יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق 's Techdirt Comments

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  • On the post: Texas’ Ridiculous Content Moderation Bill Put On Hold Until The Supreme Court Can Consider It

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 14 Oct, 2022 @ 04:09am

    Moody v. Netchoice is in the Certpool

    I can see Moody v. Netchoice in the Eleventh Circuit Certpool. In the Fifth Circuit Certpool, I did not notice anything that is related to a social medium platform.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 13 Oct, 2022 @ 10:19pm

    What Makes Amazon Whole Foods a Provider of Common Carriage

    Amazon Whole Foods holds out carriage (of groceries = merchandise or food property) under standard terms for a fee. The issue is probably clear to the average 7-year-old.

    So, essentially, he believes a mail order company is a common carrier if it charges a shipping fee.
    Amazon Whole Foods provides common carriage as well as groceries if I pay for shipping.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 13 Oct, 2022 @ 09:41pm

    Look at the Depraved White Racist Spin Nonsense!

    Has the depraved white racist used Outlook Mail, Gmail, Protonmail, etc.?

    Moreover, any given email service provider only stores emails as the user sends or receives them, and even then it’s common for older posts to be deleted unless marked otherwise. At any rate, the point is that this isn’t a case of transient storage.
    The email service holds my personal digital literary property in bailment until I request delivery by HTTP request sequence. (It's my personal digital literary property because common carriage of personal literary property to me is a legally recognized means of conveying ownership to me.) The depraved white racist is attempting to enable racial discrimination by a social medium platform. Racism is as a depraved white racist does.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 13 Oct, 2022 @ 09:32pm

    Paying Amazon Whole Foods for Delivery

    So, essentially, he believes a mail order company is a common carrier if it charges a shipping fee.
    Amazon Whole Foods provides common carriage as well as groceries if I pay for shipping.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 13 Oct, 2022 @ 09:29pm

    A Creative Imagination

    Is there anything but delusion in the last comment from the white racist supporter of discrimination by a social medium platform?

    Where is address anywhere in the definition of common carrier?
    This part:
    A common carrier holds out carriage to the public under standard terms for a fee.
    “Carriage” necessarily involves moving something (physical or digital) from one specific place to at least one other specific place.
    The racist seems to be on stern drugs. When I typed in the definition of common carriage, I never typed the word address.
    For it to be “to the public”, both the original source and final destination(s) cannot be the carrier itself in most transactions (though, of course, that a carrier can be the source or destination in some cases doesn’t prevent the service from being common carriage;
    An amusement part has been held to provide common carriage with a Ferris wheel or with a roller coaster.
    it simply means that there must be some transactions as part of the exact same service (as opposed to a separate service offered as part of the same package or something like that) where the carrier is neither the originator nor the final destination(s)).
    The primary common carrier may directly or indirectly employ another common carrier in order to complete delivery. The primary common carrier remains the primary common carrier and is completely liable to the customer for any failure in delivery.
    To facilitate this, an address designating the destination(s) is necessary. Otherwise, the carrier cannot carry to a specific place and is left “holding the bag”, so to speak, with no endpoint.
    A mass mailing has no specific delivery address, might cover a whole town, and is an example of common carriage.
    Social media platforms don’t deliver to any particular place; they simply hold it and allow others to request a copy, which the platforms generate and deliver when receiving an http request, but there is no end destination where the transaction ceases unless the sender (not the recipient) or the platform itself deletes the copy stored by the platform on servers it controls.
    Every HTTP request for content held in bailment at the server of a social medium platform is a request for common carriage of a user's digital personal literary property to the requester's computing device.
    That’s the other key issue: carriage is necessarily a transaction with a defined endpoint where the sender has no further control over whether the item or content is retained or what recipients can do with it and the sending carrier is not required to retain the contents. Most social media services allow users to remove posts they submitted, meaning they retain some control over it even after it is submitted. The platforms also generally retain possession in perpetuity and allow access even to unregistered users. There is no real endpoint to the transaction where it becomes “complete”.
    Each HTTP request sequence that results in delivery of digital personal literary property to another destination computing device constitutes a new request for common carriage.
    Before the 60s some towns used private trash haulers (truckers of trash). The trash hauler was only required to carry the trash to a legal disposal site.
    Which involves a designated endpoint. Again, whether the original source or the carrier determines the address is irrelevant.
    What is the designated endpoint? If the common carrier chooses the destination, the destination obviously was not chosen by the customer.
    If a trash hauler only offered carriage to a white, often the only way to nail such a racist trash hauler was by means of common carriage law.
    Really? I would think you could use laws regarding public accommodation for that. You don’t need to be a common carrier to be held liable under the Civil Rights Act; you just need to offer goods or services to the public at all.
    Have you read Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act? The depraved white racist is trying to enable racial discrimination by a social medium platform. Racism is as the white racist does.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 13 Oct, 2022 @ 03:21pm

