Mike, the copyright industries and brand protection people surely like to emphasize the connection between organized crime and infringements of various kinds as much as possible, because it helps make what many people (including the police and the public) regard as a minor form of crime into something serious. So it's definitely in industry's interest to conflate things like counterfeiting with copyright infringement in certain contexts - when they are talking about health and safety risks, for example. As you note, counterfeiting of some products, like drugs or precision parts, can pose a real danger. (Counterfeiting of luxury goods or infringing copies of DVDs, not so much.)
But I don't really understand the argument you're putting forward about copyright infringement and organized crime. There is little doubt (and mounds of evidence) that plenty of people, including plenty of organized criminal groups, are making plenty of money off selling pirated DVDs, CDs, video games and software. Mainly they do it by selling actual discs, but there are some revenue-generating sites out there (think east of Europe) that are being run by people who are at least accused of being part of organized crime. On the other hand, for those people selling infringing discs out of the back of their cars in the mall parking lot, maybe the only link some of them have to organized crime is selling pirated DVDs of the Sopranos.
And as you note in your post, the people making money off selling pirated discs stand to lose customers when the product is available on P2P networks and free streaming sites. In that sense, the business model of these disc pirates is just as doomed in the long run as the business model of the big labels and studios (as you so often point out).
But why would industry's logic dictate that we cheer the Pirate Bay? I think you made that remark largely in jest, but it's not as though the copyright industries don't have reason to complain about _both_ of these groups of people (those selling pirated discs for a profit, and those sharing infringing content online for free). You and I may think they are missing the larger point, that they should spend less time complaining and more time coming up with creative solutions to continue to thrive. But it's not as though it's illogical or inconsistent for the copyright industry people to dislike _both_ the black market for pirated discs and infringing file sharing online simultaneously. They have two sets of people they view as doing harm to their economic interests. Sometimes, the two opposing groups also harm each other. The copyright industries may not be terribly upset with the fact that some organized crime group in East Monrotavia is selling fewer pirated DVDs since broadband came to town and people are downloading the same stuff for free from Bittorrent, but it's not as though the copyright industries are making more money when Monrotavians make the switch.
Um, guys (and gals)? If anyone is still bothering to read this thread, it might be helpful to know that, in fact, the Indiana criminal law in question *does* have an intent requirement. That is, the violation is a misdemeanor if commited "knowingly or "intentionally". What the law in question says, essenstially (and in the midst of assorted other rules about how such products may be sold) is that buying more than 3 grams of pseudoephedrine in a week is illegal, and if one violates this law knowingly or intentioanlly, it's a misdemeanor. Here's the law:
http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title35/ar48/ch4.html
(see section 14.7 -- it's hard to find)
The Indiana Court of Appeals issued an opinion just last month in a differnet, similar case, in which the court reversed a conviction against a woman convicted under the same law under similar cirumstances. The court rejected a number of the defendant's arguments, but did accept one -- they found the government had not proven that the defendant acted knowingly or itnentionally. Perhaps that court case will be of some help to Ms. Harpold, and may also emphasize for Indiana police and prosecutors that knowledge/intent is an essential element of the offense.
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/09090901par.pdf
But that's just it -- there's an allegation of outright fraud here. Because of the procedural posture (a motion to dismiss), the judge was being asked to dismiss the claims against the ratings agencies outright -- before even considering evidence of fraud, deception, etc. -- because the ratings agencies claimed their "opinions" were protected by the First Amendment. The judge refused to dismiss the claims, holding the First Amendment wasn't an absolute bar to the case moving forward. Now, as the case moves forward, the parties can introduce evidence, and we can see if you and I -- and more importantly, the court -- think that evidence demonstrates "outright fraud."
The alternative would have been for the court to dismiss the claim without ever considering whatever evidence there may be to support the fraud claim. I would have found that result even more troubling, and I would have thought you would agree (which is why I was puzzled by your original post).
