I visited a Comcast site 20 years. As I remember there were dedicated lines (sometimes Satellite links) to the providers like HBO or Showtime. The transmission was mostly digital, but it was unpacketized. Such transmission like analog voice transmission does not carry identifiable items -- except I suppose -- a completely movie or a complete episode of a series. Broadcasting, Cable Casting, Information Services, and Telecommunications Services all have their own Chapters in Title 47.
One should realize how fascinating the controversy over social medium platforms is from the standpoints of: 1. common law, 2. state law, 3. federal statutory law, 4. federal constitutional law, 5. rules of state and federal civil procedure, and 6. rules of state and federal appellate procedure.
The Internet is state-supported. The Internet is a vast federally supported facility or establishment which provides a place of public accommodation for resource sharing. A social medium platform meets the requirements for Title II of the CRA of 1964 to kick in. Please see 42 U.S. Code § 2000a - Prohibition against discrimination or segregation in places of public accommodation.
The phrase Interactive Computer Service (ICS) of 47 U.S. Code § 230 refers to a technology that is obsolete and is no longer used. Back in the middle 90s, we also called an ICS an "Internet On-Ramp" or an "Internet Portal". An ICS is a system that exists at the edge of the Internet/WWW and is mostly outside the Internet/WWW. Common Carrier Holding of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit in Netchoice v. Florida The holding is highly qualified.
Quite the contrary, if social-media platforms currently possess the First Amendment right to exercise editorial judgment, as we hold it is substantially likely they do, then any law infringing that right—even one bearing the terminology of “common carri[age]”—should be assessed under the same standards that apply to other laws burdening First-Amendment-protected activity.Please read the highlighted part of the 11th Circuit Netchoice Opinion. You might want to go read Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., undefined (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May. 24, 1995). It mentions the Web but not the Internet because in 1996 the vast majority of people did not have a local home network and a DSL/FIBER/Cable modem router to connect to the Internet. An Internet On-Ramp in 1996 would provide access to Internet website but was limited in the other Internet access that was provided. In 1991 a case like Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) mentions neither the Internet nor the Web. A home user did not access the Internet directly. People accessed the Internet through an Interactive Computer Service like AOL, Prodigy, or CompuServe. These Interactive Computer Services were constructed outside the Internet and predate the World Wide Web. They were electronic black boards on steroids and offered online or distributed gaming. Around 1995 these Interactive Computer Services turned into portals to Internet. They began to be called Internet On-Ramps. Later they were all completely integrated into the Internet, and ICSs/Internet On-Ramps ceased to exist, but in 1996, not one was comparable to an Internet social medium platform like Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Quora, etc. Internet On-Ramps were specifically exempted from federal telecommunications common carrier law because the FCC really does not know how to regulate the "local loop" so to speak. One should be able to argue strongly that a social medium platform of 2021-2 is not an ICS of 1996 and that § 230 does not apply to a social medium platform. (Or so I believe. IANAL.) [In my filings I used the phrase social medium ICS to distinguish a modern social medium platform from an ICS of 1996. I prefer the phrase social medium platform and will adopt it if the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit revives my case and if I can file an amended complaint. I have already begun to receive unsolicited crowdfunding. Every social medium platform has a multitude that is tremendously annoyed at it. I am completely apolitical except for Palestine. My fiancée Olivia is Palestinian. She tells me I am Palestinian by نكاح. The IDF is just as likely to murder me as it is to murder Olivia when we visit her family in a refugee camp in the OT. The IDF may be more likely to murder me because I am Jewish and because the IDF considers me to be a traitor.] In my litigation I talk a little bit about the network world of 1996. My litigation differs from that of Florida because the Court sits in diversity jurisdiction and is adjudicating Massachusetts common carrier law. I explicitly pointed out that Massachusetts common carrier law has always coexisted with federal telecommunications law. Because Internet On-Ramps/Interactive Computer Services don't really exist any more, these clauses of the relevant statutes are somewhat opaque and probably obsolete. [Note that an ICS provides access to the Internet -- something that a 2022 social medium platform does not do.] 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(6) The Commission may describe measures which are reasonable, effective, and appropriate to restrict access to prohibited communications under subsection (d). Nothing in this section authorizes the Commission to enforce, or is intended to provide the Commission with the authority to approve, sanction, or permit, the use of such measures. The Commission shall have no enforcement authority over the failure to utilize such measures. The Commission shall not endorse specific products relating to such measures. The use of such measures shall be admitted as evidence of good faith efforts for purposes of paragraph (5) in any action arising under subsection (d). Nothing in this section shall be construed to treat interactive computer services as common carriers or telecommunications carriers. 47 U.S. Code § 230 (f)(2) Interactive computer service The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions. [You might find it worthwhile to read the AOL Wikipage.]
