European Commission Admits Defeat In Trying To Improve Corporate Sovereignty Chapter In CETA

Politics

from the now-what? dept

The excitement over the mad dash to finish TPP — and the failure to do so — has rather obscured the other so-called trade deals currently being negotiated, such as TAFTA/TTIP and the one between the EU and Canada, CETA. As Techdirt has reported, CETA is even further along than TPP, in what is known as the “legal scrub” phase when the lawyers tweak the agreed text in an attempt to catch drafting errors or other infelicities. Back in June, the EU commissioner responsible for trade and trade agreements, Cecilia Malmström, told Politico.eu that CETA “could be done by the end of July“. That obviously didn’t happen, or we would presumably have heard about it by now. The Politico.eu article gives a clue as to why not:

So the festering wound that is corporate sovereignty, formally “investor-state dispute settlement” (ISDS), could well be the problem here. Back in March of this year, on the subject of corporate sovereignty in CETA, Malmström said:

This promise seems to have been based on the optimistic idea that the European Commission would actually be able to come up with some improvements to ISDS in the wake of its massive rejection by the public in the Commission’s consultation on the subject. It’s true that Malmström went on to present some very vague ideas about ways in which corporate sovereignty could be “improved”, but so far these have not been turned into concrete proposals that could be discussed with the Canadian government.

Given that failure, it should perhaps come as no surprise that Zeit Online is reporting (original in German) that Malmström now has no plans to try to change CETA for the better before it is signed, merely saying that afterwards there will be a “check” on the ISDS mechanism — a worthless promise, since at that point Canada will have zero reason to make any concessions.

But signing CETA with the current corporate sovereignty chapter is a big problem. CETA’s ISDS is actually worse than previous approaches, despite repeated claims to the contrary by the European Commission. But by way of consolation, leaving it untouched may also make getting CETA passed much harder. As we wrote in February, there are some indications that German’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is not happy about the current ISDS chapter in CETA, while the French government has said that if the ISDS chapter is not re-written, France will not ratify the treaty.

Similarly, in a non-binding but significant set of recommendations to the European Commission regarding TTIP, the European Parliament said that ISDS must be replaced with “a new system for resolving disputes between investors and states which is subject to democratic principles and scrutiny” — hinting that, without such a new system, it would vote against TTIP. If that is its position on TTIP, it would make no sense not to apply it to CETA, too: since US companies will be able to use their Canadian subsidiaries to sue the EU by invoking CETA’s corporate sovereignty chapter, a bad ISDS in CETA would undermine a “better” one in TTIP.

Of course, politicians are notoriously fickle, so it’s by no means certain that national governments and the European Parliament will stick to these stated positions when it comes to the actual votes for CETA and TAFTA/TTIP. But there’s no doubt that the European Commission’s failure to come up with even the mildest of face-saving changes to CETA’s corporate sovereignty provisions has just made the task of pushing the deals through a little bit harder.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and +glynmoody on Google+

Filed Under: ceclia malmstrom, ceta, corporate sovereignty, eu, isds, tafta, tpp, ttip

DailyDirt: Even Cooler 3D Printers On The Way

Innovation

from the urls-we-dig-up dept

Most homes don’t have a 3D printer… yet. But just as most homes didn’t have a “computer” or an internet connection just a few years ago, technology can change quickly, and 3D printers could become ubiquitous relatively quickly. With 3D printers in your kitchen or living room, you could print up a Left Shark whenever you felt like it, but hopefully, no one will be doing that too often. If you already have a MakerBot or some other 3D printer, check out a few other developments that could be nice to have.

• Spiders are inspiring 3D printers to build large structures that are bigger than the printer itself. Arachnid-inspired 3D printers won’t just print big webs, but airplane wings, space stations and maybe clothes. [url]
• Plastic parts are nice, but 3D printing with copper could be even more useful. A binder-jetting process prints a glue onto copper powder which is sintered to form a solid metal piece. If 3D printing with metals gets cheaper, the capabilities of amateur printing could get a lot closer to industrial manufacturing. [url]
• Carbon3D is a startup working on a 3d printing method that prints solid objects from a liquid medium. Continuous Liquid Interface Production (CLIP) uses photochemistry to fuse liquid resins into a solid form, creating parts from a pool of liquid that have features as small as 20 microns. This technology is potentially orders of magnitude faster than other kinds of 3D printing, and it also allows for intricate geometries to be printed easily. [url]

After you’ve finished checking out those links, take a look at our Daily Deals for cool gadgets and other awesome stuff.

