If Your Antitrust Case Depends On Pretending TikTok Doesn’t Exist, It’s Going To Fail
from the trickle-down-antitrust dept
Last week’s dismissal of the FTC’s antitrust case against Meta—combined with the earlier limited remedies in the Google search case—demonstrates something that should be obvious by now: antitrust is a pathetically weak tool for increasing competition in digital markets.
This isn’t an argument against competition. Competition in digital markets matters, desperately. But antitrust enforcement is slow, cumbersome, and nearly blind to how fast these markets actually move. It takes years to litigate, offers limited effective remedies, and by the time courts rule, the competitive threats have often shifted entirely. The whole apparatus works fine for more slow-moving industries (which have real competition problems!) but consistently fails when applied to more dynamic markets where the landscape changes every few years.
Over the last decade, figures like Lina Khan and Tim Wu have pushed a more aggressive vision of antitrust—variously called “hipster antitrust” or “neo-Brandeisian antitrust”—that promises to ignore these limitations and wield antitrust as a more punitive tool against large companies. The theory goes that punishing big companies will magically result in greater competition, a kind of antitrust trickle-down economics. The results of the Meta and Google cases suggest that if we want more competition in the digital space, there are much better policy levers than antitrust.
Both cases—originally brought by Trump’s AG Bill Barr as part of a 2020 campaign stunt to show that Trump was “taking on” the hated “Big Tech” were then pursued by the Biden FTC, with amended complaints trying to fix the original weaknesses. But both cases ended up demonstrating the same fundamental problem. Last week’s dismissal of the Meta case was particularly instructive.
As Judge Boasberg noted in his long and thorough opinion, the FTC’s bizarre attempt to define the market Meta was supposedly a monopolist in didn’t pass the laugh test. Notably, the FTC insisted that Meta’s market was just for “personal social networking” among friends and family, in an attempt to avoid the continued growing success of TikTok and YouTube as competitors. Thus, the FTC said the competition for Facebook and Instagram was just the much smaller Snapchat and the barely existing MeWe.
As Boasberg noted, the FTC had to show that Meta continues to have a monopoly in the marketplace to win the case, and the only way the FTC could win that argument was if TikTok and YouTube were excluded from the market definition. But that is laughable:
The FTC contends that Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat form a distinct market that can be identified by those apps’ unique features. While those apps certainly show some distinct markings, they mostly resemble two other social-media apps that the FTC insists must be excluded: TikTok and YouTube. Their dominant features are identical, people mostly use all four to watch unconnected content that they can send in direct messages, industry participants agree that the apps belong in the same competitive market, they use similar resources and technologies, and they charge the same price to the same customers.
Even when considering only qualitative evidence, the Court finds that Meta’s apps are reasonably interchangeable with TikTok and YouTube…. Taking all the evidence together, it shows that personal social networking is not a separate product market. Instead, Meta competes in the market for social media, and that market includes — at minimum — TikTok and YouTube as well.
The opinion repeatedly demonstrates that Meta was terrified of the growing success of TikTok (and, to a lesser extent, YouTube) and kept adjusting its products (hello “Reels”) to be more like those other apps.
The court also demolished the FTC’s claim that Meta was harming consumers by making its products worse. Quite the opposite according to the actual evidence:
So the FTC instead argues that Meta has degraded these apps’ quality. By offering a worse product for the same price, the agency reasons, Meta has imposed the equivalent of a price increase.
The record, however, shows the opposite: Meta’s apps have continuously improved. The company has added scores of new features to Facebook and Instagram, from Stories to Reels to Marketplace…. The Court simply does not find it credible that users would prefer the Facebook and Instagram apps that existed ten years ago to the versions that exist today
The court points to plenty of natural experiments (bans, downtime, etc.) that show that many users consider the Instagram/Facebook Reels effectively interchangeable with TikTok and YouTube Shorts.
