Viacom Didn't Actually 'Win' Against YouTube, But The Appeals Court Ruling Is Still Dangerous

Legal Issues

from the a-mixed-bag dept

We already covered the 2nd Circuit’s ruling in the appeal of the Viacom/YouTube case, but I wanted to follow up after seeing much of the coverage. There have been a number of reports that outright declare this a “victory” for Viacom, which is a very generous reading of the ruling. To be sure, the appeals court reinstates the case that had been effectively shut down by the district court — but it did so in a manner that rejected every single one of Viacom’s interpretations of the law. The biggest concern in this lawsuit was that Viacom would be able to use it to effectively reinterpret the DMCA the way it wanted the law to act, rather than the way the law was actually written (and which the case law has supported for years). The court clearly rejected that attempt by Viacom.

But, of course, it wasn’t a complete vindication for YouTube. Reviving the lawsuit is clearly a partial step backwards for YouTube, but it’s entirely possible that they could still prevail in the district court on the specific points that were sent back for trial. And, in the details of why the appeals court revived the case are some significant problems, many of which are outlined in a thorough post by Eric Goldman. I don’t agree that the ruling is quite as significant as Goldman does, but he does make some good points about problems with the setup of the DMCA’s safe harbor and (equally troubling) the way the court ruled on a few key points that make little sense.

On the setup of the DMCA, Goldman notes that the real issue here is that the DMCA safe harbors have a bunch of different confusingly worded parts — and to keep the safe harbors, you need to hit on every point, which is kind of ridiculous when you think about it:

Most importantly, this opinion exposes a structural deficiency of the 512(c) safe harbor. The statute’s simply too long and detailed, and if a defendant fails to satisfy each and every element, the safe harbor is lost completely. This is reminiscent of military strategy and information security: the defense has to work equally well across its entire border, while the adversary can concentrate its attack and only has to succeed on one point of attack to win. The same is true with a 512(c) defense. So, it doesn’t matter that YouTube won most of the points of contention; if any single point of contention fails, YouTube’s 512(c) defense fails. As I’ve insisted before, this provides a good lesson for drafters of safe harbors and immunities–to work effectively, the safe harbors/immunities must be pithy and categorical, or else they create too many potential points of failure.

This is a really good point, and suggests that if the DMCA is to be fixed, the safe harbor provisions should be clearer that missing a single checkbox doesn’t mean you automatically lose all safe harbors.

The second concern is how the court interpreted parts of the DMCA where it’s been sent back to the lower court. As Goldman notes, the 2nd Circuit’s decision to totally punt on “right and ability to control” is going to create a huge mess for a while, in which we can expect copyright holders to flood the 2nd Circuit with cases focusing on that point — since the appeals court simply rejects the standards put forth by YouTube (which used an interpretation already accepted in the 9th Circuit) and Viacom (which used an interpretation that only made sense in the minds of Viacom execs) but fails to come up with its own standard. Meaning no one knows what the standard is… and that means that copyright holders have a chance to get the court to redefine it in their favor:

So the court agrees with no one. Given that it rejected everyone else’s definitions, we might expect the court to carefully lay out what it thinks the phrase means. Sadly, no. The opinion doesn’t provide an express definition of what qualifies as the “right and ability to control,” instead sending that issue back to the district court to figure out both the standard and whether YouTube met it. The clearest clue the court provides about the standard is it “involve[s] a service provider exerting substantial influence on the activities of users, without necessarily—or even frequently—acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity.” I have no idea what that means, other than that it’s open season for plaintiff fiestas.

The fact that this will likely open up an opportunity for new lawsuits could be a pain for innovative companies who will face a new series of bogus legal attacks. Elsewhere, Goldman warns that the end result of this ruling will mean that startups that work with user generated comments are going to have to lawyer up at an earlier stage, and may have to take extra precautions which don’t appear to be supported in law, just to avoid lawsuits.

In the end, the ruling is certainly not a “victory” for Viacom, but it does have significant problems. The district court could fix some of the problems by establishing that YouTube still gets safe harbors, even after the court’s vague and directionless remand, but if that fails, perhaps this case and its differences from existing 9th Circuit case law would end up in the Supreme Court. That, of course, is risky, since the Supreme Court has been so consistently clueless when it comes to copyright cases.

