Thieves and criminals are rarely moral. It's probably why it's hard to have a discussion about it here.
Yeah, morality is a hard sell on Techdirt. And it's for the reasons you mention. They want absolution, not guilt, for their wrongs.
Oh good, you're back. Thanks for telling me about all the important things you were doing. You're such an important person, I know. You've been posting new articles and posting in the comments on other articles, so I know you haven't spent every moment receiving important awards. You've been purposefully ignoring this thread. It's just more excuses (always excuses, never just a normal, direct conversation). But I digress.
Are you ready to point out the ONE question I did not answer that you claimed I'm running away from? I'm still here, still ready to give you the answer.
And are you ready to answer my question about the morality of piracy given the three different fact patterns I supplied?
Or did you just come back to make more excuses? Excuses, excuses, excuses. I won't hold my breath.
Many thanks. Watching Mike run away when asked direct questions about his beliefs is just priceless. Man, he can squirm.
Huh? My question to Mike was simple: I asked whether he thinks someone downloading movies via bittorrent because they don't want to pay for them is immoral. He refused to ever give a direct answer. What do you think his answer is to that question?
See how quiet things are when I'm not around? Zzzzzzz. ;)
Let's see if we can reign this in.
Do you agree that under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, a party that knowingly links to an infringing file can be liable as a contributory infringer for whatever infringement takes place by others who use that link?
Translating the commissions, he believes that the site's operators likely brought in approximately $143,000 per month in commissions. At first glance that may sound like a lot but, assuming rather significant costs to operating and maintaining the site while keeping everything as secret as possible, there really isn't that much left for "staff," though no one has any idea how big a "team" there is involved in the operation.
Wow, really? $143K a month is a lot. And I seriously doubt that operating expenses eat up much of that. Just more internet exceptionalism and apologism, IMO. How many millions does someone have to rake in from their crimes before you can admit it's "a lot"? I mean, I remember you saying that Dotcom didn't make a lot. LOL! Yeah, millions is jump chump change.
In that article, he is asking how those particular sites - which did not host or store any materials themselves, and whose links were put there by users, not site owners - could be held liable for any form of infringement.
That's not true. He never says that he's only discussing sites where the links are provided by third-parties. He says, "the videos themselves were uploaded by other people to other sites," but he does not say that the links were also provided by others. Nor would it matter whether the links were provided by others. If the site owner encouraged others to post infringing links, or if the site owner received notification (and thus knowledge) that infringing links were there, the site owner could still be liable. The fact that others post the links doesn't mean that the site owner can't be liable for them. So I don't get your point.
Given the myVidster ruling - which held that myVidster is not even liable for contributory infringement - it's a very good question.
In that particular case on that particular record, myVidster wasn't liable. But nowhere in the opinion does the court of appeals say that a linking site can never be liable. Quite the opposite, in fact. See, e.g., http://tmtlaw.default.wp1.lexblog.com/2012/08/15/did-the-flava-works-decision-create-a-copyright-loophole-for-online-video/ Posner said myVidster wasn't liable for the embeds because there was no admissible evidence that anyone used them to watch infringing videos. Change the facts and the outcome could change too. Linking sites can be liable.
But it does not mean that a site that provides links can never be liable for contributory infringement. Just that it must be shown that they must do more than merely provide links to infringing material.
Again, that doesn't contradict anything I said. Nor did Mike ever make the distinction that you're pretending he made. Mike didn't say, "Well, linking can lead to liability if other facts are present." He questioned whether it could ever lead to liability: "how is such a site infringing at all?" Nice try at revising, but no dice.
I have. But "contributory infringement" is not actually infringement. It can give rise to civil liability for contributing to someone else's infringement, but it is not in itself infringement.
Huh? That makes no sense. A contributory infringer is an infringer. Contributory infringement is actually infringement. The Supreme Court has referred to "the fact that an infringer is not merely one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual authority from the copyright owner." Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417, 435, n.17 (1984). If you read Section 106, you'll notice that copyright owners have the right "to do and to authorize" the given acts. One who authorizes an infringement is an infringer. It's called "contributory infringement" because it is in fact infringement.