As for why telling something to a small group, versus telling the general public, should (or did) make a difference to the court, that distinction relates to a line of First Amendment case law in the 60s and 70s in which the Supreme Court held that where defamatory speech relates to public officials, or even to private person on matters of public concern, that the First Amendment requires government to meet a higher standard before imposing liability for such speech. (By comparison, common law on defamation allowed a person to be found liable for defamatory statements even if they had no idea the statement was false, and hadn't even acted negligently.) The court noted an earlier case in which a claim against ratings agencies, based on the ratings they published, had been dismissed on First Amendment grounds, but seemed to find the current case more analogous to other cases involving things like false statements made by credit rating agencies in credit reports circulated to a small group, in which courts had found the subject of the false statements was not a matter of "public concern" and thus the heightened First Amendment standard did not apply.
Mike, you seem flabbergasted that a judge found that the First Amendment doesn't necessarily bar legal action against a company for its actions, where those actions involve some sort of "speech." I think of myself as a bit of a 1A absolutist at times, so I'm with you on a strong reading of the 1A. But I'm baffled by your bafflement. *Lots* of things that might be characterized as speech, or expression, or even "opinion" can nevertheless give rise to legal liability. There's the old cliche about shouting "fire" in a crowded moviehouse, but there also things like fraud, which virtually always (by definition) involves some sort of misleading or deceptive expression, and yet isn't protected by the First Amendment. Libel is another case where the 1A doesn't bar liability for false statements. (Yes, the fact that an otherwise-libelous statement is an opinion takes it out of the realm of libel, but the line between "opinion" and "factual assertion" is hardly a bright one.) There are more specific cases where deceptive or bad faith statements are likewise unprotected, e.g. perjury or other types of false statements to various government authorities in certain contexts. There are also contexts where statements/expression that might be characterized as "opinion" also give rise to legal liability, based on the relationship between the speaker and the listener. As Periphera suggests above, a doctor's opinion can give rise to legal liability, even though the First Amendment would generally protect the right of doctors to speak, and for anyone to give an opinion on someone else's health.
All of which is not to say that the court's decision is the appropriate one. But it sounds like you're suggesting that the question ought to be easy -- the ratings agencies say they were offering opinions, and thus the First Amendment categorically bars them from being held liable for those statements. That would be a broad, an overly simplistic, reading of the First Amendement -- one that I don't think you'd endorse in other contexts.
Browsing the TOS, it looks as though Wolfram is just trying to keep its options open -- leaving sufficient wiggle room for some copyright-based claim int he future, while scaring the handful of users who might actually read this thing into providing attribution to Wolfram (and thus free advertising).
Sure, there may be copyrightable elements of the output of a computer program. The most obvious is something like MS Word -- you type (creative) stuff in, and it puts words on a screen/page. That's "output," and it's copyrightable subject matter. Of course, the creative elements are words typed in by the user; generally, the display elements the software uses aren't the creative, copyrightable elements.
In many (if not most) cases, this is how Alpha seems to work -- you put in a query, and it spits back some data relating to your query. The creative element of your search is largely what you put in, not what you got back.
Wolfram may be thinking (or to put it more precisely, the authors of Alpha's TOS may be thinking) that its creative choices in deciding how to combine/compare the data inputs are copyrightable. I, like Mike, don't think that's likely. But there's plenty of caselaw out there finding that the output of computer programs is copyrightable (a number of cases involving Blizzard come to mind). The courts in these cases may not have been sloppy, they may not have understood copyright or technology as well as they should have (and in some cases, that's definitely true), but regardless of whether that's true, there is authority out there that future courts might rely on to find Alpha's output copyrightable.
By the way, another angle here is that Wolfram seems to be more or less asserting that a condition of use of the site is that users must treat the output as copyrightable, or rather, as something in which Wolfram retains attribution rights. Under that theory, a user who subsequently fails to give Alpha adequate attribution has violated the TOS, and Wolfram could then say that the user's use of the site (i.e. downloading pages into a browser cache, or copying/cutting/pasting data) is some sort of infringement, as its a use not authorized by the license. (And yes - to answer the obvious, a purported contractual violation of this sort is by no means automatically a copyright violation, but courts have been split on this issue as well, so as the TOS says, it "may" constitute a violation of copyright law, even if it probably wouldn't.)
