Giving People Property Rights In Data Will Not Solve Privacy, But…
Online privacy can’t be solved by giving people new property rights in personal data. That idea is based on a raft of conceptual errors. But consumers are already exercising property rights, using them to negotiate the trade-offs involved in using online commercial products.
People mean a lot of different things when they say “privacy.” Let’s stipulate that the subject here is control of personal information. There are equal or more salient interests and concerns sometimes lumped in with privacy. These include the fairness and accuracy of big institutions’ algorithmic decision-making, concerns with commodification or commercialization of online life, and personal and financial security.
Consumers’ use of online services will always have privacy costs and risks. That tension is a competitive dimension of consumer Internet services that should never be “solved.” Why should it be? Some consumers are entirely rational to recognize the commercial and social benefits they get from sharing information. Many others don’t want their information out there. The costs and risks are too great in their personal calculi. Services will change over time, of course, and consumers’ interests will, too. Long live the privacy tension.
Online privacy is not an all-or-nothing proposition. People adjust their use of social media and online services based on perceived risks. They select among options, use services pseudonymously, and curtail and shade what they share. So, to the extent online media and services appear unsafe or irresponsible, they lose business and thus revenue. There is no market failure, in the sense used in economics.
Of course, there are failures of the common sort all around. People say they care about privacy, but don’t do much to protect it. Network effects and other economies of scale make for fewer options in online services and social media, so there are fewer privacy options, much less bespoke privacy policies. And companies sometimes fail to understand or abide by their privacy policies.
Those privacy policies are contracts. They divide up property rights in personal information very subtly—so subtly, indeed, that it might be worth reviewing what property is: a bundle of rights to possess, use, subdivide, trade or sell, abandon, destroy, profit, and exclude others from the things in the world.
The typical privacy policy vests the right to possess data with the service provider—a bailment, in legal terminology. The service provider gets certain rights to use the data, the right to generate and use non-personal information from the data, and so on. But the consumer maintains most rights to exclude others from data about them, which is all-important privacy protection. That’s subject to certain exceptions, such as responding to emergencies, protecting the network or service, and complying with valid legal processes.
When companies violate their privacy promises, they’re at risk from public enforcement actions—from Attorneys General and the Federal Trade Commission in the United States, for example—and lawsuits, including class actions. Payouts to consumers aren’t typically great because individualized damages aren’t great. But there are economies of scale here, too. Paying a little bit to a lot of people is expensive.
A solution? Hardly. It’s more like an ongoing conversation, administered collectively and episodically through consumption trends, news reporting, public awareness, consumer advocacy, lawsuits, legislative pressure, and more. It’s not a satisfactory conversation, but it probably beats politics and elections for discovering what consumers really want in the multi-dimensional tug-of-war among privacy, convenience, low prices, social interaction, security, and more.
There is appeal in declaring privacy a human right and determining to give people more of it, but privacy itself fits poorly into a fundamental-rights framework. People protect privacy in the shelter of other rights—common law and constitutional rights in the United States. They routinely dispense with privacy in favor of other interests. Privacy is better thought of as an economic good. Some people want a lot of it. Some people want less. There are endless varieties and flavors.
In contrast to what’s already happening, most of the discussion about property rights in personal data assumes that such rights must come from legislative action—a property-rights system designed by legal and sociological experts. But experts, advocates, and energetic lawmakers lack the capacity to discern how things are supposed to come out, especially given ongoing changes in both technology and consumers’ information wants and needs.
An interesting objection to creating new property rights in personal data is that people might continue to trade personal data, as they do now, for other goods such as low- or no-cost services. That complaint—that consumers might get what they want—reveals that most proposals to bestow new property rights from above are really information regulations in disguise. Were any such proposal implemented, it would contend strongly in the metaphysical contest to be the most intrusive yet impotent regulatory regime yet devised. Just look at the planned property-rights system in intellectual property legislation. Highly arguable net benefits come with a congeries of dangers to many values the Internet holds dear.
