This "discussion" about the whole "security vs. privacy" thing the administration claims it has "welcomed" since the Snowden leaks began? Yeah. Still not happening. As Cal Borchers at BetaBoston reports, government reps at an MIT event focused on "big data and privacy" couldn't have appeared less interested in discussing any of the implications of widespread domestic surveillance.

The kicker came during an afternoon panel discussion, when John DeLong, the National Security Agency's director of compliance, should have been awarded an honorary degree in tongue biting. DeLong sat right next to Carol Rose, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, yet refused to engage when she made pointed comments, like this one: "Everything's being done in secret. But for Edward Snowden, we wouldn't even be having this conversation."

DeLong would look down and away (perhaps there was an interesting piece of metatada on the floor of Wong Auditorium), waiting silently for another panelist to move the discussion away from his agency.

This is nothing new for DeLong. Back in August of last year, he gave the Washington Post permission to quote him "by name and title" after holding a 90-minute interview with the paper, after the White House routed all press queries to him directly. When the paper refused to edit quotes after the government's "internal review" of the interview draft, the administration and the NSA then informed the Washington Post that nothing DeLong said could be used. All of his input was replaced with a bland, prepared statement.

Now, DeLong could have been interested in participating in this discussion, but this previous administration intervention seems to indicate that the NSA and the White House would prefer DeLong keeps his head down and his mouth shut -- at least in cases where it can't push through its own edit of the "discussion."

DeLong wasn't the only government rep uninterested in discussing government surveillance.

Before DeLong's group took the floor, US Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker made a brief speech in which she barely touched on the subject of privacy, then exited quickly without fielding questions.

Someone seated near me, in one of those fake whispers that's really meant to be heard by a lot of people, summed things up nicely: "No questions? Why have a real discussion, right?"

Snickers rippled a few rows in every direction.

As Borchers points out, there was plenty of discussion about private companies and privacy, but when it came to the biggest "company" of all, the US government, no one had much to say. White House counselor John Podesta somehow even managed to "phone in" his phoned-in statement (Borchers describes Podesta's contribution as "bland remarks") to open the event.

This is the US government's idea of "discussion." Canned statements and floor-gazing. The NSA made this bed and now refuses to lie in it. (Although officials will often lie outside of it -- ho, ho! *coughJamesClapper*) The administration plays along, making small gestures but refusing to consider making any substantial statements or changes. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence continues to pass out redacted documents with implied transparency, glossing over the fact that every document release so far has been compelled by an FOIA lawsuit.

This isn't a discussion. This is low murmurs and unintelligible mumbling being passed off as a "discussion" in hopes this new era of faux-openness will soon blow over and allow everyone involved to return to the opacity and darkness they've become accustomed to operating in.

Recently, we've covered a series of stories centered around license plate scanners and the way such information is stored. Despite the protests of the ACLU, local law enforcement agencies have widely deployed the technology and there have also been requests from federal agencies to build a central database of information based on plate scans. If the latest reports are to be believed, however, these would simply be attempts to nationalize an endeavor that has already been undertaken by private industry.

According to the Boston Globe, the helpful groups building this database of license plate scans and providing it to banks, creditors, private investigators and law enforcement agencies are the repo industry and data brokers. And it's far worse than you might think.

While public debate about the license reading technology has centered on how police should use it, business has eagerly adopted the $10,000 to $17,000 scanners with remarkably few limits. At least 10 repossession companies in Massachusetts say they mount the scanners on spotter cars or tow trucks, and Digital Recognition Network of Fort Worth, Texas, claims to collect plate scans of 40 percent of all US vehicles annually.

And that's just one company. The article goes on to note that there are other groups in the data brokerage business that otherwise claim to collect a large majority of US vehicles every year. Those groups freely admit to providing those scan databases to a variety of third parties.

The main commercial use of license plate scanners ­remains the auto finance and auto repossession industries, two professions that work closely together to track down people who default on their loans. Digital Recognition lists Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co., HSBC Holdings, and Citibank among its clients, while MVTRAC boasts that it serves 70 percent of the auto finance industry.