Anyway, those are theories about what the heck WOlfram might be thinking. In general, they probably aren't thinking that hard on this. Their lawyers are drafting the TOS as broadly as possible so as not to foreclose any legal claim, now known or later invented, they might want to make down the road.
Geez, Mike -- You might have pointed out (for the benefit of the majority of commenters here, who apparently couldn't be bothered to read the article) that the judge hasn't actually ordered Newsday not to publish the photos, and has actually *rejected* the defense's motion to order Newsday not to publish them, pending a hearing on the issue. In light of the judge's other rulings mentioned in the article(rejecting the defense demands that the prosecutors stop "perp walks" and refrain from commenting beyond a simple statements of facts) it seems quite likely the court will find that the defendant has not met the high hurdle -- which you pointed out -- necessary to prevent publication. While it's somewhat disappointing that the judge didn't go ahead and reject the argument outright (by finding that nothing the defense might be able to argument would justify such prior restraint), it's worth noting that there *are* countervailing interests involved here. A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, and sometimes that interest collides with the rights of a free press. (And thus, the child porn analogy -- that's a situation where the rights of children and the 1st Amendment rights of others collide, and US law finds the interest in protecting children trumps the 1A interest in that situation.) While I, along with many others, and for the most part even US courts, think that the 1st Amendment interests should (and do) take precedence in a situation like this, it's not quite so ridiculous as you make it out to be for a judge to agree to hold a hearing about the issue and hear from both sides (or rather, several sides). If the judge finds that the defendant's right to a fair trial may be jeopardized by the photos, there are a variety of other things the judge can do short of trying to order Newsday not to publish them. If the judge does try to gag Newsday (and as I said above, that seems unlikely) then your outrage will be entirely justified.
Aw, come on Mike, you're smarter than this - it may "seem" like the sort of information the 4thAm would require a warrant to obtain, but you don't need to exaggerate what's actually being argued here. While it's worth debating what the proper standard should be for getting cell phone location data (whether it be tower info, or much more precise GPS information) from a mobile provider, the question of whether the 4th Amendment protects this information from disclosure without a warrant is different (and many courts over the years have held it doesn't). Looking at the "bumper beeper" cases, they don't find 4thAm interests implicated where the tracking is in public space; tower info is so imprecise that it really can't pinpoint your location in private areas. There's also a long line of cases finding that the 4thAm generally doesn't prohibit disclosure of information you've either handed over to third parties, or which was generated by the third party about you. Finally, it's worth noting that the issue here isn't between requiring a search warrant and having no standards, but rather, whether some other type of court order will suffice to obtain these records.
I don't mean to suggest that it's not worth debating what the standards ought to be for getting this information - it is - but then perhaps it would be worth a longer Techdirt post explaining why this information ought to be given greater protection than it has in the past.
Sydnor is an idiot. I don't write that merely because I disagree with his conclusion (although I do), but because his "white paper" is so poorly written that a reasonably well-informed and well-educated reader can't make out what the %&%()& his argument actually is. I write that because, having read a number of his pieces, and having heard him speak in person, I have yet to hear him express a coherent, cogent argument about anything. He was a laughingstock among his colleagues at the USPTO, and he continues to make one of himself at PFF. (Indeed, as Mike points out, Sydnor does make his predecessor, Patrick Ross, sound like a scholar by comparison -- and that really takes some doing.) Perhaps the best thing we can do is simply ignore Sydnor, and maybe he'll go away.
The premise of this story is rather silly. Like ir or not, for better or worse, "DOJ's interpretation" of the SCA (that copies of messages that are left on a mail server, after the messages themselves have already been retrieved and read by the recipient, are not in "electronic storage" for SCA purposes, although a related law requires the govt to jump through a different set of procedural hoops if they want to get them from an ISP has been the law since 1986). Most folks reading Techdirt, even if they aren't lawyers, can appreciate the distinction between messages en route to their destination, and messages that have been opened and left on a server. The law treats these two categories *slightly* differently, treating the latter more like the files one stores at box.net or xdrive, or in a private Flickr gallery. They get legal protection, but not the exact same as messages that are in transit (or temporarily stored on their way to the recipient).
