That’s a lot of words to never actually respond to the point that I raised: in almost no actual situation does labor beget ownership. Instead, it’s always something else. I gave you a bunch of examples and your response is “yes, other things beget ownership” but you still haven’t shown real world cases where labor begets ownership. Because they basically don’t exist.

The entire basis of your argument, that there’s some sort of “natural law” saying labor begets ownership is simply wrong.

I’ll give you four concrete examples, some old and some new.

Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500 (1871). This is one of the first property law opinions that I’ve read. It discusses the two modes of acquisition I mentioned above: occupancy and accession. Here are the facts:

Manure which had accumulated in a frequented place in a public street of a borough, where the fee of the street belonged to the borough, was raked into heaps by the plaintiff in the evening, and left in that condition, to be carried away by him the next evening. During the forenoon of the next day the defendant, finding the manure in heaps, loaded it into his cart and carried it away.

So you’ve got manure on a public street. The plaintiff raked it into piles with the intention of coming back the next day to pick it up. The defendant came along in the meantime, found the piles, and took them. Who should win? What principles should be applied?

The court, quite naturally, turned to natural law. It first noted that the manure would belong to the owner of the animal:

The manure originally belonged to the travelers whose animals dropped it, but it being worthless to them was immediately abandoned[.]

This is the principle of ACCESSION. In general, whether your animals create manure, calves, meat, skin, etc., it belongs to you because it’s your animals. When your horse poops on the street, that’s your poop. And if you leave it there, you abandon it. It goes back to the commons until someone else claims it. That’s what happened in this case.

The defendant tried to escape liability by pointing out that the streets were owned by the borough, not the plaintiff, but the court didn’t buy it:

The defendant appears before the court in no enviable light. He does not pretend that he had a right to the manure, even when scattered upon the highway, superior to that of the plaintiff; but after the plaintiff had changed its original condition and greatly enhanced its value by his labor, he seized and appropriated to his own use the fruits of the plaintiff’s outlay, and now seeks immunity from responsibility on the ground that the plaintiff was a wrong doer as well as himself. The conduct of the defendant is in keeping with his claim, and neither commends itself to the favorable consideration of the court. The plaintiff had the peaceable and quiet possession of the property; and we deem this sufficient until the borough of Stamford shall make complaint.

Because the plaintiff had “had changed its original condition and greatly enhanced its value by his labor,” he had “peaceable and quiet possession of the property.” The defendant could not have “seized and appropriated to his own use the fruits of the plaintiff’s outlay” simply by pointing out that the borough owned the street. The borough might bring its own claim, but between the plaintiff and the defendant, that doesn’t change anything. The plaintiff’s claim is superior because he labored on the manure first. This is the principle of OCCUPATION. It’s the notion that labor begets ownership. This stuff is literally millennia old.

The court further rejected the argument that, whatever rights the plaintiff had acquired by way of occupancy in raking the manure, were lost when he left the piles on the street:

It is further claimed that if the plaintiff had a right to the property by virtue of occupancy, he lost the right when he ceased to retain the actual possession of the manure after scraping it into heaps.

We do not question the general doctrine, that where the right by occupancy exists, it exists no longer than the party retains the actual possession of the property, or till he appropriates it to his own use by removing it to some other place. If he leaves the property at the place where it was discovered, and does nothing whatsoever to enhance its value or change its nature, his right by occupancy is unquestionably gone. But the question is, if a party finds property comparatively worthless, as the plaintiff found the property in question, owing to its scattered condition upon the highway, and greatly increases its value by his labor and expense, does he lose his right if he leaves it a reasonable time to procure the means to take it away, when such means are necessary for its removal?

Suppose a teamster with a load of grain, while traveling the highway, discovers a rent in one of his bags, and finds that his grain is scattered upon the road for the distance of a mile. He considers the labor of collecting his corn of more value than the property itself, and he therefore abandons it, and pursues his way. A afterwards finds the grain in this condition and gathers it kernel by kernel into heaps by the side of the road, and leaves it a reasonable time to procure the means necessary for its removal. While he is gone for his bag, B discovers the grain thus conveniently collected in heaps and appropriates it to his own use. Has A any remedy? If he has not, the law in this instance is open to just reproach. We think under such circumstances A would have a reasonable time to remove the property, and during such reasonable time his right to it would be protected. If this is so, then the principle applies to the case under consideration.