Digital Recognition already provides its entire data pool to more than 3,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide, free of charge for most searches. The Massachusetts State Police is a registered subscriber, as are the Boston, Cambridge, Somerville, Brookline, and Quincy ­police departments. Even ­Boston College and Brandeis police have access to the firm’s entire scan database.

Now, in response to the privacy concerns raised by activists, what the data brokers and repo folks will tell you is that these scans typically occur in public places. That's not always true, since the repo trucks often will enter private property, such as the parking lot of an apartment or condo complex, but their point is that there is no expectation of privacy in an area that's in plain sight. They'll also tell you that these are just license plate scans, not detailed personal information about anyone in particular.

But that's bullshit, of course. It ignores the practical application of the scan database, as well as to whom that information is being sold. Banks, PIs, and creditors can all scrub this raw data against available DMV and governmental information, while law enforcement agencies both local and federal can build up a database that tracks the movement of any scanned vehicle and the citizens associated with it. If we could get Thomas Jefferson on the horn and ask him what he thought of all this, I'd argue that he'd be spending too much time picking his own jaw up off the floor to give us a proper response.

“Right now, it's the wild West in terms of how companies can collect, process, and sell this kind of data,” says Kade Crockford of the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. “The best legal minds, best public policy thinkers, and ordinary people whose lives are affected need to sit down and think of meaningful ways we can regulate it.”

Which is exactly what some legislators in Massachusetts are attempting to do with legislation, but it isn't the first time crafting this kind of law has been tried. All previous attempts have been torpedoed by the data broker industry, including one case in Utah, where Digital Recognition sued the state for its ban on plate scanners as a first amendment violation. That seems to stretch the definition a bit too far.

So, if you own a car, a private company that deals for free with law enforcement agencies knows who you are, where you've been, and where you spend most of your time. And, without additional legislation, they do so without the checks and balances that would be insisted upon were the LEOs doing the scanning themselves. This must be what they mean when they say that private industry will always outpace government.

Chris Inglis, who had been deputy director of the NSA until recently (and one of the key people who was out there responding to questions about Snowden) is now officially in his (long planned) retirement (though, he's expected to pop back up shortly in the private sector). And as a first order of business, he's apparently imparting some of the "wisdom" he learned over the last few months, by telling tech companies they need to be more transparent about the data they collect:

"There's an enormous amount of data held in the private sector," Mr. Inglis said, in his first published interview since leaving government. "There might be some concerns not just on the part of the American public, but the international public."

[....] "These companies at least have a public relations issue, if not a moral obligation, to really make sure you understand that this is to your benefit," Mr. Inglis said. "As an individual, myself, I continue to be surprised by the kinds of insights companies have about me."

Now, first off, he's right. Companies collecting tons of data on their users should absolutely be a hell of a lot more transparent about what they're collecting (and should give more controls allowing people to opt-out of certain collections). However, it seems quite rich to hear that coming from someone at the NSA, perhaps the least transparent organization ever -- and one that worked hard to make sure that the tech industry was completely barred from being transparent about what sorts of data the NSA gets from them.

To try to spin that as an issue for the tech companies is just silly. As plenty of people have pointed out over and over again, your use of a tech company's services is voluntary. You can avoid it if you don't like it. And, yes, while more information and user controls would be helpful, in the few instances where there have been data leaks, or when it has become clear what kinds of info companies collect, most people have actually been totally fine with it. That's quite different from the NSA. With a company, people may be trading information for a service which they value -- and they're making the choice that the tradeoffs are worth it. That's not true with the NSA. It's not by choice and there's no tradeoff.

No matter what, the idea that Chris Inglis is suddenly the spokesperson for transparency is simply ridiculous.

For years, HBO and Time Warner have refused to give people what they want and offer a standalone streaming video service, because they're afraid of shaking up their cozy, promotion-heavy relationship with the cable industry. Instead, HBO's Go streaming service has been made available on desktops and a growing number of devices, TVs, set tops and game consoles -- provided you log in with your traditional cable subscriber information. It's a half-measure, and availability to this day remains a little fractured.