Filed Under: 3d printing, additive manufacturing, continuous liquid interface production, manufacturing
Companies: carbon3d, makerbot

District Court Judge Worried About NSA Running Out The Clock On Phone Records… While Appeals Court Happy To Let Clock Run

Privacy

from the different-approaches dept

On Wednesday, there were separate hearings in two of the most watched cases around the NSA bulk phone records collections. First up, was a hearing before district judge Richard Leon, who was the first judge to find the NSA’s bulk collection of phone records under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act unconstitutional. As you may have heard, last week, the DC circuit appeals court struck down that ruling, focusing solely on the question of standing, saying that the plaintiff, Larry Klayman, had failed to prove that he had standing, since he used Verizon Wireless, and the documents released by Ed Snowden only showed that Verizon Business Services turned over phone records.

Of course, in a bit of a twist, while it was true at the time of the original lawsuit that there was not public information confirming Verizon Wireless participated in the program (even though many suspected it), since then the government has released documents proving that Verizon Wireless was part of the collection program. Back in court, Judge Leon made it clear he still believes that the program itself is unconstitutional (and that the appeals court did not rule on that issue, but just the standing issue). He’s also well aware that under the USA Freedom Act, the bulk collection under the PATRIOT Act is about to end, so he spent the time in court suggesting strongly to Klayman that he needs to act quickly if the case is to have any meaning at all — while also telling the DOJ he won’t let them just run out the clock. The DOJ is clearly relying on the ending of this particular kind of collection under the USA Freedom Act to suggest the court has nothing to rule on, but Judge Leon isn’t buying it:

Justice Department lawyer Rodney Patton noted that the wind-down of the NSA program follows Congress’s passage in June of the USA Freedom Act, which ends the phone metadata collection program but also extended for about six months the legal authority under which the g was set up.

“The political branches came to a compromise,” Patton said. “This court should consider what the political branches decided to do…..and not consider the extraordinary remedy of [a new] injunction.”

After Patton spoke, Leon leaned in and pointed for emphasis as he warned against foot-dragging by the government. “I am not going to allow, if I can help it, any misimpression or impression that the government is trying to run out the clock here,” the judge said. “I’m not going to tolerate that.”

There are some procedural issues in the way, however, starting with the fact that the appeals court has not officially released the appeal to send the case back to the district court, so Judge Leon hinted very strongly, while claiming he wasn’t instructing Klayman what to do, that Klayman needs to get the appeals court to officially give the case back. But he’s also clear that he still believes the program is unconstitutional:

“This court believes there are millions and millions of Americans whose constitutional rights have been and are being violated, but the window…for action is very small….It’s time to move.”

Meanwhile, over in the 2nd Circuit appeals court — the one appeals court to rule that this same program was unconstitutional, the ACLU has been working hard to demand that the program be shut down now even during the so-called “transition” period from the PATRIOT Act to the USA Freedom Act. The ACLU is arguing that if the program is unconstitutional, then it needs to be stopped, now, not during some “transition.” Unfortunately, it appears that the court is more skeptical on that one, and willing to let the government “run out the clock.” From the Guardian:

?The harm we?re suffering has no expiration date,? Abdo argued, contending that the continued surveillance, which expires on 28 November under the new surveillance regime Congress passed in June, has a chilling effect on the civil liberties group?s work.

But three judges on the second circuit court of appeals signaled a reluctance to intercede in the NSA?s ongoing surveillance, which is ostensibly designed to smooth a pathway toward letting the NSA and other federal agencies obtain vast amounts of US call records from telecoms pursuant to a judicial order.

?One would think you?re on the losing end of a civil rights catastrophe, but you?ve made tremendous progress on your point of view,? said Judge Robert D Sack, who referenced a famous Vietnam-era quote to ask if the injunction would be a moot point after November: ?Why don?t you declare victory and withdraw??

Judge Sack also compared the situation to ordering a plane to land mid-flight, rather than complete its descent. Given all that, it seems unlikely that the court will order the mass surveillance be stopped prior to the official end date set by the USA Freedom Act. And, all this means is that it’s likely the government will end up with basically no punishment for having unconstitutionally spied on Americans for years.

Filed Under: 2nd circuit, doj, nsa, patriot act, richard leon, section 215, surveillance, usa freedom act

DOJ Reasserts Its Right To Engage In Seized Data Fishing Expeditions

Privacy

from the so-many-'interests,'-so-few-granted-to-individual-citizens dept

Last June, the Second Circuit appeals court restored a bit of Fourth Amendment protection to computers/devices seized by government investigators. In the case being appealed, accountant Stavros Ganias had three of his computers imaged by Army investigators looking for evidence of billing fraud and property theft. He wasn’t a suspect in either of the crimes and the warrant specified investigators were only to review information from Ganias’ hard drives pertinent to these allegations.

Instead, the Army held onto every piece of data it had obtained for two-and-a-half years before investigators came across data that suggested Ganias was committing tax fraud. It reoriented its investigation and obtained a warrant to search the imaged drives for more evidence of Ganias’ malfeasance.

