Funniest/Most Insightful Comments Of The Week At Techdirt

from the what's-the-word dept

This week, our first place winner on the insightful side is an anonymous comment about New York’s blatantly unconstitutional investigation into online platforms in the wake of the Buffalo shooting:

So, what the’re saying is…

This guy was able to leave a HUGE trail of information about his hate crimes… But now they want to demonize the same platforms where he left all this information instead of being thankful for the huge amount of information he was able to leave for law enforcement to follow.

Isn’t that basically cutting off your nose to spite your face?

You’ll never get rid of haters and trolls, but by pushing them into the darker parts of the internet, you’re reducing the effective methods of tracing their past actions should they become actual criminals rather than just trolls.

In second place, it’s another anonymous comment, this time in response to the tired old complaint about platforms and free speech:

If I tell people who enter my house that they can’t talk about something I don’t like, and someone talks about something I don’t like, I can kick them out, even if they’re unaware that I don’t like it. I’m not violating any of their rights by doing so.

Twitter can do the same in their house.

Why is this so hard for you to understand?

For editor’s choice on the insightful side, we start with a comment from JMT in response to the claim that Section 230’s legitimacy is called into question by the fact that the Supreme Court has never ruled on it:

The fact that there’s never been a circuit split to trigger a Supreme Court appeal proves the strength of the S230.

Next, it’s Naughty Autie with a response to another tired old type of comment, about platforms versus publishers:

When I upload a story to AO3, I’m the publisher of that story, not AO3. Similarly, when someone uploads a video to YouTube, they’re the publisher of that video, not YouTube. Get it yet, or are you going to carry on down the fastlane of stupid?

Over on the funny side, our first place winner is Tribune with a comment about politicians who blame video games for mass shootings:

Former San Francisco politician Leland Yee made a career of claiming that videogames cause violence until he was arrested for running guns to the Philippines.

In second place, it’s Stephen T. Stone with a response to our post suggesting that we should elect fewer stupid people:

Then how will Republicans win elections? 🙃

For editor’s choice on the funny side, we start out with a comment from PaulT in response to another commenter pointing out that someone’s source was “a very, very out of context and misleading Project Veritas video”:

Wait, did I miss the time they had another type of video?

Finally, it’s Thad with one more comment about blaming video games for the Buffalo shooting:

I’ve played a lot of video games and generally when there are nazis in them they’re the bad guys.

That’s all for this week, folks!


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Comments on “Funniest/Most Insightful Comments Of The Week At Techdirt”

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72 Comments
ECA (profile) says:

it never ends

as to the comment on killings?
HOW about the FBI is Embarrassed?
1. They didnt notice something they(?) are supposed to be monitoring for?
2. They didnt program him, as they did OTHER people for the previous incidents.

As to Publishing.
If you create a comment and Publish it, its YOUR responsibility.
If you grab someone else’s comment, and Publish it, its Not quite yours.
If you created the video, its your. If you take another persons Vid and publish it, its Still not Yours.
In the final part you Should post a link to the comment or Vid you copied over.

We are getting to Such a Fine line of He/she said, and how FAR 1 persons Idea/Ideal Becomes another persons. Opinion is the collection of Thoughts, from your OWN history.
What comes out your mouth? What is it?
Isnt an opinion your Choice to say? or unless designated as an IDEA/… ITS YOU SAYING IT. and if what you have collected isnt complete? A Lie? Over simplification? What is it?
PITA isnt it?

Naughty Autie says:

Re:

As to Publishing:
If you create a comment and publish it, it’s YOUR responsibility.
If you grab someone else’s comment, and publish it, it’s not quite yours.
If you created the video, it’s yours. If you take another person’s vid and publish it, it’s still not yours.

And in both cases, the uploader is the publisher, not the platform they publish to. I’m sorry, what was your point again?

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Hyman Rosen (profile) says:

Free Speech

As usual, the woke ideologues who adore the viewpoint-based censorship the big platforms are providing for them are hiding behind the 1st Amendment. That the platforms are legally permitted to perform viewpoint-based censorship does not mean that they should be doing that, or that they can avoid criticism for doing that.