    Please Continue to Show White Racist Ignorance

    Where is address anywhere in the definition of common carrier? A common carrier holds out carriage to the public under standard terms for a fee.

    Addressing is a non-issue from the standpoint of common carriage law.
    Actually, it’s a critical part of it. You need a sender and a designated recipient, otherwise you’re dealing with the endpoint of the carriage, which is necessarily not a common carrier.
    Before the 60s some towns used private trash haulers (truckers of trash). The trash hauler was only required to carry the trash to a legal disposal site. If a trash hauler only offered carriage to a white, often the only way to nail such a racist trash hauler was by means of common carriage law. Racist is as racist does or as racist argues. A supporter of discrimination by a social medium platform makes an inherently racist argument.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 13 Oct, 2022 @ 03:06pm

    Please Study Constitutional Law

    Title II of the 1964 CRA is carefully crafted

    1. within the bounds of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, and
    2. within those of Amendment XIV.
    There is no exception to an implied freedom of association.
    Because there is a specific exception to the freedom of association for this specific kind of regulation. That exception does not apply to discrimination based on conduct, speech, or political affiliation.
    42 U.S. Code § 2000a is often described as a regulation of (business) conduct.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 13 Oct, 2022 @ 02:17pm

    Freedom of Association versus Freedom to Exclude

    The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment's protection of free speech, assembly, and petition logically extends to include a “freedom of association." Generally, this means we have the freedom to associate with others who have similar political, religious, or cultural beliefs. This separate freedom grew out of challenges to state laws that burdened the NAACP and was challenged by security investigations of the Communist Party.
    The Supreme Court has never held there is a right to exclude -- the goal of a discriminatory social medium platform and a depraved white racist that supports unconstitutional discrimination by a social medium platform, which is a message common carrier of digital personal literary property according to ~ 180 years of caselaw that governs carriage of a message, a writing, or voice by electromagnetic transmission.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 12 Oct, 2022 @ 04:33am

    With New Tech We Look for Applicable Old Tech Precedent

    bhull242, the white racist refrigerator repairman, pontificates.

    First, common carriers and public utilities generally cannot refuse a paying customer outside of limited circumstances. These are narrow categories which social media does not fit into. (Also, common carriers are only required to deliver X, not host it.)
    Amendment IX gives the public the Constitutional right to non-discriminatory common carriage. A common carrier has no right to refuse common carriage to a customer except for special circumstances of unfitness or lack of space. A common carrier is a person who holds himself out as willing to serve any shipper who offers him a reasonable fee to transport the kinds of goods he professes to carry to a place he professes to serve, provided they were not unfit and his conveyance was not already full. See Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Show. K.B. 127, 89 Eng. Rep. 836 (K.B. 1680); Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Show. K.B. 327, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (K.B. 1683). 47 U.S. Code § 230(c)(2)(A) identifies certain types of digital personal literary property that are unfit in the context of the Internet-- ejusdem generis applies. U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 176 L. Ed. 2D 435 (2010) provides guidance with respect to restrictions that a message common carrier (not just a social medium platform) may apply to user speech or digital personal literary property, for which a user seeks common carriage. Hosting is a meaningless term in law. A common carrier must hold property in bailment if necessary while the property is on its way to delivery by common carriage. The FCC has determined the email service is a form of common carriage but has declined to carry. Despite the pontificating of the white racist refrigerator repairman, a social medium platform is sufficiently similar to an email service that the social medium platform must provide common carriage.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 12 Oct, 2022 @ 12:03am