The broader problem here is that by the time the case reached trial, the competitive landscape had already shifted dramatically. Meta’s supposed monopoly was being actively challenged by TikTok’s explosive growth, forcing Meta to completely overhaul its products. The FTC’s case depended on freezing the market in time and pretending this competition didn’t exist.
And, really, this all shows how terrible a tool antitrust is to deal with these markets.
The Google case—which the DOJ technically won—suffered from a similar dynamic. Judge Amit Mehta recognized that the market had shifted quite a bit on its own, with Google’s search dominance being challenged by AI tools like ChatGPT. The remedies he imposed came up far short of what the government requested, precisely because the competitive threats were already emerging without court intervention.
This is not to say that antitrust never makes sense or that we don’t need more competitive markets. But the fact that the FTC has been converted, under both administrations, to be more focused on punishing companies, rather than actually pursuing policies that increase competition is a problem.
Tim Wu wrote an angry response to Boasberg’s decision in the NY Times, and in doing so, accidentally revealed the core problem with the neo-Brandeisian approach. When you strip away the legal arguments, it all comes down to vibes:
Does anyone seriously doubt that Meta is the kind of company that antitrust laws were designed to restrain?
That right there gives away the game. If your antitrust case is built on “doesn’t this company feel bad?” you’re going to take shortcuts, ignore inconvenient facts like the existence of TikTok, and then fail in court.
Wu’s piece is instructive because it shows how the FTC arrived at its laughable market definition. He claims Boasberg dismissed the case “in the face of strong evidence to the contrary, not to mention common sense,” but the “common sense” he’s appealing to is just the intuition that Meta seems big and powerful. The actual evidence—the stuff Boasberg spent pages analyzing—showed robust competition forcing Meta to completely overhaul its products.
Wu even complains that recognizing TikTok and YouTube as competitors represents “strained legal thinking” because they’re “adjacent markets.” But the whole point of antitrust law is to stop companies from abusing monopoly power to prevent competition. Showing that competition exists and is forcing the alleged monopolist to adapt its products is not a technicality—it’s proof that the market is working.
There are ways to bring good antitrust cases, but they have to involve showing that there’s an actual monopoly under the law, that the monopoly is being abused by the monopolist in order to limit further competition and/or make products worse for consumers.
When you start from “Meta feels like a monopoly” and work backward, you end up failing to make the case the law actually requires, and that doesn’t actually help enable a more competitive marketplace. The FTC was so focused on the vibes and how Meta looked bad that it failed to make the actual case it needed to make.
If we want actual competition in the marketplace, maybe stop focusing so much on antitrust laws and look at the issues that keep holding back actual competition: clean up broken copyright and patent laws that restrict competition, fix the CFAA which has been used repeatedly by big tech companies to stifle competition, and stop trying to pass laws that would make it impossible for smaller startups to exist because of the compliance costs.
Those would actually enable much greater competition, but no one wants to do the hard work on those to ensure actual competition exists.
Filed Under: antitrust, competition, ftc, hipster anti-trust, james boasberg, lina khan, market definition, monopoly, social media, tim wu
Companies: google, meta, mewe, snapchat, tiktok


Comments on “If Your Antitrust Case Depends On Pretending TikTok Doesn’t Exist, It’s Going To Fail”
Uh, what? YouTube and Facebook are the same thing?
I’ve never heard of anyone facing pressure to create a YouTube account, whereas there are some communities that are outright inaccessible to anyone without a Facebook account. For example, a local neighborhood association has only a Facebook page; and, like apparently all Facebook pages, it just says “You must log in to continue.” Had they posted on YouTube, anyone could see it, unless someone specifically configured a restriction.
That seems like a pretty major difference to me. Nevermind that videos and text are pretty different.
Less anti-trustcases, less M&A. Kill two birds.
Especially for venture and start-ups. You ain’t gonna run it,fuck off.
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What policy would achieve the latter, and how would one address concerns of fairness?
