As reported by Lawfare, “This year’s defense policy bill—the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)—would roll back data disclosures that help the department understand the real costs of what they are buying, and testing requirements that establish whether what contractors promise is technically feasible or even suited to its needs.” This change comes amid a push from the Secretary of Defense to “Maximize Lethality” by acquiring modern software “at a speed and scale for our Warfighter.” The Senate Armed Services Committee has also expressed interest in making “significant reforms to modernize the Pentagon’s budgeting and acquisition operations…to improve efficiency, unleash innovation, and modernize the budget process.”
The 2026 NDAA itself says that the “Secretary of Defense shall prioritize alternative acquisition mechanisms to accelerate development and production” of technology, including an expedited “software acquisition pathway”—a special part of the U.S. code that, if this version of the NDAA passes, will transfer powers to the Secretary of Defense to streamline the buying process and make new technology or updates to existing technology and get it operational “in a period of not more than one year from the time the process is initiated…” It also makes sure the new technology “shall not be subjected to” some of the traditional levers of oversight.
All of this signals one thing: speed over due diligence. In a commercial technology landscape where companies are repeatedly found to be overselling or even deceiving people about their product’s technical capabilities—or where police departments are constantly grappling with the reality that expensive technology may not be effective at providing the solutions they’re after—it’s important that the government agency with the most expansive budget has time to test the efficacy and cost-efficiency of new technology. It’s easy for the military or police departments to listen to a tech company’s marketing department and believe their well-rehearsed sales pitch, but Congress should make sure that public money is being used wisely and in a way that is consistent with both civil liberties and human rights.
The military and those who support its preferred budget should think twice about cutting corners before buying and deploying new technology. The Department of Defense’s posturing does not elicit confidence that the technologically-focused military of tomorrow will be equipped in a way that is effective, efficient, or transparent.
Flock Safety, the police technology company most notable for their extensive network of automated license plate readers spread throughout the United States, is rolling out a new and troubling product that may create headaches for the cities that adopt it: detection of “human distress” via audio. As part of their suite of technologies, Flock has been pushing Raven, their version of acoustic gunshot detection. These devices capture sounds in public places and use machine learning to try to identify gunshots and then alert police—but EFF has long warned that they are also high powered microphones parked above densely-populated city streets. Cities now have one more reason to follow the lead of many other municipalities and cancel their Flock contracts, before this new feature causes civil liberties harms to residents and headaches for cities.
In marketing materials, Flock has been touting new features to their Raven product—including the ability of the device to alert police based on sounds, including “distress.” The online ad for the product, which allows cities to apply for early access to the technology, shows the image of police getting an alert for “screaming.”
It’s unclear how this technology works. For acoustic gunshot detection, generally the microphones are looking for sounds that would signify gunshots (though in practice they often mistake car backfires or fireworks for gunshots). Flock needs to come forward now with an explanation of exactly how their new technology functions. It is unclear how these devices will interact with state “eavesdropping” laws that limit listening to or recording the private conversations that often take place in public.
Flock is no stranger to causing legal challenges for the cities and states that adopt their products. In Illinois, Flock was accused of violating state law by allowing Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a federal agency, access to license plate reader data taken within the state. That’s not all. In 2023, a North Carolina judge halted the installation of Flock cameras statewide for operating in the state without a license. When the city of Evanston, Illinois recently canceled its contract with Flock, it ordered the company to take down their license plate readers–only for Flock to mysteriously reinstall them a few days later. This city has now sent Flock a cease and desist order and in the meantime, has put black tape over the cameras. For some, the technology isn’t worth its mounting downsides. As one Illinois village trustee wrote while explaining his vote to cancel the city’s contract with Flock, “According to our own Civilian Police Oversight Commission, over 99% of Flock alerts do not result in any police action.”
Gunshot detection technology is dangerous enough as it is—police showing up to alerts they think are gunfire only to find children playing with fireworks is a recipe for innocent people to get hurt. This isn’t hypothetical: in Chicago a child really was shot at by police who thought they were responding to a shooting thanks to a ShotSpotter alert. Introducing a new feature that allows these pre-installed Raven microphones all over cities to begin listening for human voices in distress is likely to open up a whole new can of unforeseen legal, civil liberties, and even bodily safety consequences.