I argue in Court that Twitter is a quasi-common carrier that offers two common carriage services and one non-common carriage service. Twitter shows bad faith by intertwining tweet common carriage service with micro-blogging non-common carriage in a transparent effort to escape common carriage obligation. A social medium platform must overcome the prima facie case of mala fides. In this case, the social medium platform has a high bar, over which it must leap, because the Internet is a USA-supported facility or place of public accommodation for resource sharing. Twitter offers in Tweet service, DM service, and its microblogging service within the Internet. Twitter qualifies to be a place of public accommodation for entertainment and for exhibition. Under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Twitter may not commit public accommodation discrimination against Olivia and me because we represent 7 protected groups under this act: Jewish ethnic group, Jewish religious group, non-white racial group, Palestinian ethnic group, Palestinian national group, Arab ethnic group, and Muslim religious group. Public accommodation discrimination strengthens the prima facie case against Twitter for mala fides. In addition, Twitter is in probable violation of 1. 42 US Code § 1981 - Equal rights under the law and 2. 42 US Code § 1982 - Property rights of citizens. Civil rights discrimination strengthens the prima facie case against Twitter for mala fides. Twitter must cease its bad faith by restoring our Twitter accounts and allowing us to tweet about our engagement and in support of Palestine. The precedents of:
Only the three prongs that define common carriage count legally. Technical details are of no significance legally. Judges and juries are not required to have expertise in computer science or in network engineering.
Java does not have .h files like C while a Jave application programming interface is intrinsically connected to the definition of a Java Interface or of a Jave Class. I could have written a neutral amicus brief in this case. US law has an intrinsic bias against recognizing copyright in numerous situations. I don't do copyright law, but it important to distinguish an issue of copyright law from an issue of patent law. In order to distinguish, one must know the history of both types of law.
Here's my registration at the USPTO patent bar. The registration indicates that I have expertise in:
Anonymous Coward knows nothing about law and next to nothing about Internet technology.
Twitter can disentangle the services. Twitter provides the following three services:
A pro-Palestine advocate has the same problem. [According to Olivia I am in between according because I am Palestinian by نكاح.] A conservative is not alone in the problem of social medium exclusion. I have evidence that Blacks, Chinese, and other non-whites suffer similar exclusion.
So we agree, an ISP is a common carrier, like the telco, which guarantees that it will transfer packets from my local network, through their network, before routing the packets to a 3rd party network (unless the traffic is destened for a location directly within my ISP’s network)An ISP provides common carriage of packetized data that is carried in an IP Packet.
BUT Twitter is not paying nor making contracts for packet exchange for transit and deliver of tweets. My ISP specifically has contracts for packet exchange.Not relevant to determining whether Twitter performs common carriage.
Twitter does not pay nor contract 3rd parties for transit.Not relevant to determining whether Twitter performs common carriage.
Twitter is not an end-to-end common carrier as they only control the source end.Twitter software downloaded to the recipient computing device in an HTTP RESPONSE extracts the Tweet from the body of an HTTP RESPONSE that was transferred to the recipient computing device in a TCP VC just as Twitter software downloaded to the originating computer's browser in an HTTP RESPONSE takes the tweet from originating computer's memory and PUTs or POSTs the tweet to the Twitter server in an HTTP REQUEST. Without the Twitter software transferred to the recipient computing device, no tweet would be extracted to the memory of the recipient computing device. With this extraction no tweet would be delivered to the screen of the recipient computing device.
