You know the Ottoman Empire had exactly the same problem when they started throwing princes into the Kafes. When they were allowed out and required to rule, they were positively mad and ill prepared for statesmanship.
Suppose, for a second, there are real terrorists in the United States. By real terrorists, I mean guys (and gals) who are radical (have a fringe extremist platform), ideological (believe society should fit a specific paradigm) and fanatical (are very strongly committed to their cause) and they really do plan to further their cause (or at least represent it) by massacring a lot of people and causing a lot of damage. Bombs are great for this, but they're willing to be creative.
These guys, in our supposition, are the guys the FBI really wants to catch.
Supposed that, in the persuit of our real cell, the FBI and White House convince our legislature to pass bills to compromize crypto used in the US, so they have back doors to everyone's electronics and private data. Consequently, so does China.
Meanwhile, to counter this scrutiny, our crafty and still real terrormeisters, who were already using burners (disposable cell phones) and talking in code (a la The Pizza Connection), decide to exchange data by filling up flashdrives and drive images half-full of Moroccan jazz and goatse porn (because the FBI analysts will HAVE to sift through all of that) and half-full of encrypted data disguised as trash in empty sectors.
Plausible deniability for miles.
And since big companies foreign and domestic have big company secrets that they would really rather not be looked at too closely by police and hack-savvy competitors, they respond in kind, exchanging lots and lots of empty sectors that provide this perfect plausible deniability.
Supposing this lengthy but really rather plausible scenario, what then, FBI? What then, Director Comey? What then?
The problem with non-standard encryption is that it hasn't withstood the test of the public. We have a number of symmetrical encryption options which are difficult and expensive to crack through analysis. (Robust encryption algos won't make a difference against a $5 wrench or human error.)
There is a false security with security through obscurity, in that the obscurity always deteriorates through time (usually rapidly). After that your encryption scheme's merits will be tested, and given that secure schemes are still difficult to make, odds are that your new one won't be all that secure.
The dialog about other ways of obtaining the contents of the phone, including the use of coercive measures to force the owner to unlock it. is referring to the $5 Wrench though that would be in direct violation of the owner's right, especially if he were already a suspect.
This isn't to say that will stop them, but it does mean at some point that they have to consider that they're transgressing someone's rights before the wrench beatings proceed.
This is a really dangerous practice, using the previous compiler to compile the next. What stops bugs from endlessly being inserted during compilation this way?
I'd think if you wanted a clean compile you'd need it run by an original, assembler-written compiler, yes?
And then the base compiler is sustained on its own and used only to compile the C-Compiler.
A really bad case scenario: The NSA inserts their backdoor scheme into a commonly used C-compiler, and gets away with it for years. Then China gets a hold of the backdoor scheme (which is now in everything used in the US and much of Europe) and disseminates it to black-hat channels for maximum damage.
Then, not only is everything exposed, but it can't be easily fixed without going back to a way outdated iteration.
From the White House Website in the ISDS chapter of the TPP:
Before we had investment rules and ISDS international agreements, unlawful behavior by countries that targeted foreign investors tended either to go unaddressed or escalate into conflict between countries. In fact, early in our history, the U.S. had to deploy “gunboat diplomacy,” or military intervention, to protect private American commercial interests. ISDS is a more peaceful, better way to resolve trade conflicts between countries.
I think that an insurance-based system in which our insurance is expected to cover costs presents a moral hazard in which the person agreeing to treatment (and invested in treatment working) is not the same as the entity that pays for it.
If the patient has control, then prices inflate, since the question of treatment is not affected by pricing.
If the insurance company has control then they will actively choose to let expensive patients die off (or suffer without treatment) which is what we had before the ACA with the whole pre-existing condition controversy.
And there becomes a conflict between doctors who are compelled to treat, patients who (of course) want to continue to live, and third-party providers who want to capitalize on these compulsions.
And this is why Big Pharma has gotten really big, and now only wants to treat rich people that they can overcharge.
The problem is that it leaves a whole lot of non-rich people who really do not want to die, and who have families who are quite irate that someone could have saved their loved ones, and chose to withhold treatment.
Someone wrote something something indifferent bourgeoisie blah-blah outraged proletariat yada valid grievance. My mind escapes me but it seemed relevant.
It wasn't the people who set up the choice to be yes or no, and to use a mechanism that bypasses legislature to install what is the largest installment of new rules by trade agreement ever (possibly by orders of magnitude).
This is nothing short of a coup, and it will destroy the last remnants of the American Republic in favor of corporate oligarchy.
They hacked democracy. And the whole affair with Malaysia shows that they've happily dispensed with human rights to do it.
When the NSA was pushing the Eliptic Curve Random Number Generator (allegedly at the time to improve crypto strength), plenty of people saw that it could be a flawed algo that might have an exploitable weakness. Jokes were even made about the NSA baking in a backdoor.
So the Open Source sector has detected these things before, and were distracted by social politics within the project. Now they have cause to be paranoid about it. I suspect they'll jump on any discovered exploit like Americans on a disruptive airline passenger.