A San Francisco supervisor has proposed that police and other city agencies should have no financial consequences for breaking a landmark surveillance oversight law. In 2019, organizations from across the city worked together to help pass that law, which required law enforcement to get the approval of democratically elected officials before they bought and used new spying technologies. Bit by bit, the San Francisco Police Department and the Board of Supervisors have weakened that law—but one important feature of the law remained: if city officials are caught breaking this law, residents can sue to enforce it, and if they prevail they are entitled to attorney fees.
Now Supervisor Matt Dorsey believes that this important accountability feature is “incentivizing baseless but costly lawsuits that have already squandered hundreds of thousands of taxpayer dollars over bogus alleged violations of a law that has been an onerous mess since it was first enacted.”
Between 2010 and 2023, San Francisco had to spend roughly $70 million to settle civil suits brought against the SFPD for alleged misconduct ranging from shooting city residents to wrongfully firing whistleblowers. This is not “squandered” money; it is compensating people for injury. We are all governed by laws and are all expected to act accordingly—police are not exempt from consequences for using their power wrongfully. In the 21st century, this accountability must extend to using powerful surveillance technology responsibly.
The ability to sue a police department when they violate the law is called a “private right of action” and it is absolutely essential to enforcing the law. Government officials tasked with making other government officials turn square corners will rarely have sufficient resources to do the job alone, and often they will not want to blow the whistle on peers. But city residents empowered to bring a private right of action typically cannot do the job alone, either—they need a lawyer to represent them. So private rights of action provide for an attorney fee award to people who win these cases. This is a routine part of scores of public interest laws involving civil rights, labor safeguards, environmental protection, and more.
Without an enforcement mechanism to hold police accountable, many will just ignore the law. They’ve done it before. AB 481 is a California state law that requires police to get elected official approval before attempting to acquire military equipment, including drones. The SFPD knowingly ignored this law. If it had an enforcement mechanism, more police would follow the rules.
President Trump recently included San Francisco in a list of cities he would like the military to occupy. Law enforcement agencies across the country, either willingly or by compulsion, have been collaborating with federal agencies operating at the behest of the White House. So it would be best for cities to keep their co-optable surveillance infrastructure small, transparent, and accountable. With authoritarianism looming, now is not the time to make police less hard to control—especially considering SFPD has already disclosed surveillance data to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in violation of California state law.
We’re calling on the Board of Supervisors to reject Supervisor Dorsey’s proposal. If police want to avoid being sued and forced to pay the prevailing party’s attorney fees, they should avoid breaking the laws that govern police surveillance in the city.
Ring founder Jamie Siminoff is back at the helm of the surveillance doorbell company, and with him is the surveillance-first-privacy-last approach that made Ring one of the most maligned tech devices. Not only is the company reintroducing new versions of old features which would allow police to request footage directly from Ring users, it is also introducing a new feature that would allow police to request live-stream access to people’s home security devices.
This is a bad, bad step for Ring and the broader public.
Ring is rolling back many of the reforms it’s made in the last few years by easing police access to footage from millions of homes in the United States. This is a grave threat to civil liberties in the United States. After all, police have used Ring footage to spy on protestors, and obtained footage without a warrant or consent of the user. It is easy to imagine that law enforcement officials will use their renewed access to Ring information to find people who have had abortions or track down people for immigration enforcement.
Siminoff has announced in a memo seen by Business Insider that the company will now be reimagined from the ground up to be “AI first”—whatever that means for a home security camera that lets you see who is ringing your doorbell. We fear that this may signal the introduction of video analytics or facerecognition to an already problematic surveillance device.
It was also reported that employees at Ring will have to show proof that they use AI in order to get promoted.
Not to be undone with new bad features, they are also planning on rolling back some of the necessary reforms Ring has made: namely partnering with Axon to build a new tool that would allow police to request Ring footage directly from users, and also allow users to consent to letting police livestream directly from their device.
After years of serving as the eyes and ears of police, the company was compelled by public pressure to make a number of necessary changes. They introduced end-to-end encryption, they ended their formal partnerships with police which were an ethical minefield, and they ended their tool that facilitated police requests for footage directly to customers. Now they are pivoting back to being a tool of mass surveillance.
