We've noted plenty of examples of completely bogus takedowns due to copyright claims -- including some pretty serious ones. Over at TorrentFreak, they're asking if such bogus takedowns should be punished in some manner, and they suggest a three strikes system, in which after the third strike, parties are not allowed to file any more takedowns for a month. I'm not sure such a system would really be that productive, but it does seem that something should be done. I know that whenever we talk about bogus takedowns, people point to the "penalty of perjury" language found in DMCA takedown notices. But that's usually a misreading of what the perjury notices actually say. The "penalty of perjury" part only needs to apply to the claim that the party writing the letter is authorized to act on behalf of the rightsholder. That's it. It does not need to apply to the claim that the content is actually infringing, even though most people interpret the notice to read that way. Separately, when the takedowns happen via automated systems like YouTube's ContentID, or via government action, like ICE's domain seizures, the perjury claims have no bearing at all, since they happen outside of the DMCA entirely.

So what can or should be done in those situations? At one point, some Brazilian officials had suggested effectively putting the public domain and fair use on par with copyright -- and thus equalizing the punishments for violating either. There is some poetic justice in such a setup. Given the insanity of today's statutory damages rates (which can lead to up to $150,000 for infringement of a single item), would it be reasonable to then say if you take down something incorrectly, you are opening yourselves up to similar damages?

Defenders of copyright would argue that's way too harsh, though they'd do so without any hint of realization that those penalties are way too harsh for today's infringement as well. Besides, they wouldn't have to worry if they only issue proper takedowns.

Of course, the problem with that is that you're effectively creating a "two wrongs" situation, rather than fixing the bad situation. You could argue that if you set it up so that the two sides had to be in lockstep, then that might actually encourage copyright holders to be more willing to come to the table to reduce statutory damages to more reasonable levels, though this also explains why they'd fight as hard as they could against any such proposal.

In the end, I really don't know what the proper response is -- but it does seem clear that the ability to falsely censor content online, thanks to the DMCA and bogus notices and automated systems, is a real problem that needs to be fixed.

We've noted in the past that there's been a bit of a debate within the American Bar Association concerning the position it should take on SOPA/PROTECT-IP. It seems that the fight is heating up, and different kinds of lawyers are fighting about it. The Trademark Legislation Committee agreed to and adopted (by a pretty wide margin) a resolution saying that SOPA needed significant changes to prevent abuse. A key change? That the private right of action should be filed "under penalty of perjury," rather than the toothless sanctions for those who file bogus takedowns. This seems like a reasonable suggestion to prevent abuse, and the Committee agreed.

But... then the copyright lawyers flipped out. Despite this and other suggestions already being agreed to, the copyright folks proposed a bunch of changes -- including deleting the "penalty of perjury" inclusion. Another change? The trademark lawyers had agreed that the private right of action definition of "dedicated to theft of US property" should be much more limited, adding significant qualifiers to what is covered to deal with the vagueness of the definition. The copyright lawyers want that deleted as well.

Further on that point, the letter the trademark lawyers prepared highlighted serious concerns about how vague the definition of "dedicated to theft of US property" is, and pointed out how it has significant inconsistencies that "need to be addressed." The copyright lawyers? Apparently they don't want to address the inconsistencies and want the whole complaint about the language dumped. Specifically, here was the recommendation that had been approved:

As worded, the definition of web sites that are “Dedicated to Theft of U.S. Property,” which forms the basis of liability pursuant to this bill, is vague and requires some clarification. Specifically, § 103(a)(1)(B)(i) provides three different ways in which a U.S. directed site could have exposure to action under this bill: 1) if it is “primarily designed or operated for the purpose of . . . offering goods or services in a manner that engages in, enables, or facilitates” a violation of 17 U.S.C. § § 501 or 1201, or counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) or 18 U.S.C. § 2320; 2) if it “has only limited purpose or use other than . . . offering goods or services in a manner that engages in, enables, or facilitates” the same violations; or 3) if it “is marketed by its operator or another acting in concert with that operator for use in offering goods or services in a manner that engages in, enables, or facilitates” the same violations.

Option three in this series does not require a showing that the marketing efforts have a primary purpose of, or have a limited purpose other than, infringing these intellectual property rights. We believe this inconsistency needs to be addressed to reduce possibility of abuse that could result in the effective shut down (by disabling a revenue stream) of an otherwise legitimate web site that offered a single product later determined to be a counterfeit.

In order to effectuate this purpose, option three in the series identified above should be modified to reflect a narrow interpretation of the definition of “Dedicated to Theft of U.S. Property.”

The copyright lawyers? Want that whole section left out. Basically, it looks like anything that highlights the serious problems of SOPA should be taken out, according to the copyright lawyers. The stuff left in is minor and inconsequential.