Case in point: Sony this week finally made HBO Go available on the Playstation 3 (despite HBO Go launching in early 2010), but not the new Playstation 4. The new Playstation 3 version works for most cable operators in the country -- except for users on Comcast. Why not? Comcast doesn't really give an answer other than to say the massive (and soon to get much larger) company only has so many people available to ensure TV Everywhere authentication works on new devices:

"With every new website, device or player we authenticate, we need to work through technical integration and customer service which takes time and resources. Moving forward, we will continue to prioritize as we partner with various players."

Which might almost sound like a reasonable explanation -- until you realize that HBO Go on Roku hasn't worked for Comcast users since 2011, despite Roku being one of the most prominent Internet streaming devices available. Apparently, it's a matter of priorities? Comcast's argument for being allowed to acquire companies is always that these acquisitions make them bigger and more efficient. So apparently, getting simple TV authentication to work takes Comcast years longer than every other pay TV operator because Comcast is simply too big, efficient and fantastic?

Now, Playstation 3 users have joined the Roku user chorus, asking Comcast in their official forums why they can't use HBO Go, and are being greeted by the same silence Roku owners have enjoyed for years. I'm not sure you can get away with calling this a net neutrality violation (I think the term is mutated to the point of uselessness anyway), given HBO Go on Roku will work if you have Comcast broadband -- but get HBO from another pay TV provider like Dish. Still, it's fairly curious how Comcast's own Internet video and on-demand offerings (which include HBO content) tend to take priority.

The problem illustrates once again how the TV Industry's "TV Everywhere" mindset fails because it winds up taking value away from the user, not delivering it. It's also another shining example of how HBO should shake off its fears, embrace innovation, leapfrog the gatekeepers and release the standalone Internet streaming app everyone has been clamoring for.

Earlier this week, we wrote about the accusations that the CIA was spying on Senate staffers on the Senate Intelligence Committee as they were working on a massive $40 million, 6,300-page report condemning the CIA's torture program. The DOJ is apparently already investigating if the CIA violated computer hacking laws in spying on the Senate Intelligence Committee computers. The issue revolved around a draft of an internal review by the CIA, which apparently corroborates many of the Senate report's findings -- but which the CIA did not hand over to the Senate. This internal report not only supports the Senate report's findings, but also shows that the CIA has been lying in response to questions about the terror program.

In response to all of this, it appears that the CIA is attempting, weakly, to spin this as being the Senate staffers' fault, arguing that the real breach was the fact that the Senate staffers somehow broke the rules in obtaining that internal review. CIA boss John Brennan's statement hints at the fact that he thinks the real problem was with the way the staffers acted, suggesting that an investigation would fault "the legislative" branch (the Senate) rather than the executive (the CIA).

In his statement on Wednesday Brennan hit back in unusually strong terms. “I am deeply dismayed that some members of the Senate have decided to make spurious allegations about CIA actions that are wholly unsupported by the facts,” Brennan said.

“I am very confident that the appropriate authorities reviewing this matter will determine where wrongdoing, if any, occurred in either the executive branch or legislative branch,” Brennan continued, raising a suggestion that the Senate committee itself might have acted improperly.

A further report detailed what he's talking about. Reporters at McClatchy have revealed that the Senate staffers working on this came across the document, printed it out, and simply walked out of the CIA and over to the Senate with it, and the CIA is furious about that. Then, in a moment of pure stupidity, the CIA appears to have confronted the Senate Intelligence Committee about all of this... directly revealing that they were spying on the Committee staffers.

Several months after the CIA submitted its official response to the committee report, aides discovered in the database of top-secret documents at CIA headquarters a draft of an internal review ordered by former CIA Director Leon Panetta of the materials released to the panel, said the knowledgeable person.

They determined that it showed that the CIA leadership disputed report findings that they knew were corroborated by the so-called Panetta review, said the knowledgeable person.

The aides printed the material, walked out of CIA headquarters with it and took it to Capitol Hill, said the knowledgeable person.

“All this goes back to what is the technical structure here,” said the U.S. official who confirmed the unauthorized removal. “If I was a Senate staffer and I was given access to documents on the system, I would have a laptop that’s cleared. I would be allowed to look at these documents. But with these sorts of things, there’s generally an agreement that you can’t download or take them.”

The CIA discovered the security breach and brought it to the committee’s attention in January, leading to a determination that the agency recorded the staffers’ use of the computers in the high-security research room, and then confirmed the breach by reviewing the usage data, said the knowledgeable person.