    It is pure ignorance to refer to speaking or to publishing of a social medium platform. Because of the way HTTP works, no one ever receives personal literary property or other intellectual property from a social medium user without first requesting it via a sequence of HTTP requests. A supporter of discrimination by a social medium platform discrimination hides two basic truths of the World Wide Web. No one ever forces his intellectual property on anyone. A social medium platform is not a broadcaster. The intellectual property, which the social medium platform holds in bailment until it is ready to be delivered via common carriage, is always recipient-requested by a message sent directly to the social medium platform -- starting with an HTTP GET Request. A social medium platform is massively subsidized by the US government and by the public both of whom put tremendous amounts of money into expanding the Internet. Pre-Breakup AT&T always tried to make sure it owned every piece of equipment that attached to its network or that was in it in order to avoid an accusation that AT&T was government-subsidized or a government proxy (actor). (A social medium platform does not do much R&D because the R&D, which drives the Internet is mostly government-subsidized in government-subsidized networks by government-subsidized researchers at colleges and at universities.) A common carrier has no Amendment I rights with respect to the merchandise or property that it transports or holds in bailment during transport. A member of the public has an Amendment IX right to non-discriminatory common carriage from every social medium platform. The Internet is established by the state as a place of public accommodation for resource sharing, for academic research, for academic communications, for exhibition, and for entertainment. See 42 U.S. Code § 2000a (b) "Establishments ... supported by State action as [not to be] places..." The phrasing is a simile. In addition, the Internet is a state-supported state-designated public forum. See 47 U.S. Code § 230 (a) & (b). The clauses are declaratory and declare the Internet to a government-designated public forum. Every social medium platform comes under Title II of the CRA. Because every social medium platform provides an open forum within a public forum, every social medium platform is a state proxy (a state actor in confusing terminology). Every social medium platform violates the Constitution whenever it abridges the freedom of speech of the public.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 12 Oct, 2022 @ 12:00am

    Social Medium Platform = Mass-Requesting-From + Common Carriage

    Amendment I Rights Are a Weak Argument Against Discrimination by a Racist Social Medium Platform. A social medium platform platform appears to be a common carrier that performs the equivalent of mass mailing. In reality, users mass request common carriage of digital personal literary property or other intellectual property to their computing devices.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 10 Oct, 2022 @ 10:19am

    White racist elitist dummy Stephen T. Stone once again shows completely erroneous beliefs about the US legal system!

    The states regulated telegraphs, telephone systems, and other common carriers for decades before the US federal government became involved.

    Keep whining about common carriers. Neither Twitter nor Facebook are a common carrier until the federal government says so⁠—and since it hasn’t, you can feel free to die mad about that fact.
    The federal government has never involved itself with an intrastate common carrier like a local taxi company. In the glory days of national telephone common carriage, the FCC regulated common carriage among voice common carriers. Regulation of common carriage at the local loop was left to a state, which usually applie state common carriage law. The ignorance of white racist-elitist dummy Stephen T. Stone could fill a plethora of Rose Bowls.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 08 Oct, 2022 @ 12:34am

    Depraved White Racist User-Loser Genocide-Supporter Stephen T. White Has Never Read the US Constitution!

    Yet the depraved shit-for-brains racist Stephen T. White babbles incoherently about the Constitution to justify and to legitimize a social medium platform's violations of common carriage law. The depraved white racist user-loser genocide-supporter Stephen T. White mangles US Constitutional law. Hosting has no legal meaning. While a social medium platform transports my wife's digital personal literary property by common carriage, it temporarily keeps my wife's property in storage on a backend database server. Bailment or hosting of digital personal literary property is not the speech of the social medium platform, and the social medium platform has neither editorial discretion nor distributor discretion with respect to bailment (hosting) except to a user-loser, who like Stephen T. Stone does not understand full-stack software engineering at the level of a PHOSITA (Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art). If a social medium platform wishes to escape the obligations that common carriage law imposes on the social medium platform, the social medium platform need only

