If you are an average person who takes average measures today then you run a high risk of getting pwn3d.
If you're a little bit smarter than average, you can reduce your risk.
I apologize for my tone - it was more snotty than warranted (although more appropriate to the preceding comment that "[a]nybody can learn how to block such things" which implied a lack of expertise was some kind of person failure on the part of victims).
However, I do think people who are promiscuous about running scripts generally don't know that they are doing so. Its a mistake to expect people to take precautions against dangers they don't know exist and to give them no recourse if they don't. That's basically a darwinian approach - only the strong/savvy have a right to privacy.
And in an imperfect world you should also expect the legal system to punish your rapist.
However, a judge in one of them has pointed out that there's no evidence of harm, at least not enough harm to matter to the court under the law.
I would recommend reading the decision itself (http://www.scribd.com/doc/62531370/Bose-v-Interclick) in addition to the commentary, as this is statement is inaccurate.
The court dismissed plaintiff's claims under 18 USC 1030 because Congress has mandated that civil claims are only authorized by this statute when the plaintiff has suffered at least $5,000 in economic harm. This is a much narrower articulation of "harm" than that implied by the article.
The court found plaintiff's allegations of deceptive business practices (NY GBL Sec. 349) and trespass to chattel to be sufficient (dismissing against Interclick's Adertiser clients, but not Interclick itself) stating that "courts have recognized similar privacy violations as injuries for the purposes of section 349" (at 21)
Also, to be pedantic, no decision was made as to whether there was evidence to support the allegations. A motion to dismiss addresses only whether the allegations, if true, create a valid cause of action.
Its not voluntary if you don't know about it and agree to it. Most facebook users don't know about it (but have probably unwittingly "agreed" to it via the TOS). Non facebook users have most certainly not agreed to it.
I agree with you that the effect will be to dissuade people from taking stands against malevolent conventions. Although I think this side effect is a non-factor in the decision to implement real names. I think its more likely that the policy is intended to facilitate the gathering of more useful marketing data by allowing a more complete profile to be constructed and making it more difficult to obscure personal information.
The idea that real names enhance discourse is based on the false assumption that misbehavior is usually anti-social, and will be reduced by community shaming. In fact the most horrific cruelty in human history has been done in furtherance of community norms such as racism, misogyny and religious intolerance.
But, why isn't anyone talking about a very serious problem: the fact that we allow ratings agencies to have so much power in the first place?
I'm sure this was mentioned in comments to the last post, but in case it wasn't it should be noted that Dodd-Frank included two shots across the ratings agency bows: 1) it removed their exemption from expert witness liability and 2) it required federal agencies to remove "baked-in" reference to ratings agencies from the regulations they promulgate. Both of these had the potential to seriously impede the ratings agencies. In fact after the law made them responsible for their opinions they immediately began refusing to allow their ratings to be published (although the SEC appears to have given them a perpetual waiver and a bill to remove this provision has emerged from the House subcommittee a few weeks ago without much fanfare). Of course, both reforms appear to have been eviscerated through the typical process of backroom dealing and regulatory capture. Whoops!
Actually, I think the vast majority of lawyers would agree that there are too many lawyers. Our guild is doing a terrible job of ensuring demand always outstrips supply.
Cooley is actually pretty notorious. Third and fourth tier schools tend to have a massive culling after 1st year, where the bottom quarter/third get kicked out, but Cooley is so large that its cull is especially brutal. That being said, the Cooley grads I've known haven't been any worse on average than other lawyers.
I think that the propensity for making arguments which benefit your client without taking into account its effect on society in general is unrelated to the oversupply of attorneys. I think the pro-IP camp is strongly represented by lawyers whose clients are pro-IP. The problem with Regent grads was their ideological uniformity and authoritarian leanings, not their knowledge of the law.
Very true. Although in this case, Google didn't have a choice - this was a search warrant, not a subpoena.
Subpoenas can be challenged by making a motion to quash, search warrants cannot. That is why a search warrant requires a magistrate to validate the existence of probable cause.
What's especially disgusting about this is that the remedy for an unconstitutional search is exclusion from evidence in the criminal proceeding. Since it is clear that here they are using the criminal justice system on a pretensual basis in order to obtain information. Its absolutely revolting that the prosecutor would take part in this.
I would like to have seen a more extensive discussion of the commercialization aspect, particularly the role patents play in attracting the kind of investment that allows a firm to turn the invention into an innovative product. The historical example method he uses is effective at demonstrating commercialization is possible without patents and that there are instances where patents impede commercialization, but it is not well suited to evaluating the effect of patents on commercialization in general. That would require a broader study of various innovations and how they were brought to market.
Except that the article in Science is about the prevalence of specific genomic signatures among the dying salmon, which as another commenter has stated implicates salmon farming.
So First Nations' actions are completely irrelevant to the the government censorship. Wild speculation couched as being "almost certain" is a great way to pollute our discourse with false knowledge, which is highly tenacious and resistant to correction - http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/nyhan-reifler.pdf
This reminds me of the scenario in Moore v Regents of the University of California (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore_v._Regents_of_the_University_of_California) where cancer cells were removed as part of treatment and then turned into a profitable, patented cell line, without the consent of Moore (with all sorts of fund chicanery as well). The court found that people could not have property rights in their own tissues for a variety of reasons, both practical and moral. Therefore Moore was not entitled to any money made through the commercializati of his cancer.
One of the practical concerns cited by the court was chilling of medical research, by creating fear of unwittingly using "stolen" tissue. Which is interesting, because this argument applies equally well to the patent in the developed cell line (and patents in general) - fear of patent litigation stifling innovation and all that.
A motion to dismiss is not a motion for summary judgment.
1) The original story is unclear, but after looking at the decision itself it bears mentioning that this was a motion to dismiss, meaning all of the plaintiff's allegations are treated as true - there is really no determination about whether they are actually true. The motion to dismiss is really more about determining whether the plaintiffs allegations make out a valid claim of copyright infringement. Summary judgment is where you see start to see actual factual inquiry. (as a sidenote, I really wish reporting on court decisions would do a better job at addressing procedural posture - its kind of important for the significance of these rulings).
2) In the decision, the fair use argument is characterized as follows:
Defendants argue that, if they used LaChapelle’s protected material, it was to "critic[ize] how
Rihanna is treated by the press and comment on her relationship with the media."
If this is sum and substance of Rihanna's fair use argument, the judge is dead on that it is unavailing.