Beginning in 2019, girls will be allowed to participate, at least in some form, in all parts of the BSA program. Explorers/Venturing* have been co-ed since 1969, but those programs are limited to members between the ages of 14 and 20.
*Confusingly, the Explorer program was superseded by Venturing. However, the Explorer name lives on, but refers to the completely different Learning for Life program, which focuses on exploring career and life preparation.
A) Of course businesses have rights. In fact, it is a business which is requesting relief here. The businesses are either incorporated or established under state and federal law, not pure contract. (For further reference "corporate law" is not synonymous with "rights based in contract.")
In regard to an objection to prior restraint? Both businesses and individuals have a right to object to prior restraint. It's a first amendment issue and, in this case, its a jurisdictional issue for the court.
B) Copyright is generally an exclusive right and, in a case like this, is a strong basis for an injunction against the parties. I doubt many would object if the sight was enjoined from streaming whatever contest is at issue here. The issue is that the injunction goes far, far beyond that and enjoins nonparties, such as VeriSign, whose role here is a bit of a mystery, without prior notice or representation in the case.
C) Actually, this does affect others who are abiding by the law. The injunction is largely focused on nonparties to the case, such as VeriSign and others, who have only a tangential relationship to this dispute. And by tangential, I mean they exist as a part of the internet backbone and have as much to do with my actions as a phonebook printer which prints my telephone number. This ruling likely exceeds the authority of the court and is far beyond its subject matter jurisdiction. Put simply, this is a big deal.
D) As I said in response to C), this affects many, many more people than infringers and pirates.
That...is an odd ruling. Generally, a court cannot issue an injunction on nonparties. See, e.g., Citizens Alert Regarding the Env't v. U.S. E.P.A., 259 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2003), aff'd sub nom. Citizens Alert Regarding Env't v. E.P.A., 102 F. App'x 167 (D.C. Cir. 2004)( "[E]ven assuming arguendo that the Corps money were subject to NEPA, an injunction is not proper here because plaintiffs have not actually sued the Corps. As such, even if the Corps did fail to obey NEPA, that failure would not provide the Court a basis on which to enjoin JTSA (or any of the other state and municipal actors who have been named as defendants) from proceeding with construction of the pipeline. The Corps is not a party to this action, and the Court is therefore powerless to issue an injunction against it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). Accordingly, the Court is unable to compel those who are parties not to act until the Corps complies with a directive that the Court simply lacks the authority to give.")
The issue is that the court's power to grant an injunction is bound by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65(d) states that the court may bind: (A) the parties; (B) the parties' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B).
The issue here is that the ISPs are not a party and are seemingly not acting in active concert with the actual parties. It seems like an enormous stretch to say that an ISP, by fetching information from any user-submitted URL, is acting in active concert.
I think you're reading more than is there into the use of the word deposited. Don't think the implication is that they no longer have a copy, only that they sent a disc containing the report to the court.
Of course, you could be right that there are some extraordinary copy protections oin place, but even that seems unlikely.
Sure, there is a general prohibition of third-party plaintiffs. Had you bothered to read through the case citations I gave you above, you would see there are limited circumstances in which the Supreme Court has specifically carved out exceptions. The general test is that third-party standing is allowed when the third party’s interests are “inextricably bound up with the activity the litigating wishes to pursue”; when the litigant is “fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right” as the third party; or when the third party is less able to assert her own rights. . . ." Singleton v. Wulff, 482 U.S. 106, 114-16 (1976). To clarify, that, along with every single case I cited above, is a United States Supreme Court opinion.
Among the list of third-parties which may bring an action on behalf of another are schools, which may act on behalf of their students and in their own proprietary interest. See Runyun v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 & n.3 (1976) (“It is clear that the schools have standing to assert these arguments on behalf of their patrons.”) Again, that is a United States Supreme Court decision.
Now, to connect the dots for you, I will quote the 9th Circuit's opinion, because I feel that arguing with me is probably the only way you will ever read even a sentence of the court's opinion.
>The States argue that the Executive Order causes a concrete and particularized injury to their public universities, which the parties do not dispute are branches of the States under state law. See, e.g., Hontz v. State, 714 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Wash. 1986) (en banc); Univ. of Minn. v. Raygor, 620 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Minn. 2001).
The States begin by particularizing the harm to universities which are organs of the state.
> Specifically, the States allege that the teaching and research missions of their universities are harmed by the Executive Order’s effect on their faculty and students who are nationals of the seven affected countries. These students and faculty cannot travel for research, academic collaboration, or for personal reasons, and their families abroad cannot visit. Some have been stranded outside the country, unable to return to the universities at all. The schools cannot consider attractive student candidates and cannot hire faculty from the seven affected countries, which they have done in the past.
The Universities are being directly harmed on their own, but also are in the position where members of the University and those closely associated with it, or who conduct business with the university, are being harmed.