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Reminder that Mike is a devotee to the pro-corporate “consumer harm” theory of antitrust that was thrust upon us by Ronald Reagan and Robert Bork. This is why he got into a tizzy over Lina Khan actually wanting things to change.
And the EFF talked about Hipster Antitrust last year and how it was still important, rather than looking at the simple win/loss ratios:
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/02/hip-hip-hooray-hipster-antitrust
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Or maybe I’m an advocate for what will actually work in increasing competition, rather than what will waste at least five years (and maybe more) wasting a ton of time and money and accomplishing fuck all.
It’s not that I’m pro-Bork or any nonsense like that, but I’m pro-figuring out what works.
I’m sorry that people like you want to live in lala land rather than reality.
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Then why are there no mentions of recent cases of tech antitrust that did work? We’ve had some, especially (but not only) if you include the EU. And in situations that wouldn’t be solved by things like copyright/CFAA reforms.
I don’t see how expecting things like copyright/CFAA changes is any more realistic. If a similar case happened with e.g. copyright you’d be all over how it needs reform and doesn’t actually need to take 5 years. And even putting aside the nontrivial legislative hurdles, they’re fundamentally not even designed to address the same types of problems.
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What relevance does EU Antitrust have for us? Some Apple users can now charge their phones and laptops with the same charger now? Congrats, I guess. Apple still is an incredibly customer hostile company.
As for recent domestic Antitrust ‘wins’, they’re a fucking mess. Apple, who is far more restrictive with their app store and has a larger market in the US, doesn’t have to open their store. Google, who already has a method of side loading, must now distribute other stores. This is dumb as hell. Further, spinning off Chrome (a largely open source project that generates no revenue) is quite possibly the dumbest fucking thing I’ve ever heard. Nobody that can afford that will be better than Google, and certainly will be worse if Meta, X, or MS get it. Further, that will almost certainly kill firefox because Google will no longer need to find 90% of it’s development.
Calling anything we’ve done recently success is stretch IMHO.
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Maybe Google saying “We have competition! Look at FireFox! We fund 90% of it, but it’s totally fine!” is part of the problem?
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The main relevance is showing what is possible. For instance, that USB-c case- it didn’t take 5 years, it was 13 months. If the thesis is that antitrust is inherently too slow for tech, discrete counterexamples matter. Apple will always be hostile, but it can still be constrained to act better (and in a region that has far less leverage),quickly, if we want it to be. Letting it take 5 years is a policy choice, not inherent to antitrust.
I do think interoperability is important (even ignoring the knock-on effects of setting precedent), but there were other cases if you don’t: In the EU, Apple has to allow other app stores, Facebook has to provide an equivalent ad-free tier, Microsoft has to debundle Teams/365 and provide third party API interoperability, etc. (That’s not counting the many fines: $3bil for Google, $500m Apple, $200m Meta etc. I tend to discount fines as the price of business, but there is a scale and frequency where they are real incentives).
There’s definitely been setbacks. The Apple/FTC decision was disappointing. The Google app store one… not ideal, but better than the status quo. Chrome is…complicated. The solutions picked were bad, but the precedent of it being a monopoly was a W. (You don’t want to kill Firefox, but at the same time I don’t think you can have real competition when the competitor is subsidized and vertically integrated). The bigger W was having to license it’s search index.
There’s other cases, though. In a different Apple’s app store case, Epic just won a case preventing it from collecting it’s absurd fees outside the app, and it has to allow devs to direct users to make payments outside the Apple Store. And perhaps one of the biggest (on the hardware side, but still tech) was killing the Nvidia/ARM deal.
And that’s not counting progress on things like right-to-repair (credit: Karl’s coverage tho), depending if you want to count that as ‘antitrust’. Or steps companies took proactively that never became public. It’s impossible to measure, but deterrence is just as important as actual cases. e.g. Amazon and iRobot(Roomba). A big part of why AI is so weird with stuff like acquihires and minority stakes is because companies trying to avoid antitrust scrutiny if do a Facebook-eats-Instagram.