Here's the Ninth Circuit discussing contributory infringement:
1. Contributory Copyright InfringementPerfect 10 v. Visa, 494 F.3d 788, 794-95 (9th Cir. 2007).
Contributory copyright infringement is a form of secondary liability with *795 roots in the tort-law concepts of enterprise liability and imputed intent. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir.1996); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. et al., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir.2007). This court and the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) have announced various formulations of the same basic test for such liability. We have found that a defendant is a contributory infringer if it (1) has knowledge of a third party's infringing activity, and (2) ?induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct.? Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.1971)). In an Internet context, we have found contributory liability when the defendant ?engages in personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement.? A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted). In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court adopted from patent law the concept of ?inducement? and found that ?[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement.? 545 U.S. 913, 930, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 162 L.Ed.2d 781 (2005).3 Most recently, in a case also brought by Perfect 10, we found that ?an actor may be contributorily liable [under Grokster ] for intentionally encouraging direct infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps that are substantially certain to result in such direct infringement.? Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 727.
We understand these several criteria to be non-contradictory variations on the same basic test, i.e., that one contributorily infringes when he (1) has knowledge of another's infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement. Viewed in isolation, the language of the tests described is quite broad, but when one reviews the details of the actual ?cases and controversies? before the relevant court in each of the test-defining cases and the actual holdings in those cases, it is clear that the factual circumstances in this case are not analogous. To find that Defendants' activities fall within the scope of such tests would require a radical and inappropriate expansion of existing principles of secondary liability and would violate the public policy of the United States.
We must next consider whether Google could be held liable under the first category of contributory liability identified by the Supreme Court, that is, the liability that may be imposed for intentionally encouraging infringement through specific acts.11 Grokster tells us that contribution to infringement must be intentional for liability to arise. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930, 125 S.Ct. 2764. However, Grokster also directs us to analyze contributory liability in light of ?rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law,? id. at 934?35, 125 S.Ct. 2764, and *1171 common law principles establish that intent may be imputed. ?Tort law ordinarily imputes to an actor the intention to cause the natural and probable consequences of his conduct.? DeVoto v. Pac. Fid. Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir.1980); Restatement (Second) of Torts ? 8A cmt. b (1965) (?If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.?).Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2007).
Section 106 grants copyright owners the right ?to do and to authorize? any of the exclusive rights enumerated therein. The committee reports explain:Use of the phrase ?to authorize? is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers. For example, a person who lawfully acquires an authorized copy of a motion picture would be an infringer if he or she engages in the business of renting it to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance.6 Patry on Copyright ? 21:43.
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court stated that: ?the Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another.?
Lower courts have wrongly assumed the statement is true, but as the committee reports just quoted indicate, it isn't: the right granted in section 106 ?to authorize? is an express statement of contributory infringement.
Just because your BS is always called out doesn't make you right or Mike wrong, or vice versa for that matter. But without proof, you're just pissing in the wind.
Huh? I didn't say, nor have I ever said, that Mike is wrong because my BS gets called out. Mike is wrong because Mike works backward, is intellectually dishonest, jumps to conclusions, and ignores all evidence that doesn't jive with his anti-IP hate mongering. Lots of people challenge me on my posts, but unlike most, I explain myself and cite caselaw. If you haven't noticed that Mike plays fast and loose with reality, then you just aren't paying attention. He's an extremist zealot who couldn't be honest about IP if his life depended on it.
And you're the epitome of impartiality, Mr. I-think-Fuck-off-and-die-counts-as-an-argument.
I love it. You're too stupid to actually make a point, so you just say something that makes no sense and is a lie.
Please link to where I used "fuck off and die" as an argument.
You cannot.
Nothing. His point was about Mike's zealotry. Studies that make piracy look positive are trotted out as gospel truth, while studies that make piracy look bad are either ignored or claimed to be completely debunked. The point is that it's impossible to take Mike seriously because he's so incredibly biased. So when Mike posts a FUD-piece like this ("LEAKED!" OMG!), it's hard to get too worked up.
You are, once again, lying. I've never seen Mike say that links should never give rise to any liability.
The post I'm thinking of was just last month where Mike, when talking about "websites that involve either links or embeds of videos hosted elsewhere," pondered, "how is such a site infringing at all?"
Link: http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120803/05165019928/judge-posner-embedding-infringing-videos-is-not-copyright-infringement-neither-is-watching-them.shtml
So right there it's pretty clear that he doesn't see how linking and embedding can possibly be infringing. Towards the end of the article he states that "hosting the embed code" is not infringing. And he concludes that the infringement is "completely disconnected from the . . . the site doing the embedding." Of course, Mike was completely misreading the opinion out the Seventh Circuit. My opinion is that he did so intentionally, but that's neither here nor there.
