Top Court In Illinois Says Compelling Password Production Isn’t A Fifth Amendment Violation
from the [government-slowly-lowers-wrench] dept
Well, this is an unfortunate turn of events. The last time we discussed this issue in this state (March 2019), a state appeals court came to the opposite conclusion: compelling password production is a violation of rights.
That ruling said the foregone conclusion doctrine didn’t apply, at least not the way the state wanted it to apply. The state said the only thing it needed to show was that the phone likely belonged to the criminal suspect. If it could provide enough evidence linking the phone to the arrested person, and could make the reasonable assumption the device contained evidence, these conclusions would allow compelled password production to bypass the Fifth Amendment.
That’s not what’s actually at stake here, the appeals court replied. The government wasn’t interested in the passcode. It was actually interested in what the device contained, which it could access more easily if the defendant was forced to unlock it.
While the State is aware that the passcode existed and that Spicer knew it, the State could not know that the passcode was authentic until after it was used to decrypt Spicer’s phone. Moreover, the production of Spicer’s passcode would provide the State more information than what it already knew. Although the focus of the foregone conclusion is on the passcode, in our view, it properly should be placed on the information the State is ultimately seeking, which is not the passcode but everything on Spicer’s phone.
That was the call made by this appeals court in the Spicer case — a ruling that did not go so far as to call all compelled production a Fifth Amendment violation, but one that made it clear the “foregone conclusion” analysis should be applied to what the state is actually seeking, rather than what it assumes about phone ownership.
This decision (People v. Spicer) was applied by the district court in another criminal case. The court reached the same conclusion the appeals court did: compelled password production is a Fifth Amendment violation.
The state’s Supreme Court, however, has recently reversed that decision. (h/t FourthAmendment.com) And in doing so, it has not only nullified the findings in Spicer, but established precedent that says the only foregone conclusion the government needs is the one connecting the phone to the criminal suspect.
And it reaches its conclusion despite acknowledging the password is not really what the cops want. They want an unlocked phone so they can access everything inside of it. This is from the decision’s [PDF] discussion of the practical effects of the lower court’s ruling.
The search warrant issued allowing a search of defendant’s phone, and the circuit court entered an order denying the State’s motion to compel defendant to provide the passcode to the phone. In determining whether the circuit court’s order effectively quashed the search warrant, we observe that the definition of “quash” is “[t]o annul or make void; to terminate.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Here, the search warrant authorized officers to search defendant’s phone and required defendant to unlock the phone so officers could execute the warrant. The circuit court’s denial of the motion to compel eliminated the requirement for defendant to comply with the search warrant. As such, we conclude that the circuit court’s order annulled or voided the search warrant; thus, it had the substantive effect of quashing the search warrant.
We further conclude that the circuit court’s denial of the motion to compel effectively suppressed evidence. Although the denial did not directly suppress specifically identified evidence, it prevented the State from accessing any evidence on the phone and presenting it to the factfinder, thereby having the substantive effect of suppressing evidence.
The government didn’t want the passcode. It wanted an unlocked phone. The search to be performed did not target a passcode, but everything the passcode would provide access to. Police didn’t have much evidence connecting the seized phone to the alleged crime (forged checks being deposited via mobile deposit), but still insisted the defendant should be forced to unlock the phone. There wasn’t much in the way of any “foregone conclusions,” no matter which standard the lower court applied.
[Detective Todd] Ummel believed defendant’s phone contained a photograph of the checks, and he was “hoping to find” such a photograph. Ummel further sought additional files pertaining to the mobile deposits. He conceded, however, that he did not know for certain that any such files existed and that there was currently nothing connecting defendant to the transactions besides Spurling’s statements. Ummel added that he had not attempted to subpoena records from defendant’s cell phone carrier to obtain copies of text messages.
[…]
Applying those principles, the circuit court observed that Spurling’s statements were the only evidence linking defendant’s phone to the transactions in question and it would be speculative to presume that a photograph of the checks would remain on the phone after the transactions were complete. Though the circuit court did not perceive the State’s endeavor as a fishing expedition, it concluded that the State did not establish with reasonable particularity that, at the time it sought the act of production, it knew the evidence existed, the evidence was in defendant’s possession, and the evidence was authentic.
The appellate court (not the same one that handled the Spicer case) reversed the lower court’s decision, declaring compelled passcode production to be harmless in terms of the Fifth Amendment.
In this case, the appellate court declined to follow Spicer and concluded that the compelled production of the passcode is nontestimonial, reasoning that a passcode may be used so often that retrieving it “is a function of muscle memory rather than an exercise of conscious thought.” 2021 IL App (4th) 210180, ¶ 59. The appellate court asserted that “a cell phone passcode is more akin to a key to a strongbox than a combination to a safe.”
