It looks like they learned all the lessons from the failure of UltraViolet and promptly threw them in the trash.
"In addition, the startup said it was implementing an “opt-out mechanism” to allow people to exclude photos from its database."
I'm certain they will take inspiration from the Hitch-hikers Guide To The Galaxy and make the opt-out process as reasonable and straightforward as viewing the planning notice for destroying the earth from the aforementioned book.
What are the odds that the lack of evidence of any unathorised access is due to the fact it has no proper monitoring or logging function? There should have been evidence of access from either/both the Censys.io search engine or the security researcher at a minimum.
Not just profit, it's about short-term profit. Make all the money now and ignore any obvious, predictable consequences in the longer term ... even if it leads to customers turning away from your service in some form or another.
Is there something weird in US laws that differentiates between intentional actions that cause such damage and accidental damage that is the foundation for this decision?
For example a cop car in pursuit of a suspect accidentally collides with a civilian vehicle, cop engaged in a foot pursuit breaks someone's back-yard fence while climbing over it, etc. How is the liability in such cases handled? Is it consistent with this decision?
You have demonstrated a fundamental failing commonly seen amongst proponents of section 230 needing to be limited or removed entirely. It is NOT FB's or Twitter's content. It is their USERS content. The content served up by FB, Twitter, YouTube, etc. is the very definition of user generated content (UGC). That includes the adverts, etc. as that content is generated by users, the only difference being that they are paying users (advertisers, snake-oil salesmen, etc.) unlike the rest of us average Joes. I genuinely didn't think the concept was difficult to grasp, but f##king Hell, some people make me facepalm so hard about this that I may need corrective surgery for a broken nose.
This judgement is quite sensible and long overdue in my opinion but I'm puzzled as to how it got so bad in the first place.
In Ireland we have something similar and the authority to seize criminal assets resides solely in the hands of the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB). They have to go to a judge with the list of assets, get it approved before they can actually seize anything. Some criminals have appealed the seizures but not once has a seizure been overturned to the best of my knowledge.
Outside of CAB nobody has the authority to do this and it has been fairly successful in so far as it crippled some drug gangs. Power vacuums meant new gangs rise up to take their place but overall asset seizure has helped remove some criminals from the playing field.
I don't understand how a tool such as this was ever put in the hands of local police across the US to misunderstand (accidentally or otherwise), abuse and misuse. It makes far more sense for it to be used at the federal level rather than local police level.
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Any system, no matter how perfect, MUST take the human element into account. Otherwise it's just a farce waiting to happen: https://www.theregister.com/2006/02/06/greece_mobile_snooping_scandal/
https://www.theregister.com/2007/09/07/ericsson_fine_greek_phonetap/ Unfortunately I can't find the original article that broke down the details of the heist (pity, it was a great read) but it went something like this ... An unknown party (they were never caught as far as I know) got someone to write a software patch for the legally required lawful intercept system (the system by which wiretaps are performed) in the Ericsson equipment. This system was a tightly guarded secret in Ericsson, no more than a few dozen people had access and knowledge to be able to write the patch. It's not clear whether they used current/former Ericsson staff to write the patch or somehow got their hands on the source code, etc. and wrote the patch without inside knowledge but with a lot of trial and error. Regardless of how they wrote the patch it worked exceptionally well. They then acquired access credentials for Vodafone Greece control sites to give them access to some core exchange equipment. They then installed the patch, not clear if it was done remotely or whether they actually entered the control room and applied the patch in person. They cleaned up any record of themselves so it's not clear the exact date on which all this happened. The patch allowed them to invisibly use the lawful intercept system ... no records in the logs, no notice/warning on control center screen, as far as the system was concerned there were no intercepts running. The patch created a clone of the target phone-call in real-time and sent a digital stream of the conversation to one of a number of burner phones. The entire thing went unnoticed for it's full duration, about a year. It was only discovered after the fact when a legitimate software update was applied and it clashed with the illegal patch causing the update to fail. The sytem in question allowed temporary patches to be loaded, which would then be overwritten by an official update (this allowed operators to remedy an issue without waiting for an official update). The update failed as the code and data it was designed to run against in that part of the system had been altered by the illegal patch. The investigation into the failed update uncovered the illegal patch and that was when the scale of the heist started to be uncovered.