Freedom of speech is not defined by the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment is a partial implementation of freedom of speech, directed against governments. Freedom of speech is a broader concept, and outsourcing censorship to private companies not bound by the 1st Amendment is a violation of the freedom of speech of the people being censored, distinct from the freedom of speech of the censors.

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glenn says:

Re:

Conservatives have lost the meaning of “house rules,” which basically has always meant “my house, my rules.” According to conservatives now, all houses belong to them so they get to make the rules to suit themselves. To these conservatives only their own rights matter; everyone else can go pound sand.

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Anonymous Coward says:

Re:

outsourcing censorship to private companies not bound by the 1st Amendment is a violation of the freedom of speech of the people being censored

Okay, NeoNazi.

Where and when has the US Government actually badgered ANY news company, publisher, email provider, ISP, TV network they do not own, cellphone company and/or social media provider to remove speech?

Be specific.

Anonymous Coward says:

Re:

Freedom of speech is not defined by the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment is a partial implementation of freedom of speech, directed against governments. Freedom of speech is a broader concept, and outsourcing censorship to private companies not bound by the 1st Amendment is a violation of the freedom of speech of the people being censored, distinct from the freedom of speech of the censors.

If you’re admitting that your interpretation of freedom of speech isn’t covered by the ruling document that forms the basis for our government, then you’re admitting you’re wanting to impose a non-legal concept on others through laws and the courts. You might as well be telling us your religion requires other people to give you a platform and an audience because that has as much clout as your claim (that amount being none whatsoever).

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Joachim Martillo (user link) says:

Illegitimacy and Illogic of 47 U.S. Code § 230

CDA caselaw is inherently illegitimate. The CDA says nothing about editorial discretion but does say when an Interactive Computer Service (ICS) cannot be considered to be a publisher. The CDA says an ICS is a publisher and has unfettered editorial discretion to remove a user or his content only if one uses the logical fallacy of denial of the antecedent to interpret the statute.

From Petition to SCOTUS for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit Before Judgment [21–6916].

While the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit has been busy in the effort to create a circuit split over § 230, my fiancée and I have been working on splitting the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit from ridiculous CDA caselaw.

In District Court, I spent a good deal of time in the effort of explaining the correct meaning of the CDA without net neutrality fanaticism.

From Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration [1:21-cv-11119-RGS].

We are trying to create a case that SCOTUS will be interested in reviewing.

[I am to be blamed for typos and less than perfect phrasing. I can’t write something concisely in 10 words when I can write it in 100 words.]

List of Important Litigation Documents

[We are counter-punchers and the later Reply Briefs are probably better argued than the earlier filings.]

  1. Original Complaint [1:21-cv-11119-RGS]
  2. District Court Orders
  3. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
  4. Reconsideration Exhibits
  5. District Court Reconsideration Denial
  6. Appellant’s Brief [21-1921]
  7. Appellant’s Appendix
  8. Petition to SCOTUS for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit Before Judgment [21–6916]
  9. Petition’s Appendix
  10. Twitter’s Appellee’s Brief
  11. Appellant’s Reply Brief to Twitter
  12. Medium’s Appellee’s Brief
  13. Appellant’s Reply Brief to Medium

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Anonymous Coward says:

Re:

That nobody with any understanding of CDA 230 has ever made or could ever make such claims mist be why the docket shows this bullshit case keeps getting laughed out of every court and the Supreme Court already denied cert for that illiterate idiocy.

https://dockets.justia.com/docket/massachusetts/madce/1:2021cv11119/236205

The only illegitimacy and illogic is obviously in Joachim’s anti-constitutional-law fanaticism.

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ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Understanding Makes a Difference

I am not challenging the CDA. There is nothing wrong with the CDA. The caselaw is mostly broken and makes no sense for an assortment of reasons.

  1. The Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit based the ruling in Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) on the logical fallacy, which is a form of inverse error and which is called denial of the antecedent.
  2. None of the Plaintiffs in the cases, which try to apply common carriage law, had much understanding of common carriage law.
  3. None of the Plaintiffs in the cases, which try to apply civil rights law, had much understanding of its application in the context of common carriage.
  4. None of the Plaintiffs, who tried to apply the 1964 CRA understood how the Internet/WWW and its services operate.