    1. cease to monetize eyes on a page and
    2. cease trading in the information that it collects from a user in exchange for message common carriage service.[1]
    In other words, as long as a social medium platform makes money from common carriage, it is legally and Constitutionally obligated to obey the law of common carriage. The Ninth Amendment gives the public the Constitutional right to non-discriminatory common carriage. A common carrier has no right to refuse common carriage to a customer except in special circumstances. A common carrier is a person who holds himself out as willing to serve any shipper who offers him a reasonable fee to transport the kinds of goods he professes to carry to a place he professes to serve, provided they were not unfit and his conveyance was not already full. See Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Show. K.B. 127, 89 Eng. Rep. 836 (K.B. 1680); Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Show. K.B. 327, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (K.B. 1683). By definition, a common carrier has to serve all comers. If he wrongfully refuses to accept a consignment, he is suable in tort. See Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Show. K.B. 327, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (K.B. 1683). Denial of common carriage is a self-evidencing violation and deserves draconian penalties because common carriage law is the root and beginning of anti-discrimination law, without which modern civil society does not function. Note
    1. The digital personal literary property or intellectual property, of which a social medium platform is bailee and which the social medium platform distributes by message common carriage to other users, serves in barter for service. Bailment of digital personal literary property is valuable to the social medium platform because the social medium platform uses this intellectual property to attract more eyes to the website of the social medium platform.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 08 Oct, 2022 @ 12:29am

    Depraved White Racist Genocide-Supporter Stephen T. Stone Prevaricates

    The depraved white racist user-loser genocide-supporter Stephen T. White mangles US Constitutional law. Hosting has no legal meaning. While a social medium platform transports my wife's digital personal literary property by common carriage, it temporarily keeps my wife's property in storage on a backend database server. Bailment or hosting of digital personal literary property is not the speech of the social medium platform, and the social medium platform has neither editorial discretion nor distributor discretion with respect to bailment (hosting) except to a user-loser, who like Stephen T. Stone does not understand full-stack software engineering at the level of a PHOSITA (Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art). If a social medium platform wishes to escape the obligations that common carriage law imposes on the social medium platform, the social medium platform need only

    1. cease to monetize eyes on a page and
    2. cease trading in the information that it collects from a user in exchange for message common carriage service.[1]
    In other words, as long as a social medium platform makes money from common carriage, it is legally and Constitutionally obligated to obey the law of common carriage. The Ninth Amendment gives the public the Constitutional right to non-discriminatory common carriage. A common carrier has no right to refuse common carriage to a customer except in special circumstances. A common carrier is a person who holds himself out as willing to serve any shipper who offers him a reasonable fee to transport the kinds of goods he professes to carry to a place he professes to serve, provided they were not unfit and his conveyance was not already full. See Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Show. K.B. 127, 89 Eng. Rep. 836 (K.B. 1680); Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Show. K.B. 327, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (K.B. 1683). By definition, a common carrier has to serve all comers. If he wrongfully refuses to accept a consignment, he is suable in tort. See Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Show. K.B. 327, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (K.B. 1683). Denial of common carriage is a self-evidencing violation and deserves draconian penalties because common carriage law is the root and beginning of anti-discrimination law, without which modern civil society does not function. Note
    1. The digital personal literary property or intellectual property, of which a social medium platform is bailee and which the social medium platform distributes by message common carriage to other users, serves in barter for service. Bailment of digital personal literary property is valuable to the social medium platform because the social medium platform uses this intellectual property to attract more eyes to the website of the social medium platform.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 08 Oct, 2022 @ 12:01am

