It's been a long time since cases under § 1981 have specifically worried about only whites and non-whites. Often a § 1981 case involves the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
I responded to racist anti-Palestinian Zionist trolls, who were acting far worse toward Olivia and me 1. because we are a couple, 2. because Olivia is a non-white Palestinian Arab Muslim, and 3. because I am Jewish. A racial supremacist Zionist goes ballistic at the thought of Jewish-Palestinian miscegenation. Only we were banned. Such discrimination is 1. unlawful for a common carrier and also 2. unlawful under 42 U.S. Code § 1981 - Equal rights under the law.
Federal agencies regulate interstate&international trucking common carriage, interstate&international rail common carriage, interstate&international river common carriage, interstate&international sea common carriage, etc. States deal with many more common carriage types, which are defined by common law.
When a user originates such a tweet, his followers are alerted. The tweet is comparable to a mass mailing, which is a common carriage service.
Rides, Elevators, and Escalators all carry a passenger from place A to place B (A is not required to be distinct from B). If an entity holds out the above carriage 1. to the public 2. under uniform terms 3. to the public, the entity provides common carriage service.
I make a mistake here and there. I meant the following.
...extended a modern front end
A Court must assess the intent of Congress in its entirety in determining original intent. The Comments of Wydon and Cox apply mostly to FCC Regulation of an ICS/Internet On-Ramp, which is an obsolete technology, which is not used any more. No evidence indicates 1. that Cox and Wydon have any understanding of a 2022 social medium platform and 2. that they realize a 2022 social medium platform differs radically from a 1996 ICS/Internet On-Ramp. 40 years of experience with the FCC tells me that the FCC does not have a clue about regulating the Internet edge/local loop. It makes sense to keep the FCC far away from it. The states have much more experience with the edge/local loop. Constitution Article VI, ¶ 2 together with the 10th Amendment tell us that when the federal government declines to regulate, a state has the authority to regulate. This argument is being made in Ohio, in the First Circuit, in the Fifth Circuit, in the Eleventh Circuit and in the US Supreme Court. 10 State AGs support this position.
I believe the most technical person involved in any of the proceedings is Leonid Goldstein. I would have written an amicus brief more useful to the Judges.
The Judge dismissed the monetary claim for denial of message common carriage. The Judge used an analog voice precedent. He was wrong. My case continues in Appellate Court and is a genuine threat. Why do you think Twitter and A Medium Corp are spending the big bucks to defend themselves against me?
I am certainly qualified to provide an expert report and testimony with respect to technology, which is related: 1. to possible infringement of 1A rights, 2. to meaning of §230, and 3. to message common carriage.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit published its opinion but did not make it precedential. See the first page. Look in the upper right. Stephen T. Stone would not know the operation of the US legal system if the operation ran up and bit him on the ankle.
Twitter was only founded in 2006. The original Twitter tweet service was constructed on SMS and was obvious message common carriage because it was little more than a thin protocol layer upon an existing common carriage service. The issue of the common carrier status of Twitter's Internet tweet service is only just reaching SCOTUS and is not yet in the caselaw. Once the case reaches SCOTUS, the common carriage status of Twitter's Internet tweet service will be found in caselaw. By comparison with analogous services found to constitute message common carriage since the 1850s, the common carriage status of Twitter's Internet tweet service is not a close call.
A court will consider the original intent of Congress.
Title II of the 1964 CRA forbids discrimination or segregation in a place of public accommodation for entertainment or for exhibition. State support is not required. The Democracy Wall is not a close call. Twitter has less of a claim of 1st Amendment infringement than a private owner of the Democracy Wall would have. Twitter is massively supported by the US federal government because Twitter service is within the Internet/WWW.
The typical software patent is written in a way that cannot be valid. Here is my recommendation for software invention claiming: Patent Eligibility. Senator Tillis told me he considered the analysis useful, but most patent practitioners did not understand it -- the form of the Cassandra Complex from which I suffer.
If I were a woman, I would not abort a fetus, but I am not a woman. My opinion does not count. I want to make kids with Olivia, but it's Olivia's decision to open up her baby factory for business. I dislike a questionable legal decision like NetChoice v. Florida, No. 21-12355 (11th Cir.), Opinion, May 23, 2022. I loathe a crappy legal decision like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973). I would have argued a federal right to abortion by means of the 13th Amendment.
The social medium platforms are about to be drowned by a tidal wave.
Duh! The caselaw that defines a message common carrier of digital personal literary property goes back to the 1850s. The description fits a 2022 social medium platform. Congress can void this definition interstate by explicit legislation. It has not. Each state can void this definition state-by-state by explicit legislation. SCOTUS could vitiate this definition interstate and for all states but only by wildly contorted legal logic. I can't think of any situation in which SCOTUS voided common law except because of an explicit statute.
The legal question is the following. Does Twitter have a valid claim of 1st Amendment infringement if Twitter is compelled to carry out its common carriage obligations? SCOTUS teaches in these two cases
You don't understand federal telecommunications common carrier statutory law
The federal government does not define common carriage by statute. The FCC has the statutory authority to define a subset of common carriers that it will regulate as federal telecommunications common carriers. Other common carriers remain common carriers, which are regulated by other federal agencies or by state agencies.