Ganias challenged this, claiming the government’s inability to stay within the limits of its initial investigation violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The appeals court agreed, and tossed the evidence investigators had gathered with its second warrant.

The Government had no warrant authorizing the seizure of Ganias’s personal records in 2003. By December 2004, these documents had been separated from those relevant to the investigation of American Boiler and IPM. Nevertheless, the Government continued to retain them for another year-and-a-half until it finally developed probable cause to search and seize them in 2006. Without some independent basis for its retention of those documents in the interim, the Government clearly violated Ganias’s Fourth Amendment rights by retaining the files for a prolonged period of time and then using them in a future criminal investigation.

The DOJ disagreed with this finding and asked for an en banc rehearing. The court has obliged, giving the agency a second crack at receiving legal permission to engage in prolonged fishing expeditions with seized devices and data. The DOJ has filed an 86-page brief, which not only suggests investigators have every right to root around in digital unmentionables until evidence of criminal activity — any criminal activity — is found, but that the term “brief” is often severely misleading.

TL; DR: because warrants were issued (even if the second had nothing to do with the target of the first warrant), no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. And, if a violation did occur, here’s a “good faith” band-aid.

The government’s actions in this case were reasonable and complied with the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of computers to execute search warrants and further permits the retention of those computers—even if they contain non-responsive files—for legitimate government reasons, including, inter alia, evidence authentication and compliance with discovery obligations. Because the government legitimately holds the forensic images, a subsequent search of those images is generally reasonable where, as here, the search is authorized by a search warrant. But even if the government agents failed to comply with the Fourth Amendment in some respect, they acted in good faith, in reliance on two warrants, and with the goal of respecting the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, there is no basis for suppression in this case.

More specifically, the DOJ argues that the government’s needs and wants (along with its possessory interest during the duration of the original investigation) supersede any privacy interest raised by Ganias. The DOJ makes only a passing reference to its fishing expedition, claiming it was prompted (mostly) by evidence not located on the seized computers.

Because the government acted reasonably in obtaining and retaining the forensic images in this case, its subsequent search of those images for evidence of tax violations by Ganias—under the authority of a new search warrant—was also reasonable. The images were legitimately in the government’s possession, and the government developed probable cause (based largely on evidence outside the retained forensic images) to believe that the images contained evidence of another crime. Thus, it is entirely reasonable for the government to obtain a subsequent search warrant to review a retained image anew. The individual’s privacy interest is protected effectively by the issuance of a second warrant.

The DOJ spends most of the brief explaining both imaging methods and the many reasons all seized data must remain intact during the course of an investigation. It devotes far fewer paragraphs to explaining why it feels it has the right to examine unrelated files for evidence of other wrongdoing. When it does finally get around to discussing this aspect of its “rummaging” efforts, it unsurprisingly decides this is best illustrated with a recounting of a child pornography investigation.

This doesn’t conflate Ganias’ almost-undetected tax evasion with the sexual abuse of children, because that would be pointless and crazy. It’s actually more devious and disingenuous than that. It not-so-subtly implies that if the court finds rummaging through files and examinations exceeding the scope of issued warrants to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, child pornographers will go undetected or unpunished.

Now, in all fairness to a government agency (one frequently unwilling to extend the same courtesy to others), examining hard drive images is far from straightforward and it’s often difficult to determine what’s relevant without looking at what isn’t.. The language of affidavits isn’t really built to handle the nuances of forensic data examination. Changes in technology definitely raise new concerns and issues, but the DOJ feels any new problems should be resolved in its favor.

It contends that the government retains a possessory interest in seized computers, which will almost always outweigh the interests of those whose devices have been seized. This becomes very problematic when the agency seizing the data also determines the extent of the searches and the endpoint of any investigations. While the establishment of probable cause and the securing of warrants does conform with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the strength of those protections can easily be undermined by the same government that’s supposed to be respecting these boundaries.

The appeals court will be wading back into some very thorny issues. Hopefully, it won’t result in scaled-back protections.

Filed Under: doj, fishing expedition, fourth amendment, stavros ganias

Washington State Court Confused By Section 230, Says Backpage May Be Liable For User Posts

Legal Issues

from the because-we-said-so dept

What is it about state courts where they seem much more confused by the law than federal courts? The latest is a horrifically confused ruling out of Washington State’s Supreme Court, basically handwaving its way past nearly all caselaw on Section 230 of the CDA. That law makes it clear that online service providers are not liable for actions/content of their users. This was a key purpose behind the law, which Congress passed to make sure that people couldn’t file frivolous lawsuits targeting service providers, rather than the actual users who broke the law. It’s a good and extremely important law in the development of the internet, having helped stop numerous frivolous lawsuits, but more importantly, for providing strong protections that made it possible for many internet services to exist in the first place. And, yet, every once in a while, a court seems to miss all of this, and today that court is the Washington State Supreme Court, ruling that Backpage.com may be directly liable for the fact that one of its users used the service to engage in sex trafficking with young girls.