I am the first plaintiff that understands:
1. the operation of the Internet/WWW,
2. propositional calculus,
3. common carriage law,
4. civil rights law, and
5. public accommodation law.

I also understand the First Amendment.

My complaint has no connection to the First Amendment whatsoever.

Show me how much you understand the First Amendment.

Which of the following statutes violates the First Amendment?

  • 42 U.S. Code § 2000a,
  • 42 U.S. Code § 1981,
  • 42 U.S. Code § 1982,
  • 42 U.S. Code § 1983,
  • Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159 § 1, and
  • Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159 § 2.

A First Amendment argument does not provide a defense to a civil charge either of public accommodation discrimination, of a civil rights infraction, or of a common carriage violation.

U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 176 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2010) lists the traditional exceptions to the First Amendment.

“From 1791 to the present,” however, the First Amendment has “permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,” and has never “include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.” Id., at 382–383, 112 S.Ct. 2538. These “historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar,” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment) — including obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), defamation, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–255, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952), fraud, Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–449, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (per curiam), and speech integral to criminal conduct, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949)—are “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942).

Yet, the First Amendment only provides a limited restriction on the power of Congress to enact a law.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

For example, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, of which § 2000a is an element, limits the ability of a restaurateur to express himself by refusing to serve blacks because nowhere within its statutory text does § 2000a abridge the freedom of speech (expression). § 2000a regulates conduct, which is associated with interstate commerce.

Not one of the other listed statutes abridges the freedom of speech (expression).

The regulation of interstate commerce is an enumerated power of the US federal government.

Because the District Court Judge understood my legal reasoning, he tried to bury my complaint as quickly as he could by means of a truly specious argument.

Because the former Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit understood my legal reasoning, he was trying to hurry the case along.

SCOTUS denied cert because the case was not ripe for review. I was letting SCOTUS know that I am cultivating the case.

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ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:2 A Lower Court Has So Ruled

The Massachusetts District Court agreed with me when I argued that Twitter, LinkedIn, Facebook, A Medium Corp, The Harvard Crimson, and the Stanford Daily were all providing a common carriage service. The Court incorrectly held on the basis of an irrelevant voice precedent that I had no monetary claim under MGL c. 159, s. 1 & s. 2.

It should surprise no one that there is an ongoing appeal in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Twitter was confused in its Appellee’s Brief and argued that it was not a federal telecommunications common carrier. Twitter was distressed that I was asking for ~ $3,000,000 in penalties to be paid to me.

In my reply brief, I explained basic common carriage law to Twitter.

Although the FCC may determine that an entity is not providing FCC-regulated telecommunications common carriage with respect to a service, it may still provide common carriage with respect to the service from the standpoint either of federal law or of state law.

I also pointed out that my original estimate of the penalty, which Twitter owes to me, was low.

Each tweet represents multiple requests for common carriage because each source destination pair constitutes an individual request for common carriage.

Electronic transmission or carriage of digital personal literary property has been well understood since the 1840s.

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ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:4 Please Learn the Definition of Common Carriage

Carriage qualifies to be common carriage if carriage is held out
1. to the public,
2. under uniform terms,
3. for a fee.

Common carriage differs from contract carriage, which is individualized.

An amusement park, which offers roller coaster rides to the public, holds out a common carriage service.

California allows the fee to be $0, and there are California state decisions that hold the owner of an escalator or of an elevator provides common carriage.

The fee can be paid in barter or in work.

Work for passage on a freighter is an example of work-for-carriage common carriage.

When I use a major social medium platform, I pay the fee by barter or by work because I exchange “eye-on-the-page” for carriage. “Eyes-on-the-page” is a valuable commodity. If a major social medium platform wishes to escape common carriage obligation, it need only cease to monetize “eyes-on-the-page”.

Otherwise, a social medium platform, which makes money by common carriage, must obey common carriage law.

Stephen T. Stone (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:5

Again: How does all that bullshit make Twitter a “common carrier” in the sense that the government can force Twitter to carry all legally protected speech? Anything other than a direct legal citation that says “a social media service can be legally compelled by the government to host speech it otherwise wouldn’t” will not be considered a valid answer.