So clearly I'm not lying, and Mike has explicitly claimed that links aren't infringing. Strike 1.
He has said that linking should not be an infringement in and of itself. And the courts agree - including the case you just mentioned:Google does not, however, display a copy of full-size infringing photographic images for purposes of the Copyright Act when Google frames in-line linked images that appear on a user?s computer screen. Because Google's computers do not store the photographic images, Google does not have a copy of the images for purposes of the Copyright Act. In other words, Google does not have any "material objects ... in which a work is fixed ... and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated" and thus cannot communicate a copy.
The Ninth Circuit there was discussing direct liability for infringement of the display right. The clue is that it comes under the section heading "III. Direct Infringement A. Display Right." The court said that linking is not direct infringement. I never claimed otherwise (although I do disagree with the Ninth Circuit on that point, and there is some caselaw and commentary that suggests otherwise).
You need to read the part of the opinion that comes later (under the helpful section heading "IV Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement A. Contributory Infringement") where the court of appeals says that linking can give rise to indirect liability for infringement.
Given that the issue is contributory infringement, there has to be primary infringement, so in that sense linking "in and of itself" is not infringement. You could say that about all contributory infringers. But I never claimed otherwise. Nor do I believe Mike has ever made that distinction (he's too busy pretending like linking gives rise to no liability). So no, I don't get your point. Strike 2.
This is relevant to the seizures, which are criminal cases, because there is no "secondary liability" in the criminal statutes. But that's not saying, and Mike never said, that there should be no liability at all.
The Copyright Act doesn't distinguish between direct and indirect infringers, and both are treated the same under Section 506. So you're wrong. Section 506 creates criminal liability for infringers, whether direct or indirect.
And Mike did question how linking sites are "infringing at all," so you're wrong there too. Strike 3.
I'm really getting sick of you lying, Joe. For a while, it was interesting debating the law with you. Now I realize you're just spouting off off-topic legal quotes to smear Techdirt. It's really sad.
Huh? No matter, 'cause... You're out! ;)
Oh yes, please take Mike Masnick's zealotry seriously.
Cuz y'know, any zealot that ignores this, is a zealot worth taking seriously...
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132153
Sorry, but if a study's conclusions don't comport with his predetermined reality, then that study is ipso facto conclusively debunked. Perhaps you need some Kool-Aid and a lobotomy.
So you just assume bad faith. Remind me again how you're just here to talk about things directly and not second guess people's motives or beliefs because they don't matter to you?
I don't just assume bad faith. After two and a half years of reading this blog and watching Mike be weaselly (nice word, thanks) and arrogant and all the other nasty things I've witnessed, I've deduced bad faith. There is no other explanation.
I didn't say I'm not here to second guess people's motives or beliefs. I'm OK with a myriad of beliefs, and I have no problem being challenged on mine (as you're doing) or challenging others. It's when bad faith enters the picture that I get upset. And I think Mike runs in "bad faith" mode 24/7.
Yeah, it's not weaselly at all for you to say 'A is the same as B' and then follow that up with 'it is well-settled that B is illegal' when you know full well that it has not be 'well-settled' that A is illegal or that A is the same as B.
I don't think I misrepresented anything. What I said is true. A linker is an authorizer (true; but unsettled), and it is settled that an authorizer is a contributory infringer (also true). I'm simply making an argument--one that the Ninth Circuit had no trouble making. I even cited precedent and everything.
So I said X implies Y (which I did not say was settled), and then I said Y implies Z (which I said is settled). You mistook what I said to imply that X implies Z is settled. I didn't say that. That you made a mistake does not mean I'm being "weaselly."
You're really going to great lengths with this. Silly.
How can they know? You still haven't answered the question you just keep avoiding it and restating your premise. I've rejected your premise until you provide an explanation of how it comes to be and that explanation must include the copyright holder because they're the only ones that start with the knowledge. So how does it get from them to the person with the link?
I've having trouble telling if you're even serious with this argument. If I go to a file locker site, locate the link for a copyrighted movie that's in theaters or just come out on DVD, and then provide links to it so other people can download that movie, I know that I'm linking to an infringing video. You seem to think that copyright owner has to tell me it's infringing, but I'm saying that common sense is at play as well. If I know a movie is in theaters or just came out on DVD, I know that the file locker's copy is infringing. To pretend like I don't know because the copyright owner didn't explicitly tell me is ridiculous because it's not just what I actually know that matters--it's what I should have known that matters too.