Why now? It is hard to believe the company is betraying the trust of its millions of customers in the name of “safety” when violent crime in the United States is reaching near-historically low levels. It’s probably not about their customers—the FTC had to compel Ring to take its users’ privacy seriously.
No, this is most likely about Ring cashing in on the rising tide of techno-authoritarianism, that is, authoritarianism aided by surveillance tech. Too many tech companies want to profit from our shrinking liberties. Google likewise recently ended an old ethical commitment that prohibited it from profiting off of surveillance and warfare. Companies are locking down billion-dollar contracts by selling their products to the defense sector or police.
Axon Enterprise’s Draft One — a generative artificial intelligence product that writes police reports based on audio from officers’ body-worn cameras — seems deliberately designed to avoid audits that could provide any accountability to the public, an EFF investigation has found.
Our review of public records from police agencies already using the technology — including police reports, emails, procurement documents, department policies, software settings, and more — as well as Axon’s own user manuals and marketing materials revealed that it’s often impossible to tell which parts of a police report were generated by AI and which parts were written by an officer.
You can read our full report, which details what we found in those documents, how we filed those public records requests, and how you can file your own, here.
Everyone should have access to answers, evidence, and data regarding the effectiveness and dangers of this technology. Axon and its customers claim this technology will revolutionize policing, but it remains to be seen how it will change the criminal justice system, and who this technology benefits most.
For months, EFF and other organizations have warned about the threats this technology poses to accountability and transparency in an already flawed criminal justice system. Now we’ve concluded the situation is even worse than we thought: There is no meaningful way to audit Draft One usage, whether you’re a police chief or an independent researcher, because Axon designed it that way.
Draft One uses a ChatGPT variant to process body-worn camera audio of public encounters and create police reports based only on the captured verbal dialogue; it does not process the video. The Draft One-generated text is sprinkled with bracketed placeholders that officers are encouraged to add additional observations or information—or can be quickly deleted. Officers are supposed to edit Draft One’s report and correct anything the Gen AI misunderstood due to a lack of context, troubled translations, or just plain-old mistakes. When they’re done, the officer is prompted to sign an acknowledgement that the report was generated using Draft One and that they have reviewed the report and made necessary edits to ensure it is consistent with the officer’s recollection. Then they can copy and paste the text into their report. When they close the window, the draft disappears.
Any new, untested, and problematic technology needs a robust process to evaluate its use by officers. In this case, one would expect police agencies to retain data that ensures officers are actually editing the AI-generated reports as required, or that officers can accurately answer if a judge demands to know whether, or which part of, reports used by the prosecution were written by AI.
One would expect audit systems to be readily available to police supervisors, researchers, and the public, so that anyone can make their own independent conclusions. And one would expect that Draft One would make it easy to discern its AI product from human product – after all, even your basic, free word processing software can track changes and save a document history.
But Draft One defies all these expectations, offering meager oversight features that deliberately conceal how it is used.
So when a police report includes biased language, inaccuracies, misinterpretations, or even outright lies, the record won’t indicate whether the officer or the AI is to blame. That makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assess how the system affects justice outcomes, because there is little non-anecdotal data from which to determine whether the technology is junk.
The disregard for transparency is perhaps best encapsulated by a short email that an administrator in the Frederick Police Department in Colorado, one of Axon’s first Draft One customers, sent to a company representative after receiving a public records request related to AI-generated reports.
“We love having new toys until the public gets wind of them,” the administrator wrote.
No Record of Who Wrote What
The first question anyone should have about a police report written using Draft One is which parts were written by AI and which were added by the officer. Once you know this, you can start to answer more questions, like:
Are officers meaningfully editing and adding to the AI draft? Or are they reflexively rubber-stamping the drafts to move on as quickly as possible?
How often are officers finding and correcting errors made by the AI, and are there patterns to these errors?
If there is inappropriate language or a fabrication in the final report, was it introduced by the AI or the officer?
Is the AI overstepping in its interpretation of the audio? If a report says, “the subject made a threatening gesture,” was that added by the officer, or did the AI make a factual assumption based on the audio? If a suspect uses metaphorical slang, does the AI document literally? If a subject says “yeah” through a conversation as a verbal acknowledgement that they’re listening to what the officer says, is that interpreted as an agreement or a confession?