How does Twitter have end-to-end control of Comcast’s network? AT&T’s network? Verizon’s network?Irrelevant because such control is not necessary to match a prong of the common carriage test.
My ISP has no contracts with Twitter for Tweet deliver. Period. Hell, they could block Twitter from their networks and there isn’t a thing that can be done about it… see Russia for an example.A contract is not necessary. Twitter can rely on the service of the ISP just as it relies on the browser of the originating and recipient computers.
They do NOT HAVE CONTROL OF ANYTHING PAST THEIR SERVERS AND NETWORKS. No matter how much you wish this to be true, it isn’t. And every argument you make is just as easy to destroy as the next.Without the Twitter software that runs in the browser of the destinian computer, no tweet appears on the destination computer screen. Twitter has much more control over delivery at the destination computing device than an originating local telephone company has over long distance call completion and long distance voice call establishment to a destination customer premises equipment. Blocking Twitter tweet delivery would probably constitute unlawful restraint of trade and unlawful service denial. Both Twitter and also the end user could each file a complaint with the FTC. Twitter can rely on lawful behavior of an ISP.
They do NOT HAVE CONTROL OF ANYTHING PAST THEIR SERVERS AND NETWORKS. No matter how much you wish this to be true, it isn’t. And every argument you make is just as easy to destroy as the next.Until you start to argue the three prongs that define common carriage, your input to the conversation is noise and not informations.
I meant "Did you read this passage (p.43) from the Florida decision?"
Did you read this passage (p.43) from the Florida statute?
Finally, Congress has distinguished internet companies from common carriers. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 explicitly differentiates “interactive computer services”—like social-media platforms—from “common carriers or telecommunications services.” See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(6) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to treat interactive computer services as common carriers or telecommunications carriers.”). And the Act goes on to provide protections for internet companies that are inconsistent with the traditional common-carrier obligation of indiscriminate service. In particular, it explicitly protects internet companies’ ability to restrict access to a plethora of material that they might consider “objectionable.” Id. § 230(c)(2)(A). Federal law’s recognition and protection of social-media platforms’ ability to discriminate among messages—disseminating some but not others—is strong evidence that they are not common carriers with diminished First Amendment rights.The Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit misinterpreted 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(6).
PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) does not allow me to include active links. If you search for a case citation with casetext appended, you should reach the case in a somewhat user-friendly format. Original Complaint {1:21-cv-11119-RGS} District Court Orders Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration Reconsideration Exhibits District Court Reconsideration Denial Appellant's Brief {21-1921} Appellant's Appendix Petition to SCOTUS for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit Before Judgment {21–6916} Petition's Appendix Twitter's Appellee's Brief Appellant's Reply Brief to Twitter Medium's Appellee's Brief Appellant's Reply Brief to Medium
The District Court did not laugh me out of court -- that's dismissal with prejudice. The former chief justice of the Court of Appeals reviewed my arguments and decided to move my case along.
I use a bicycle courier to deliver documents from Staples to the Boston Federal Court. This bicycle courier provides common carriage service to me. In DC I use a carriage service that Staples arranges, but my agreement with Staples explicitly states that the carriage service works for me and not for Staples. Amazon provides its own common carriage services for the delivery of goods. Amazon has complete common carrier liability and is always quick to replace a lost shipment.
You seem not to have read Judge Schuck's opinion. I never mention the public utility argument except to deride it. Judge Schuck carefully showed why the public utility argument does not work for Google.
Long Established Caselaw Treats Rides, Elevators, and Escalators as Common Carriers.
Rides, Elavators, and Escalators like Truckers, which hold out common carriage, are common carriers but not federal telecommunications common carriers.