Could Donald Trump Block Hillary Clinton's Campaign From Visiting His Website Via The CFAA?

Legal Issues

from the who-the-hell-knows dept

In the past few weeks, we’ve written about two troubling rulings in the 9th Circuit appeals court concerning the CFAA, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. That law, that was literally written in response to Ronald Reagan being freaked out by the (fictional) movie War Games, was designed to go after hackers and make computer hacking into other people’s computers a crime. The law is woefully outdated and unfortunately vague, with terms like “unauthroized access” and “exceeds authorized access.” For years, many of us have been pushing for Congress to reform the law to make it not quite so broad, because in its current setup it’s the law the DOJ relies on when all else fails. That’s why the DOJ loves it. If you did something it doesn’t like on a computer, it’ll try to use the CFAA against you.

The two recent cases were not helpful. The first, called Nosal II (because it was the second CFAA case involving David Nosal trying to use data from his former employer), found that convincing a former colleague to share their password with you could violate the CFAA. The court tried to limit the impact of this, by adding some caveats, and insisting that mere password sharing wouldn’t qualify without some additional event that indicated a lack of authorization, but it does still seem like a vague standard that many will try to use going forward. The second case, Facebook v. Power, found that Power violated the CFAA by continuing to access Facebook accounts, with permission of those Facebook users, after Facebook had sent a cease-and-desist. The court found that the cease-and-desist acted as a clear point that said “you’re not allowed here.”

But it’s difficult to square that with the original Nosal ruling (Nosal 1) which found that merely violating a terms of service was not a CFAA violation. So ignoring a terms of service is not a CFAA violation, but ignoring a cease-and-desist letter is. It’s not clear why one has power over the other, though perhaps there’s an argument that a cease-and-desist is a proactive action towards an individual by a website, whereas a terms of service is broadly applicable. Still, it feels weak.

And, it raises tricky situations like the following, first raised by Andy Sellars, about a situation in which one individual alerts another that they can no longer visit a website. Let’s say this happened between two presidential candidates. Hypothetically.

And, as Eriq Gardner at the Hollywood Reporter notes in response, the answer is totally unclear. And that seems really problematic. I had tossed out some hypotheticals in my original post on the Facebook v. Power ruling, but this is a good one as well, because you could absolutely see some political candidates issuing that kind of cease-and-desist. There may be arguments about whether then accessing such a website would create a loss necessary to qualify for the CFAA, but it’s still quite worrisome that the court has now put in place a vague standard that at least suggests that you can bar someone from a website by merely telling them not to go there. That’s going to create a bunch of messy litigation going forward.

Filed Under: cease and desist, cfaa, donald trump, hillary clinton, hypotheticals, public website