> Most relevant for our purposes, schools have been permitted to assert the rights of their students. . . . (I'm skipping citations here that you probably won't read, but feel free to look them up, as well.) As in those cases, the interests of the States’ universities here are aligned with their students. The students’ educational success is “inextricably bound up” in the universities’ capacity to teach them. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115. And the universities’ reputations depend on the success of their professors’ research. Thus, as the operators of state universities, the States may assert not only their own rights to the extent affected by the Executive Order but may also assert the rights of their students and faculty members.
Here, the court begins applying the facts to the test set in Singleton, which I have given for you above. Here, the court is explaining that the interests of the universities are inseparably related to those of their faculty, researchers, and students.
>We therefore conclude that the States have alleged harms to their proprietary interests traceable to the Executive Order. The necessary connection can be drawn in at most two logical steps: (1) the Executive Order prevents nationals of seven countries from entering Washington and Minnesota; (2) as a result, some of these people will not enter state universities, some will not join those universities as faculty, some will be prevented from performing research, and some will not be permitted to return if they leave. And we have no difficulty concluding that the States’ injuries would be redressed if they could obtain the relief they ask for: a declaration that the Executive Order violates the Constitution and an injunction barring its enforcement. The Government does not argue otherwise. We therefore hold that the States have standing.
Finally, the Court completes the analysis. What harm occurs? The university will be less-able to carry out its own functions and its members may be fully-prevented from performing tasks which they have previously contracted to do. Thus, there is a particularized injury, and a party who is in a position to request relief.
Do I think this will convince you? No, because you're arguing with vigor about a topic you fundamentally misunderstand and refuse to learn about. if you were interested in learning, you would have read any of the half dozen cases I cited above, or even a summary, and reconsidered your position. However, my hope is that something along the way will spark your intellectual curiosity to learn about the law.
Well, you tried. Third-party standing is not barred; in fact, it has been refined and approved by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. et al. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000)(" An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its members would have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires individual members' participation in the lawsuit."); Runyun v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 & n.3 (1976) (“It is clear that the schools have standing to assert these arguments on behalf of their patrons.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S> 510, 536 (1925) (allowing a school to assert the “right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and religion training [and] the right of the child to influence the parents’ choice of school:); Singleton v. Wulff, 482 U.S. 106, 114-16 (1976) (explaining that third-party standing is allowed when the third party’s interests are “inextricably bound up with the activity the litigating wishes to pursue”; when the litigant is “fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right” as the third party; or when the third party is less able to assert her own rights); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (“[Vendors] have been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advocates of the rights of the third parties who seek access to their market or function.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that doctors may assert the rights of their patients).
Those are just the cases cited in the opinion that are from the Supreme Court. I'm glad you're interested in the case, but you should probably start by reading the case, and then checking the citations to see what other courts, and especially the Supreme Court, have said.
OK, let's try this. I'm going to rest on the analysis of standing done by the 9th Circuit. Please provide specific citations and analysis about what the proper standard for standing is and explain how they erred.
Here's the thing, if the government had super secret intelligence information, it is more than free to submit briefs for in camera review which contain that information. That they affirmatively declined to do so, nor were willing to giving even the vaguest of descriptions, is why the court was not willing to give deference. Further, when those who have claimed responsibility for the drafting of the EO repeatedly claim it was done with the intent of violating the establishment clause, the court will be even less likely to extend deference.
I know this because I read the opinion. I encourage you to do the same.
Standing was addressed and the court of appeals found that the state's own proprietary interest (through its various universities, in particular), were harmed, thus giving the state standing to bring the case.
You would know this if you read through the opinion. It's 29 pages at a very low density. I encourage - actually, I beg - you to read it.
On the one hand, I have no doubt DOJ and FBI lawyers truly dread dealing with Mr. Leopold, so there is at least some theoretical grounding to the term "terrorist." On the other, you strip the word of effect when a person who sends mundane document requests is given the same label as people who murder the innocent.
The overarching problem here, beyond what was directly lost, is the breach in chain of custody. Had they paid the ransom, there would still be a significant breach in the chain of custody of the evidence because an outside actor has taken control of the documents and it would be difficult to prove that nothing has been altered. Taken broadly, this is a problem for *all* documents, whether they were captured by the ransomware or not, because it shows that someone else at least had access to the files, although there is not the same evidence they were compromised.
Suffice to say, I'm glad I'm not the Department's IT staff or the prosecutor who is going to have to convince a judge that the evidence should be admitted.
Remember, after you break the cyber you have to drill through the other locks and then convince the FBI to turn off the power by staging a terrorist attack first. Also, look out for barefoot guys in tank tops.
"No one but children are swayed by emotional arguments and cherry picking individual sufferers" is the emotional wing of the argument. First, you build a strawman by reducing an argument about whether it is necessary to consider the consequences of policy on third party suffering to whether we should build policy off of anecdote. Second, you argue that anyone who falls for your strawman is less than an adult and not worthy of consideration.
A human life is lost when a DNR order is followed, the plug is pulled on someone who is brain dead, and a thousand different situations which are 100% legal, ethical, and moral. There is more nuance than think of the children.