And yes, it's still against the law to break into a webmail account and swipe messages, even if they've been read. The CFAA, 18 USC 1030, among other laws, makes it a crime.
Hey Anon -
If, as citizens, we just wanted to maximize the amount of money our various government offices could collect for performing their jobs (the ones we've already paid them to do), why stop at a measly $8 per sheet? Why not charge $8000? Or $8 million? That way, all you'd need to do is sell one copy and you'd make more money than if everyone in the county each bought a copy. I mean, there's got to be some developer or someone who's willing to pay $8 mil, right? And why stop at tax maps? Why not make access to the tax *code* cost money? So people would have to pay $100 just to find out how much tax they owed? That would raise lots of revenue, too. Right?
Also, just to point out one quibble with the initial story: Under US law, *federal* government works are unprotected by copyright. Works produced by state and local governments may still enjoy copyright protection (along with works produced by foreign governments, to the extent their own government's protect them).
by Anonymous Coward on Feb 6th, 2008 @ 11:22am
Ummm, as a citizen of WV, I would think you would want the tax office to collect money.
Guess what, if they stop getting that money, your taxes will go up. Think about it.
I'm not a big fan of opt-out programs generally, but Amazon's strikes me as having better disclosure of terms than most such programs. And seriously, if the people who are complaining to you are too stupid to recognize the difference between a blog post about Amazon Prime, and the actual purveyors of Amazon Prime, then it's unclear whether *any* disclosure is going to be clear enough to avoid suckering them. Seriously -- I've read that Techdirt post. It's not like it's difficult to tell that it's written *about* Amazon, not *by* Amazon.
Techdirt has not posted any stories submitted by pilgrim.
Mike, the copyright industries and brand protection people surely like to emphasize the connection between organized crime and infringements of various kinds as much as possible, because it helps make what many people (including the police and the public) regard as a minor form of crime into something serious. So it's definitely in industry's interest to conflate things like counterfeiting with copyright infringement in certain contexts - when they are talking about health and safety risks, for example. As you note, counterfeiting of some products, like drugs or precision parts, can pose a real danger. (Counterfeiting of luxury goods or infringing copies of DVDs, not so much.)
But I don't really understand the argument you're putting forward about copyright infringement and organized crime. There is little doubt (and mounds of evidence) that plenty of people, including plenty of organized criminal groups, are making plenty of money off selling pirated DVDs, CDs, video games and software. Mainly they do it by selling actual discs, but there are some revenue-generating sites out there (think east of Europe) that are being run by people who are at least accused of being part of organized crime. On the other hand, for those people selling infringing discs out of the back of their cars in the mall parking lot, maybe the only link some of them have to organized crime is selling pirated DVDs of the Sopranos.
And as you note in your post, the people making money off selling pirated discs stand to lose customers when the product is available on P2P networks and free streaming sites. In that sense, the business model of these disc pirates is just as doomed in the long run as the business model of the big labels and studios (as you so often point out).
But why would industry's logic dictate that we cheer the Pirate Bay? I think you made that remark largely in jest, but it's not as though the copyright industries don't have reason to complain about _both_ of these groups of people (those selling pirated discs for a profit, and those sharing infringing content online for free). You and I may think they are missing the larger point, that they should spend less time complaining and more time coming up with creative solutions to continue to thrive. But it's not as though it's illogical or inconsistent for the copyright industry people to dislike _both_ the black market for pirated discs and infringing file sharing online simultaneously. They have two sets of people they view as doing harm to their economic interests. Sometimes, the two opposing groups also harm each other. The copyright industries may not be terribly upset with the fact that some organized crime group in East Monrotavia is selling fewer pirated DVDs since broadband came to town and people are downloading the same stuff for free from Bittorrent, but it's not as though the copyright industries are making more money when Monrotavians make the switch.
