The patent lawyers were clear.
Such a racist has no rational response to the truth and invariably screeches, "Go away!"
It's entertaining that the USPS is not a statutorily defined federal telecommunications common carrier. The USPS is a common law-defined state message common carrier just like Twitter and other racist discriminatory social medium platforms. Racist participants in TechDirt seem unable to keep their racist pro-discrimination nonsense straight. The Plaintiffs did not bother with a complaint about denial of common carriage because there was no denial of common carriage. Because a racist, who supports the right of a social medium platform to discriminate against a US citizen, did not bother to read the complaint, he does not realize that the complaint contains no charge that is related to common carriage. It is worth mentioning that no private message carrier has ever argued that the carriage of a postcard, which openly contains the speech of a customer, infringes the First Amendment rights of the private message carrier.
Hottest Topic in Patent Law Today is Interplay of Constitutional Law, Statutory Law, and Common Law
But racist pro-genocide pro-libel legal nitwits that support ongoing violation of anti-discrimination law by a social medium platform is unlikely to be aware of any currently important legal issue. Why do you think I participated in the discussion? It was not merely because I am IP law professional.