Filed Under: dmca, eric goldman, safe harbors
Companies: viacom, youtube

Breaking: Appeals Court Sends Viacom-YouTube Case Back To District Court, Future Of Safe Harbors Still Uncertain

Legal Issues

from the some-good,-some-bad dept

The original ruling in the Viacom vs. YouTube case was a complete and total victory for YouTube. The court effectively dumped the case at the summary judgment stage, correctly recognizing that YouTube qualified for the DMCA’s safe harbors, and that Viacom was trying to change the clear definitions in those safe harbor provisions. This upset many copyright maximalists, and we heard stories about how the ruling would never survive the appeal. To some extent that was correct. The ruling in the appeal came out today, and it definitely walks back some of the original ruling, but, on the whole, it still leans towards YouTube’s position.

The key question in the lawsuit revolved around the so-called “red flag” knowledge question — and whether or not that meant specific knowledge of items that were infringing (as YouTube and the lower court believed) or just general knowledge of infringement on the site (as Viacom argued). Here, the appeals court got it right, saying that specific knowledge is necessary.

Although the parties marshal a battery of other arguments on appeal, it is the text of the statute that compels our conclusion. In particular, we are persuaded that the basic operation of § 512(c) requires knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity. Under § 512(c)(1)(A), knowledge or awareness alone does not disqualify the service provider; rather, the provider that gains knowledge or awareness of infringing activity retains safe-harbor protection if it “acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). Thus, the nature of the removal obligation itself contemplates knowledge or awareness of specific infringing material, because expeditious removal is possible only if the service provider knows with particularity which items to remove. Indeed, to require expeditious removal in the absence of specific knowledge or awareness would be to mandate an amorphous obligation to “take commercially reasonable steps” in response to a generalized awareness of infringement. Viacom Br. 33. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of the statute, which requires “expeditious[ ]” action to remove or disable “the material” at issue. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).

The court rightfully rejects the idea that the “red flag” knowledge part of the DMCA means that just knowing that there’s some infringement — without knowing specifics — means you lose the safe harbors. Since this is the key question in the lawsuit, it’s great that the appeals court got this right. This was also the point that the maximalists insisted that no appeals court would uphold, and, clearly, they were wrong about that.

The court responds to the claim that if red flag knowledge does not apply to “general” knowledge of infringement, then it’s superfluous, by noting that’s not true:

The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is thus not between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard. In other words, the actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or “subjectively” knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement “objectively” obvious to a reasonable person. The red flag provision, because it incorporates an objective standard, is not swallowed up by the actual knowledge provision under our construction of the § 512(c) safe harbor. Both provisions do independent work, and both apply only to specific instances of infringement.

In other words, it’s possible to show that there are red flags, but they have to be red flags for infringement of specific items, not knowledge that there is infringement in general. That’s a good ruling and it makes sense. Accepting Viacom’s interpretation would have effectively killed large parts of the DMCA. YouTube’s interpretation (now supported by both the district and the appeals court) keeps the DMCA’s safe harbors in existence.

That said, the court then suggests that the district court may have erred in granting the summary judgment on that point. Here, the court is talking specifically about YouTube’s actions, and saying that Viacom at least raised enough issues that it is possible to argue that YouTube did, in fact, have knowledge of specific infringement. In other words, the court agrees on the big picture interpretation of the law, but disagrees on the specific application by the district court. It doesn’t mean that the court thinks that YouTube violated the DMCA — just that Viacom at least raised enough issues that it should be handled by a jury in a trial, rather than decided at the summary judgment stage. So the case will now go back to the district court to be heard over that issue.

Even here, the judge notes that while Viacom pointed to some email evidence that YouTube execs may have known of some specific instances of infringement which they ignored, it also points out that it’s unclear if those specific instances involve videos that are part of this lawsuit — and that’s necessary if YouTube is to lose its safe harbor provisions.

A second issue involves the question of whether or not YouTube exhibited “willful blindness” to infringement on the site. Here, the ruling is a bit troublesome. It notes that the DMCA does not refer to willful blindness (and that the DMCA does note that there is no duty to monitor). But… it then still suggests that there can be a willful blindness question under the DMCA if there is specific knowledge of infringement. So, again, going back to the main issue in this case, if Viacom can show specific knowledge, it might also be able to get YouTube for being “willfully blind.” But, it’s no sure thing that Viacom can actually show specific knowledge of clips that are a part of this lawsuit.