Ironically, Draft One does not save the first draft it generates. Nor does the system store any subsequent versions. Instead, the officer copies and pastes the text into the police report, and the previous draft, originally created by Draft One, disappears as soon as the window closes. There is no log or record indicating which portions of a report were written by the computer and which portions were written by the officer, except for the officer’s own recollection. If an officer generates a Draft One report multiple, there’s no way to tell whether the AI interprets the audio differently each time.
Axon is open about not maintaining these records, at least when it markets directly to law enforcement.
In this video of a roundtable discussion about the Draft One product, Axon’s senior principal product manager for generative AI is asked (at the 49:47 mark) whether or not it’s possible to see after-the-fact which parts of the report were suggested by the AI and which were edited by the officer. His response (bold and definition of RMS added):
“So we don’t store the original draft and that’s by design and that’s really because the last thing we want to do is create more disclosure headaches for our customers and our attorney’s offices—so basically the officer generates that draft, they make their edits, if they submit it into our Axon records system then that’s the only place we store it, if they copy and paste it into their third-party RMS [records management system] system as soon as they’re done with that and close their browser tab, it’s gone. It’s actually never stored in the cloud at all so you don’t have to worry about extra copies floating around.”
To reiterate: Axon deliberately does not store the original draft written by the Gen AI, because “the last thing” they want is for cops to have to provide that data to anyone (say, a judge, defense attorney or civil liberties non-profit).
Following up on the same question, Axon’s Director of Strategic Relationships at Axon Justice suggests this is fine, since a police officer using a word processor wouldn’t be required to save every draft of a police report as they’re re-writing it. This is, of course, misdirection and not remotely comparable. An officer with a word processor is one thought process and a record created by one party; Draft One is two processes from two parties–Axon and the officer. Ultimately, it could and should be considered two records: the version sent to the officer from Axon and the version edited by the officer.
The days of there being unexpected consequences of police departments writing reports in word processors may be over, but Draft One is still unproven. After all, every AI-evangelist, including Axon, claims this technology is a game-changer. So, why wouldn’t an agency want to maintain a record that can establish the technology’s accuracy?
It also appears that Draft One isn’t simply hewing to long–establishednorms of police report-writing; it may fundamentally change them. In one email, the Campbell Police Department’s Police Records Supervisor tells staff, “You may notice a significant difference with the narrative format…if the DA’s office has comments regarding our report narratives, please let me know.” It’s more than a little shocking that a police department would implement such a change without fully soliciting and addressing the input of prosecutors. In this case, the Santa Clara County District Attorney had already suggested police include a disclosure when Axon Draft One is used in each report, but Axon’s engineers had yet to finalize the feature at the time it was rolled out.
One of the main concerns, of course, is that this system effectively creates a smokescreen over truth-telling in police reports. If an officer lies or uses inappropriate language in a police report, who is to say that the officer wrote it or the AI? An officer can be punished severely for official dishonesty, but the consequences may be more lenient for a cop who blames it on the AI. There has already been an occasion when engineers discovered a bug that allowed officers on at least three occasions to circumvent the “guardrails” that supposedly deter officers from submitting AI-generated reports without reading them first, as Axon disclosed to the Frederick Police Department.
To serve and protect the public interest, the AI output must be continually and aggressively evaluated whenever and wherever it’s used. But Axon has intentionally made this difficult.
What the Audit Trail Actually Looks Like
You may have seen news stories or other public statements asserting that Draft One does, indeed, have auditing features. So, we dug through the user manuals to figure out what that exactly means.
The first thing to note is that, based on our review of the documentation, there appears to be no feature in Axon software that allows departments to export a list of all police officers who have used Draft One. Nor is it possible to export a list of all reports created by Draft One, unless the department has customized its process (we’ll get to that in a minute).
This is disappointing because, without this information, it’s near impossible to do even the most basic statistical analysis: how many officers are using the technology and how often.
Based on the documentation, you can only export two types of very basic logs, with the process differing depending on whether an agency uses Evidence or Records/Standards products. These are:
A log of basic actions taken on a particular report. If the officer requested a Draft One report or signed the Draft One liability disclosure related to the police report, it will show here. But nothing more than that.