The better property rights system is the one we’ve got. Through it, real consumers are roughly and unsatisfactorily pursuing privacy as they will. They often—but not always—cede privacy in favor of other things they want more, learning the ideal mix of privacy and other goods through trial and error. In the end, the “privacy problem” will no more be solved than the “price problem,” the “quality problem,” or the “features problem.” Consumers will always want more and better stuff at a lower cost, whether costs are denominated in dollars, effort, time, or privacy.
Jim Harper is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior research fellow at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.
Re: The problem with "privacy"
I think your comment is well suited to governmental regulation aimed at privacy: "You (corporation) may not use or share this true information." But privacy is as much a product of people withholding information from others or sharing it subject to restrictions. When people conceal information about themselves, the First Amendment and free speech are not implicated. And when they share information subject to promises that restrict further sharing and use, that is also perfectly consistent with free speech law. People and companies can contract away their free speech rights, and they regularly do. I, too, find it bizarre that there are laws requiring true information to be "disappeared" from public view. I think that can't happen here in the U.S., but I've been wrong in my predictions about legal developments before.
On Transparency Forcing
Thanks, Mike, for the kind words. (Though I notice that you have yet to pan a Greenhouse post!) I should emphasize that I'm arguing against manufactured property rights and in favor of organic property rights. It seems to me like your query would be well-placed with any product or marketplace. Consumers could always know more about the goods or services they buy. Alas, they're awfully insistent on knowing just enough. On aggregate, I think the average transaction makes people at least a little better off, so unhampered markets move clunkily forward on making people wealthier and happier. In a new and changing marketplace, which the "information economy" certainly still is, the risks are less clear, and they may rapidly change. So it's harder to be certain that things are going the right direction. But I think the "right direction" should always be consumer-defined. Experts like you or me are not in a position to know better than consumers what they want. And there isn't a method better than trial-and-error for learning what the full costs and benefits of products and services are. So privacy advocates should shout from the rooftops "beware," and reporters should continue to tout wrongs and harms. Two major conduits of transparency. But I don't see "forcing" transparency here. Consumers are highly resistant to it, and I think it's unlikely to make them better off than informing them in organic ways.
Re: The problem with "privacy"
I think your comment is well suited to governmental regulation aimed at privacy: "You (corporation) may not use or share this true information." But privacy is as much a product of people withholding information from others or sharing it subject to restrictions. When people conceal information about themselves, the First Amendment and free speech are not implicated. And when they share information subject to promises that restrict further sharing and use, that is also perfectly consistent with free speech law. People and companies can contract away their free speech rights, and they regularly do. I, too, find it bizarre that there are laws requiring true information to be "disappeared" from public view. I think that can't happen here in the U.S., but I've been wrong in my predictions about legal developments before.
Harm/Damages --> Enforcement Nexus
The adjective "real" in your title reminded me of a post I wrote in the Bernie Madoff days riffing on a journalist's comment calling for a "real" regulator at the SEC. Well, the real SEC lets Bernie Madoffs go until things are in flames, then scurry in and assert their role in protecting the public. That has nothing to do with your post, except for the use of the word "real." Because my question is about harm and damages. A real enforcement mechanism, in my sense of "real," would penalize bad behavior in proportion to the harm it does. To know when the whips should be whipped out, you need to have a sense of what damage has been done. Tort law has well-developed doctrines about what is harmful: when damage has been done that justifies compensation or penalization. Where do you stand on this? "Forget it"? "Isn't it obvious"? "Harm is a real conundrum"? "Absent harm we need to innovate. We'll call it 'privacy harm'"? Something else?
Re: Decreasing Yelp Value both perceived & monetary
Spot on. In the main, the suit is for breach of contract, and the contract (ToS) says that you can't do things that undermine the value of the site for others.
Less spot-on is MikeM's take: "I'm just not convinced that means it violates the law." A contract is private law, and, while a court will decide officially if it does, it seems pretty apparent that the fake posts violate that law. (MikeM's take is appropriately equivocal to the extent it deals with statutes regulating advertising.)
