You might want to add some punctuation to that title. At first I read it as "EU Opens Itself Up To Massive Innovation, Hindering Patent Trolling" and was very surprised. After reading the article it becomes obvious you meant "EU Opens Itself Up To Massive, Innovation-Hindering Patent Trolling".
Google seems to think so. After a long string of Samsung devices the new Nexus is a variant of the LG Optimus G. It's a pretty awesome handset.
The Razer devices do have built-in flash storage, or at least my Mamba 2012 does. Unlike Logitech's products, you don't need the configuration software running all the time in order to customize settings. Synapse is only used to modify the configuration profiles, which are then stored on the device itself and used even when it's acting as a plain USB HID mouse without drivers. It's one of my favorite features, actually.
It's possible they've stopped including on-board storage and are relying on Synapse 2.0's cloud storage non-feature for new devices. If that's true I'll probably stop buying their products.
The problem here is that profit really comes after step 3, so they never get to the rest of it. If they had to stop piracy in order to profit the Internet would be a different (and probably happier) place.
For example, if the fans like a content creator, but they feel he charges too much and it takes too long to get the content legally, the $I cost of the content has just gone up.
I think you've misconstrued the issue with routers. The only way in which DNSSEC will affect most provider devices (including true layer 3 routers) is by increasing the size of DNS packets. For almost all devices that shouldn't be a problem. ISPs, then, shouldn't have to upgrade their infrastructure much beyond their nameservers.
Where DNSSEC could become a problem is the ALG in NAT gateways (including home routers), which is responsible for parsing DNS responses to determine which masked computer they're intended for. Poorly implemented ALGs may be confused by DNSSEC packets. I suppose it's also possible that some gateway devices include a caching DNS resolver or some sort of DNS proxy that would need to be updated, but I've personally never seen one. DNSSEC is not exactly a new protocol, however. Most reasonably new hardware should support it.
Turning on DNSSEC too early won't break the Internet. Legacy clients will simply continue to use regular, unsecured DNS. Rolling out DNSSEC won't do anything to change that. While it is true that clients configured to require validation will fail if the recursive resolver doesn't support it, that's a per-client setting and can easily be disabled.
All of that is largely irrelevant to the discussion of SOPA. Your post seems to be insinuating that DNSSEC is not ready and thus we have time to fix it. Unfortunately, SOPA doesn't just break some implementation detail of DNSSEC as the MPAA seems to think. It breaks the very idea of DNSSEC. It enshrines in law the idea that the recursive resolver must lie to the client, which is exactly what DNSSEC was designed to prevent.
Re: Alan Cooper
Well... apparently he is: