Certainly it would be hard for him to reference them without bringing himself into frivolous territory. My copy of RFC733 (format for ARPANET electronic mail) is dated 1977, which is somewhat prior to the plaintiff's publication.
The problem is authentication. The authors have surely moved on from their institutions at the time of publication, and some may no longer be available at all.
If there were such a thing, then it would have to be brought in a state where the law supports it. Most states have fairly crummy anti-SLAPP laws, with the most common deficiency being that they only apply to things involving the government. See, for some foundation, Eastern Railroad Presidents Ass'n v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (20-Feb-1961). While it does not deal with an anti-SLAPP motion, it does give some foundation for the run-of-the-mill statute.
Unless you can show that the plaintiff is a government figure, your anti-SLAPP aspirations are probably doomed.
His aspirations to have invented e-mail, which I was personally using before his ``invention'', well, that is a fact question which may have to go to trial. Not my case, I am not a lawyer in the state where venue appears to lie, and I cannot usefully discuss the parties' respective litigation strategies.
If I were to have any views at all as to the merits of the case, they would probably lump the plaintiff's claim in with claims for goodness for this "markdown" mark-up intended to replace HTML with something less familiar but at the same time less useful.
[use Pine and unix mail] Yes. Pine post-dates Elm, which post-dates 1978.
Interestingly enough, I have tarballs of old V6 and V7 unix sources, which contain e-mail back in the late 1970s. Which is no surprise, if you consider that even as an undergrad at that time, I expected e-mail to be provided on pretty much anything calling itself a computer system.
I conclude that the plaintiff may be less than fully forthright in asserting a claim to have invented e-mail in late 1978.
First Amendment does not require research, nowhere in its text will you find such a thing. The US Supremes, in Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), said that an action by a public figure will only lie if there is what they term malice.
Malice is either knowing falsehood or reckless disregard. In other words, you can repeat something you heard, even if it is false, so long as you do not believe it to be false or avoid finding out that it is false.
There is a great body of work on this subject and I am summarizing, leaving out many nuances.
When discussing such a thing, it is nice to have the text of the ordinance to hand so we can see what it actually says. Normally I would be fairly harshly critical of the original article and its writer for this omission.
However, a quick search of the city web site does not produce it. The closest is that it is supposedly attached as `U' to the badly-scanned minutes, but in fact no such attachment is there.
Neither does Municode have ordinances for Madison, MS.
From this I can conclude that either (a) Madison's ordinance is so bad that it must be kept away from public view, or (b) Madison's officials are so incompetent that they expect people to know and obey a secret ordinance.
You decide. Or you can come up with a nicer conclusion flowing from the same facts. Let us know if you do.
The public records law [Ch. 119, generally] only applies to records made or received as part of the entity's business. Unless there is some action on the part of the city's governing board authorizing, or use of city resources supporting, the mayor's facebook page, I think he has a strong argument that it is his and not the city's.
Officials do not lose all rights to act as themselves during their time in office. You do not get to review the mayor's personal check register, either, nor do you get to review his contributions to his church to see whether he tithes.
I have not seen the suit, but presume that there are some allegations trying to tie the facebook account to the city. I am of the view that it will not be an easy case.
One of these days, someone whose video is subjected to a takedown notice is going to file suit for a declaration of non-infringement. The sender of the takedown notice is likely to feel sad as a result, especially if the court awards fees to the prevailing video author.
One or two of these will probably not stem the tide of invalid notices, but it could start a trend.
Well, I never thought I would say that these companies are legitimate. I can say, however, that at least Portfolio are a buyer of used debt. They then try to monetize it. I am not as familiar with Anchor but would be unsurprised if they were similar.
Some of the used debt is time-barred, and some of it has other problems, so it is generally worth defending. If you get a call from these people, tell them to send a letter and stop calling. If you get a letter, you or your atty can send an appropriate dispute notice.
If you get a notice for court, take it to a lawyer right away. Do not ignore. If you do not know what you are doing, paying a lawyer will generally result in a better outcome at lower cost, even in small claims.
There is often a fee-shifting provision. This may make the cost of the lawyer even more reasonable.
Disclaimer: The law in your state may vary. I am not your lawyer. Go away.
