Why The US Can’t Adopt Ukraine’s Innovative Approach To Unmanned Warfare Systems

(Mis)Uses of Technology

from the affordable-precise-mass dept

It is widely accepted that drones have changed the conduct of modern war dramatically. The war in Ukraine, in particular, is driving the rapid evolution of drone technology. Evidence of how far things have come was provided recently by the following claim from Ukraine, reported here on The Next Web (TNW):

In April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that his forces had, for the first time in the history of warfare, seized an enemy position using only unmanned systems. No infantry. No human soldiers entering the contested ground. Drones and ground robots identified the target, suppressed defensive fire, and captured the position without a single Ukrainian casualty. The claim has not been independently verified in detail, and Ukraine’s military has declined to provide specifics.

The TNW article goes on to give some details about the company that apparently played a major role in that unmanned assault:

a Ukrainian-British defence technology startup called UFORCE, has conducted more than 150,000 combat missions since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, achieved unicorn status with a valuation exceeding one billion dollars, and is now scaling production from a discreet London headquarters designed, the company says, to protect it from Russian sabotage. The age of unmanned warfare is no longer a conference-circuit prediction. It is a line item on a defence contractor’s balance sheet.

Politico interviewed the Ukrainian commander in charge of the Third Assault Brigade’s ground robotic systems unit, the one which carried out the attack. Mykola Zinkevych provided some interesting indications of what robotic systems were already doing today, and what Ukraine’s future plans were for unmanned warfare systems. For example, Zinkevych said:

Delivery of important cargo, evacuation of the wounded, conducting surveillance in open areas, destruction of enemy fortifications, sabotage operations behind enemy lines, laying minefields — all this is now performed by ground robotic systems

In the short term:

Infantrymen can and should be taken out of direct fire. Our goal for 2026 is to replace up to 30 percent of personnel in the most difficult areas of the front with technology

In a post on Facebook (in Ukrainian), Zinkevych gave details of the ambitious longer-term goals (via Google Translate), which will involve the wider deployment of unmanned ground vehicles (UGV):

In March alone, 9,000+ missions were completed by the military. Our goal is for 100% of front-line logistics to be performed by robotic systems.

In the first half of 2026, due to increased demand, we will contract 25,000 UGVs, which will be gradually delivered to the front. This is twice as much as in the entire year 2025.

A new paper from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, written by the former defense minister of Ukraine, Andriy Zagorodnyuk, explores what he calls “The New Revolution in Military Affairs”, which is being brought about by “rapid innovation and adaptation, introducing new types of unmanned systems, countermeasures, and operating methods at unprecedented speed.” A key element of this is “affordable precise mass” — the highly effective deployment of cheap, long-range drones on a massive scale. He calls this transformation:

a structural shift in warfare in which new technologies drive the development of novel operational concepts and doctrines, fundamentally altering how military power is generated and employed, and forcing enduring changes in military organizations. These trends include the emergence of affordable precise mass, the fragmentation of the air domain, the growing difficulty of maneuver, the centrality of networked warfare, and the elevation of rapid adaptation as a core military capability. This transformation is still in its early stages, but countries that fail to recognize and adapt to it risk preparing for a form of war that has lost its decisiveness.

One important aspect of this shift touches on an area that will be familiar to Techdirt readers. As noted in the quotation above, Zagorodnyuk underlines the importance of rapid adaptation for this new kind of warfare:

The decisive advantage lies with those who can shorten the loop between combat experience, technical adaptation, and redeployment. As a result, ultra-fast adaptation becomes a paramount requirement for survival—and directly shapes force organization.

In Ukraine, this has led to drone operators being deeply involved in the technology’s evolution:

Units maintain their own repair facilities, component stocks, and small-scale production capabilities. Some operate informal research-and-development cells. Successful adaptations spread laterally through personal networks, messaging platforms, and volunteer communities rather than through centralized bureaucratic channels.

But Zagorodnyuk points out a key reason why the important lessons emerging from the wars in Ukraine and Iran are unlikely to be learned in many Western countries, including the US:

legal, contractual, and technical restrictions often prevent units from modifying or repairing their own equipment. In the United States, for example, defense contractors frequently retain control over maintenance data, software, and diagnostics, limiting what military personnel can do independently. The debate around the “right to repair” reflects this tension. While intended to protect intellectual property and safety standards, such restrictions can slow adaptation cycles and reduce operational flexibility—precisely the opposite of what high-intensity, technology-driven warfare now demands.

In other words, today’s obsession with protecting intellectual monopolies above all else could one day prove a major obstacle to fighting — and winning — future wars.

Follow me @glynmoody on Mastodon and on Bluesky. 

Filed Under: adaptability, affordable precise mass, development, drones, ground robots, intellectual monopolies, london, research, right to repair, russia, ugv, ukraine, unicorn, unmanned ground vehicle, warfare, zelensky
Companies: politico, Uforce