Let’s start by making one thing clear: the trafficking of these girls is horrific and one hopes that all legal recourse is being used against those who actually were engaged in the trafficking. But targeting Backpage makes no more sense than targeting Ford because one of its cars was used as the getaway vehicle in a bank robbery. And yet… the court rules otherwise. And it doesn’t give any good reason at all, other than because it said so. The court doesn’t ignore Section 230. It properly notes that Section 230 protects service providers, but not those who develop the content. And then it decides that Backpage may have created rules that “induce sex trafficking,” and thus it could be seen as developing the content. Here’s the key part of the ruling:

Viewing J.S. ‘s allegations in the light most favorable to J.S., as we must at this stage, J.S. alleged facts that, if proved true, would show that Backpage did more than simply maintain neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain content. Those allegations include that (1) “Backpage.com … has intentionally developed its website to require information that allows and encourages … illegal trade to occur through its website, including the illegal trafficking of underage girls,” (2) “Backpage.com has developed content requirements that it knows will allow pimps and prostitutes to evade law enforcement,” (3) “Backpage.com knows that the foregoing content requirements are a fraud and a ruse that is aimed at helping pimps, prostitutes, and Backpage.com evade law enforcement by giving the [false] appearance that Backpage.com does not allow sex trafficking on its website,” (4) “the content requirements are nothing more than a method developed by Backpage.com to allow pimps, prostitutes, and Backpage.com to evade law enforcement for illegal sex trafficking, including the trafficking of minors for sex,” ( 5) Backpage’ s “content requirements are specifically designed to control the nature and context of those advertisements so that pimps can continue to use Backpage.com to traffic in sex, including the trafficking of children, and so Backpage.com can continue to profit from those advertisements,” and (6) Backpage has a “substantial role in creating the content and context of the advertisements on its website.” … According to J.S., Backpage’ s advertisement posting rules were not simply neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain content but were instead ~’specifically designed … so that pimps can continue to use Backpage.com to traffic in sex.” …

Given J. S. ‘s allegations, it does not appear “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that no facts exist that would justify recovery”‘ in this case, and, therefore, dismissal of J.S.’s claims under CR 12(b)(6) is not appropriate…. It is important to ascertain whether in fact Backpage designed its posting rules to induce sex trafficking to determine whether Backpage is subject to suit under the CDA because “a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.” … Fact-finding on this issue is warranted.

In short, because the plaintiffs claim that — even though Backpage’s terms of service directly state that you are not allowed to use the service for illegal activities such as trafficking or prostitution — because they believe Backpage really wants that, it means that it’s somehow crossed the line and helped to “develop” the content. That’s bizarre and legally wrong. I imagine this will reach a federal court which will destroy this decision.

There’s a concurring ruling from Justice Charles Wiggins that is even more confused and completely misreads Section 230 and the volumes of caselaw that make it clear that 230 grants full immunity to service providers. Wiggins insists that’s not true. Because he’s wrong.

I write separately to emphasize that this holding implies that the plaintiffs’ claims do not treat Backpage.com as the publisher or speaker of another’s information under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). The dissent misreads this statute to provide “immunity” to ‘”interactive service providers.'” Dissent at 1. This reading is irreconcilable with the actual language of the statute, which does not include the term or any synonym of “immunity.” Subsection 230(c)(1) instead provides a narrower protection from liability: the plain language of the statute creates a defense when there is (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker of information (3) that is provided by another information content provider.

Thus, when the cause of action does not treat an intermediary as a publisher or speaker, subsection 230(c)(1) cannot be read to protect that intermediary from liability. Plaintiffs’ claims that Backpage.com created ucontent rules” specifically designed to induce sex trafficking and evade law enforcement do not treat Backpage.com as the publisher or speaker of another’s information. Accordingly, I join the majority opinion.

This is just wrong. It’s a really twisted reading of Section 230 that no court has made before. Wiggins is trying to argue that they’re not blaming Backpage for the sex trafficking, but merely for the rules that induce sex trafficking (even though the company goes way beyond what’s legally necessary to insist that no sex trafficking is allowed on the platform). Basically, he’s arguing that if people think you mean one thing, but say another, Section 230 safe harbors might no longer apply to you. Because.

There’s a strong dissent from Justice Sheryl Gordon McCloud pointing out how ridiculous it is that things got this far.

The majority holds that J.S.’s complaint would support a claim that Backpage functions as an “information content provider” because it alleged that Backpage maintains content requirements for advertisements posted on its website that surreptitiously guide pimps on how to post illegal, exploitative ads. But J.S.’s complaint clearly alleges that another content provider, not Backpage, provided the content for the advertisements. J.S. thus seeks to hold Backpage liable as a publisher or speaker of that information. Subsection 230(c)(l) therefore bars J.S.’s claims.