There are many more details in the McClatchy report, which I highly recommend reading. And, yes, perhaps there's an argument that Senate staffers weren't supposed to take such documents, but the CIA trying to spin this by saying it was those staffers who were engaged in "wrongdoing" is almost certainly going to fall flat with Congress. After all, the intelligence committee is charged with oversight of the CIA, not the other way around. "You stole the documents we were hiding from you which proved we were lying, so we spied on you to find out how you did that" is not, exactly, the kind of argument that too many people are going to find compelling.

Still, the latest is that the CIA has successfully convinced the DOJ to have the FBI kick off an investigation of the Senate staffers, rather than of the CIA breaking the law and spying on their overseers.

Of course, the CIA may still have one advantage on its side: there are still some in Congress who are so supportive of the intelligence community itself that even they will make excuses for the CIA spying on their own staff. At least that seems to be the response from Senate Intelligence vice chair Senator Saxby Chambliss, one of the most ardent defenders of the intelligence community he's supposed to be watching over. When asked about all of this, he seemed to be a lot more concerned about the staffers supposedly taking "classified" documents than about the CIA spying on those staffers:

“I have no comment. You should talk to those folks that are giving away classified information and get their opinion,” Intelligence Committee Vice Chairman Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) said when asked about the alleged intrusions.

A few weeks back, we reported that the European Parliament's Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) committee planned to send some questions to Edward Snowden as part of its inquiry on electronic mass surveillance of EU citizens. He's now replied to these, prefacing them with a short statement (pdf -- embedded below.) Although there are no major revelations -- he specifically states that he will not be disclosing anything not already published -- it does contain many important clarifications and interesting comments. For example, he confirms that:

The NSA granted me the authority to monitor communications world-wide using its mass surveillance systems, including within the United States. I have personally targeted individuals using these systems under both the President of the United States' Executive Order 12333 and the US Congress' FAA 702. I know the good and the bad of these systems, and what they can and cannot do, and I am telling you that without getting out of my chair, I could have read the private communications of any member of this [LIBE] committee, as well as any ordinary citizen. I swear under penalty of perjury that this is true

Before moving on to the parliamentarian's questions, he concludes his opening statement as follows:

For the record, I also repeat my willingness to provide testimony to the United States Congress, should they decide to consider the issue of unconstitutional mass surveillance.

The first question from the MEPs on the committee concerns the extent of the cooperation between the NSA and EU member states. Snowden's answer includes some new background information on what's been going on here:

One of the foremost activities of the NSA's FAD, or Foreign Affairs Division, is to pressure or incentivize EU member states to change their laws to enable mass surveillance. Lawyers from the NSA, as well as the UK's GCHQ, work very hard to search for loopholes in laws and constitutional protections that they can use to justify indiscriminate, dragnet surveillance operations that were at best unwittingly authorized by lawmakers. These efforts to interpret new powers out of vague laws is an intentional strategy to avoid public opposition and lawmakers' insistence that legal limits be respected, effects the GCHQ internally described in its own documents as "damaging public debate."

That makes a mockery of the UK government's insistence that GCHQ's actions were always "within the law": that's only true to the extent that the agency happily exploited to the maximum loopholes its lawyers have spotted in the already weak UK legislation covering this area. In terms of the spying programs, Snowden hints that there's much more to come, and underlines that revealing them is now a matter for journalists, not for him:

There are many other undisclosed programs that would impact EU citizens' rights, but I will leave the public interest determinations as to which of these may be safely disclosed to responsible journalists in coordination with government stakeholders.

Another question probed the options for raising concerns about spying programs, and asked him whether he thought he had exhausted them before deciding to leak the documents himself. He explained that he had reported programs that seemed problematic to "more than ten distinct officials, none of whom took any action to address them." So much for the idea that he didn't try hard enough to use official channels before taking more drastic action. On the question of what the European Parliament could do to help him, Snowden's answer is characteristically self-effacing:

If you want to help me, help me by helping everyone: declare that the indiscriminate, bulk collection of private data by governments is a violation of our rights and must end. What happens to me as a person is less important than what happens to our common rights.