I think you're missing that willful blindness is knowledge: "Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law (where indeed it may be enough that the defendant should have known of the direct infringement, Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir.1987); 2 Goldstein, supra, ? 6.1, p. 6:6), as it is in the law generally." In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.).
As the Supreme Court recently explained:
The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in criminal law. Many criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence *2069 of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances. The traditional rationale for this doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner are just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 Mod. L.Rev. 294, 302 (1954) (hereinafter Edwards) (observing on the basis of English authorities that ?up to the present day, no real doubt has been cast on the proposition that [willful blindness] is as culpable as actual knowledge?). It is also said that persons who know enough to blind themselves to direct proof of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those facts. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (C.A.9 1976) (en banc). ***Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068-71 (2011).
Given the long history of willful blindness and its wide acceptance in the Federal Judiciary, we can see no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. ? 271(b). ***
While the Courts of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful blindness in slightly different ways, all appear to agree on two basic requirements: (1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.9 We think these requirements give willful blindness an appropriately limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence. Under this formulation, a willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to *2071 have actually known the critical facts. See G. Williams, Criminal Law ? 57, p. 159 (2d ed. 1961) (?A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew?). By contrast, a reckless defendant is one who merely knows of a substantial and unjustified risk of such wrongdoing, see ALI, Model Penal Code ? 2.02(2)(c) (1985), and a negligent defendant is one who should have known of a similar risk but, in fact, did not, see ? 2.02(2)(d).
Contributory liability requires that the secondary infringer ?know or have reason to know? of direct infringement. Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 & 846 n. 29 (11th Cir.1990); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On?Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1373?74 (N.D.Cal.1995) (framing issue as ?whether Netcom knew or should have known of? the infringing activities). The district court found that Napster had both actual and constructive knowledge that its users exchanged copyrighted music. The district court also concluded that the law does not require knowledge of ?specific acts of infringement? and rejected Napster's contention that because the company cannot distinguish infringing from noninfringing files, it does not ?know? of the direct infringement. 114 F.Supp.2d at 917.A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
It is apparent from the record that Napster has knowledge, both actual and constructive, of direct infringement.
How do they 'ALREADY KNOW?' Legally that knowledge can only come from one place, the copyright holder, because only they know what uses are authorized. Did the copyright holder give them notice? No? Then HOW COULD THEY KNOW?
Are you serious? Under your logic, no one could ever be liable for willful infringement unless first told by the copyright holder that they were infringing. That's not how it works. A person can knowingly link to a work that they know to be infringing without the copyright owner being involved whatsoever. It's silly to say that a person can never know that a link they're posting points to an infringing work. People knowingly post such links all the time. If that's your best argument, I'm not persuaded.
I care that he won't discuss his beliefs because I think he's lying about what he really believes. He's doesn't want to have any sort of discussion where he directly discusses his personal beliefs because he knows that his deception will come to light. It's the deceit that bothers me, not the fact that he has differing opinions than me.
Annoying. This is really simple.
Google doesn't know the link points to infringing content until someone tells them.
But a person who on purpose posts a link that they already know points to infringing content ALREADY KNOWS that the link points to infringing content. No one has to tell them because they already know.
How can someone knowingly link to infringing material yet not know that they're linking to infringing material until someone tells them they are? That makes zero sense.
So when you say they cannot know, that makes no sense. I'm talking about people who do know and who post the link with that knowledge.
Sheesh.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re:
For the majority of people, making a copy is NOT immoral.
It's more than just "making a copy." It's taking without paying content that someone spent time, energy, and skill creating. People make a living selling that copy. When you take it without paying, you are violating their rights and not giving them the money they deserve. If you truly valued that copy, which clearly you do if you're downloading it so you can consume it, then you should pay the price they are asking for it. That money you should have paid is rightfully theirs. So no, it's not just making a copy. It's ripping people off because you're selfish and immoral. I know this message is lost on Techdirt. But the reality is, almost every nation on earth recognizes that it's more than just "making a copy." It's people's livelihoods. And it's the notion that without the marketable right, people won't invest as much in the creation of new and better works. And before you spout nonsense about alternative business models, let me point out that most of the good stuff--the stuff that people download--uses the copyright business model. You pirates, by "stealing" what isn't yours, are only shooting yourselves, and our culture, in the foot. Morality doesn't sell on Techdirt because most of Mike's hardcore fans have none.