Um, guys (and gals)? If anyone is still bothering to read this thread, it might be helpful to know that, in fact, the Indiana criminal law in question *does* have an intent requirement. That is, the violation is a misdemeanor if commited "knowingly or "intentionally". What the law in question says, essenstially (and in the midst of assorted other rules about how such products may be sold) is that buying more than 3 grams of pseudoephedrine in a week is illegal, and if one violates this law knowingly or intentioanlly, it's a misdemeanor. Here's the law:
http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title35/ar48/ch4.html
(see section 14.7 -- it's hard to find)
The Indiana Court of Appeals issued an opinion just last month in a differnet, similar case, in which the court reversed a conviction against a woman convicted under the same law under similar cirumstances. The court rejected a number of the defendant's arguments, but did accept one -- they found the government had not proven that the defendant acted knowingly or itnentionally. Perhaps that court case will be of some help to Ms. Harpold, and may also emphasize for Indiana police and prosecutors that knowledge/intent is an essential element of the offense.
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/09090901par.pdf
Re: Re:
But that's just it -- there's an allegation of outright fraud here. Because of the procedural posture (a motion to dismiss), the judge was being asked to dismiss the claims against the ratings agencies outright -- before even considering evidence of fraud, deception, etc. -- because the ratings agencies claimed their "opinions" were protected by the First Amendment. The judge refused to dismiss the claims, holding the First Amendment wasn't an absolute bar to the case moving forward. Now, as the case moves forward, the parties can introduce evidence, and we can see if you and I -- and more importantly, the court -- think that evidence demonstrates "outright fraud."
The alternative would have been for the court to dismiss the claim without ever considering whatever evidence there may be to support the fraud claim. I would have found that result even more troubling, and I would have thought you would agree (which is why I was puzzled by your original post).
As for why telling something to a small group, versus telling the general public, should (or did) make a difference to the court, that distinction relates to a line of First Amendment case law in the 60s and 70s in which the Supreme Court held that where defamatory speech relates to public officials, or even to private person on matters of public concern, that the First Amendment requires government to meet a higher standard before imposing liability for such speech. (By comparison, common law on defamation allowed a person to be found liable for defamatory statements even if they had no idea the statement was false, and hadn't even acted negligently.) The court noted an earlier case in which a claim against ratings agencies, based on the ratings they published, had been dismissed on First Amendment grounds, but seemed to find the current case more analogous to other cases involving things like false statements made by credit rating agencies in credit reports circulated to a small group, in which courts had found the subject of the false statements was not a matter of "public concern" and thus the heightened First Amendment standard did not apply.
Mike, you seem flabbergasted that a judge found that the First Amendment doesn't necessarily bar legal action against a company for its actions, where those actions involve some sort of "speech." I think of myself as a bit of a 1A absolutist at times, so I'm with you on a strong reading of the 1A. But I'm baffled by your bafflement. *Lots* of things that might be characterized as speech, or expression, or even "opinion" can nevertheless give rise to legal liability. There's the old cliche about shouting "fire" in a crowded moviehouse, but there also things like fraud, which virtually always (by definition) involves some sort of misleading or deceptive expression, and yet isn't protected by the First Amendment. Libel is another case where the 1A doesn't bar liability for false statements. (Yes, the fact that an otherwise-libelous statement is an opinion takes it out of the realm of libel, but the line between "opinion" and "factual assertion" is hardly a bright one.) There are more specific cases where deceptive or bad faith statements are likewise unprotected, e.g. perjury or other types of false statements to various government authorities in certain contexts. There are also contexts where statements/expression that might be characterized as "opinion" also give rise to legal liability, based on the relationship between the speaker and the listener. As Periphera suggests above, a doctor's opinion can give rise to legal liability, even though the First Amendment would generally protect the right of doctors to speak, and for anyone to give an opinion on someone else's health.