But he then goes on to say:

As for asylum, I do seek EU asylum, but I have yet to receive a positive response to the requests I sent to various EU member states. Parliamentarians in the national governments have told me that the US, and I quote, "will not allow" EU partners to offer political asylum to me, which is why the previous resolution on asylum ran into such mysterious opposition. I would welcome any offer of safe passage or permanent asylum, but I recognize that would require an act of extraordinary political courage.

Sadly, it seems unlikely that political courage will be forthcoming given the extremely weak responses from European governments to the spying leaks. Snowden was also asked about economic espionage:

global surveillance capabilities are being used on a daily basis for the purpose of economic espionage. That a major goal of the US Intelligence Community is to produce economic intelligence is the worst kept secret in Washington.

In this context he makes an astute observation:

Recently, governments have shifted their talking points from claiming they only use mass surveillance for "national security" purposes to the more nebulous "valid foreign intelligence purposes." I suggest this committee consider that this rhetorical shift is a tacit acknowledgment by governments that they recognize they have crossed beyond the boundaries of justifiable activities..

He also elaborates on an early comment that encryption, done properly, does offer a measure of protection against the kind of surveillance programs he has revealed:

The good news is that there are solutions. The weakness of mass surveillance is that it can very easily be made much more expensive through changes in technical standards: pervasive, end-to-end encryption can quickly make indiscriminate surveillance impossible on a cost-effective basis. The result is that governments are likely to fall back to traditional, targeted surveillance founded upon an individualized suspicion.

In other words, encryption brings a double benefit. It helps preserve people's privacy and freedom, and thanks to the high costs of breaking properly-encrypted communications, it encourages governments to move back to the older, more targetted kind of spying that Snowden himself calls "above reproach". Finally, he was asked some more hostile questions from the right-leaning members of the committee, including whether the Russian secret service had approached him:

Of course. Even the secret service of Andorra would have approached me, if they had had the chance: that's their job.

But I didn't take any documents with me from Hong Kong, and while I'm sure they were disappointed, it doesn't take long for an intelligence service to realize when they're out of luck. I was also accompanied at all times by an utterly fearless journalist [WikiLeaks' Sarah Harrison] with one of the biggest megaphones in the world, which is the equivalent of Kryptonite for spies. As a consequence, we spent the next 40 days trapped in an airport instead of sleeping on piles of money while waiting for the next parade. But we walked out with heads held high.

As that hints, it's an eloquent and important document that is worth reading in its entirety. It not only adds useful details to many of the facts that have been published earlier, but also underlines the consistently rigorous and moral approach that Snowden has taken from the beginning.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and +glynmoody on Google+

Almost exactly two years ago, we wrote about the tacocopter, a sort of proof of concept idea for using drones to deliver products to people's homes. Yes, Amazon got some attention last year for claiming to be working on something similar, but the Tacocopter (and Lobstercopter on the east coast) idea was the first I'd heard of anyone seriously thinking about commercial-use drones. However, the key point of our Tacocopter story was that they were illegal:

Current U.S. FAA regulations prevent ... using UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, like drones] for commercial purposes at the moment.

Well, that's no longer the case apparently. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) administrative law judge Patrick Geraghty has unleashed the tacocopters of the world by issuing a ruling that the FAA has no mandate to regulate commercial drones. The case involved the first time that the FAA had actually tried to fine someone, a guy named Raphael Pirker, $10,000 for trying to film a commercial with a drone at the University of Virginia.

The issue, basically, is that the FAA has historically exempted model airplanes from its rules, and the NTSB finds it impossible to square that with its attempt to now claim that drones are under its purview. As Geraghty notes, accepting that leads to absurd arguments about the FAA's mandate over all flying objects:

Complainant has, historically, in their policy notices, modified the term "aircraft" by prefixing the word "model", to distinguish the device/contrivance being considered. By affixing the word "model" to "aircraft" the reasonable inference is that Complainant FAA intended to distinguish and exclude model aircraft from either or both of the aforesaid definitions of "aircraft".

To accept Complainant's interpretive argument would lead to a conclusion that those definitions include as an aircraft all types of devices/contrivances intended for, or used for, flight in the air. The extension of that conclusion would then result in the risible argument that a flight in the air of, e.g., a paper aircraft, or a toy balsa wood glider, could subject the "operator" to the regulatory provisions of FAA Part 91, Section 91.13(a)....