That dissent also trashes Wiggins’ attempt to parse a difference between “immunity” and a more limited liability protection:

Given the allegations in this particular case, the difference in terminology is irrelevant. The question is how far the subsection 230( c )(1) protection reaches, and courts interpreting subsection 230(c)(1)’s language uniformly hold that its protection for publishers is “quite robust.” They apply an expansive definition of ‘”interactive computer service provider”‘ and a rather restrictive definition of “information content provider.” Carafano v. Metrosplash.com …. They hold that the law provides immunity if the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated a duty deriving from the defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or speaker. Barnes v. Yahoo!… As long as a third party “‘willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process.”‘ Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com…. The inquiry is whether the defendant “function[ed] as an ‘information content provider’ for the portion of the statement or publication at issue.” Carafano…; see also Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com … (affirming district court’s dismissal of complaint where plaintiff failed to show that defendant “was responsible for the creation or development. of the allegedly defamatory content at issue”).

The dissent further notes that the majority decision mistakenly takes J.S.’s assertions that Backpage is the developer of content as true, even though it’s clearly not the case under the law:

This allegation-that Backpage designed its posting rules to induce sex trafficking-might prove true. Indeed, we presume it is true when evaluating the sufficiency of J. S. ‘s complaint. But adopting such posting rules still does not make Backpage a “content provider” within the meaning of the CDA, even under the Ninth Circuit case upon which J.S., the majority, and the concurrence place principal reliance….

In fact, courts have consistently rejected the contention that defendants “develop” content by maintaining neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain content. For example, in Dart v. Craigslist… which the majority cites at 7, the plaintiff claimed that even though Craigslist, an Internet classifieds service, prohibited illegal content on its website, users frequently posted ads promising sex for money…. Consequently, the plaintiff asserted that Craigslist “ma[de] it easier for prostitutes, pimps, and patrons to conduct business.” … A federal court in Illinois dismissed the claims… explaining, “Plaintiffs argument that Craigslist causes or induces illegal content is further undercut by the fact that Craigslist repeatedly warns users not to post such content. While we accept as true for the purposes of this motion plaintiffs allegation that users routinely flout Craigslist’s guidelines, it is not because Craigslist has caused them to do so. Or if it has, it is only ‘in the sense that no one could post [unlawful content] if craigslist did not offer a forum.”‘ … see also Chi. Lawyers’… (“Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing.”); Roommates, … (“To be sure, the website provided neutral tools, which the anonymous dastard used to publish the libel, but the website did absolutely nothing to encourage the posting of defamatory content-indeed, the defamatory posting was contrary to the website’s express policies.”)….

The facts in Dart are analogous to the facts here. J.S. alleges that pimps-not Backpage-created and uploaded the ads at issue… (“adult pimps … posted advertisements for the girls”) … (“adult pimps … create[ d] … and then uploaded [the] advertisements of S.L. onto . . . Backpage.com”). Nothing in Backpage’s policies obligated users to flout Backpage’s express content requirements or to post unlawful content. J. S. ‘s allegations indicate that the pimps chose the content ultimately used in the advertisements…. The actual “information” at issue consisted of the particular wording and photos that the pimps provided….

Thus, holding Backpage liable would punish it for publishing third party content, and the CDA prohibits such liability.

It seems highly likely that Backpage will appeal and will win.

Filed Under: cda, immunity, liability, safe harbors, section 230, trafficking, washington
Companies: backpage, backpage.com

Techdirt Reading List: Larry Lessig's Republic, Lost

Techdirt

from the worth-a-read dept

We’re back again with another in our weekly reading list posts, of books we think our community will find interesting and thought provoking. Once again, buying the book via the Amazon links in this story also help support Techdirt.

As you’ve probably heard by now, Larry Lessig is may be running for President if he’s able to raise $1 million by the end of this weekend — positioning himself as a 100% referendum candidate focused on political corruption and money in politics. His plan is to pass campaign finance reform, and then resign from the Presidency. He’s currently right around $750,000, which makes me think he’ll make it over the line with a last minute bump.

I’m still not entirely sure what I think of the campaign. As I said in my original post about it, it feels gimmicky and a little nutty. Others have raised more serious concerns, some of which Lessig just tried to respond to, which is worth a read. However, equally worth reading is Lessig’s 2011 book about money in politics (and how to fix it): Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress–and a Plan to Stop It.