All of which is not to say that the court's decision is the appropriate one. But it sounds like you're suggesting that the question ought to be easy -- the ratings agencies say they were offering opinions, and thus the First Amendment categorically bars them from being held liable for those statements. That would be a broad, an overly simplistic, reading of the First Amendement -- one that I don't think you'd endorse in other contexts.
keeping their options open
Browsing the TOS, it looks as though Wolfram is just trying to keep its options open -- leaving sufficient wiggle room for some copyright-based claim int he future, while scaring the handful of users who might actually read this thing into providing attribution to Wolfram (and thus free advertising).
Sure, there may be copyrightable elements of the output of a computer program. The most obvious is something like MS Word -- you type (creative) stuff in, and it puts words on a screen/page. That's "output," and it's copyrightable subject matter. Of course, the creative elements are words typed in by the user; generally, the display elements the software uses aren't the creative, copyrightable elements.
In many (if not most) cases, this is how Alpha seems to work -- you put in a query, and it spits back some data relating to your query. The creative element of your search is largely what you put in, not what you got back.
Wolfram may be thinking (or to put it more precisely, the authors of Alpha's TOS may be thinking) that its creative choices in deciding how to combine/compare the data inputs are copyrightable. I, like Mike, don't think that's likely. But there's plenty of caselaw out there finding that the output of computer programs is copyrightable (a number of cases involving Blizzard come to mind). The courts in these cases may not have been sloppy, they may not have understood copyright or technology as well as they should have (and in some cases, that's definitely true), but regardless of whether that's true, there is authority out there that future courts might rely on to find Alpha's output copyrightable.
By the way, another angle here is that Wolfram seems to be more or less asserting that a condition of use of the site is that users must treat the output as copyrightable, or rather, as something in which Wolfram retains attribution rights. Under that theory, a user who subsequently fails to give Alpha adequate attribution has violated the TOS, and Wolfram could then say that the user's use of the site (i.e. downloading pages into a browser cache, or copying/cutting/pasting data) is some sort of infringement, as its a use not authorized by the license. (And yes - to answer the obvious, a purported contractual violation of this sort is by no means automatically a copyright violation, but courts have been split on this issue as well, so as the TOS says, it "may" constitute a violation of copyright law, even if it probably wouldn't.)
Anyway, those are theories about what the heck WOlfram might be thinking. In general, they probably aren't thinking that hard on this. Their lawyers are drafting the TOS as broadly as possible so as not to foreclose any legal claim, now known or later invented, they might want to make down the road.
Uh, Mike
Geez, Mike -- You might have pointed out (for the benefit of the majority of commenters here, who apparently couldn't be bothered to read the article) that the judge hasn't actually ordered Newsday not to publish the photos, and has actually *rejected* the defense's motion to order Newsday not to publish them, pending a hearing on the issue. In light of the judge's other rulings mentioned in the article(rejecting the defense demands that the prosecutors stop "perp walks" and refrain from commenting beyond a simple statements of facts) it seems quite likely the court will find that the defendant has not met the high hurdle -- which you pointed out -- necessary to prevent publication. While it's somewhat disappointing that the judge didn't go ahead and reject the argument outright (by finding that nothing the defense might be able to argument would justify such prior restraint), it's worth noting that there *are* countervailing interests involved here. A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, and sometimes that interest collides with the rights of a free press. (And thus, the child porn analogy -- that's a situation where the rights of children and the 1st Amendment rights of others collide, and US law finds the interest in protecting children trumps the 1A interest in that situation.) While I, along with many others, and for the most part even US courts, think that the 1st Amendment interests should (and do) take precedence in a situation like this, it's not quite so ridiculous as you make it out to be for a judge to agree to hold a hearing about the issue and hear from both sides (or rather, several sides). If the judge finds that the defendant's right to a fair trial may be jeopardized by the photos, there are a variety of other things the judge can do short of trying to order Newsday not to publish them. If the judge does try to gag Newsday (and as I said above, that seems unlikely) then your outrage will be entirely justified.