A log of an individual officer/user’s basic activity in the Axon Evidence/Records system. This audit log shows things such as when an officer logs into the system, uploads videos, or accesses a piece of evidence. The only Draft One-related activities this tracks are whether the officer ran a Draft One request, signed the Draft One liability disclosure, or changed the Draft One settings.
This means that, to do a comprehensive review, an evaluator may need to go through the record management system and look up each officer individually to identify whether that officer used Draft One and when. That could mean combing through dozens, hundreds, or in some cases, thousands of individual user logs.
An example of Draft One usage in an audit log.
An auditor could also go report-by-report as well to see which ones involved Draft One, but the sheer number of reports generated by an agency means this method would require a massive amount of time.
But can agencies even create a list of police reports that were co-written with AI? It depends on whether the agency has included a disclosure in the body of the text, such as “I acknowledge this report was generated from a digital recording using Draft One by Axon.” If so, then an administrator can use “Draft One” as a keyword search to find relevant reports.
Agencies that do not require that language told us they could not identify which reports were written with Draft One. For example, one of those agencies and one of Axon’s most promoted clients, the Lafayette Police Department in Indiana, told us:
“Regarding the attached request, we do not have the ability to create a list of reports created through Draft One. They are not searchable. This request is now closed.”
Meanwhile, in response to a similar public records request, the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, which does require a disclosure at the bottom of each report that it had been written by AI, was able to isolate more than 3,000 Draft One reports generated between December 2024 and March 2025.
They told us: “We are able to do a keyword and a timeframe search. I used the words draft one and the system generated all the draft one reports for that timeframe.”
We have requested further clarification from Axon, but they have yet to respond.
However, as we learned from email exchanges between the Frederick Police Department in Colorado and Axon, Axon is tracking police use of the technology at a level that isn’t available to the police department itself.
In response to a request from Politico’s Alfred Ng in August 2024 for Draft One-generated police reports, the police department was struggling to isolate those reports.
An Axon representative responded: “Unfortunately, there’s no filter for DraftOne reports so you’d have to pull a User’s audit trail and look for Draft One entries. To set expectations, it’s not going to be graceful, but this wasn’t a scenario we anticipated needing to make easy.”
But then, Axon followed up: “We track which reports use Draft One internally so I exported the data.” Then, a few days later, Axon provided Frederick with some custom JSON code to extract the data in the future.
What is Being Done About Draft One
The California Assembly is currently considering SB 524, a bill that addresses transparency measures for AI-written police reports. The legislation would require disclosure whenever police use artificial intelligence to partially or fully write official reports, as well as “require the first draft created to be retained for as long as the final report is retained.” Because Draft One is designed not to retain the first or any previous drafts of a report, it cannot comply with this common-sense and first-step bill, and any law enforcement usage would be unlawful.
Axon markets Draft One as a solution to a problem police have been complaining about for at least a century: that they do too much paperwork. Or, at least, they spend too much time doing paperwork. The current research on whether Draft One remedies this issue shows mixed results, from some agencies claiming it has no real-time savings, with others agencies extolling its virtues (although their data also shows that results vary even within the department).
In the justice system, police must prioritize accuracy over speed. Public safety and a trustworthy legal system demand quality over corner-cutting. Time saved should not be the only metric, or even the most important one. It’s like evaluating a drive-through restaurant based only on how fast the food comes out, while deliberately concealing the ingredients and nutritional information and failing to inspect whether the kitchen is up to health and safety standards.
Given how untested this technology is and how much the company is in a hurry to sell Draft One, many local lawmakers and prosecutors have taken it upon themselves to try to regulate the product’s use. Utah is currently considering a bill that would mandate disclosure for any police reports generated by AI, thus sidestepping one of the current major transparency issues: it’s nearly impossible to tell which finished reports started as an AI draft.
We do not fear advances in technology – but we do have legitimate concerns about some of the products on the market now… AI continues to develop and we are hopeful that we will reach a point in the near future where these reports can be relied on. For now, our office has made the decision not to accept any police narratives that were produced with the assistance of AI.