Having decided that this act was nontestimonial, it didn’t even bother to apply the foregone conclusion doctrine and skipped straight to siding with the government’s assertions. That led to this appeal, which asked the state Supreme Court to decide whether or not compelling password production violates Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination.
The state of Illinois had plenty of friends pitch in on its behalf:
Before proceeding with our analysis, we acknowledge that this court granted a motion of Indiana, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia (collectively, amici states) to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the State’s position on appeal.
So, there’s a handy list of states where governments feel citizens have too many constitutional protections… at least when it comes to phone searches. Good to know.
The state’s top court says producing a passcode is testimonial, but not testimonial enough. The Fifth Amendment does not apply.
To summarize, the State established that, at the time it sought the act of production, it knew with reasonable particularity that the passcode existed, the passcode was in defendant’s possession or control, and the passcode was self-authenticating. These implicit facts add “little or nothing to the sum total of the [State’s] information.” Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. In other words, the act of entering the passcode has no testimonial value, as the facts implicit in the act are already known by the State. Therefore, the facts are foregone conclusions and insufficiently testimonial to be privileged under the fifth amendment. For these reasons, we conclude that the foregone conclusion doctrine applies as an exception to the fifth amendment privilege in this case.
That’s the call. The dissent, however, says the majority is forgetting there’s another constitution in the mix here.
Because police have all the cell phone’s contents, they may use any means at their disposal to decrypt the contents but one: they must not compel Sneed to decrypt or translate the contents of the cell phone. The Illinois Constitution provides: “No person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself ***.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10. Prosecutors intend to use the decrypted contents to prove Sneed committed forgery. The appellate court’s order compels Sneed “in a criminal case to give evidence against himself,” and therefore it violates article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution.
The dissent goes on to point out investigators had other options. They just decided not to use them because it wasn’t worth the expense.
The Illinois State Police, De Witt County, and the Clinton Police Department understandably decided that the prosecution of Sneed for forging less than $1000 worth of checks did not justify the expense of hacking or commercial decryption. The circuit court’s order denying the State’s motion to compel Sneed to decrypt the cell phone’s contents left the police and prosecutors with a choice of either spending thousands in pursuit of decryption to lead to a conviction for a relatively minor offense or trying to obtain the conviction without the decryption.
But somehow the government is fine spending thousands on a single lowball prosecution in hopes that it might be easier in the future to bypass constitutional protections to engage in other lowball prosecutions.
And it worked. The state spent an untold amount of taxpayers’ money seeking precedent that diminished their constitutional protections. Now, it’s free to compel decryption in almost any criminal case, even if it has plenty of other means of obtaining evidence. The state wins. Illinoisans lose.
Filed Under: 5th amendment, compelled production, compelled speech, decryption, illinois, incrimination, passwords


Comments on “Top Court In Illinois Says Compelling Password Production Isn’t A Fifth Amendment Violation”
I don’t understand how the supreme court in Il is able to interpret exceptions to parts of a constitution that are as clear-cut as this one. The fifth amendment says, unambiguously, that “[N]o person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”. The fifth amendment of the US constitution says that “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Though there’s more to “unpack” in relation to the constitution of the US, the important part is “No person… shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” That’s, like… completely unambiguous. No exceptions. No “unless” or “except” parts. You cannot be forced to be a witness against yourself in a criminal case. End of discussion. Sometimes, I really wish courts would interpret the constitution at face value and literally, instead of trying to make exceptions where the language is completely unambiguous.
IANAL, and I think the state is right on this one. They are compelling the digital equivalent of a combination to a safe. It seems like this would be more about search and seizures, not the 5th.
Re:
forcing you to give your password is testifying against yourself, that’s why the 5th applies here. If they can’t connect the phone to the crime, but can force you to prove that it was, that’s forcing you to incriminate yourself.
By the way, they CAN’T force you to give up your safe passcode, that’s been well esteablished that they have to force/crack it to get in, because making you give the passcode violates the 5th amendment.
Re: Re:
Help a Canadian to understand this:
How does this work/how is it different, when the issue is the police/court demanding that the suspect produce the physical key to a safe, rather than the combination to a safe, or the pass-code to a cellphone?
Re: Re: Re:
Arguably, it isn’t. But case law indicates that “testifying against oneself” applies solely to communications, and the court seems to uphold that in this instance. It’s absurd, since I would think that forcing you to provide (any) evidence that would result in the incrimination of yourself would be a violation, but apparently not.