As with the fundamentals of Lessig’s campaign, I don’t agree with the entire book, and I still worry about the serious unintended consequences that may occur based on campaign finance laws that sound good, but may create free expression concerns. That said, Lessig still makes a very compelling argument about just how corrupt the system really is, and how that undermines nearly everything in government. At the very least, if you’re considering supporting Lessig (or, even hating on Lessig), you at least owe it to yourself to read his book, in which he lays out his ideas in a very thorough manner. And, yes, if you don’t wish to buy the book from Amazon, Lessig also allows for free downloads from his own website, though (obviously) getting it that way doesn’t help support Techdirt.

Filed Under: corruption, larry lessig, money in politics, reading list, republic lost, techdirt reading list

Daily Deal: Microsoft Certified Solutions Developer

Deals

from the good-deals-on-cool-stuff dept

Learn how to create and manage apps for the Windows Store while prepping yourself for the certification exams with the $50 Microsoft Certified Solutions Developer Bundle. The first course covers a complete overview of programming in C#, including all the syntax, build types and customization tips. The second course takes your C# knowledge and helps you apply it to designing, developing and deploying Windows Store apps. The third course helps you master the skills for using C# and Microsoft Visual Studio to take your apps to the next level. Completing all three courses will have you well on your way to being ready to ace your certification exams (exams not included as they must be administered at official exam centers).

Note: The Techdirt Deals Store is powered and curated by StackCommerce. A portion of all sales from Techdirt Deals helps support Techdirt. The products featured do not reflect endorsements by our editorial team.

Filed Under: daily deal

Med Express Ordered To Pay $20k In Sanctions For Frivolous Lawsuit Over A Negative eBay Review

Free Speech

from the slappety-slapp-slapp dept

Back in 2013, we wrote about an Ohio medical equipment company, named Med Express, which had sued a marginally dissatisfied customer, Amy Nicholls, demanding she take down her eBay review. Her review wasn’t even that bad. It just expressed dismay that the product she ordered arrived postage due, meaning she had to pay more than expected to get it. She found that to be a nuisance and expressed it. The lawyer representing Med Express, James Amodio, told Public Citizen’s Paul Levy directly that he had filed the lawsuit to get the review taken down, even if it was entirely truthful. Here was Paul Levy, at the time:

I contacted James Amodio, Med Express?s lawyer, to explain to him the many ways in which his lawsuit is untenable. He readily admitted that, as the complaint admits, everything that the customer had posted in her feedback was true; he did not deny that a statement has to be false to be actionable as defamation; but he just plain didn?t care. To the contrary, he told me that I could come up to Medina, Ohio, and argue whatever I might like, but that the case was going to continue unless the feedback was taken down or changed to positive. And he explained why his client was insisting on this change ? he said that it sells exclusively over eBay, where a sufficient level of negative feedback can increase the cost of such sales as well as possibly driving away customers

A couple of days later, Med Express’s President, Richard Radey, showed up in our comments, appearing to apologize for the lawsuit, and saying it was a mistake and he was instructing his attorneys to drop the lawsuit. He also claimed that the lawyers were doing a lot of this without his knowledge, but he clearly signed an affidavit claiming that the review included “false” information. Paul Levy, once again, pointed out that if this was all a big mistake, it seemed odd that Med Express had filed a bunch of similar lawsuits:

Of the current crop of lawsuits, the suit against Nicholls isn?t even the worst. I haven?t yet been able to see the original documents from the transaction on which Med Express? lawsuit against Guam resident Tan Jan Chen is based, but the lawsuit against Scranton-area resident Dennis Rogan is over a two-word ?neutral? buyer feedback stating ?Order retracted.? Apparently, Rogan bought a piece of equipment on eBay but Med Express had to refund his money because, as it explained in a message accompanying the PayPal refund, ?This should not have been still listed?we removed this item a few weeks back-it broke.? As in Nicholls? case, the statement over which Med Express sued for libel was true, but even worse than in Nicholls? case, Rogan had not even left ?negative? feedback.

Also, thanks to a friendly Popehat signal, Nicholls (and Rogan) had found pro bono legal support from Tom Haren and Jeffrey Nye (along with Levy), who quickly filed a response and counterclaims, meaning that even though Radey claimed Med Express was dropping the lawsuit against Nicholls, it couldn’t just walk away.

And… because of that, Med Express just got hit with $20,000 in sanctions for filing a bogus lawsuit. You can read the decision here. Even without an anti-SLAPP law in Ohio, the court clearly recognized that this was a frivolous lawsuit. Not only that, the court found that Radey himself appeared to be playing word games in his own testimony to the court.

Specifically, during testimony Radey claimed that he had seen the reviews give “1” ratings in “all of those categories” (on eBay you can rate a seller on 4 different categories). However, as a representative from eBay told the court, the sellers don’t actually get to see those ratings — and, neither Rogan nor Nicholls actually gave Med Express a “1” in every category (in fact, Rogan only rated Med Express in one category and gave the company the highest rating, a 5). That’s called lying by Radey.

