They've pushed the envelope into controversy, and thus extended what is acceptable expression in a game, but they're still heavy handed when it comes to DRM and critical press or treatment of end users with grievances.
This incident is not uncharacteristic of Rockstar Games.
The reason Jefferson acknowledged protections such as against self incrimination or from illegal search and seizure or oddly from quartering soldiers in your own home during peacetime is because these transgressions were often made by the British garrisons against colonials.
In an open system it is going to be impossible to cover every contingency. Someone who thinks long enough and hard enough and is determined to address every obstacle in order to launch such an attack will be able to do so.
As we step up security measures, they have diminishing returns in terms of cost of resources, convenience and freedoms for the safety gained. And we're raising questions now regarding the effectiveness of all the post 9/11 measures we've taken. The TSA, the FBI anti-terror efforts, the War on Terror and the mass surveillance program all look like some very expensive Tiger-Repellant Rocks rather than effective measures to counter terror.
My guess is that we should protect our planes (and whatever other sensitive resources we have) with enough security to fend off the rampages and idiots, and then suffer the occasional mad genius that succeeds, knowing that they're rare and that it takes a lot of time and effort to plan such an attack. Keep calm and carry the fuck on.
The problem there is that we're not very good at moving on from high-drama catastrophes like that, whether it's 9/11 or rampage killings or an industrial accident or a natural disaster. So we focus far more energy on those things that might kill us in a high-profile way, than those things that might kill us in a pedestrian way (e.g. utilizing municipal crosswalks as a pedestrian).
Feinstein actually compels me to abstain from that election, given there are no viable third parties, and Feinstein's position is so secure.
Feinstein'd be the Democrat equivalent of those super-secure Tea-Partiers that caused the October 2013 shutdown if it weren't that she were a total shill that doesn't really give a rat's anus about her constituency.
As a (raging, extremist) liberal who has voted Democrat in the past, I can say with some certainty that there are plenty of civil-rights-minded, environmentalist, pro-welfare-state, pro-education Democrats out there who feel the mass-surveillance program is a terrible thing that should be disbanded in entirety.
Feinstein doesn't speak for us in this regard. But California Democrats also don't trust her Republican rival to be any more pro-privacy.
I have no confidence in either party anymore, frankly.
How many false negatives do we get nationwide every year? Does someone have a stat on it? Lives lost? Are they more dangerous than coke machines?
Heck, how many true positives do we get? I'd think that such victories would be espoused and celebrated since we're desperate to show success and progress in the war on terror.
I suspect the drama and trauma to ordinary lives due to false positives is far, far more injurious than those saved by true positives and those lost to false negatives combined. But I'd be happy to see some statistics that prove me wrong.
Well, Goatse is about as close as one can get to Langford's BLIT, a universal visual brown note. Fortunately, we haven't discovered any killer pokes on the human being that can be delivered by image or audio file.
My experience with hackers (which goes back into the 80s) is more that they're curious or mischievous than malicious, but some are. And the Stuxnet incident demonstrates that nations and ideological organizations will exploit such vulnerabilities to do damage if it is feasible to do so.
Stuxnet provided us a demonstration of the potential damage to which insecure net assets can lead. I'm glad that our first newsworthy attacks against critical internet security vulnerabilities resulted in public disgust rather than public casualties.
Still, I expect this is just the first of many shots. This one was across the bow.
Yeah, we're still debating what kinds of spying data is admissible in court.
That is the whole point, for instance, of the FISC is to issue warrants (which they do in excess) on spying data that's already collected so that it may be used if necessary. That's why there are regulations about what kinds of cell-phone data (metadata but not conversations except by warrant) or emails (after 180 days or when held by a third party) are collected above board.
Parallel reconstruction is there to reduce our dependence on any data which is obtained via secret or questionable ways, either to keep detection methods obscure (security through obscurity) or to prevent a method from being challenged as contrary to Forth-Amendment protections.
I do have a public key (buried) that I've never used because no-one else does. But this a problem with implementation. I remember once wrestling with winsock software in order to get internet access, where now it's hard to get my devices to not sign on.
I think we're approaching an era in which encryption will be as transparent to the user as our current HTTPS use. The notion of this era terrifies the FBI and law enforcement worldwide since they will actually have to deal with human privacy.
OR...spying will return to the way it was during the cold war, where it's a thing you're not supposed to do (and spying data is inadmissible in court) but everyone does it anyway, and it's appropriately embarrassing when it's discovered.
In the meantime, we proceed to encrypt internet communications end-to-end until they can spy all they want and still have nothing to process, and feed from big bads has to be run through number-crunchers the size of nuclear reactors before they have viable data to process.