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ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:6 Please Learn the Definitions

The definition of valid answer makes no sense. A social medium service has no legal definition. Message carriage has been a matter of state or colony law since the colonial times. In the 1850s this law was extended to electronic transmission of digital literary property by telegraph.

Under message common carriage law, carriage of a digital literary property by tweet service does not differ substantially from carriage of a digital literary property by a telegraph service. Just as the 1869 Massachusetts common carriage law was extended to telex service, email service, and PSPDN message service, it is extended to tweet service.

A law would have to be enacted for Twitter to be freed from obligation under existing law.

Twitter carries neither analog speech (e.g. POTS) nor digital speech (e.g. ISDN or DMI).

The FCC regulates telecommunications common carriers, and the Federal government has made it illegal to discriminate in the interstate common carriage of such speech. See USC Title 47.

Such speech is usually not considered merchandise, an item, or property for the purpose of common carriage law.

Speech via VOIP (or other digitization with packetization) is treated in a separate category.

Intrastate carriage of above speech types is a matter of state law and local phone companies are under state common carriage law or state public utility law. State common carriage law and state public utility law forbid discrimination among customers.

Twitter carries or transports digital literary property. For example, in Massachusetts common carriage of digital literary property is governed by MGL c. 159, s. 1 and s. 2. These statutes also govern the carriage either of a digital message by a telegraph or of a message by Fedex on a paper substrate.

Neither Twitter, a telegraph company, nor Fedex may discriminate among members of the public.

Stephen T. Stone (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:7

Neither Twitter, a telegraph company, nor Fedex may discriminate among members of the public.

Insofar as Twitter can’t violate non-discrimination laws, yes, that is true. But in every other aspect, Twitter can absolutely discriminate⁠—it can refuse to host certain kinds of speech and it can boot people who refuse to follow Twitter’s terms of service. None of what you’re saying refutes that central point, and you need to refute that central point if you want me to take you seriously.

Please cite the exact and specific law, statute, or “common law” court precedent⁠—including the text thereof⁠—that says the government can legally compel a privately owned open-to-the-public interactive web service (e.g., Twitter) to host any and all legally protected speech. I have three citations from within the past five years, one of which is from the Supreme Court, that either heavily imply or explicitly state the government can’t do that. What do you have?

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Stephen T. Stone (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:7

The court adds that both the Title II and common carrier claims, if otherwise meritorious, would be preempted by Section 230. The court says simply: “The defendants’ alleged blocking of content posted by Martillo and disabling of his account are editorial decisions protected by the CDA.” (Source)

You’re relying on the wrong case, kid. Try again.

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ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:8 The Case Continues

The District Court agreed that Twitter was a common carrier by Massachusetts law. He denied that there was a fine for denial of voice common carriage. He was on thin ice — one possible reason for a dismissal without prejudice.

The dismissal is being appealed because I am trying to force the First Circuit

  1. to acknowledge that CDA caselaw is rooted in the logical fallacy of denial of the antecedent and
  2. to issue an opinion on 47 U.S. Code § 230 (c)(2)(A) — something, which the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has studiously avoided.

I am arguing with Twitter and with A Medium Corp in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

The Court may have been hoping that Twitter and Medium would demolish my arguments. I demolished their arguments with respect to Common Carriage Law, Civil Rights Law, and Public Accommodation Law. Now everything is stopped. The Court of Appeals may be waiting for some guidance from SCOTUS because no one in the First Circuit has the stomach to create a circuit split.

For the record Medium did a better job of briefing and arguing than Twitter did.

Alito or his clerks have already seen my arguments but have not seen anything from a defendant because every defendant declined to respond to the petition for certiorari.

I am also arguing that each defendant provides a public accommodation under the 1964 CRA.

I made a number of arguments to this point, but to my mind the following is the strongest.

The Internet/WWW is a state-supported establishment that has a definite identifiable structure that can be mapped to a location that has sublocations all over the planet. The Internet/WWW has premises that have buildings with grounds or appurtenances throughout the United States of America. The premises of the Internet/WWW may temporarily include premises of a user, whose device connects to the Internet/WWW. Since the 1950s the Internet/WWW, which has evolved from the ARPANET, was intended to become a place of accommodation for resource sharing. Now it is public, and because every defendant is within the Interner/WWW, which is a state-supported place of public accommodation, each defendant is a place of public accommodation.