We urge other prosecutors to follow suit and demand that police in their jurisdiction not unleash this new, unaccountable, and intentionally opaque AI product.
Conclusion
Police should not be using AI to write police reports. There are just too many unanswered questions about how AI would translate the audio of situations and whether police will actually edit those drafts, while simultaneously, there is no way for the public to reliably discern what was written by a person and what was written by a computer. This is before we even get to the question of how these reports might compound and exacerbate existing problems or create new ones in an already unfair and untransparent criminal justice system.
EFF will continue to research and advocate against the use of this technology but for now, the lesson is clear: Anyone with control or influence over police departments, be they lawmakers or people in the criminal justice system, has a duty to be informed about the potential harms and challenges posed by AI-written police reports.
In an unprecedented move, the U.S. Department of Treasury and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently reached an agreement allowing the IRS to share with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) taxpayer information of certain immigrants. The redacted 15-page memorandum of understanding (MOU) was exposed in a court case, Centro de Trabajadores Unidos v. Bessent, which seeks to prevent the IRS from unauthorized disclosure of taxpayer information for immigration enforcement purposes. Weaponizing government data vital to the functioning and funding of public goods and services by repurposing it for law enforcement and surveillance is an affront to a democratic society. In addition to the human rights abuses this data-sharing agreement empowers, this move threatens to erode trust in public institutions in ways that could bear consequences for decades.
Specifically, the government justifies the MOU by citing Executive Order 14161, which was issued on January 20, 2025. The Executive Order directs the heads of several agencies, including DHS, to identify and remove individuals unlawfully present in the country. Making several leaps, the MOU states that DHS has identified “numerous” individuals who are unlawfully present and have final orders of removal, and that each of these individuals is “under criminal investigation” for violation of federal law—namely, “failure to depart” the country under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1). The MOU uses this basis for the IRS disclosing to ICE taxpayer information that is otherwise confidential under the tax code.
In practice, this new data-sharing process works like this: ICE makes a request for an individual’s name and address, taxable periods for which the return information pertains, the federal criminal statute being investigated, and reasons why disclosure of this information is relevant to the criminal investigation. Once the IRS receives this request from ICE, the agency reviews it to determine whether it falls under an exception to the statutory authority requiring confidentiality and provides an explanation if the request cannot be processed.
But there are two big reasons why this MOU fails to pass muster.
“While the MOU references criminal investigations, DHS recently reportedly told IRS officials that ‘they would hope to use tax information to help deport as many as seven million people.’ That is far more people than the government could plausibly investigate, or who are plausibly subject to criminal immigration penalties, and suggests DHS’s actual reason for pursuing the tax data is to locate people for civil deportation, making any ‘criminal investigation’ a false pretext to get around the law.”
Second, it’s unclear how the IRS would verify the accuracy of ICE’s requests. Recent events have demonstrated that ICE’s deportation mandate trumps all else—with ICE obfuscating, ignoring, or outright lying about how they conduct their operations and who they target. While ICE has fueled narratives about deporting “criminals” to a notorious El Salvador prison, reports have repeatedly shown that most of those deported had no criminal histories. ICE has even arrested U.S. citizens based on erroneous information and blatant racialprofiling. But ICE’s lack of accuracy isn’t new—in fact, a recent settlement in the case Gonzalez v. ICE bars ICE from relying on its network of erroneous databases to issue detainer requests. In that case, EFF filed an amicus brief identifying the dizzying array of ICE’s interconnected databases, many of which were out of date and incomplete and yet were still relied upon to deprive people of their liberty.
In the wake of the MOU’s signing, several top IRS officials have resigned. For decades, the agency expressed interest in only collecting tax revenue and promised to keep that information confidential. Undocumented immigrants were encouraged to file taxes, despite being unable to reap benefits like Social Security because of their status. Many did, often because any promise of a future pathway to legalizing their immigration status hinged on having fulfilled their tax obligations. Others did because as part of mixed-status families, they were able to claim certain tax benefits for their U.S. citizen children. The MOU weaponizes that trust and puts immigrants in an impossible situation—either fail to comply with tax law or risk facing deportation if their tax data ends up in ICE’s clutches.