The third issue is the question of what “the right and ability to control” infringing activity means. Both YouTube and Viacom interpret that phrase differently… and here, the court rejects them both. The district court accepted YouTube’s interpretation, saying (reasonably, in my opinion) that a service provider must know of the particular case before it is required to “control” it. That is, how can the “right and ability to control” apply to a situation where there is no specific issue at hand? What is the service provider expected to control if it doesn’t know what it’s controlling? Viacom, instead, argued that the issue around the “right and ability to control” created a magical “vicarious liability” for service providers if their services were used to infringe. Both courts reject that argument as making little sense and (importantly) going against the Congressional record (which specifically left out vicarious liability, which had been found in an earlier DMCA draft). Here, the appeals court tries to thread the needle with a somewhat confused ruling that doesn’t quite agree with either side. It’s not a vicarious liability standard, but it doesn’t quite require specific knowledge. Instead, the court literally says “something more” is required — and asks the district court to consider what that “something more” might be.

Finally, there’s an issue of what “by reason of” storage means. The DMCA’s safe harbors give protection for infringement that happens “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.” YouTube (and the district court) pointed out that YouTube fits under this definition. Viacom tried to argue that YouTube does not qualify because it does much more than storage — such as converting (transcoding) videos, offering playback of videos and offering “related videos.” Viacom tried (at both levels) to argue that those functions go beyond mere storage, and do not qualify for safe harbor protections. Thankfully, the appeals court here agrees with the lower court and says those are protected. It notes that it’s clear that Congress intended “service provider” to mean much more than just a storage provider. I should note that one of our frequent critics in the comments has been insistent that the DMCA was designed only to apply to pure storage providers — but now we’ve got yet another detailed court ruling pointing out that this is 100% false.

However, the court does send one “feature” back to the lower court for review. It questions whether or not the syndication of videos to third party sites then falls outside the safe harbor provisions concerning “by reason of storage.” The court isn’t sure that this is outside the safe harbors, but at least asks the lower court to explore the issue.

In the end, this is a mostly good ruling. It gets the biggest question of law right, even if it’s not sure about YouTube’s specific actions. On some of the other points, it’s a little fuzzy in its thinking, but this is still mostly a victory for YouTube at this stage (though, who knows how the lower court and a jury will rule on some of the specifics). It could have been a more complete victory, but this is hardly the complete rejection of the district court ruling that some maximalists insisted was going to be delivered.

Filed Under: dmca, liability, red flag knowledge, safe harbors
Companies: viacom, youtube

Weird Al Wonders Why Sony Music Never Gave Him His White & Nerdy Cut Of YouTube's Equity Payout

Music Industry

from the white-and-nerdy dept

Back when Google bought YouTube in 2006, one of the side notes on the deal which didn’t get that much attention was that right before the deal closed, YouTube gave a bunch of equity to the major record labels, structured more or less as a payoff in exchange for not suing YouTube for a few years. The most beautiful part in all of this for the labels, of course, was that they got a ton of free cash which they never planned to share with artists. Since the deal was done as equity, the labels could insist that it had nothing to do with royalties, and they could keep the whole amount — and they did. But, of course, if artists expected the labels to protect their interests, they were out of luck.

It seems that some artists are finally bringing this point out. We’ve covered the many, many lawsuits over the past few years where artists are suing their labels over whether or not iTunes purchases count as a sale (tiny royalty) or a license (big royalty). However, some are also bringing up other wrongs. Eminem’s producers, FBT, who were one of the first of these cases, specifically called out the fact that they never received any of the YouTube money.

And, now, Weird Al Yankovic is joining the party. In yet another one of these lawsuits about the difference between a license and a sale, Weird Al also focuses on the missing YouTube payments and points out that his song White & Nerdy was hugely popular on YouTube around the time of the buyout.

This may be a difficult legal argument to win, but if Weird Al (or, rather, his production company Ear Booker Enterprises) can show that Sony Music did the equity deal under that structure specifically to avoid paying out royalties, things could get interesting, especially for other artists whose work was popular on YouTube at the time…

Filed Under: royalties, termination rights, weird al
Companies: sony music, youtube

For Those Freaking Out Over Pinterest's Terms Of Service, Have You Stopped Using Every Other Internet Site Yet?

Overhype

from the calm-down,-sparky dept

Last month we suggested that copyright holders stop freaking out over Pinterest. At the time, we noted there were two areas that people were panicking about: one was the terms of service and the other was whether or not Pinterest itself was violating the copyrights of images that are “pinned” by its users. We focused on the latter issue (and pointed out it was stupid) and breezed past the first issue by noting that the terms of service issue was silly, because the terms are mostly boilerplate language used by pretty much every online site.