The litigation isn’t over until it’s over, and because the original dismissal was without prejudice, I can file again.

I can also re-petition SCOTUS for certiorari when the case in the Court of Appeals completes.

It’s also possible that Ketanji Brown Jackson could participate in the First Circuit panel. It would be cool.

Stephen T. Stone (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:9

The District Court agreed that Twitter was a common carrier by Massachusetts law.

No. No, it did not. Per the ruling, emphasis mine:

Martillo also claims that the defendants violated a Massachusetts common carrier law which provides that “[e]very common carrier of merchandise or other property” “shall not discriminate against any particular person or subject him to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.” … The defendants are not common carriers of “merchandise or other property” for purposes of this 1869 law.

Further, even if Martillo had stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a or the state common carrier law, the defendants would be immune from such claims under the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230. The CDA provides in relevant part: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of … any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material” “that the provider or user considers to be lewd, lascivious, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” … This provision “‘precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role,’ and therefore bars ‘lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions – such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content.’” … The defendants’ alleged blocking of content posted by Martillo and disabling of his account are editorial decisions protected by the CDA.

But please, tell me again how the ruling says what it doesn’t say. Go ahead, bullshit me some more as if I’m an illiterate dumbfuck, see how far that gets you.

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ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:10 Did you read the authority?

Why didn’t the District Court apply the three-prong test to argue that a Defendant was not a common carrier?

Instead he accepted the common carrier characterization and argued against the fee by asserting that a defendant does not carry merchandise or other property. The authority points out that voice is neither merchandise nor property. (Who was referring to voice?)

He need only have pointed that a prong was absent to rule that a defendant is not a common carrier, but I am correct.

Each defendant holds out message carriage
1. to the public
2. under uniform non-individualized terms
3. for a fee, which can be considered work or barter (“eyes-on-a-page”).

Each defendant is a message common carrier.

Stephen T. Stone (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:11

Each defendant is a message common carrier.

And yet, the court said “[t]he defendants are not common carriers of ‘merchandise or other property’ for purposes of this 1869 law”. Key word: NOT.

Show me where that specific ruling directly and explicitly says otherwise. Show me a law, statute, or court ruling that directly and explicitly says Twitter is a common carrier. If you can’t do that, get lost⁠—your opinions are neither facts nor legal precedent.

Toom1275 (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:12

As a reminder of how it works in the real world:

Message is published by the user.
The message is conveyed from the source (the user) to its destination (Twitter) by the actual common carrier here, the ISPs. After its conveyance, the transit ends with the message residing on twitter’s servers.

A viewer then requests to see twitter’s content, so twitter (the source) sends a copy of the content to the common carrier (Again, the ISPs) to be delivered to the endpoint viewer.

Anyone who understands how websites work will notice the basic fact of how twitter relies on common carriers and does not in any way act as one.

bhull242 (profile) says:

Re:

CDA caselaw is inherently illegitimate. The CDA says nothing about editorial discretion […]

It doesn’t need to, nor is there any reason why it would.

[…] but does say when an Interactive Computer Service (ICS) cannot be considered to be a publisher.

False; it says when an ICS cannot be held liable as a publisher for specific content.

The CDA says an ICS is a publisher and has unfettered editorial discretion to remove a user or his content only if one uses the logical fallacy of denial of the antecedent to interpret the statute.

Please explain the fallacy then.

While the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit has been busy in the effort to create a circuit split over § 230, my fiancée and I have been working on splitting the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit from ridiculous CDA caselaw.

So what?

In District Court, I spent a good deal of time in the effort of explaining the correct meaning of the CDA without net neutrality fanaticism.

I just read it, and amazingly, everything you said in it is wrong. I would love to dissect it to explain why it’s all wrong, but that would be a monumental task, especially in a space like this. But yeah, it fails right out of the gate by failing to understand that “virtual” and “virtual space” are not “places” in legal terms or common-sense terms, failing to understand how technology actually works, failing to adequately explain how an arcade is supposed to be even remotely analogous to the internet (which it isn’t) or how such an idea supports any of your other contentions (so it was pointless to bring up in the first place), failing to understand that computers were much, much smaller than a room by the time the CDA was passed, that no one has ever referred to a computer as a place like you suggest, and so on. As someone who codes for a living, I can tell you that you haven’t the slightest idea what you’re talking about.