Not really any of our business. That is between him and his client. He might be handling it pro bono, for instance, because he is a big believer in their type of publishing; there would probably be an assignment of fees in such a case.
He may also be getting paid every month as he sends bills to the client. Or he could bill irregularly because he is busy with other things. All of that is between him and his client.
With all that in mind, I do remind people that the atty should not take an interest in the litigation itself. The rules on this can get complicated, however, because of legitimate contingency fee arrangements in tort cases and unconstitutional fee restrictions in worker comp cases. And things are at least somewhat different in your state.
The vendor did more than furnish a tool. It was an active participant. It is as though Smith and Wesson were handing bullets to a guy operating a single-shot rifle so that he could more quickly fire at his victims.
Here, the ``tool'' worked only with the active participation of the defendant Awareness. Awareness knowingly and intentionally, as part of its product, collected intercepted data. At least that appears to be the allegation of the complaint; it remains to be proved.
In the same manner that I don't have access to the coding of this website (I can only see the results, not the code driving it), I don't have any particular rights to code that may exist as part of an item
The situations are not analogous. I have may have no useful rights to a video of my neighbor reading a book, but if I purchase the book I have rights to my copy.
I can repair that book. I can take it apart and re-bind it as the old binding wears out. I can furnish new covers if I want. The author's rights to the words printed inside it are undiminished, but the rights to the particular copy are mine. I could, should I choose, rip out chapter 3 (the one with the nasty bits about Judge -- and the banking cartel).
I can highlight some of the remaining chapters. I can scribble notes in there. I can pass my copy along to a buyer, complete with my notes and the missing chapter 3 if I still have it.
Likewise, if I purchase some device, I gain no rights to the code inside it. I cannot sell copies of that code. But I can surely sell my device. Or open it up and repair it. I can rip out the offending chapter 3, the part which says ``do not work when vendor sends a disable code'', should it please me to do so.
All this works because I have the rights of ownership of my copy.
What happens is that the city decides to incorporate someone elses (sic) work into their law without consultation with or payment to the standards body
It is not quite as you describe. The standards agencies actually urge the adoption of their standards as law. See, e.g. Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress Int'l, 293 F.3d 791,794 (US 5th Cir. en banc) (SBCCI urges local govts to adopt its standards as provided).
If you can have secret courts, why can't you have secret cases too?
Secret courts are an obvious evil. For the same reason, secret cases so qualify; I have one of those pending now and to date the court does not appear sympathetic to my views.
What is wrong with it? Well, I agree with the court in R. v. Sussex Justices, 1924 K.B. 256,259 (K.B. 1924) that it is not enough for justice to be done, it must also be seen to be done. And if it is not seen, you can be fairly confident that ultimately it will not be done, for as Justice Brandeis said, ``Sunlight is the best disinfectant, electric light the most efficient policeman.''
Yes, there are rules. And the judge acknowledges that the rules were not violated. None the less, an outrageous sanction is imposed for expressly not violating the rules.
My personal impression from reading the order is that the judge was not impressed with the plaintiffs' cases. To the extent there was judicial discretion it would be exercised in favor of the defendants. The court even reduced the judgment to only twice the belated offer from the defendants, plus fees.
The judicial conduct in question appears to me likely to increase disrespect for the courts and the judiciary. However, it is in Ohio, and so it is possible either that the general regard for the courts is low, or they do not require judges to act in such a way as to encourage public confidence in their courts. I am not familiar with the law of Ohio, though I have spelled the name of the state on multiple occasions.
A trade mark is intended to assist consumers in distinguishing particular products and their origins. If I were to sell a snack under the Cheeto name, it would be infringement; the same is true if I were to sell malted battery acid under the Pepsi name. But if I were to say that I want a lunch consisting of Cheeto snacks and Pepsi malted battery acid, I should be correctly using the marks.
Here, the writer is correctly using the trade mark to identify a particular product from a particular vendor. That is the intent of trade marks.
Sure, Pepsi could say that it does not want to be associated with a Cheeto-faced ferret-wearing shitgibbon, but that is a political issue largely unrelated to the question of whether the use of the Cheeto name is correct to identify a particular product from a particular vendor.
Assume also that I insult Cafe Press at this point.