Nod. There's quite a bit of ongoing cooperation already. Good key words to start with are: NIPP, HSPD-7, NCCIC, ICS-CERT, ISAC, CIPAC (if results are ambiguous, tie in with DHS)...and go from there. Some of the terms are cyber-specific, others are general critical infrastructure protection that includes cybersecurity. A lot of information is publicly available, but (probably because of the volume of government B.S. writing that is hard to go through and the aforementioned political/leadership communication limitations), most people really aren't aware of the extent of work currently being done.
A rough broad generalization (re overclassification) that while, yes, there probably is a lot of it that shouldn't be...there is also a lot of stuff that gets classified, not because of its content, but because of the original sources. Ie, if you find out something and know it for a fact because of sources/infrastructure that need protecting, that...thread...of information is classified. If there is public reporting of it later from unclass sources...that...thread...of information would not be.
Most of the critical infrastructure which is involved in cyber war belongs to the private sector. If you read the legislation (or even anything but the worst of the reporting) you'd see that (much/most of) it aimed at how to handle convincing (or requiring) private companies to work together, put in reasonable controls, how to work with the government, etc.
If someone drops a bunch of troops on US soil, there are clear laws and protocols already in place. But, with cybersecurity, imagine if the military wasn't allowed to prevent anyone from landing weapons or troops in/on US assets or even really see what's going on....and that once that happened...there were conflicting and confusing laws and protocols on how to respond. Especially if you're not 100% sure who's troops/weapons they are. This is what it's currently like in the US from a cybersecurity (war) perspective.
...by listening to people who you already clearly know have no idea what they're talking about. Would you trust a politician or a senior military leader to really understand and be able to speak to the nuance of complicated psychological issues in the military? Would you trust the head of the FBI to clearly and without bias talk about the complex state of affairs that lead to stuff like Occupy Wallstreet? No...well, I wouldn't. By the time the comments have bbeen interpreted up from experts through 10 levels of bureaucracy, vetted by public affairs, and then filtered through the media, they're all ridiculous oversimplified to the point of being incorrect or misleading. That doesn't mean the underlying truth isn't there. With regard to cyber war, there are plenty of non-government relatively unbiased sources that are saying the same thing.
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Re: Re: You're making a common mistake
Nod. There's quite a bit of ongoing cooperation already. Good key words to start with are: NIPP, HSPD-7, NCCIC, ICS-CERT, ISAC, CIPAC (if results are ambiguous, tie in with DHS)...and go from there. Some of the terms are cyber-specific, others are general critical infrastructure protection that includes cybersecurity. A lot of information is publicly available, but (probably because of the volume of government B.S. writing that is hard to go through and the aforementioned political/leadership communication limitations), most people really aren't aware of the extent of work currently being done.
Re: Re:
A rough broad generalization (re overclassification) that while, yes, there probably is a lot of it that shouldn't be...there is also a lot of stuff that gets classified, not because of its content, but because of the original sources. Ie, if you find out something and know it for a fact because of sources/infrastructure that need protecting, that...thread...of information is classified. If there is public reporting of it later from unclass sources...that...thread...of information would not be.
Re: Re: Huh ???
Most of the critical infrastructure which is involved in cyber war belongs to the private sector. If you read the legislation (or even anything but the worst of the reporting) you'd see that (much/most of) it aimed at how to handle convincing (or requiring) private companies to work together, put in reasonable controls, how to work with the government, etc.
If someone drops a bunch of troops on US soil, there are clear laws and protocols already in place. But, with cybersecurity, imagine if the military wasn't allowed to prevent anyone from landing weapons or troops in/on US assets or even really see what's going on....and that once that happened...there were conflicting and confusing laws and protocols on how to respond. Especially if you're not 100% sure who's troops/weapons they are. This is what it's currently like in the US from a cybersecurity (war) perspective.
You're making a common mistake
...by listening to people who you already clearly know have no idea what they're talking about. Would you trust a politician or a senior military leader to really understand and be able to speak to the nuance of complicated psychological issues in the military? Would you trust the head of the FBI to clearly and without bias talk about the complex state of affairs that lead to stuff like Occupy Wallstreet? No...well, I wouldn't. By the time the comments have bbeen interpreted up from experts through 10 levels of bureaucracy, vetted by public affairs, and then filtered through the media, they're all ridiculous oversimplified to the point of being incorrect or misleading. That doesn't mean the underlying truth isn't there. With regard to cyber war, there are plenty of non-government relatively unbiased sources that are saying the same thing.