This MOU is also sure to have a financial impact. In 2023, it was estimated that undocumented immigrants contributed $66 billion in federal and payroll taxes alone. Experts anticipate that due to the data-sharing agreement, fewer undocumented immigrants will file taxes, resulting in over $313 billion in lost tax revenue over 10 years.
This move by the federal government not only betrays taxpayers and erodes vital trust in necessary civic institutions—it also reminds us of how little we have learned from U.S. history. After all, it was a piece of legislation passed in a time of emergency, the Second War Powers Act, that included the provision that allowed once-protected census data to assist in the incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II. As the White House wrote in a report on big data in 2014, “At its core, public-sector use of big data heightens concerns about the balance of power between government and the individual. Once information about citizens is compiled for a defined purpose, the temptation to use it for other purposes can be considerable.” Rather than heeding this caution, this data-sharing agreement seeks to exploit it. This is yet another attempt by the current administration to sweep up and disclose large amounts of sensitive and confidential data. Courts must put a stop to these efforts to destroy data privacy, especially for vulnerable groups.
The Anchorage Police Department (APD) has concluded its three-month trial of Axon’s Draft One, an AI system that uses audio from body-worn cameras to write narrative police reports for officers—and has decided not to retain the technology. Axon touts this technology as “force multiplying,” claiming it cuts in half the amount of time officers usually spend writing reports—but APD disagrees.
The APD deputy chief told Alaska Public Media, “We were hoping that it would be providing significant time savings for our officers, but we did not find that to be the case.” The deputy chief flagged that the time it took officers to review reports cut into the time savings from generating the report. The software translates the audio into narrative, and officers are expected to read through the report carefully to edit it, add details, and verify it for authenticity. Moreover, because the technology relies on audio from body-worn cameras, it often misses visual components of the story that the officer then has to add themselves. “So if they saw something but didn’t say it, of course, the body cam isn’t going to know that,” the deputy chief continued.
The Anchorage Police Department is not alone in claiming that Draft One is not a time saving device for officers. A new study into police using AI to write police reports, which specifically tested Axon’s Draft One, found that AI-assisted report-writing offered no real time-savings advantage.
This news comes on the heels of policymakers and prosecutors casting doubt on the utility or accuracy of AI-created police reports. In Utah, a pending state bill seeks to make it mandatory for departments to disclose when reports have been written by AI. In King County, Washington, the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office has directed officers not to use any AI tools to write narrative reports.
In an era where companies that sell technology to police departments profit handsomely and have marketing teams to match, it can seem like there is an endless stream of press releases and local news stories about police acquiring some new and supposedly revolutionary piece of tech. But what we don’t usually get to see is how many times departments decide that technology is costly, flawed, or lacks utility. As the future of AI-generated police reports rightly remains hotly contested, it’s important to pierce the veil of corporate propaganda and see when and if police departments actually find these costly bits of tech useless or impractical.
Across the United States, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has already begun increasing enforcement operations, including highly publicized raids. As immigrant communities, families, allies, and activists think about what can be done to shift policy and protect people, one thing is certain: similar to filming the police as they operate, you have the right to film ICE, as long as you are not obstructing official duties.
Filming ICE agents making an arrest or amassing in your town helps promote transparency and accountability for a system that often relies on intimidation and secrecy and obscures abuse and law-breaking.
While it is crucial for people to help aid in transparency and accountability, there are considerations and precautions you should take. For an in-depth guide by organizations on the frontlines of informing people who wish to record ICE’s interactions with the public, review these handy resources from the hard-working folks at WITNESS and NYCLU.
At EFF, here are our general guidelines when it comes to filming law enforcement, including ICE:
What to Know When Recording Law Enforcement
You have the right to record law enforcement officers exercising their official duties in public.
Stay calm and courteous.
Do not interfere with law enforcement. If you are a bystander, stand at a safe distance from the scene that you are recording.
You may take photos or record video and/or audio.
Law enforcement cannot order you to move because you are recording, but they may order you to move for public safety reasons even if you are recording.
Law enforcement may not search your cell phone or other device without a warrant based on probable cause from a judge, even if you are under arrest. Thus, you may refuse a request from an officer to review or delete what you recorded. You also may refuse to unlock your phone or provide your passcode.