Unfortunately, it appears that not everyone reads Techdirt (tragic, that) and the freakout has continued — and it only seems to have grown over the past few weeks. We keep seeing more and more articles giving the terms of service issue attention. So many of the articles point back at a silly blog post by a lawyer describing how she “tearfully deleted” her Pinterest boards after reading the terms of service. For whatever reason, this story went viral, despite the fact that even the way she wrote it suggests this is one of her first forays into internet terms of service and copyright issues. She also notes in her post that “you have no right to reproduce this article or any portion thereof” which is a copyfraud statement, overclaiming rights. Yes, I do have the right to produce “portions thereof” in situations where it’s fair use, and I will do so — such as here, when I am commenting on her article.

Either way, her “tearful” post covers ground that’s been covered many times before. This same issue comes up every so often when people read online terms of service for the first time. In the past we’ve seen similar freakouts about Twitpic, Google Plus and other sites as well.

Thankfully Nancy Sims, the copyright librarian at the University of Minnesota Libraries, puts the smack down on the FUD that people are kicking up concerning Pinterest’s indemnification, right to share and copyright license clauses. She notes that these elements are found in just about every user-generated content site’s terms of service, and goes through the details of Tumblr, YouTube, Facebook and even her own University’s terms of service:

Tumblr

Indemnity: “Subscriber will indemnify and hold Tumblr, its directors, officers and employees, harmless, including costs and attorneys’ fees, from any claim or demand…”
Right to share: “Subscriber represents, warrants and agrees that it will not contribute any Subscriber Content that (a) infringes, violates or otherwise interferes with any copyright or trademark of another party […] (c) infringes any intellectual property right of another or the privacy or publicity rights of another…”
License of copyrights: “…hereby grants and agrees to grant Tumblr a non-exclusive, worldwide, royalty-free, transferable right and license (with the right to sublicense), to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works…”

Full Tumblr Terms of Service

YouTube

Indemnity: “…you agree to defend, indemnify and hold harmless YouTube, its parent corporation, officers, directors, employees and agents, from and against any and all claims, damages, obligations, losses, liabilities, costs or debt, and expenses (including but not limited to attorney’s fees)…”
Right to share: “You affirm, represent, and warrant that you own or have the necessary licenses, rights, consents, and permissions to publish Content you submit..” AND “You further agree that Content you submit to the Service will not contain third party copyrighted material, or material that is subject to other third party proprietary rights, unless you have permission from the rightful owner of the material or you are otherwise legally entitled to post the material and to grant YouTube all of the license rights granted herein.”
License of copyrights: “you license to YouTube all patent, trademark, trade secret, copyright or other proprietary rights in and to such Content for publication on the Service” AND
“you hereby grant YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable and transferable license to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform the Content…”

(Not to mention points 9 and 10, in all their caps-locked glory.)

Full YouTube Terms of Service

Facebook

Indemnity: “If anyone brings a claim against us related to your actions, content or information on Facebook, you will indemnify and hold us harmless from and against all damages, losses, and expenses of any kind (including reasonable legal fees and costs) related to such claim.”
Right to share: “You will not post content or take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates someone else’s rights or otherwise violates the law.”
License of copyrights: “For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos and videos (IP content) […] you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook (IP License).”

(Props on their use of human-readable language!) 

Full Facebook Terms of Service 

And finally, from a user agreement for uploading content onto a server the University of Minnesota Libraries hosts! (Yes, I think these are reasonable terms of use, because I was involved in drafting them! (Although I’d still simplify the language a little.))

Indemnification (sort of): “I agree that I am solely responsible for the Content and for any consequences of uploading it to the [Server] and making it publicly available…”
Right to share: “I am the sole creator and the owner of the copyrights and all other rights in the Content; or without obtaining another’s permission, I have the right to deposit the Content in the [Server]” AND “The Content does not infringe the copyrights or other intellectual property rights of another, nor does the Content violate any laws or another’s rights of privacy or publicity. The Content is solely my original creation or if not, those portions that are not my creation are used with the copyright holder’s express permission or as permitted by law.”
License of copyrights: “I grant […] the following non-exclusive, perpetual, royalty-free, world-wide rights and licenses: to access, reproduce, distribute and publicly display the Content, in whole or in part, to secure, preserve and make it publicly available, and to make derivative works based upon the Content in order to migrate the Content to other media or formats, or to preserve its public access.”

This kind of stuff is standard. Hell, even we’ve got some similar terms over at the Insight Community (and we had to fight with our lawyers to push back on some of them). All of these terms are pretty standard. They’re basically meant to prevent the company from getting sued if you abuse the service, which is kind of silly since the companies are mostly protected by safe harbors anyway, and no tech startup would ever actually use one of these indemnity clauses against an ordinary user because they’d then lose every single other user they have.