And one brief non-tech example, blocking the Kroger-Albertson merger is interesting because of how quick/proactive it was (~9mo to 2y depending on measurement).
I think you can be disappointed by how messy and little it’s accomplished so far, but IDK how someone can say it’s unrealistic to see potential, especially given the moribund state it’s reviving from and while supporting at least equally lofty solutions.
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Europe is an entirely different legal animal than the US, and it doesn’t track that what happens there can happen here.
Chrome has such massive market share because everything else sucked huuuuuge balls. Firefox was (and still iss) really bad, Internet Explore was less than useless, and fuck Apple sideways. To even suggest that Google should have to spin off Chrome is so fucking detached from reality, it’s absurd.
Fundamentally you’re trying to treat the symptoms. There’s no determined effect, it’s a long slow process, and often the industry has changed before the case is sorted.
Instead we should actually approach consumer protection laws. Mandate data interoperability: user data is theirs and always accessible, no undocumented file/API/ABIs, standards testing for software to actually meet what it says on the box, required security and bug fixes regardless of service contracts. No undocumented APIs between individually procured software/services. Gotta use what you publish.
Frankly, i don’t give a shit about adwords. I want to be able to get my data and select software that’s fit for use.
I would love to read an article on here about AI corpos gobbling up all the RAM and raising prices for consumers. Do you think that would fit into what the FTC should be tackling?
I also think that antitrust law can and should be used to get corporations to behave and make products and services that people like to use, rather than feeling miserable using them but are required to out of necessity thanks to network effects, etc.
Like… Over in the EU, they have the GDPR, the DMA, and the DSA. A lot of anger is directed at those laws by Americans over here that work in the tech policy and tech think-tank space. Saying “Europe will never have anything like Silicon Valley at this rate!”. Maybe there are a large number of Europeans who don’t want their economic bloc populated by extractive, greedy unregulated corpos, and just want the existing companies and their services and products to behave?
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On what grounds? They’re buying it for their own use, and using it. Those might be stupid purchases, but they’re not just sham for market manipulations, which is what’s acutally illegal.
I expect that, like with graphics cards for Bitcoin mining, this business will eventually crash, dumping a shitload of cheap (probably ECC) RAM into the market.
An Ounce of Prevention...
It’s much harder to put the tooth paste back in the tube.
Why let Meta buy Instagram, and WhatApp to solidify monopolies? Force them to compete instead of allowing them to buy out competitors.
It’s much easier to deny acquisitions, than to establish legal grounds to break them apart later.
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How dare you suggest something that makes sense. It would put all those lawyers and regulators out of paying jobs.
/s
There is a very big difference between antitrust being a weak tool, and antitrust being hamstrung in the U.S. Antitrust has been defanged in those “slow moving” industries too; they see the exact same struggles. Ironically, you quoted the main reason it’s been weak- the perversion of consumer welfare standards- something vibe-based which isn’t in the law itself.
No, it doesn’t. There is a ton of evidence (like Meta buying Instagram, Whatsapp etc in the first place). Those were/are quintessential antitrust violations. The problem is that current courts like to ignore this, even though the law does not require it. There are other (not legally significant, but still useful) signs as well, like Meta’s profit margins, which are still over 30%. Not exactly a (Magnificent Seven) company under siege.
Antitrust laws don’t have to (and don’t) say “if a single other company exists, you’re golden”. They’re about leveraging market position to unfairly solidify themselves. That exists even in a world of TikTok (or oligopolies), even if you ignore the ~decade of wasted opportunity. When Standard Oil was broken up, it had a 64% market share.
The issue is not a lack of evidence or ignoring TikTok, it’s that we’ve spent decades building up precedent that ignores that evidence despite the plain text of the law.
While those things would be nice, they’re complements, not replacements;they don’t address thing like non-IP moats or acquisitions. The main things propping up Meta are not copyright, CFAA, etc. (And things like interoperability mean the CFAA and antitrust go hand-in-hand). Antitrust also has the massive benefit of being improvable under existing law, hence the focus.