A reasonable time for the removal of this manure had not elapsed when the defendant seized and converted it to his own use. The statute regulating the rights of parties in the gathering of sea-weed, gives the party who heaps it upon a public beach twenty-four hours in which to remove it, and that length of time for the removal of the property we think would not be unreasonable in most cases like the present one.

So even though the plaintiff did not have actual possession of the piles, he had constructive possession. Since he had “greatly increase[d] its value by his labor and expense,” he had possession, and this meant that he had a “reasonable time to remove the property.” The court looked by analogy at the statute on seaweed on a beach, which permits someone 24 hours to remove the piles of seaweed once they’ve been gathered. Since 24 hours is reasonable there, the court held that 24 hours is reasonable here. As the plaintiff had left the piles less than 24 hours, he had the superior claim.

The case law is teeming with applications of natural law modes of acquisition of property, such as accession and occupation. You seem to deny this, and I can only assume it’s because you’re simply not familiar with this aspect of property law. These notions date back many, many centuries—especially in the context of land, animals, and the like. But they turn up in intellectual property as well.

Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The is where the Supreme Court adopted the “hot news” doctrine. Of course, the opinion is no longer good law because of the Erie doctrine, it nonetheless shows how labor begets ownership. The Court, when it had the power to make such declarations, did so. Said the Court:

Obviously, the question of what is unfair competition in business must be determined with particular reference to the character and circumstances of the business. The question here is not so much the rights of either party as against the public but their rights as between themselves. See Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241, 258. And, although we may and do assume that neither party has any remaining property interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its first publication, it by no means follows that there is no remaining property interest in it as between themselves. For, to both of them alike, news matter, however little susceptible of ownership or dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, organization, skill, labor, and money, and to be distributed and sold to those who will pay money for it, as for any other merchandise. Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which both parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same field, we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the public.

In order to sustain the jurisdiction of equity over the controversy, we need not affirm any general and absolute property in the news as such. The rule that a court of equity concerns itself only in the protection of property rights treats any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property right (In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 210, 8 Sup. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 593, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092); and the right to acquire property by honest labor or the conduct of a lawful business is as much entitled to protection as the right to guard property already acquired (Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 37–38, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. Law, 729, 742, 65 Atl. 165, 9 L. R. A. [N. S.] 254, 118 Am. St. Rep. 727, 9 Ann. Cas. 698; *237 Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881). It is this right that furnishes the basis of the jurisdiction in the ordinary case of unfair competition.

The question, whether one who has gathered general information or news at pains and expense for the purpose of subsequent publication through the press has such an interest in its publication as may be protected from interference, has been raised many times, although never, perhaps, in the precise form in which it is now presented.

Because of the “the cost of enterprise, organization, skill, labor, and money” in collected the news, the Court found “quasi property” rights as between the parties. Note that this is but an application of the general rule: “a court of equity . . . treats any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property right.” Though these rights weren’t legal—that is, recognized in courts of law—they were nonetheless—recognized in courts of equity. Those courts determined what is just and right, equitable and moral. A person has “the right to acquire property by honest labor” and “is as much entitled to protection as the right to guard property already acquired.” Labor begets ownership.

The defendant, said the Court, was reaping where he had not sown:

The fault in the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the complainant as against the public, instead of considering the rights of complainant and defendant, competitors in business, as between themselves. The right of the purchaser of a single newspaper to spread knowledge of its contents gratuitously, for any legitimate purpose not unreasonably interfering with complainant’s right to make merchandise of it, may be admitted; but to transmit that news for commercial use, in competition with complainant—which is what defendant has done and seeks to justify—is a very different matter. In doing this defendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material that has been acquired by complainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant for money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant’s members is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown. Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized interference with the normal operation of complainant’s legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the profit from those who have earned it to those who have not; with special advantage to defendant in the competition because of the fact that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of gathering the news. The transaction speaks for itself and a court of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair competition in business.