I recommend people read the rest of Sims’ article about all of this, as she notes that there’s a tremendous amount of FUD making the rounds concerning Pinterest, which seems to be creating an unnecessary chilling effect against using the site.

Filed Under: copyright, indemnification, terms of service
Companies: facebook, pinterest, tumblr, youtube

Why Does An Unpatentable 'Abstract Idea' Become Patentable If You Add 'On The Internet'?

Patents

from the good-question dept

Back in 2009, we wrote about a case involving a company called Ultramercial, which held a broad and ridiculous patent (7,346,545) that effectively covered the process of watching an ad before you could download content (seriously). Ultramercial sued Hulu, YouTube and WildTangent over this. The case went back and forth with an initial ruling that rejected the patent, by noting that it was just an “abstract idea” and abstract ideas are not patentable. As that court ruling noted:

At the core of the ‘545 patent is the basic idea that one can use advertisement as an exchange or currency. An Internet user can pay for copyrighted media by sitting through a sponsored message instead of paying money to download the media. This core principle, similar to the core of the Bilski patent, is an abstract idea. Indeed, public television channels have used the same basic idea for years to provide free (or offset the cost of) media to their viewers. At its heart, therefore, the patent does no more than disclose an abstract idea.

Tragically, CAFC, the appeals court that handles patent matters and has a long history of expanding patent law, reversed the lower court’s ruling and deemed the patent valid. While it didn’t put it in these words specifically, it certainly appeared that the court was saying that any abstract idea can still be patentable if you just make it happen “on the internet.”

In that ruling, the court discusses the fact that “abstract ideas” are not patentable, and notes that it used to use its machine-or-transformation test to determine if something was or was not an abstract idea. However, after the Supreme Court ruled in the Bilski case that this test might not always be appropriate, while failing to say what test would be appropriate, it’s left CAFC with the freedom to make up totally arbitrary rules. And in this case, the arbitrary rule was effectively “we don’t apply the machine-or-transformation test to ‘information age’ inventions.” Why? Because if the inventions aren’t physical, the machine or transformation test no longer applies:

While machine-or-transformation logic served well as a tool to evaluate the subject matter of Industrial Age processes, that test has far less application to the inventions of the Information Age…. Technology without anchors in physical structures and mechanical steps simply defy easy classification under the machine-or-transformation categories.

Shorter version: what would be considered unpatentable abstract ideas in the offline world suddenly become patentable if you add “on the internet” to them.

That doesn’t sound right to lots of people, and thankfully WildTangent is appealing the case and hoping the Supreme Court will hear it. As the petition to the Supreme Court notes, the question presented is:

Whether, or in what circumstances, a patent’s general and indeterminate references to “over the Internet” or at “an Internet website” are sufficient to transform an unpatentable abstract idea into a patentable process for purposes of 35 U.S.C.

Along with the petition, there were also two interesting filings in support, urging the Supreme Court to hear the case. One from Redhat, CCIA and EFF, which goes into great detail about how such broad patentability would seriously harm the open source world, and a strongly worded brief from Google and Verizon (yes, together) about how such a ruling would do serious harm to innovation by allowing all sorts of abstract ideas to be locked up via patent. Hopefully the Supreme Court is willing to listen — and will push back (yet again) on a bad CAFC ruling.

Filed Under: abstract ideas, ads, cafc, downloads, software patents, supreme court
Companies: ccia, eff, google, hulu, ultramercial, verizon, wildtangent, youtube

UPDATE: Brazilian Performance Rights Agency Demands Blogger Pay $204 A Month To Embed Videos

Copyright

from the you-can-only-take-my-money-for-so-long-before-you-take-it-all dept

Well, you can never say that performance rights organizations are unwilling to explore every option when attempting to snag a bit more income, ostensibly for their roster artists. American PROs (ASCAP, BMI, etc.) have attempted to collect from Girl Scouts, every cell phone owner with a ringtone and argued that a single person listening to their own music via the cloud is a “public performance.” British PROs (PRS, mainly) have levied fees against pretty much any small business that has the audacity to play radios at an audible volume, as well as succeeding in collecting fees for “public performances” from hotels/motels who provide in-room radios for their guests. SABAM, Belgium’s PRO arm, has managed to out-thug the rest of the world’s PROs, demanding fees from truck drivers for listening to the radio in their cabs (“workplace”) as well as collecting for bands that don’t even exist.