    Anonymous Clown the Magic Believer

    A subsentient nitwit like Anonymous Clown believes that an electromagnetic field or wave is non-physical. I wonder whether he believes a heavier bowling ball falls faster (in a vacuum) than a light bowling ball. In the context of addresses of structures in a computer memory, “virtual” can means “moving” rather as a traveling circus, which can be set up and taken down, provides a moving place of public accommodation for exhibition and for entertainment. A virtual address is physical but travels between locations in storage, which can be primary, secondary, or remote.[1] Sometimes virtual refers to structures that be easily reconfigured. Before I invented the logical or virtual packet switch in 1991,[2] bridges and routers were instantiated in hardware. Sometimes a single hardware device bridged or routed packets. If a company needed more than one bridge or router, it had to purchase a separate physical device for each required bridge or router. If a hardware device executed my control software, it could instantiate multiple logical or virtual bridges or routers. The logical or virtual bridges or routers were definitely physical and genuinely bridged or routed packets, but a set of independent logical or virtual bridges or routers all running on a single hardware device could easily be deconfigured and reconfigured into a new set of logical or virtual bridges or routers all running on the selfsame hardware device. Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003) also refers to a virtual entity, but as the Appellant’s Brief points out,[3] this decision provides a questionable basis for holding that the Internet is not a public accommodation according to 42 U.S. Code § 2000a. A WWW frontend adds an extra abstraction level according to the MVC design pattern.[4] The frontend abstraction (or model) facilitates user interaction with a frontend structure created by software that the service downloads to a user’s program-executing device (usually either a desktop computer or a mobile device like a smartphone or a tablet). The abstraction may or may not have a simple relationship with a frontend data structure. In this case, the qualification “virtual” refers to the interaction abstraction that pertains to the exchange of information between the user and a program that is executing on the frontend device or on a backend server device. The Memorandum Opinion of the Noah Court was correct in denying that the virtual forum[5] (chat room) was a place in the sense of the CRA. Plaintiff Noah’s error in presenting his case was metaphorically equivalent to confusing a movie (not a place) with the movie theater (a place), where the movie is exhibited. If Plaintiff Noah had focused on the AOL’s temporarily assembled place of public accommodation[6] for exhibition and for entertainment, he might have had a good argument that AOL was violating § 2000a by allowing other users to create an environment hostile to Muslims, who constitute a protected class under § 2000a. Notes [1] A logical address is restricted to traveling among locations in primary storage. [2] {omitted} [3] {omitted} [4] The virtual forum (virtual conference room or virtual meeting room) interaction abstraction is an elementary instance of a virtual reality. [5] Plaintiff Noah entered the temporarily assembled “movie theater” by means of his program-executing device.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 07 Oct, 2022 @ 08:07am

    What Absurdity?

    Someone has to be responsible for carriage of goods so that the customer can identify who he should sue if goods are lost or damaged. If the mail order company tells the customer that he must arrange shipping with a common carrier, the customer has a business relationship with the common carrier and can sue him for loss or damage. If the mail order company chargers the customer a shipping fee, the mail order company becomes the primary common carrier that delivers the goods to the customer. The 1869 Massachusetts stature states precisely the above. All these issues were worked out hundreds of years ago. When Amazon Fresh or Amazon Whole Foods ships merchandise to me, Massachusetts regulates Amazon under Massachusetts common carriage law, duh! Massachusetts penalty for a common carriage violation is brutal as the penalty should be. Amazon is always quick to replace a lost or damaged shipment. A brutal penalty must be imposed on every depraved racist social medium platform for its common carriage violations. A TechDirt user-loser white racist supporter of discrimination by a social medium platform has either vacuum for brains or shit for brains and is incapable of understanding really really simple legal basics!

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 07 Oct, 2022 @ 05:19am

    Learn How Law Works

    A judge will almost invariably issue a judgement on a technicality if he can. A merits verdict is hard and requires a jury unless the right to jury is waived. After the jury verdict a judge must check for validity as a matter of law.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 07 Oct, 2022 @ 04:44am

    The Stupidity of a White Racist TechDirt User-Loser Anonymous Clown Knows Neither Metes Nor Bounds!

    I doubt whether this Anonymous Clown even qualifies to be a completely ignorant shit-for-brains user-loser.