Re: Re: Re:2
Carrying the keys to the safe analogy further, it seems there is (in your view) an important distinction between knowledge (of a password to a phone) and possession (of keys to a safe). In my view, either one is evidence of ownership or at least custody of the object of the search.
What is the case law if someone refuses to turn over the keys to a safe or file cabinet? Do defendants turn over keys to locations of incriminating evidence primarily to avoid property damage? In the latter case, the “ability to decrypt the phone” argument seems more relevant as an analog to cracking a safe.
Re: Re: Re:3
This is where I think the courts get it wrong – with the disconnect between ownership and participation.
Evidence of ownership can (and should) be used to establish guilt regarding the relevance of whatever evidence is in the container (digital or physical), but compelling the defendant to participate in any way in the prosecution getting access to that evidence is forcing them to be a witness against themselves and provide evidence against themselves, which should be considered a constitutional violation.
That the defendant’s ownership of the container can be established should make the unconstitutional nature of any compelled action all the more obvious.
Re: Re: Re:4
The “Foregone Conclusion Doctrine” seems to say otherwise, like it or not. If the government coerces a defendant tell them if there is something illegal on a phone, and the defendant refuses, they should be protected. If the government reasonably knows it’s already there, not so much. It seems to be a fairly narrow exception, to my tiny brain. If a defendant hides a phone, and refuses to tell the government where it is, they should be protected.
Re: Re: Re:5
If the government knows that the evidence is one the phone with 100% certainty, they do not need to get into the phone, as they already have what they want from somewhere else.
Re: Re: Re:6
Reasonably knows, not 100% certainty. If they have a phone tap of the defendant saying that he put child porn on his phone, you could reasonably infer that it’s there. Not 100% certain.
Re: Re: Re:
The distinction seems pretty obvious to me. A key is a physical object; a combination is knowledge. Giving a key isn’t “testifying.” Testifying requires transfering knowledge from my brain to the public record.
So while the cops can take a key from me and use it to open my safe, they can’t make me tell them where the key is, because a) that’s testifying, and b) they can’t prove that I know.
Same with a safe (or phone) combination. Knowledge in my head cannot be compelled if it’s going to be used against me.
That’s part of the problem with this ruling. Another part is that “I forget” is a vaiable defense. Sure, you’ll probably be held in contempt. But I’d take this shit to the Supreme Court, and then I still wouldn’t tell them my code.
Re:
Pretty sure the cops just call in a locksmith if you refuse to open a lock which they have a warrant to open. So yeah, that’s what they should do for phones too.
Re: combination to a safe
Not a bad analogy. And if the state cannot set forth in its warrant application what is in that safe, it probably should not be rummaging around in there to see what it can find.
It is not inevitable that you are going to discover the contents of a safe, or of a car phone. Someone has to let you in.
For all I know, the safe contains pictures of where the bodies are. So does the car phone. And the suspect is in the pictures with the bodies. Discovery is inevitable if there is a second set of prints, marked ``back-up of pictures in safe/on car phone”, and the cops have that second set.
Do your brain exercises, Illinois.
This has big “show us where you buried the body” energy. I legit forgot my passcode recently which I’ve been using for a good long while. The harder I though, the less I could remember it. Very frustrating. And I wasn’t under the added stress of being charged with failure to remember what the cops want right now.
Also seems off that the bigger the crime, the more rights you have since they’ll just crack the phone instead of squeezing you for info.
Workaround
I guess, when creating a passcode, you could always make it an admission of a crime. Such as, “I shoplifted a hairband from Claire’s”
Not sure if this really helps, but it sure would be interesting to find out.
Re: forcing the state to violate your rights.
you bring up a great point. they are compelling the defendant to unlock the phone. something they have attributed to being muscle memory and performative, something you do, and ,even though the first amendment would call that speech, the court is saying it isn’t testimony that they are compelling, and therefore not a violation of 5th amendment rights to self incrimination. But what if the defense forced the issue in the court record by specifically complying with the compelled court order by providing a signed affidavit testifying that, under duress by the state, the pass code to the phone is xxtz. if they use the information, anything derived from the decrypted contents are now fruit of the poison tree.
Check images?
I’ve done a lot of mobile deposits and I do not ever remember the images staying on the phone. They’re uploaded to the bank.
I suppose it might be useful to find that there was a bank app on the phone set up to log into the suspect’s account, but that’s not what they said they’re looking for.
Illinois SC: 'Constitutional rights' are more guidelines than rules...
To answer the question of ‘Is forcing someone to provide their password a fifth amendment violation?’ one need only ask the following: Would those demanding a password be willing to trade it for legal immunity regarding any and all contents the password grants access to?