This article also neglects the many wins we’ve seen in both the U.S. and EU w.r.t. things like Apples app store, even in it’s enervated state. Wins those other policies wouldn’t be able to deliver.
Getting people like Khan in place is only a start, we also need to flip judges. Google’s case was just the first crack in the armor. Just because it didn’t happen overnight doesn’t mean it’s a bad lever.
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I dont mind using a slow lever if that is the only option. But what other levers exist that would maybe do a better job?
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I think it depends on what problem exactly you’re trying to solve. The post lumps everything together under “competition”, but there are vastly different types. Copyright/CFAA style reforms are better for some things, like allowing 3rd party programs to utilize user accounts if the user agrees but the platform doesn’t. If you want to stop M&A (like Facebook buying competitors like Instagram in the first place), antitrust is your main tool. Or if you want to force a company to provide an open third-party API, etc.
That said, I would also push back a bit on the assumption of it being inherently slow. I think it will be slow to get antitrust back in vogue/power, but once it’s actually normalized, it has the potential to move fast in individual cases. There are already antitrust cases that have worked in ~10months. It’s slow now, but it doesn’t have to stay slow. And even in a slow regime, there is value in deterrence from decisions companies make to avoid ever being scrutinized.
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Also the public switched telephone network in 1984—which was mostly digital by then, including in the long-distance space which was probably the main beneficiary of the new possibilities for competition (whereas having different local-line monopolies in different areas didn’t seem all that helpful).
While reading this article, I can’t help but think about Google Adsense. A while ago, TechDirt wanted to move away from Adsense and find a competitor to the Adsense network. The effort ended up being fruitless because there was no actual competitor to be had that wasn’t just pushing scams.
I mean, if you are an independent website, trying to use a third party ad network seems to be a choice between Adsense or nothing for the most part. Yes, Facebook has advertising, but that seems to be off limits to third party websites.
So, I’m confused. If there’s no actual competition in something like an ad network, how is anti-trust not actually a tool to fix something like that? How is Adsense not a monopolistic power and why can’t anti-trust fix that?
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Mike would probably say it can magically be fixed by reforming copyright or some garbage.
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Yeah, as I wrote that’s the one FTC antitrust case that I think might actually make sense:
https://www.techdirt.com/2023/01/27/the-latest-antitrust-case-against-google-is-by-far-the-most-serious/
But it’s also a loooooooooong loooooong way from being completed. They’re talking about an initial ruling on remedies coming sometime next year, but possibly even the year after.
And who knows where the market will be at that point.
My point is antitrust is way too slow and ineffective.
What I really want is someone to build a better ad system.
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And getting Congress to agree to copyright reforms and CFAA reforms is something that will actually go fast, in your eyes?? Really?
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No, but it’s a REAL permanent fix, rather than a one off, where EACH TIME it takes forever, and by the time it’s concluded it’s too late.
I’m honestly confused at the people who don’t seem to get this.
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I get why that’s appealing, but I have three issues with that argument. The first and by far most important is they’re simply not interchangeable policies. Being permanent and auto-executing is great! but the point is moot if it doesn’t do things like block M&A. A world with your ideal copyright/CFAA reforms is one where the Magnificent Seven are still an anti-competitive mess.
Second, nothing is actually permanent.Requiring legislation to undo it is a meaningful but not insurmountable hurdle, and you know this because we already have to defend copyright from becoming worse.
Third, if you’re assuming you can get legislation passed (which is itself a hurdle), you can design anti-trust provisions that auto-execute, or execute faster, by law.
You’re right that having to constantly fight the fight sucks, but I just don’t think you can avoid it. I would absolutely love One Weird Trick to not have to deal with regulation. But that doesn’t exist, so you may as well try to do it well.