    Every social medium platform performs store-and-forward switching of a message among users.
    No, it doesn’t. The message is fixed on the server. The message doesn’t come to me, I go to the message.
    If the message is fixed on the server, how does User-Loser ever read it? Is he magically transported to the server? When he is magically transported to the server, how does User-Loser read the message out of the database store? Does User-Loser believe that when he watches broadcast or cablecast TV that the video was never transmitted from the broadcast or cablecast origin. Why does he believe reading messages from a social medium platform on his computing device differs substantially from watching broadcast or cablecast video?
    the message arrives at the computing device of a destination user by magic.
    No, it doesn’t. But your description isn’t accurate either.
    User-Loser must go back to pre-K. User-Loser has much material on which he must catch up. I know exactly how web and cloud services work. I designed or wrote some of the first such services.
    Neither mass mailing common carriage nor mass announcement common carriage requires a specific destination address.
    True, but this does not dispute other AC’s point. Even in a mass mailing, one is still specifying where to deliver the messages (everyone in a ZIP code, everyone at somedomain.com, for example).
    The legal definition of common carriage says nothing about destination address. A common carrier holds out carriage to the public under standard terms for a fee. Nothing else. User-Loser and his depraved white racist ilk tries to rewrite the definition of common carriage so that a racist discriminatory social medium platform can escape the consequences of its violation.
    The described public notice board is a material board to which a member affixes a material message.
    Twitter is a virtual board to which a member affixes a virtual message. The function is identical. Why does the manner of implementation make a difference?
    Why don't we arrest a gamer for killing another gamer in a virtual reality game? Only reality counts. I can argue the point less fancifully. An illegal monopoly could be rewritten in virtual reality not to be the monopoly, which it is in the real world. Virtue reality does not represent a legitimate defense either in a criminal trial or in a civil trial.
    Twitter temporarily stores a message in a backend database system (hosting) while the message is on the way to an end-user by message common carriage.
    The public notice board temporarily stores a message in a backend database system (admittedly, not a very robust or organized one). The message doesn’t travel. It doesn’t travel on Twitter either.
    Does User-Loser mean the poster board onto which the message is tacked? A backend database server of a social medium system has a definite meaning both to a PHOSITA (Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art) and in ordinary dictionary usage. Poster board does not qualify.
    The frontend model makes it easier for an end user to interact with Twitter’s system.
    My eyes make it easier for me to interact with the public notice board.
    User-Loser's eyes interact with the display on his computing device and not with a backend server. Must I explain how biological vision works? I have been a biomedical physicist and can explain biological vision to any level of detail.
    In other words, Twitter’s system has no similarity whatsoever to the material notice board
    Clearly that is inaccurate. And again, everything you describe as a function of Twitter can also be accomplished with Simple Machines Forum software, but I haven’t seen you claim that every website using that software is also a common carrier or state actor. The function is identical. Why does the manner of implementation make a difference?
    Virtual reality is neither actionable nor a defense in trial court. If an entity holds out carriage via its website to the public according to standard terms for a fee, it 1. provides common carriage, 2. commits a self-evidencing violation if it denies common carriage, and 3. must pay potentially astronomical penalties for its violations.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 07 Oct, 2022 @ 04:06am

    User-Loser White Racist Anonymous Clown Knows Nothing About Academia -- No Surprise There!

    Junior academics often take jobs at several universities before finding a tenured position or taking a higher paying corporate job.

  • On the post: No One Has Any Clue How Texas’ Social Media Law Can Actually Work (Because It Can’t Work)

    יונתן פֿאליק , عطا الله عفلق ( profile ), 07 Oct, 2022 @ 04:01am

    SCOTUS Did Not Tell Me to Fuck Off the First Time!

    User-loser white racist-elitist Stephen T. Stone has masturbatory fantasies! The first time the case was not ready for review. It's closer now, and there are three-to-five related cases headed to SCOTUS. The odds are way against a depraved white racist elitist (like brainless dickless Stephen T. Stone, who uses electro-stimulation instead of his hand) and his favorite racist discriminatory social medium platform. A competent attorney would recommend to a social medium platform immediately

    1. to cease removing a user and his content,
    2. to stop shadow-banning, and
    3. to end algorithmic recommendations
    in order to reduce legal exposure. I am already talking with the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ with respect to a District Court complaint that accuses the class of social medium platforms of civil rights discrimination against me since July 2, 2021. It's truly wonderful when the rules allow parallel litigation for the good guys (anti-racists) to pile an endless stream of litigation on a depraved racist individual or corporation.

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