Report: TSA Is Spending $1 Billon On Bag Scanners That 'May Never Meet Operational Needs'
from the good-thing-it's-just-other-people's-money dept
Somehow, “TSA” stands for “The Terrorists Won.” In exchange for endless inconveniences, inconsistently deployed security measures, and a steady stream of intrusive searches and rights violations, we’ve obtained a theatrical form of security that’s more performative than useful.
Since screeners continue to miss nearly every piece of contraband traveling through security checkpoints, the TSA has opted to buy even more screening equipment. Apparently, it’s hoping no one will say it’s not doing anything about these failures. It is throwing money at the problem. That’s something. Unfortunately, it doesn’t appear to be solving it.
A new report [PDF] from the DHS Inspector General says the shiny new scanners the agency bought to “address capability gaps in carry-on bag screening” aren’t doing that now, and perhaps never will. The TSA obtained 300 computed tomography (CT) scanners, which were supposed to detect a broader range of explosives and make flying slightly less inconvenient by allowing passengers to keep their fluids and their laptops in their respective bags. The ultimate goal is safer flying, less hassle at checkpoints, and faster throughput. It has achieved none of these goals, despite more than $1 billion being obligated towards the rollout of CT scanners nationwide.
Instead of meeting its own four-factor test for essential capabilities, the TSA’s new toys fell short of every self-imposed metric.
TSA deployed 300 CT systems to airport passenger screening checkpoints that did not address all needed capabilities. These issues occurred because DHS did not provide adequate oversight of the acquisition. Specifically, DHS allowed TSA to use an acquisition approach not recognized by DHS’ acquisition guidance. In addition, DHS allowed TSA to deploy CT systems even though they did not meet all TSA key performance parameters. DHS also did not assess TSA’s detection upgrade before TSA incorporated it into the CT system. As a result, TSA risks spending over $700 million in future appropriated funding to purchase CT systems that may never fully meet operational mission needs.
The entire rollout is slated to cost around $1.28 over the next ten years. And that’s if it stays on track and, unlike nearly every large government program, does not result in cost overruns. In exchange, passengers are theoretically gaining more security, but only if they’re willing to wait in longer lines.
TSA’s February 2018 Operational Requirements Document identified the need for a CT system capable of screening, on average, 200 items per hour to successfully perform the mission. However, we determined TSA purchased 300 CT systems capable of screening an average of 170 items per hour — 15 percent less than the minimum requirement, and less than the AT X-ray system capability of approximately 354 items per hour.
And you can kiss the incremental security gains goodbye. If things get busy enough, most bags will still be handled the old fashioned way.
DHS determined TSA would have to either use the CT systems during periods of lower volume passenger traffic or use both the CT systems and AT X-ray systems to balance high demand and reduce the impact to checkpoint operations.
In addition, the CT scanners needed an upgrade less than 8 months after purchase, which would have to be rolled out live during “low volume travel periods.” This upgrade was required to bring the machines in line with what the TSA promised they’d be able to do, like detect contraband and reduce the need to open carry-on bags.
The Inspector General says buying scanners that will incrementally improve until they meet the baseline metric used to justify their purchase is a terrible way to spend tax dollars. And it points the finger firmly in the direction of the department that directly oversees the TSA.
DHS does not recognize “incremental delivery” of capabilities as an approved acquisition approach.
And yet, it approved this acquisition anyway, which is slated to run north of a billion dollars within the next ten years. The DHS greased the wheels for yet another TSA failure.
Despite operational test and evaluation requirements, DHS allowed TSA to proceed to full rate production (“Produce” phase) even though the system did not meet its key performance parameter for throughput. DHS did not require TSA to develop a remediation plan or re-evaluate its performance requirement as required by DHS’ acquisition guidance. Instead, DHS approved TSA’s decision to accept the CT system in exchange for attaining the advanced detection capabilities it offered over the AT X-ray.
The IG offers three recommendations. Unfortunately, none of them are “grab your receipts and get your money back” or “dissolve the TSA.” It strongly suggests DHS handle acquisitions better by following its own guidelines — the ones ignored to allow the TSA to acquire scanners that slow down the screening process without offering any measurable gains in travel security.