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Not Sure That This Ranks as an Outrage
Earlier in this thread, I quoted direct proof that Chevron alleges the non-parties to be involved. Judge Kaplan stated: "The email addresses listed in the subpoena belong to non-parties who allegedly were involved directly or indirectly in the Ecuadorian litigation" (the Ecuadorian litigation being part of the factual basis for the RICO claim).
It's in the passive voice, but I can't think of any interpretation of it other than as Judge Kaplan's recitation of Chevron's allegation. An allegation is saying something that has yet to be proven.
Discovery can reveal the existence and actions of parties who are properly then added to the case. That could be what's going on here. As I said earlier, if you assume the non-involvement of these parties, the discovery is indeed wrong, but the allegation exists, and what courts do with allegations is allow discovery so allegations can be examined.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Not Sure That This Ranks as an Outrage
In Dendrite, the sufficiency of the claim of harm (and thus the existence of wrongdoing) could be ascertained from looking at the anonymous communications without unmasking the speaker. In this case, we have known individuals whose participation in the alleged wrongdoing may be revealed by discovery. They could be added as defendants. It's a textbook use for discovery (though I'll admit it's been a long time since I looked at a discovery textbook! ;-)
You probably agree with me (and I hope so) that there is not First Amendment protection for speech that facilitates criminal and civil wrongdoing.
If you start with the premise that these parties were not involved in wrongdoing, their communications would be protected by the First Amendment, but if you don't start with that premise, their communications are subject to discovery.
I'm picking up that you take as a premise that non-parties were not involved in wrongdoing, that you disagree with Judge Kaplan about the facts, and that discovery will not show they were involved. When you say "no showing" and "no evidence," are you sure you're not discounting and dismissing evidence that actually does exist? (Weak evidence is evidence.)
I just don't come to this case with the same premises. If you disagree with Judge Kaplan about the facts, I can't argue with you because I don't have an opinion of the facts. Taking the facts and allegations as he states them, I don't find his application of the law outrageous.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Not Sure That This Ranks as an Outrage
I don't understand your comment. Who's "they"?
The non-parties alleged to have been involved in the fraud brought a constitutional challenge...
Re: Re: Re: Not Sure That This Ranks as an Outrage
The ruling says: "The email addresses listed in the subpoena belong to non-parties who allegedly were involved directly or indirectly in the Ecuadorian litigation." The judgment in that case, Chevron argues, is the product of fraud and violations of the RICO Act. This makes the email communications relevant to the case and within the bounds of appropriate discovery. It may help Chevron prove the fraud and RICO violations they allege.
Re: Re: Not Sure That This Ranks as an Outrage
The company is arguing in court that the defendants and their associates violated their rights. To prove the allegations, they need access to information about who did what. There isn't a First Amendment right to bar discovery of information (whether it be about your organizing, speech, associating, or religion) if it is plausibly relevant to a lawsuit.
To illustrate: Let's say Ann is videotaping Bob at a protest. Bob is wearing a mask to hide his identity, but as he yells "Fuck Exxon!" and throws a brick through Exxon's window, his mask falls off. He picks it up and quickly puts it back on.
Ann and Bob were both doing things that are protected by the First Amendment: videotaping a newsworthy event and protesting/speaking. Bob was trying to maintain his anonymity, which he is generally entitled to do. But Exxon has full rights to subpoena Ann's videotape in a lawsuit against Bob to get access to information about what happened and who did what.
For some reason, the ruling turns on the fact that the people trying to keep the information out of court are not proven to be Americans, but I don't think that really matters.
Re: Not Sure That This Ranks as an Outrage
Chevron has indeed shown why it needs the information. It has a RICO case. To prove RICO allegations, you have to know a lot about people's communications with one another.
I'm not endorsing the case or even the RICO law, but I think this subpoena is well within bounds for a case like this.
It is indeed standard practice to get as much information relevant to a case as you can. I was a document clerk on a civil case brought by a farmer once, and because he alleged anquish, pain, and suffering, I got to (had to) see documents about his urology visits.