The deposition of [eBay’s] Ms. Long shows that Mr. Rady’s testimony was false.

Radey then testified again, in which he tried to tap dance around his earlier false testimony. The court explains here:

Mr. Radey also testified again. His testimony varied from the first hearing in that he attempted to clarify his prior trial testimony wherein he testified he saw Defendants Nicholls and Rogan rated him with all 1’s in the detailed seller ratings categories. This time he testified he must have jumped to the conclusion Nicholls and Rogan rated him with all 1’s (as opposed to his prior testimony that he basically watched it happen almost live). Mr. Rady also testified he called Ebay years ago and Ebay gave him the idea to file suit against Ebay and buyers leaving negative feedback. The negative feedback could be removed by court order. The testimony wasn’t credible.

Apparently, Radey and Med Express went through five different lawyers during this whole process, and back in July, their last lawyer withdrew from the case, citing “irreconcilable differences with the client.” And the company has not found a new lawyer.

In the end, the court is not at all impressed by Radey.

The Plaintiff’s complaints had no merit, legally or factually, when they were filed.

The court then lists out the four indications of a frivolous filing, noting that Med Express’s suit violated all four.

The Plaintiff’s suit was for an improper purpose. The goal was to thwart Ebay’s seller ranking system for financial gain by obtaining an injunction against out of state defendants unlikely to be able to defend themselves. The Defendants did absolutely nothing wrong. They simply participated in Ebay’s feedback component in exactly the manner in which Ebay intended. While Mr. Rady may perceive Ebay’s seller ranking system to be unfair to sellers, the remedy wasn’t to attack the buyers.

The Plaintiff’s complaint was not warranted under existing law, could not have been supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and could not be supported by a good faith argument for the establishment of new law. The Defendants did nothing more than accurately recite a statement of facts and express their opinion.

Meanwhile, in Levy’s blog post about this (linked above), he notes that it appears that Radey has been seeking to avoid all the negative publicity about this by changing the name of his business on eBay.

Med Express changed its eBay moniker from Med Express Sales to Medical Specialists, apparently to try to avoid the negative associations caused by its lawsuit; a recent check of eBay suggests that, although Med Express was still in business as of the second sanctions trial this past spring, it has changed its selling name again.

Either way, it looks like he’s going to have to pay up for his bogus lawsuits. Hopefully this is a lesson to others who think about filing similar SLAPP suits, even where there are no anti-SLAPP laws.

Filed Under: bad reviews, defamation, feedback, frivolous lawsuits, richard radey
Companies: ebay, med express, medical specialists

Everything The Same Is Infringing: How Hugh Hefner Used Mario Bros. To Show YouTube's Copyright System Sucks

Copyright

from the mario-pron? dept

There’s an old saying that those that lie down with dogs will get back up with fleas. One modern derivative of that maxim might be: if you bend over backwards for copyright censors you will become censors yourself. No better example of this can be found than YouTube’s ContentID system, the automated platform that scours YouTube videos looking for uploads of identical audio or video content and proactively takes them down in favor of the original content owner. That’s how it works in theory, that is. In practice, ContentID appears to be most useful in taking down fair use content, trolling legitimate creators, and even silencing political speech, supposedly the most revered thing in this great Republic of ours. It’s typical in these cases for the automation to be blamed, but that’s a mistake. The real blame lies with Google for implementing such a flawed system, with the entertainment industry and trolls for abusing it, and with all of us for simply accepting it. Everyone, in other words, is to blame.

I came to that conclusion recently, when Hugh Hefner used Mario Bros. to show me how silly all of this is. The whole thing started when a Kotaku writer uploaded a video of some Mario Maker levels that play themselves.

Two days ago, I uploaded a video to YouTube. It featured some awesome automatic Mario Maker levels that basically play themselves. Today, I was dinged with a copyright notice for that same video. The claimant was none other than…Playboy? I’m serious. I didn’t get flagged by Nintendo. Rather, I got flagged by Hugh Hefner’s operation.

Playboy, obviously, does not own Mario. It did not create Mario Maker. It did not build the level on display in my video. And yet my video was still flagged. What gives?

What gave was that Playboy had uploaded a video that contained one of the same levels in the other video. Because these levels play by themselves, rather than being played by a human, the videos have the exact same content. So, faster than a Mario Brother running with the ‘B’ button mashed down, ContentID flagged Kotaku’s video as infringing and sent out a notice. Other users likewise had videos of that Mario Maker level flagged in favor of Playboy, which I am very much certain doesn’t own any of the IP surrounding Nintendo’s center-piece franchise. Most, like the Kotaku writer, submitted disputes which were resolved quickly. Playboy, for its part, has been active in getting all of the claims dismissed…

…which is entirely besides the goddamn point. ContentID was dinging uploaders for copyright violations in an automated fashion, with no checks, on content owned by an unrelated party. That doesn’t make any sense. And, in some cases, there can be actual harm done.