Seriously, none of that is how anything works.

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ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Did you study propositional calculus?

Logical Fallacy

The simple statement of the inverse fallacy is the following.

(p → q)
∴ (q → p)

The above form is sometimes called affirmation of the consequent.
Zeran applied the inverse fallacy in contrapositive form.

(p → q)
∴ (¬p → ¬q)

In this form the inverse fallacy is sometimes called denial of the antecedent.
In the Zeran appellate decision,

  1. p represents “a social medium ICS is accused of defamation or of a similar act”,
  2. ¬p represents “a social medium ICS is not accused of defamation or of a similar act”,
  3. q represents “a social medium ICS is not a publisher”, and
  4. ¬q represents “a social medium ICS is a publisher”.

The decision assumes the following principles with respect to publisher liability and editorial discretion.

  1. A non-publisher has no liability and no unfettered editorial discretion.
  2. A publisher has liability and unfettered editorial discretion.

The Zeran decision court combines the inverse fallacy with 47 U.S. Code § 230 (c)(1) to yield the following.

  1. If a social medium ICS is accused of defamation or of a similar act, the social medium ICS has no publisher’s liability [for libel or slander, which is present in third party content].
  2. If a social medium ICS is not accused of defamation or of a similar act, the social medium ICS has a publisher’s unfettered editorial discretion [to remove a user or his content].

The above fallacious interpretation of a clause within a statute is not judicial but is ideological and seems to be a covert possibly unconscious attempt unjustifiably to inject net neutrality into the federal statute even though Congress never legislated net neutrality into this statute. If the federal judiciary interprets the law on the basis of the inverse fallacy, the federal judiciary violates the U.S. Constitution Article I Section I by legislating and teaches the public that the inverse fallacy is a reasonable basis of law.[1]

Footnote

[1]Both the Appellant’s Brief (p. 30a) and also the Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Reconsideration (p. 144a). contain a more detailed discussion of the use of logical fallacy in creating § 230 caselaw.

Stephen T. Stone (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:

None of that explains how Twitter is a common carrier. None of that cites any law, statute, or court ruling that directly and explicitly says Twitter is a common carrier. You’re not dealing with a bunch of dumbfucks who are going to kiss your ass because you say a bunch of fancy words to disguise how you have no point⁠—either make a coherent point with citations of actual facts or get lost.

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ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:2 Three-Prong Test Says It All

Neither Twitter nor Medium challenged me when I asserted that it provides service in exchange for “eyes-on-a-page”. Both firms have discussed the value of “eyes-on-a-page” in SEC filings.

Each defendant holds out message carriage
1. to the public
2. under uniform non-individualized terms
3. for a fee, which can be considered work or barter (“eyes-on-a-page”).

Each defendant is a message common carrier.

Stephen T. Stone (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:3

Has a court ruled as much? Has a law or statute that stood up to legal scrutiny said as much? Give me an actual, specific, on-the-record legal citation that says Twitter is a common carrier. Your legal filings don’t count; neither does the Massachusetts case you point keep pointing to (which explicitly says the opposite of what you think it says).

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:4 Obviously I am addressing an Internet/WWW Context

Page means web page.

If I discuss a bridge in a networking context, I do not mean a suspension bridge or any other type of bridge over water.

If you don’t like to “eyes-on-a-page” as payment for social medium message common carriage, a user also provides the social medium platform with user content in exchange for social medium message common carriage.

I allude to this exchange in my Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Reconsideration. User content is not as valuable as “eyes on a page”, but if you don’t understand what a social medium platform considers really valuable, user content is part of the exchange that the user makes with the social medium for common carriage.

ThorsProvoni (profile) says:

Re: Re: Re:2 How Can Anyone Claim to Know Computer Science Without Knowing Propositional Calculus?

Denial of the Antecedent has nothing to do with law per se although a legal decision should be logical.

Denial of the Antecent is a special case of the Inverse Fallacy.

The other case is Affirmation of the Consequent.

Why don’t you google the inverse fallacy?

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