I don't see anywhere in the ruling, Josh, that the people seeking to quash access to data are doing so on the basis of attorney-client privilege. Maybe they're not entitled to it, or maybe their lawyers didn't argue it. When you don't argue something, you're guaranteed to lose...
I know little about this case, and I don't endorse Chevron's side (or anyone's), but my spidey-sense is picking up bad lawyering on the side of the people trying to quash the subpoena. Where's the argument that this is a SLAPP (strategic litigation against public participation)? There is an anti-SLAPP law in New York state (which may or may not apply), but then I don't know if NY's anti-SLAPP law protects non-NY individuals, which gets us back to whether the people seeking to quash are even U.S. persons entitled to the protection of U.S. law. That's what the ruling turned on, whether non-U.S. persons get First Amendment protection.
It's worth reading the ruling -- not that I did that before I first commented!... ;-)
Here it is: http://dg5vd3ocj3r4t.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/documents/Kaplan-Order-Hotmail-IP-subpoena_0.pdf
Not Sure That This Ranks as an Outrage
It's data about participants in the dispute, not ALL Americans, NSA-style, right? That makes it pretty much ordinary discovery for litigation. I suppose if the merits of the lawsuit itself are weak, getting this data is also weak, but it's not an additional, separate outrage for a court to require access to data relevant to the dispute.
Re: Re: "State Violence"???
I should have taken care to note that violence and threats of violence are interchangeable in my opposition to violence. I think it is wrong for a person to hold a knife as if it he'd plunge it in your chest if you refuse his request for money. And I think it is wrong for the state to threaten to imprison you if you refuse its request for money, and do worse if you try to resist the imprisonment.
Re:
I talked a bit more about terminology in a reply to an earlier comment. Take a look. Thanks.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Meh on the UN Stuff
1) I was using theft as an anology to simplify and illustrate. The "Here," at the beginning of the next paragraph was meant to signal that.
2) Whether the holders of the domain are or are not taking advantage of consumer confusion is a factual issue that Paul obviously would dispute. And that's the point: There is a dispute, and it is consistent with libertarian principle to dispute what one views as a violation of one's rights, including trademark rights as they exist in the UDRP.
Re: Re: Meh on the UN Stuff
This is challenging stuff, so it's not surprising to have comments this confused.
It is not hypocritical to live under the current regime while advocating for another. That goes for roads, taxes, schooling, and every other thing, including domain-name-allocation rules.
The best legal explanation for domain names is that they are licenses-to-use, not the outright property of the domain name holder. The terms of the license bar fraudulent use and trademark violation. Paul believes that his trademark is being violated by the owners of the RonPaul.com domain and he is using the channels available to him to bring his case.
It might be preferable for domain names (more accurately, the right to associate a string in a given top-level domain with a given IP address) to be a piece of property, in which case Paul would bring a trademark action, or a common law fraud or trade disparagement action, against the holders of the domain. It's very much an open question whether the holders of the domain can be brought into a court that offers Paul the remedies he believes he's due. The current law allows him to move against the domain, and this is what he's doing.
Paul is not obligated to forgo the benefits of the law in this area just because he might structure the law differently.
Re: Re: Meh on the UN Stuff
I'm not. Probably, you're a little vague on what libertarians believe.
Re: Re: Meh on the UN Stuff
A libertarian does not have to buy back stolen property to avoid charges of hypocrisy because the dispute resolution procedures of the police and courts are something libertarians embrace as part of the limited role of the state.
Here, Paul believes he has a case against the holders of the domain based on trademark (in that the holders of the RonPaul.com domain are taking advantage of confusion about the source of goods). He does not have to buy the domain, but can use the procedures in place to resolve the dispute without being hypocritical.
Meh on the UN Stuff
"Hypocritical libertarian! You argue for privatized roads but you still drive to work on public roads!"
That's the meatspace equivalent to chastising Ron Paul for using the UDRP to seek control of the domain. Is there some other adjudication body he could use? No.
Whatever the merits on the rest of the dispute, about which I truly have no opinion, the UN-hypocrisy point is unfair, I think.
Thanks, though, for all you do, Mike!
Re: I'm the blogger in question
Good news.