This was an unfair business practice. While INS v. AP is no longer good law, the law of unfair competition goes back centuries. And it is based on these same notions of fairness, and, of course, labor begetting ownership. If you want to see real world applications of natural law, read some of the unfair competition case law. These torts were invented by the courts based on equitable principles.

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The plaintiff had a “human cannonball” performance that a news station aired in its entirety. The news station argued that the First Amendment trumped the performer’s property rights under the state’s right of publicity. The Supreme Court first distinguished the right of publicity from the other three types of privacy torts:

Time, Inc. v. Hill, which was hotly contested and decided by a divided Court, involved an entirely different tort from the ‘right of publicity’ recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court. As the opinion reveals in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court was steeped in the literature of privacy law and was aware of the developing distinctions and nuances in this branch of the law. The Court, for example, cited W. Prosser, Law of Torts 831-832 (3d ed. 1964), and the same author’s well-known article, Privacy, 48 Calif.L.Rev. 383 (1960), both of which divided privacy into four distinct branches.7 The Court was aware that it was adjudicating a ‘false light’ privacy case involving a matter of public interest, not a case involving ‘intrusion,’ 385 U.S., at 384-385, n. 9, 87 S.Ct., at 540, ‘appropriation’ of a *572 name or likeness for the purposes of trade, id., at 381, 87 S.Ct., at 538, or ‘private details’ about a non-newsworthy person or event, id., at 383 n. 7, 87 S.Ct., at 539. It is also abundantly clear that Time, Inc. v. Hill did not involve a performer, a person with a name having commercial value, or any claim to a ‘right of publicity.’ This discrete kind of ‘appropriation’ case was plainly identified in the **2856 literature cited by the Court8 and had been adjudicated in the reported cases.9

The differences between these two torts are important. First, the State’s interests in providing a cause of action in each instance are different. ‘The interest protected’ in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light ‘is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation.’ Prosser, supra, 48 Calif.L.Rev., at 400. By contrast, the State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.10 As we later note, the State’s interest is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation. Second, the two torts differ in the degree to which they intrude on dissemination of information to the public. In ‘false light’ cases the only way to protect the interests involved is to attempt to minimize publication of the damaging matter, while in ‘right of publicity’ cases the only question is who gets to do the publishing. An entertainer such as petitioner usually has no objection to the widespread publication of his act as long as the gets the commercial benefit of such publication. Indeed, in the present case petitioner did not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his act; he simply *574 sought compensation for the broadcast in the form of damages.

The right of publicity, said the Court, is analogous to patent and copyright law in that it seeks to protect “the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors.” Labor begets ownership. The other three privacy torts, by the way, also come (at least in part) from natural law—more specifically, the Lockean notion of bodily integrity.

The news station lost because it tried to reap where it had not sown:

The broadcast of a film of petitioner’s entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that performance. As the Ohio court recognized, this act is the product of petitioner’s own talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort, and expense. Much of its economic value lies in the ‘right of exclusive control over the publicity given to his performance’; if the public can see the act free on television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair.12 The *576 effect of a public broadcast of the performance is similar to preventing petitioner from charging an admission fee. ‘The rationale for (protecting the right of publicity) is the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay.’ Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp. Prob. 326, 331 (1966). Moreover, the broadcast of petitioner’s entire performance, unlike the unauthorized use of another’s **2858 name for purposes of trade or the incidental use of a name or picture by the press, goes to the heart of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an entertainer. Thus, in this case, Ohio has recognized what may be the strongest case for a ‘right of publicity’ involving, not the appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place.

The interest being protected was the “product of petitioner’s own talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort, and expense.” Labor begets property.

The Court noted that it’s the same underlying rationale for copyright:

Of course, Ohio’s decision to protect petitioner’s right of publicity here rests on more than a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public. This same consideration underlies the patent and copyright laws long enforced by this Court. As the Court stated in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, 74 S.Ct. 460, 471, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954):

‘The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.’

Copyright, like the right of publicity, are rewards based on labor. Such labors “deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.” Labor begets ownership.

Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13 CIV. 5784 CM, 2014 WL 6670201 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014). This is the Turtles’ lawsuit over pre-1972 sound recordings under New York. These recordings are neither protected nor preempted by the 1976 Copyright Act, so the question was whether they were protected under the state’s common law. The court held that they are. Can you guess why? Labor begets ownership. Said the court:

New York has elected to “fill th[e] void” Congress left, by continuing to enforce its preexisting body of copyright common law for pre–1972 sound recordings. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc. (Naxos), 4 N.Y.3d 540, 559–60, 565, 797 N.Y.S.2d 352, 830 N.E.2d 250 (2005); see Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 662–63 (2d Cir.1955); Firma Melodiya v. ZYX Music GmbH, 882 F.Supp. 1306, 1316 (S.D.N.Y.1995). Under that law, artists can acquire a common law copyright in “any original material product of intellectual labor” A.J. Sandy, Inc. v. Junior City, Inc., 17 A.D.2d 407, 234 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (App.Div.1962)—including sound recordings—by expending “time, effort, money, and great skill” in its creation. 104 N.Y. Jur.2d Trade Regulation § 262; see RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir.1940). The term “any original material product of intellectual labor” includes sound recordings. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554–55 (Sup.Ct.1964); Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Wagner–Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492–93 (Sup.Ct.1950) aff’d, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App.Div.1951).

The Turtles originally acquired a common law copyright in their sound recordings by expending time, effort, money and skill to create them. That copyright was then transferred to White Whale, and eventually to Flo and Eddie, which now owns the sound recordings. Sirius does not contest Flo and Eddie’s claim to possess a common law copyright in the Turtles recordings (though it insinuates that some of the underlying ownership transfers are undocumented). Rather, Sirius contends that Flo and Eddie’s rights as holder of the copyright in the sound recordings does not give them the exclusive right to publicly perform those works.

How does one acquire the common law rights? Simple: “by expending time, effort, money, and great skill’ in its creation.” The Turtles had the rights because they expended “time, effort, money and skill to create them.” Labor begets ownership. We don’t often think about copyright this way because the Copyright Act for the most part preempts state law, but where it doesn’t, you see labor theory applied. As mentioned above, labor is also one reason we have statutory rights. But even when the statutory rights aren’t there, the common law declares those rights to exist because of labor.

You seem to deny all of this, and, again, I have to assume it’s because you haven’t ever really looked into it. The reports are full of courts invoking natural law. This has been going on for centuries. All you have to do is look, and you’ll see it too.

In the end, you’ve got nothing but a tautology for your argument. “Natural law” says “labor begets ownership” for “moral” reasons. Yet, when we dig in, we find it’s all exceptions and labor never actually begets any ownership at all, but you have an excuse for every single possible counter example. But the problem is that the underlying rule doesn’t actually exist in any real world. Even when we show that labor never begets ownership, you simply move the goalposts (as you’ve done for years) and say “sure, but morals.” Okay.

Still think I’m moving the goalposts? I can find example after example from decade after decade applying these principles in multiple contexts. In contract law, the courts don’t simply enforce the contract because it’s a contract. The courts enforce it because it’s the right thing to do. People SHOULD keep their promises. You seem to think that law and morality don’t overlap. Nothing could be further from the truth. The former flows from the latter. And when the contract is immoral, it’s not enforced. And even when there’s no contract, the courts might enforce one anyone based on the morality. These moral issues arise in all law: contracts, property, privacy, publicity, etc. You name it. I don’t get the sense you’ve studied this closely. Is that correct?

If you want to check out some of the classical references, I recommend starting with Blackstone’s Commentaries from the 1760s. Source: http://lonang.com/library/reference/blackstone-commentaries-law-england/ Check out Book II in particular. Kent’s Commentaries from 50 years later are also a must-read. Here’s Kent explaining the different modes of acquiring property (occupancy, accession, intellectual labor): http://lonang.com/library/reference/kent-commentaries-american-law/kent-36/ These treatises base property on natural law because that is where property law comes from, if you go back to first principles. I can dig up links to many early treatises on copyright law, all replete with references to natural law. You’d be surprised at how deeply this stuff runs, apparently. I’m not (just) making the normative argument that the law should be this way. I’m arguing that it is in fact this way in the descriptive sense.