When you get flagged, the claimant has a whole 30 days to review your dispute, during which your video typically stays up while also making money for the claimant. Sometimes, the claimant will even be able to block the video from being viewed entirely. Even if the dispute gets dismissed, it might mean waiting days if not an entire month for the motion to actually get through. In the meantime, any YouTuber who supports themselves with ads and just wanted to show off the level to their subscribers, or perhaps added some good commentary to the footage, will lose revenue (as well as gain an unnecessary headache.)

Personally, I’d love to see “An unnecessary headache” as the epitaph on ContentID’s gravestone.

Filed Under: contentid, copyright, hugh hefner, mario bros, mario maker, youtube
Companies: nintendo, playboy, youtube

City Of Peoria Offers $125,000 Non-Apology To Owner Of Twitter Account That Parodied Its Mayor

Legal Issues

from the mayor's-power-inversely-proportionate-to-skin-thickness dept

The taxpayers of Peoria, Illinois, will be footing the bill for the bumbling thuggishness of their thin-skinned mayor and an all-too-compliant police force.

Last April, Peoria mayor Jim Ardis somehow stumbled across a parodic Twitter account run by local Jon Daniel. Taking offense to the account’s content, Ardis managed to talk the police department into raiding Daniel’s apartment, despite the chief of police informing the mayor that no criminal activity had actually occurred.

Backlash ensued. The mayor took to the airwaves to defend his actions, claiming the parody account used up all the free speech, leaving him no way to defend himself against tweets suggesting he was “trill as fuck.”

A lawsuit ensued. The ACLU took up Daniel’s case and sued the mayor, the city and various law enforcement officers. Faced with the possibility of increased damages if the case went to trial, the city has decided to pay Daniel $125,000 for actions it took because its mayor couldn’t take a joke.

The central Illinois city of Peoria tentatively agreed Wednesday to pay $125,000 to settle a lawsuit filed by a man whose home was raided by police over a Twitter account he created depicting the mayor as a lewd fan of drugs and alcohol.

The deal includes no admission that Peoria did anything wrong, but it calls for the city to send its police department a directive emphasizing that parody does not fall under an Illinois statute regulating false personation of a public official, which was used to obtain warrants to arrest Daniel.

As is the case with nearly every government lawsuit settlement, the accused get to walk away without admitting wrongdoing while allowing other people to pick up the tab.

The directive agreed to by the city in the settlement is the tiniest concession of wrongdoing. And, as such, it’s redundant. It simply demands the police enforce the law as it is written, rather than the mayor’s reading of it through the haze of butthurt and misdirected indignation.

In consideration of the releases set forth in Paragraph 6 above, Defendant agrees to implement the False Personation Statute Directive (attached hereto as Exhibit 1), including but not limited to announcing and distributing Exhibit 1 to all current City of Peoria police officers at roll call and certifying to the ACLU that they have done so. Defendant City of Peoria further agrees that it will continue to abide by the terms of the False Personation Statute Directive until and unless a specific change in circumstances, such as a modification in the governing law or a change in the interpretation of the law by the Peoria County State’s Attorney’s office, provides Defendant a good faith belief that adherence to the terms of the False Personation Statute Directive are no longer appropriate.

This reminder shouldn’t be needed and will doubtless be greeted with various levels of eye-rolling when delivered to police officers. The cops that weren’t involved will know the actions taken on behalf of Ardis were wrong. And those who did participate will resent being talked down to by a settlement stipulation. The underlying problem with this directive is that — as noted above — the involved officers already knew Daniel’s parody account didn’t break the law cited in support of the raid of his apartment.

Here’s what Chief Settingsgaard emailed to the mayor before the raid took place.

Mayor/Manager, I reviewed this matter with Detective Feehan. He is in the process of shutting down the account as you saw from my last email. This phony Twitter account does not constitute a criminal violation in that no threats are made. I’m not sure if it would support a civil suit for defamation of character. I’m not an expert in the civil arena but my recollection is that public officials have very limited protection from defamation. I asked (Feehan) about identity theft and he advised it did not qualify because the statute requires the use of personal identifying information such as a social security number, DOB, etc., and a financial gain form (sic) the use of that information. Twitter does not require identifying information other than an email address and name, and there appears to be no financial gain.

And yet, the police did raid Daniel’s apartment. Rereading the law at roll call isn’t going to prevent abuse in the future. The Peoria Police Department has already indicated its willingness to ignore the law if the right person asks. With this settlement, it’s basically buying its way out of accountability.

Filed Under: abuse of power, defamation, jim ardis, jon daniel, parody, peoria, trill as fuck