There’s a lot of competition out there in the dog-eat-dog world of performance rights double and triple-dipping, but it appears that Brazil’s PRO, ECAD (Central Office of Collection and Distribution) is ready to play in the big leagues. Its strategy? Collect royalties from bloggers who embed videos. (As you may recall, ASCAP tried this a few years back to no avail, but Brazil’s relationship with copyright could safely be described as “incomprehensibly inconsistent.”)

(The following quotes come from a translated page, so they have been copied verbatim.) [UPDATE: Eduardo, the author of the original post, has sent over a better translation of the quotations.)

The saga of unusual collections of the Central Office of Collection and Distribution (ECAD) has added another chapter last week. The boys from the blog Caligraffiti received last Tuesday in an email warning that the collecting society would have to pay royalties for videos from YouTube and Vimeo that appeared on the site.

The saga of unusual collections from the Central Office of Collection and Distribution (ECAD) gained another chapter last week. The boys from the blog Caligraffiti received last Tuesday an email from the collecting society warning that they would have to pay royalties for videos from YouTube and Vimeo embedded on the site.

This is surprising. ECAD already collects performance royalties from Youtube Brasil for its artists. In fact, it collects quite a bit from Youtube.

YouTube Brasil will have to pay 2.5% of its gross revenue per exhibition of songs protected by Ecad (Bureau of Revenue Distribution) in the country. If the amount of the stipulated percentage does not reach BRL 258,000 (US $146,250) in a year, the site must pay the value as “minimum annual fee”.

Not only does Youtube Brasil pay a minimum mandatory fee yearly but ECAD has also hit the site with a BRL 645,000 (US $366,000) “subscription fee.” The PRO collected roughly BRL 510,000 (US $289,000) in 2011. With Youtube already on the hook for the performance royalties, how does ECAD arrive at the conclusion that embedded video (just a link back to Youtube for all intents and purposes) should subject bloggers to performance royalty payments?

Well, according to ECAD, Youtube is the “transmitter” and of course, has to pay. But blogs embedding videos are “relays” and are also subject to these fees. Basically, ECAD has found a loophole in the existing law and is looking to exploit it. ECAD’s spokesman:

[UPDATE: Translation via Eduardo, along with this splendid note — “This second one has a very bad wording in portuguese as well, written by lawyers in their own language.”]:

The right of public performance in digital mode is through the concept of transmission exists in law and in this art. 5 of section II of Law 9.610/98, which issue is the transmission or dissemination of sounds or sounds and images through of radio waves, satellite signals, wire, cable or other conductor, optical or other electromagnetic process, so this includes the Internet.

The rights of public performance in digital media happen through the concept of transmission found in the article 5, section II of the law 9.610/98, in wich transmission or emission are the diffusion of sounds or images through radio waves, satellite signals, wire, cable or other conductor, optical or other electromagnetic process, so this includes the Internet.

ECAD also argues that the “transmitter” and the “relay” are completely different forms of use and as such, do not represent “double recovery.” This is, roughly translated, complete horseshit. But it gets even worse. Bloggers are being charged a flat-rate based on a designation that ECAD itself decides. The cheapest option, most likely, is to be declared a “non-profit.” But even that designation saddles the blog with crippling fees.

To blog [as] a nonprofit, the amount charged by Ecad is nothing lightweight: R $ 352.59 (US $204) monthly.

Caligraffiti is a niche blog dedicated to design and technology, with a hit count of 1,000-1,500 hits per day and is not profitable. Every contributor does something other than blogging for income. Despite this, ECAD has designated the blog as a “webcasting or broadcasting program originating from the internet,” a category that is sure to increase the amount levied against it.

In response to this collection attempt, Caligraffiti was briefly taken offline. After some legal consultation, the bloggers decided to re-open and fight ECAD head on, stating that this is clearly an attack on the internet itself, which was built on open sharing and dissemination of information.

ECAD is also sticking to its guns, stating that although it has no collection arm “dedicated” to collecting from bloggers, anyone who “publicly performs music” (read: “embeds video”) on their site is subject to these fees. Of course, ECAD isn’t doubling up on royalties just to be greedy. Its focus is on “the awareness and enlightenment on the need for payment copyright,” without which its covered artists would be “disrespected” by callous bloggers and their embedding code.

Eduardo has also confirmed that ECAD has gone after weddings with DJs for performance royalties (as Ninja pointed out in the comments) and pointed out that the BRL $359 amounts to roughly half a month’s wages at minimum wage.

