How ACTA Exports Worst Of US Copyright Law Without Corresponding Exceptions
from the despite-the-assurances dept
With the official draft of ACTA finally released, Jonathan Band alerts us to a filing (which I'm guessing he played a large role in drafting) from the Library Copyright Alliance (along with CCIA, CEA, NetCoalition, EFF, Public Knowledge and a few other groups) that carefully and with great detail highlights the many serious problems with the released ACTA draft, detailing how it is not, in fact, in line with US copyright law, and how at different points it seeks to lock in areas of the law that are still very much in flux. You should read the whole thing:
These comments will focus on the language in the Consolidated Text that we believe the U.S. government has endorsed. While the United States probably could comply with these provisions of the Consolidated Text without amending the U.S. Copyright Act, these provisions are inconsistent with U.S. law in several significant, troubling respects. The common thread of these inconsistencies is that the Consolidated Text does not reflect the balance in U.S. copyright law. This lack of balance is at odds with the Obama Administration's policy concerning balanced international copyright lawThe biggest concern comes in the form of statutory damages. Again, the text of ACTA does not currently go beyond US copyright law, but it does tie the hands of Congress on an issue that has constantly been debated (and over which there are some ongoing lawsuits challenging the legitimacy of current statutory rates). Locking those in would be a massive problem. When you then combine that with a lack of prominent exceptions to copyright law -- such as fair use (which is in US law, but not elsewhere, and is not required by ACTA), you create a situation that could present massive liability problems to US companies operating abroad:
Although the existing statutory damages framework has a chilling effect on innovation and follow-on creativity, its negative impact in the U.S. is somewhat mitigated by the existence of strong exceptions such as the fair use doctrine. Other countries, however, do not have these exceptions. And the U.S. in ACTA has not demanded the adoption of these exceptions. In other words, the U.S. seeks the export of our strong enforcement mechanisms but not our strong exceptions.Along those lines, the letter notes that US law contains the right to decrease statutory awards in the case of "innocent infringement." Once again, this does not show up in ACTA, so we are, yet again, exporting the draconian parts of copyright law, without any of the important strong exceptions.
This asymmetric export of our laws could be particularly harmful to U.S. Internet companies as they attempt to expand their operations overseas. For example, U.S. courts have treated the copying of copyrighted material by search engines as permitted by fair use. In contrast, courts in Europe have found Google and other search engines liable for copyright infringement for engaging in similar activities. If ACTA is adopted, and European countries enact statutory damages, the potential exposure of U.S. search engines will increase exponentially for conduct considered lawful in the U.S. They will be liable not just for the actual damages they cause, but the level of damages set by statute. Under current U.S. law, if a company is held liable under a direct or secondary liability theory for infringements by thousands of consumers, the resulting damages (up to $150,000 multiplied by thousands of works deemed infringing) could easily bankrupt the company. Raising the possibility of similar, ruinous damages for conduct considered lawful in the U.S. would simply hinder U.S. businesses' ability to operate abroad.
The letter also highlights the attempt in ACTA to not just lock in third party liability when it comes to copyright (a concept that has been determined by case law, but not in Congress -- and, in fact, was rejected by Congress when a law creating such liability was proposed a few years ago), but also appears to redefine third party liability, by expanding the definition to cover three different things, when current US law does not do that:
There are numerous problems with these two clauses of footnote 47. First, they suggest that inducement is a different test from contributory infringement; that is, they imply that there are three theories for third party infringement under copyright -- vicarious liability, inducement, and contributory infringement. However, Grokster makes clear that inducement is not separate and distinct from contributory infringement.And, of course, once again, it looks like in the issue of third party liability, ACTA makes it much stronger and removes the balance found in US copyright law:
Finally, article 2.18.3 lacks the balance present in U.S. third party liability law. Article 2.18.3 makes third party liability mandatory. In contrast, exceptions to such third party liability are only permissive: "the application of third party liability may include consideration of exceptions or limitations...."Notice the pattern? This does a variety of problematic things. First, it creates serious problems abroad for all other countries that sign onto ACTA, giving them all the limitations of copyright law without the important exceptions (which, it's been shown, are more important when it comes to economic activity). Second, should the US ever adapt its own copyright law, which has been going on pretty much non-stop, it locks in the limitations, but not the exceptions. That means that US law will only be able to take away the exceptions, but not ratchet down some of the problematic aspects of copyright law. That's downright scary.
And, of course, the rationale for all of this? It's based on studies that our own government now says were bogus.
It's even worse when you realize that if the point of copyright law is to promote the progress of science and the useful arts and there's no real evidence of a causal link between any particular copyright policy and greater societal progress, then it makes no sense at all to harmonize copyright laws in lockstep. Instead, it makes sense to do the exact opposite. It makes sense to let different countries experiment with different types of copyright laws so that we can actually build real evidence for what works and what does not work. Locking in a particular set of laws across much of the developed world, without any evidence as the basis is downright scary. It's faith-based policy making, pushed almost entirely by a small group of businesses who stand to benefit. It's an incredible shame that the USTR seems totally taken in by them.