Despite reasonably exercising your First Amendment rights, law enforcement officers may illegally retaliate against you in a number of ways including with arrest, destruction of your device, and bodily harm. They may also try to retaliate by harming the person being arrested. We urge you to remain alert and mindful about this possibility.
Consider the sensitive nature of recording in the context of an ICE arrest. The person being arrested or their loved ones may be concerned about exposing their immigration status, so think about obtaining consent or blurring out faces in any version you publish to focus on ICE’s conduct (while still retaining the original video).
Your First Amendment Right to Record Law Enforcement Officers Exercising Their Official Duties in Public
Federal appellate courts typically frame the right to record law enforcement as the right to record officers exercising their official duties in public. This right extends to private places, too, where the recorder has a legal right to be, such as in their own home. However, if the law enforcement officer is off-duty or is in a private space that you don’t have a right to be in, your right to record the officer may be limited.
Special Considerations for Recording Audio
The right to record law enforcement unequivocally includes the right to take pictures and record video. There is an added legal wrinkle when recording audio—whether with or without video. Some law enforcement officers have argued that recording audio without their consent violates wiretap laws. Courts have generally rejected this argument. The Seventh Circuit, for example, held that the Illinois wiretap statute violated the First Amendment as applied to audio recording on-duty police.
There are two kinds of wiretaps laws: those that require “all parties” to a conversation to consent to audio recording (12 states), and those that only require “one party” to consent (38 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal statute). Thus, if you’re in a one-party consent state, and you’re involved in an incident with law enforcement (that is, you’re a party to the conversation) and you want to record audio of that interaction, you are the one party consenting to the recording and you don’t also need the law enforcement officer’s consent. If you’re in an all-party consent state, and your cell phone or recording device is in plain view, your open audio recording puts the officer on notice and thus their consent might be implied.
Additionally, wiretap laws in both all-party consent states and one-party consent states typically only prohibit audio recording of private conversations—that is, when the parties to the conversation have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Law enforcement officers exercising their official duties, particularly in public, do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Neither do civilians in public places who speak to law enforcement in a manner audible to passersby. Thus, if you’re a bystander, you may legally audio record an officer’s interaction with another person, regardless of whether you’re in a state with an all-party or one-party consent wiretap statute. However, you should take into consideration that ICE arrests may expose the immigration status of the person being arrested or their loved ones. As WITNESS puts it: “[I]t’s important to keep in mind the privacy and dignity of the person being targeted by law enforcement. They may not want to be recorded or have the video shared publicly. When possible, make eye contact or communicate with the person being detained to let them know that you are there to observe and document the cops’ behavior. Always respect their wishes if they ask you to stop filming.” You may also want to consider blurring faces to focus on ICE’s conduct if you publish the video online (while still retaining the original version)
Moreover, whether you may secretly record law enforcement (whether with photos, video or audio) is important to understand, given that officers may retaliate against individuals who openly record them. At least one federal appellate court, the First Circuit, has affirmed the First Amendment right to secretly audio record law enforcement performing their official duties in public. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit recently upheld Oregon’s law that generally bans secret recordings of in-person conversations without all participants’ consent, and only allows recordings of conversations where police officers are participants if “[t]he recording is made openly and in plain view of the participants in the conversation.” Unless you are within the jurisdiction of the First Circuit (Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico and Rhode Island), it’s probably best to have your recording device in plain view of police officers.
Do Not Interfere With Law Enforcement
While the weight of legal authority provides that individuals have a First Amendment right to record law enforcement, courts have also stated one important caveat: you may not interfere with officers doing their jobs.
The Seventh Circuit, for example, said, “Nothing we have said here immunizes behavior that obstructs or interferes with effective law enforcement or the protection of public safety.” The court further stated, “While an officer surely cannot issue a ‘move on’ order to a person because he is recording, the police may order bystanders to disperse for reasons related to public safety and order and other legitimate law enforcement needs.”
Just because you have the right, however, does not mean law enforcement will always acknowledge and uphold your right in that moment. Be safe and be alert. If you have reason to think your devices might be seized or you may run the risk of putting yourself under surveillance, make sure to check out our Surveillance Self-Defense guides and our field guide to identifying and understanding the surveillance tools law enforcement may employ.
