I am not challenging the CDA. There is nothing wrong with the CDA. The caselaw is mostly broken and makes no sense for an assortment of reasons.

1. The Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit based the ruling in Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) on the logical fallacy, which is a form of inverse error and which is called denial of the antecedent.
2. None of the Plaintiffs in the cases, which try to apply common carriage law, had much understanding of common carriage law.
3. None of the Plaintiffs in the cases, which try to apply civil rights law, had much understanding of its application in the context of common carriage.
4. None of the Plaintiffs, who tried to apply the 1964 CRA understood how the Internet/WWW and its services operate.

I am the first plaintiff that understands:
1. the operation of the Internet/WWW,
2. propositional calculus,
3. common carriage law,
4. civil rights law, and
5. public accommodation law.

I also understand the First Amendment.

My complaint has no connection to the First Amendment whatsoever.

Show me how much you understand the First Amendment.

Which of the following statutes violates the First Amendment?

• 42 U.S. Code § 2000a,
• 42 U.S. Code § 1981,
• 42 U.S. Code § 1982,
• 42 U.S. Code § 1983,
• Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159 § 1, and
• Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159 § 2.

A First Amendment argument does not provide a defense to a civil charge either of public accommodation discrimination, of a civil rights infraction, or of a common carriage violation.

U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 176 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2010) lists the traditional exceptions to the First Amendment.

“From 1791 to the present,” however, the First Amendment has “permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,” and has never “include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.” Id., at 382–383, 112 S.Ct. 2538. These “historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar,” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment) — including obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), defamation, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–255, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952), fraud, Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–449, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (per curiam), and speech integral to criminal conduct, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949)—are “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942).

Yet, the First Amendment only provides a limited restriction on the power of Congress to enact a law.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

For example, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, of which § 2000a is an element, limits the ability of a restaurateur to express himself by refusing to serve blacks because nowhere within its statutory text does § 2000a abridge the freedom of speech (expression). § 2000a regulates conduct, which is associated with interstate commerce.

Not one of the other listed statutes abridges the freedom of speech (expression).

The regulation of interstate commerce is an enumerated power of the US federal government.

Because the District Court Judge understood my legal reasoning, he tried to bury my complaint as quickly as he could by means of a truly specious argument.

Because the former Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit understood my legal reasoning, he was trying to hurry the case along.

SCOTUS denied cert because the case was not ripe for review. I was letting SCOTUS know that I am cultivating the case.