..... The reasonable inference is not that FAA has overlooked the requirements, but, rather that FAA has distinguished model aircraft as a class excluded from the regulatory and statutory definitions.

The judge notes that while the FAA had some internal memorandum about these issues, it did not put forth a full rule, and thus it is not an actual policy. As a result, the ruling finds that the current definition of aircraft is not applicable here and thus the FAA has no real mandate over this kind of drone.

This does not preclude the FAA from trying to go through a full rule-making process to try to gain a mandate over commercial drone use, but that will involve a big political fight. It's way easier to block something like that from becoming official than overturning it if it was already deemed the law.

One of the key themes to emerge in the debate about surveillance is the oversight of the agencies involved, and to what extent it is effective. In the US, that has been put into stark relief by news that the committee that is supposed to keep an eye on the spies was itself spied upon. And now over in the UK, we learn that things are just as bad when it comes to the equivalent oversight body, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT). Its powers sound impressive:

The Tribunal can investigate complaints about any alleged conduct by, or on behalf of, the Intelligence Services - the Security Service (sometimes called MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (sometimes called MI6) and GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters).

The scope of conduct the IPT can investigate concerning the Intelligence Agencies is much broader than it is with regard to the other public authorities. The IPT is the only Tribunal to whom complaints about the Intelligence Services can be directed

Unfortunately, the IPT's credibility as the public's watchdog for the intelligence services has just been seriously undermined by the following information published by The Guardian:

A controversial court that claims to be completely independent of the British government is secretly operating from a base within the Home Office, the Guardian has learned.

The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which investigates complaints about the country's intelligence agencies, is also funded by the Home Office, and its staff includes at least one person believed to be a Home Office official previously engaged in intelligence-related work.

It gets worse:

the IPT will not say whether GCHQ had disclosed the existence of its bulk surveillance operations, which attempt to capture the digital communications of everybody -- including those people who complain to the tribunal.

Nor will it disclose whether it has issued any secret ruling on the lawfulness of those operations, on the grounds that the rules under which it operates stipulate that it cannot do so without the permission of GCHQ itself. It has not sought that permission on grounds it knows it would not be given.

So the body tasked with overseeing GCHQ has to get GCHQ's permission before it can reveal any wrongdoing by GCHQ, which it doesn't bother doing when it knows it would be refused. Isn't oversight a wonderful thing?

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and +glynmoody on Google+

As pointed out in the comments by Matthew S, this story has now been debunked. Turns out that the drapes in the background were different, and not in her house, as the woman claimed. It appears the photo got on her phone because they had mutual friends on Facebook, and the woman got confused. We apologize for posting this story based on the incorrect info. The original story, crossed out, is below.

So, let's say you're a creepy dude, the kind that likes to brazenly break into other people's homes. Now let's say that, in addition to being a creepy criminal, you're also a complete idiot looking to get caught, the kind we've covered in the past. How exactly do you find the perfect combination of self-incrimination while maintaining the high level of creepiness you've spent so many years cultivating?

Here's one Denver creep's attempt to show us the way:

The victim told police she had no idea the man had been inside her home while she was there — until she checked her cellphone the next day. According to police, on Jan. 29 at approximately 9:20 p.m. a woman was putting her children to bed when an unknown man entered her home and used the woman’s cellphone to take a picture of himself.

Yes, apparently a gentlemen who is working entirely too hard on his Breaking Bad cosplay strategies (see video in the link) also decided to break into a house and take absolutely nothing other than a selfie on his victim's cell phone. Of course, because this is apparently an attempt by the burglar to get himself caught, neighbors recognized him and are working with police to identify the man.

“He doesn’t have glasses when you normally see him walking down the street. Maybe they’re a disguise. I don’t know,” said Gardner. When asked about the facial hair, Gardner replied, “Oh, that’s his, that’s him.”

As of the time of this writing, the man hasn't yet been caught by police, but one imagines that is simply a matter of time. After all, our dumb criminal went ahead and provided the single thing smarter bad guys work as hard as possible to avoid: a picture of his face. That kind of dedication to getting caught deserves our respect and our applause.