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Define “better” and “ad system”. In the rare case of ads people actually want to see, such as some Superbowl ads, I don’t see why any “system” is needed. Whereas, once there is a system, isn’t the point to get ads in front of people who don’t want to see them—and, at best, don’t specifically want to not see them?
Ad blockers give end users almost exactly the “ad system” they want; I’ve certainly never heard of anyone lamenting having missed an ad due to one. Which suggests “better” would have to be judged from the advertisers’ points of view, and then I’m really unsure what a “fix” would look like. I mean, you’re not the first person to think of “better ads”; didn’t some web-cartoonist even create and run a system, described in that way, for many years?
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Remember when we had a real chance at competition reform in Congress in the form of AICOA/OAMA, and Techdirt joined hands with think-tank Chamber Of Progress (and more) to sink the bill’s chances of even getting to a vote?
https://www.vice.com/en/article/big-tech-lobbyists-use-trans-people-to-avoid-antitrust-regulation/
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What a load of horseshit. My concerns about AICOA and OAMA were clearly laid out and had fuck all to do with whatever any lobbyists were saying.
The problems with AICOA/OAMA were very real and detailed. They would give MAGA folks the ability to sue companies that did content moderation on “conservative” apps. It would have been a fucking disaster.
https://www.techdirt.com/2022/06/23/republicans-effectively-admit-that-if-content-moderation-is-written-out-of-antitrust-bills-theyll-pull-their-support/
I honestly am so sick of you fucking idiots insisting that just because I’ve opposed bad bills it’s because of tech lobbying. Honestly fuck all the way off. Go away. You’re a fucking idiot.
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Public Knowledge also pointed out why AICOA/OAMA as it was, was okay, countering all the hand-wringing about Content Moderation.
https://publicknowledge.org/big-tech-competition-bills-dont-address-content-moderation-and-thats-a-good-thing/
If AICOA and OAMA had passed, and we got forward movement on dismantling the chokeholds on app stores and digital ecosystems, we likely wouldn’t have these issues where Apple was able to fully prevent apps like ICEBlock from being accessible by people.
Both Evan Greer and Public Knowledge were and still are correct on wanting AICOA/OAMA, with AICOA’s 3(a)(3) intact.
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PK was flat out wrong on that. I’ve talked to them about it and I think the evidence that they were wrong was in the fact that the GOP promised to walk away from the bill if that single point was clarified to mean that it wouldn’t impact content moderation.
And it’s easy to find plenty of others, including allies of PK, who called out the dangers of the bill.
Here’s Free Press, for example, who are regularly in close agreement with PK:
https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/2022-06/senate-letter-asking-klobuchar-for-content-moderation-fix-on-s2992.pdf
https://www.freepress.net/news/provision-senate-antitrust-bill-would-undermine-fight-against-online-hate-and-disinformation
Here’s Brookings agreeing with Free Press:
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/two-ways-to-improve-senator-klobuchars-needed-antitrust-legislation/
Here are law professors Anupam Chander and Jane Bambauer:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/06/06/antitrust-bills-big-tech-hate-speech-disinformation/
PK got this one wrong and many others, even among their close friends, called out the problems of AICOA. And the fact that the GOP promised to walk away if they fixed that key flaw should tell you everything you need to know.
And yet you want to falsely claim that it was just tech lobbyists?
Grow the fuck up.
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Ah yes, Anupam Chander, totally not a lobbyist:
https://prospect.org/2022/07/05/debate-that-could-blow-up-big-tech-legislative-crackdown/
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Nice to cherry pick one person out of all the ones I named.
And of all the people to pick. Anyone who thinks Prof. Chander is on the take is a fucking idiot.
My goodness, your obsession with this one issue is incredible. You’re wrong. AICOA had real problems. Many, many people called it out. They could have been fixed. There were easy fixes on that one issue.
But MAGA said if those problems were fixed, they’d walk.
You still ignore that part, because you know it proves you’re full of shit.
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That your haters’ one and only weapon against you is hallucinations is a sign you must be doing something right, Mike.