Aw, come on Mike, you're smarter than this - it may "seem" like the sort of information the 4thAm would require a warrant to obtain, but you don't need to exaggerate what's actually being argued here. While it's worth debating what the proper standard should be for getting cell phone location data (whether it be tower info, or much more precise GPS information) from a mobile provider, the question of whether the 4th Amendment protects this information from disclosure without a warrant is different (and many courts over the years have held it doesn't). Looking at the "bumper beeper" cases, they don't find 4thAm interests implicated where the tracking is in public space; tower info is so imprecise that it really can't pinpoint your location in private areas. There's also a long line of cases finding that the 4thAm generally doesn't prohibit disclosure of information you've either handed over to third parties, or which was generated by the third party about you. Finally, it's worth noting that the issue here isn't between requiring a search warrant and having no standards, but rather, whether some other type of court order will suffice to obtain these records.
I don't mean to suggest that it's not worth debating what the standards ought to be for getting this information - it is - but then perhaps it would be worth a longer Techdirt post explaining why this information ought to be given greater protection than it has in the past.
Sydnor is an idiot. I don't write that merely because I disagree with his conclusion (although I do), but because his "white paper" is so poorly written that a reasonably well-informed and well-educated reader can't make out what the %&%()& his argument actually is. I write that because, having read a number of his pieces, and having heard him speak in person, I have yet to hear him express a coherent, cogent argument about anything. He was a laughingstock among his colleagues at the USPTO, and he continues to make one of himself at PFF. (Indeed, as Mike points out, Sydnor does make his predecessor, Patrick Ross, sound like a scholar by comparison -- and that really takes some doing.) Perhaps the best thing we can do is simply ignore Sydnor, and maybe he'll go away.
The premise of this story is rather silly. Like ir or not, for better or worse, "DOJ's interpretation" of the SCA (that copies of messages that are left on a mail server, after the messages themselves have already been retrieved and read by the recipient, are not in "electronic storage" for SCA purposes, although a related law requires the govt to jump through a different set of procedural hoops if they want to get them from an ISP has been the law since 1986). Most folks reading Techdirt, even if they aren't lawyers, can appreciate the distinction between messages en route to their destination, and messages that have been opened and left on a server. The law treats these two categories *slightly* differently, treating the latter more like the files one stores at box.net or xdrive, or in a private Flickr gallery. They get legal protection, but not the exact same as messages that are in transit (or temporarily stored on their way to the recipient).
And yes, it's still against the law to break into a webmail account and swipe messages, even if they've been read. The CFAA, 18 USC 1030, among other laws, makes it a crime.
Hey Anon -
If, as citizens, we just wanted to maximize the amount of money our various government offices could collect for performing their jobs (the ones we've already paid them to do), why stop at a measly $8 per sheet? Why not charge $8000? Or $8 million? That way, all you'd need to do is sell one copy and you'd make more money than if everyone in the county each bought a copy. I mean, there's got to be some developer or someone who's willing to pay $8 mil, right? And why stop at tax maps? Why not make access to the tax *code* cost money? So people would have to pay $100 just to find out how much tax they owed? That would raise lots of revenue, too. Right?
Also, just to point out one quibble with the initial story: Under US law, *federal* government works are unprotected by copyright. Works produced by state and local governments may still enjoy copyright protection (along with works produced by foreign governments, to the extent their own government's protect them).
by Anonymous Coward on Feb 6th, 2008 @ 11:22am
Ummm, as a citizen of WV, I would think you would want the tax office to collect money.
Guess what, if they stop getting that money, your taxes will go up. Think about it.
If they can't tell the difference ...
I'm not a big fan of opt-out programs generally, but Amazon's strikes me as having better disclosure of terms than most such programs. And seriously, if the people who are complaining to you are too stupid to recognize the difference between a blog post about Amazon Prime, and the actual purveyors of Amazon Prime, then it's unclear whether *any* disclosure is going to be clear enough to avoid suckering them. Seriously -- I've read that Techdirt post. It's not like it's difficult to tell that it's written *about* Amazon, not *by* Amazon.