We've written a lot about the state of Illinois' infamous Eavesdropping Act, a law that has been routinely abused by Illinois law enforcement officers to prevent citizens from recording them while they work. After a long legal battle that nearly made its way to the Supreme Court, the courts found that the use of the law to prosecute citizens who record police officers was unconstitutional and the latest court to hear the state's arguments suggested the law be repealed altogether.

The law is still on the books at the moment (although LEOs can no longer use it against camera-wielding citizens), which may come in handy for the plaintiffs of a class action suit against an Illinois gas company. (h/t to Above the Law)

The lawsuit claims the gas company charged customers unnecessary fees to cover gas line leaks and repairs. According to an investigation that preceded the lawsuit, Nicor Gas collected nearly $26 million in 2009 while paying out only $600,000 in benefits. In a class action lawsuit filed in 2011, the plaintiffs allege that Nicor also charged several customers $19.95/mo. for appliance coverage (while labeling it only as "Nicor Service Charge" on the bill).

So, why is this lawsuit rising to the surface in 2014? Well, it's because Nicor Gas apparently plans to violate the Illinois Eavesdropping Act in order to defend itself against these claims.

The utility recorded millions of phone calls over the course of a decade and plans to “divulge them outside of Nicor and to use them in court as they litigate the consumer class action,” according to a statement about the case...

“The Illinois Eavesdropping Act flatly prohibits corporations who collect or make such recordings from divulging any part of them to any third party and prohibits such recordings be used in court proceedings,” said [Adam] Levitt (plaintiffs' attorney).

“Nicor Gas claims that all customers recorded heard a ‘warning’ before being recorded, and ‘consented’ by remaining on the line after the warning was given. But under the law, any consent only gave Nicor Gas a right to record, not to divulge or use the recordings. Any ‘consent’ they got from customers that permitted them to record was for the limited purpose of internal quality assurance – not for divulgence to outside parties, and certainly not for use in public court proceedings,” according to Levitt.

Even if this use of the Eavesdropping Act may be somewhat questionable given the circumstances (the most probable defense against the claims is that customers agreed to these charges during phone conversations with Nicor Gas), it's hard to see how the power company will route around the specifics of the law.

From the law itself:

No communication or conversation or any part, portion, or aspect of the communication or conversation made, acquired, or obtained, directly or indirectly, under this exemption (j), may be, directly or indirectly, furnished to any law enforcement officer, agency, or official for any purpose or used in any inquiry or investigation, or used, directly or indirectly, in any administrative, judicial, or other proceeding, or divulged to any third party.

Exemption (j) covers recorded business-to-consumer "oral telephone solicitation and marketing" recordings. Incoming calls ("What the hell is THIS charge?") are also covered by this exemption.

For the purposes of this subsection (j), "telephone solicitation" means a communication through the use of a telephone by live operators:

(i) soliciting the sale of goods or services;
(ii) receiving orders for the sale of goods or services;
(iii) assisting in the use of goods or services; or
(iv) engaging in the solicitation, administration, or collection of bank or retail credit accounts.

Even if it does somehow find a way to present its recordings as evidence, the calls themselves may be incriminating.

Critics accuse Nicor of using scare tactics to sell ComfortGuard.

According to a ComfortGuard marketing script, Nicor call-center reps are instructed to tell customers "the utility is only legally responsible to make the situation safe or make repairs to its own facilities. What that means is that the property owner (such as yourself) may have to find and hire an independent contractor to come in, do an inspection and then make those repairs. That can be expensive, and it could also mean days without any gas to heat the home, cook and so on."

In fact, ICC [Illinois Commerce Commission] staff argue, Nicor is legally required to inspect leak complaints inside customers' homes and make repairs, at charges typically ranging from $50 to $100.

We'll have to see where Nicor goes with this, but the allegations are pretty damning, and it's hard to see how its own sales tactics and vague line item descriptions are going to help its case. Even if it is interesting to see this law being used as a defense mechanism rather than a weapon against citizens, it only helps to highlight how badly written the Illinois Eavesdropping Act is. If nothing else, it presents yet another reason for legislators to seriously consider scrapping the law and starting over.