Filed Under: brazil, embedding, fees, licenses, videos, youtube
Companies: ecad, google, youtube

Rumblefish CEO: Claiming Copyright On Your Incidental Recordings Of Birds Was Merely A Series Of Unfortunate Errors

Copyright

from the that-just-happen-to-profit-us dept

Following Rumblefish claiming copyright via YouTube’s ContentID system (and putting ads on the video to monetize it) of a guy’s nature video because the birds singing in the background sounded too much like a Rumblefish-licensed track, Rumblefish’s CEO has gone into PR crisis mode, setting up an AMA (ask me anything) on Reddit to address the story. While he gets a smidgen of kudos for the funny title of it:

I’m the CEO of Rumblefish, I guess we’re the newest up and coming bird music licensing company – I’m also a copyright, music licensing, entrepreneur guy. Ask me anything.

the details aren’t leaving many satisfied. The key explanation is basically that it was a “series of unfortunate errors”:

Here’s what happened. YT ID’d a song in our catalog improperly, it was disputed, one of our content ID reps re-instated the claim mistakenly. The issue was brought to our attention b/c of a post tonight. We reviewed the video, I watched it myself, and it was clearly a mistake. We released the claim on Sunday eve a few hours after our mistake came to our attention. That’s what happened.

We review a substantial amount of claims every day and the number is increasing significantly. It’s been rather challenging. We have millions of videos now using our songs as soundtracks and keeping up is getting harder and harder.

This is, almost certainly, an accurate reflection of the specific events, but hardly touches on the key error. That the Rumblefish rep re-instated the video “mistakenly.” Remember, this was a nature video. There was no music. No one who watched the actual video would think that it involved someone taking “bird songs” off of some Rumblefish licensed track and placing it on the video.

Separately, this highlights an ongoing problem that we’ve discussed concerning YouTube’s ContentID program. While it has been a great way to enable copyright holders to make money from content uploaded by others, it also can (and often is) abused to either take down content or to monetize someone else’s content.

Filed Under: birds, content id, copyright
Companies: google, rumblefish, youtube

Sony Music Exec: The Internet Is Full Of Opportunities & Not A Problem; Intransigent Collection Societies, However…

Say That Again

from the more-people-getting-it dept

We’ve detailed a few times the ridiculous standoff in Germany, where the incredibly aggressive music collection society GEMA is involved in a big lawsuit against YouTube for posting videos with music in them. YouTube has done licensing deals with collection societies around the globe, but GEMA refuses to even sit down to start a conversation until after the lawsuit happens. Because of that, all GEMA music in Germany is barred from YouTube entirely. This leads to some situations in which totally licensed videos are banned in Germany. This has been going on for years and years with no change.

GEMA, of course, says that it’s doing this to “protect” the artists. But as I’ve pointed out in the past, many, many artists in Germany don’t believe that at all. In the past we’ve noted that GEMA tried to ignore Creative Commons licenses as well as barred members from offering their music for free (two years ago, when I was in Germany at a music conference, I had multiple artists explain to me they had an “official” website where they would “sell” music to keep GEMA happy… and an “unofficial” website where they’d offer their music for free. The whole thing is crazy.

In fact, it’s gotten so crazy that apparently even the major labels are getting sick of it. TorrentFreak has the news of a top Sony Music exec, Edgar Berger, who runs their international business, talking about how the internet hasn’t been a problem at all, but has created tons of new opportunities. The ones creating the real problems for the industry? GEMA. Because the music is blocked “to protect the artist,” it appears that the labels and artists are missing out on large revenue checks from YouTube’s ContentID…

“There is absolutely nothing to complain about. The Internet is a great stroke of luck for the music industry, or better: the Internet is a blessing for us,” Berger said.

“You can not blame the Internet for harmful excesses. On the contrary. It has brought us tremendous new opportunities,” he added.

But with these new opportunities come new rivals from an unexpected corner. According to the Sony boss, music rights collecting agencies are now preventing innovation in certain countries.

In Germany, for example, most YouTube videos by Sony artists are blocked due to the music rights group GEMA, and not because Sony wants it that way. When asked why Sony’s music is not available on YouTube in Germany, Berger responded bitterly.

“It’s not because of us. You must direct this question to the German collecting agency GEMA, they licensed the copyright very restrictively.”

Quite a contrast from the “old” story, right? Here’s a situation in which technology and business model innovation via Content ID are creating massive new revenue opportunities for the entertainment industry — and the old school system of excess protectionism is denying them that revenue.