Since the answer is a resounding ‘No‘ because the entire point of getting the password is to use the contents it unlocks against the one being forced it should be clear to any judge the matter comes before that forcing someone to provide a password is absolutely a fifth amendment violation.
Compelled Kibitzing During Search Warrant
“Officer, be sure to check my underwear drawer. That’s where I hide the important stuff.”
“Oh! Don’t forget the freezer. Check the packages labeled Steak.”
I’m not an attorney. So I really should not be lawyering. I prefer a Lawyer doesn’t computer (less they know how, with proof of education and evidence of real world experience) so I owe it to return the consideration.
In my non-lawyer view, it’s a difference of what I have (a key, a face, a voice or fingerprint, a blood level alcohol) verses what I know (the elements of a crime).
The US government is prohibited from forcing me to make their legal case against me by requiring that I recite anything I know about the elements of the crime I commit. If they can’t do it without my help, they don’t have a good enough case to put me in prison.
They is yet another example of Magic Computer Pixie Dust. Give a wild, carefree dance while throwing that magical “With a computer” dust around and suddenly the world is topsy turvy and the old rules and bylaws are meaningless. Utter, complete, stinking to high Heaven, full quill B.U.L.L.S.H.I.T. I wish people (And courts!) would STOP thinking merely sticking “With a computer” on it changes any damn thing.
That said, my memory is going because of an illegal habit I have, so I can’t remember that damn password. The habit that affects my memory? Why, it’s a crime.
You can’t make me tell you. If I could remember what it was.
Professional criminals
When it comes to strongboxes, there are key-locks that are difficult enough to require a specialist locksmith which can get expensive or impossible to call in. They can use a hot lance, but that could damage the evidence, especially if one keeps a block of thermite in with those documents.
I suspect there are also ways to make sure we don’t know what the key is.
When it comes to password-secured phones, there are encryption packages that allow for multiple accounts, and a determined mobster could assure that one of them only has recent record of call to mom.
I don’t know at all how forgone conclusion doctrine works. If the court actually knows what evidence is on the phone, I’d think they don’t need to see it. If they need to see the evidence on the phone, it’s not a forgone conclusion, rather speculation by a bogus informant or something. Law enforcement commonly lies to courts in order to get warrants of false pretenses and secure false convictions. This only sounds like another vector of corrupt abuse.
Re: Professional criminals, continued
That said, the capacity for phones to have multiple accounts means the court can assert a phone has yet another account with this uncovered evidence, and hold someone in contempt (for fourteen years) for failing to unlock the phone so that the evidence is revealed.
Re: The key could be a mushroom or a giraffe.
otoh
Maybe Im misunderstanding. They had a warrant to search the phone but the warrant didnt include the password. Is that correct? Then Id think forcing him to give up the password would be like forcing someone to open their front door to officers that had a warrant to search the house. Its implied even if not openly stated.
Wait, the court establishes in their fact-finding that there is not enough to go by the “foregone conclusion” doctrine, then continues on to admit that a password is testimonial evidence…
… only to conlude that the “foregone conclusion” applies and a password is ” insufficiently testimonial”?
Are they insane? Or is it simply a case of them writing the conclusion they like before writing the rest of their decision, not even paying attention to the conclusion they decided on at first?
This comment has been flagged by the community. Click here to show it.
Top Court In Illinois Says Compelling Password Production Isn’t A Fifth Amendment Violation
The recent ruling by the top court in Illinois regarding compelling password production raises important questions about the intersection of digital privacy and constitutional rights. While the court’s decision may not be seen as a Fifth Amendment violation, it sparks a broader conversation about the balance between law enforcement needs and individual rights. The implications of this ruling on privacy and the protection of personal information are worth considering, especially in an increasingly digital age where the boundaries of privacy are continually being tested.
My experiences at The Apparel Factory have been amazing. The store has a wide selection of high-quality wholesale clothing that exceeded my expectations. The staff is friendly and helpful, providing excellent customer service. It has become my go-to place for fashionable outfits and a memorable shopping experience.
When it doubt...
Constitutionally protected rights should win out over making a cop’s job easier.
A search warrant for my home does not obligate me to give the police officer keys.
It’s really amazing how simple this was and how wrong they got it.
Really?
A lock is a lock is a lock. The nature of a lock does not change the applicability of the Fifth Amendment.
Plead the Fifth
Depending on the nature of the crime, why not take the penalty for contempt of court instead of self incrimination for submitting passwords. Or, perhaps just say you have forgotten the passwords. How can it be proven you didn’t?