Filed Under: collection societies, edgar berger, germany, internet, music, opportunities
Companies: gema, google, sony, youtube

Guy Gets Bogus YouTube Copyright Claim… On Birds Singing In The Background

Copyright

from the that-ain't-right dept

A whole bunch of folks have been sending in this Slashdot story about a guy who had one of his videos “claimed” via ContentID on YouTube due to a purpoted match with content that Rumblefish claims to hold the copyright on. We actually saw this post early on, because it links to an old Techdirt post about questionable Rumblefish takedowns. In this case, the guy says that there was no music in the video, but that Rumblefish said that the birds singing in the background violated its copyright:

“I make nature videos for my YouTube channel, generally in remote wilderness away from any possible source of music. And I purposely avoid using a soundtrack in my videos because of all the horror stories I hear about Rumblefish filing claims against public domain music. But when uploading my latest video, YouTube informed me that I was using Rumblefish’s copyrighted content, and so ads would be placed on my video, with the proceeds going to said company. This baffled me. I disputed their claim with YouTube’s system — and Rumblefish refuted my dispute, and asserted that: ‘All content owners have reviewed your video and confirmed their claims to some or all of its content: Entity: rumblefish; Content Type: Musical Composition.’ So I asked some questions, and it appears that the birds singing in the background of my video are Rumblefish’s exclusive intellectual property.”

While it’s still not fully clear what happened, the idea of claiming copyright on birds singing is actually not an entirely new concept (though, yes, it is ridiculous). In 2010, we wrote about Apple getting sued buy a guy, Martyn Stewart, who had recorded a bunch of bird sounds. Someone else had used those sounds in an app called iBird. As I said then, I’m not sure that there really is much “copyright” to claim over recording birds, but even if someone wants to make an argument that recording birds is copyrightable, it’s pretty clear that the guy in the story above was just recording his own sounds — not using someone’s “copyright”-covered bird songs…

Filed Under: birds, contentid, copyright, youtube
Companies: google, rumblefish, youtube

Universal Music Claims Copyright Over Song That It Didn't License, Just Because One Of Its Artists Rapped To It On A Leaked Track

Copyright

from the going-overboard dept

Last year, when Universal Music issued a very questionable takedown of a Megaupload commercial — which involved some Universal Music artists — UMG suggested that it had extra special rights with YouTube in which it could take down videos that it didn’t even have a direct copyright on. Google later said that UMG was greatly exaggerating the details of their deal, and all UMG could do beyond issuing normal copyright takedowns was to take down live performances.

So a bunch of folks are scratching their heads over a highly questionable UMG takedown of a song by a Florida-based rap duo, After the Smoke (who are not signed to Universal). The details are a bit complex, and to understand what appears to have happened, you first have to go back a bit. It seems that After the Smoke recorded an instrumental “beat” which they then shopped around to various artists to potentially rap/sing over. This is pretty common, and if someone likes the beat, they’ll buy it. In this case, they offered the beat to Yelawolf, who they had opened for. Yelawolf claimed to like it, and apparently did record over it… but about the same time got signed to Universal Music and nothing happened with the track (and the beat was never paid for). However, about a month ago, the Yelawolf track over the ATS beat got leaked — leading ATS to get upset about the lack of credit (and, one assumes, payment).

Some of the folks who participated in the Yelawolf track apologized and went public with a statement about how this track was not intended to be released and how leaks suck and how ATS definitely deserves credit. That statement also noted that ATS had (after not finding a buyer) recorded their own version of a song over the beat. And, indeed, soon after, ATS released their own official version…. but then UMG took it down. As far as I can tell, UMG apparently decided that because its act — Yelawolf — had recorded over this beat (despite not licensing it), it must own it… and because of that blocked ATS’s song — which was completely their own. It seems likely that UMG simply used the Yelawolf track with YouTube’s ContentID to block any tracks with the same music — but things got screwy when it turned out that neither UMG nor Yelawolf had actually licensed the beat.

Either way, in another report, ATS filed a complaint with YouTube… and was told, too bad, and that UMG owned the track. Eventually, as the story started spreading, someone at UMG realized the mistake and backed down.

But, in the short term, this really does (yet again) highlight one of the many problems of an aggressive takedown system. UMG clearly screwed up here and shut down an independent act’s own song — which, honestly, one of its own acts had infringed on the copyright for. This is really quite an amazing form of copyright abuse when you think about it: UMG artist fails to license beat on a song that is leaked… and then UMG claims copyright over the official song over the same beat. That’s definitely adding insult to injury — or, perhaps, adding injunction to infringement. While it appears that cooler heads prevailed and got this worked out eventually, it seems pretty crazy that any artist should have to deal with some giant industry conglomerate completely shutting down their own works based on bogus copyright claims.

Filed Under: after the smoke, copyright, licensing, takedowns, yelawolf, youtube
Companies: universal music, youtube