> On the other hand if she's only pro-encryption when it comes to encryption she's using then it's not a change of position at all, she's still anti-encryption in general she just realizes the value of it when it comes to her stuff, while continuing to believe that the public at large shouldn't be able to have the same level of privacy and security.
Oh she understands the value of encryption no matter whose information it protects, make no mistake about that. There's a subtler motive at work here: she doesn't think you deserve to avail yourself of that value. It's that pervasive attitude permeating throughout the DNC that leads me to see them all, and Hillary more than most, as psychopathic snakes. It is that snide, barely obscured mentality underpinning the actions they take that is corroding the foundational philosophies of our republic. How dare you think you should have the same rights and protections as your betters. How dare you think your betters should have to follow the same laws as you.
That's not a hard and fast rule. When UAC was first introduced, everyone had to ask how to turn it off.
And I too turned it off for a few limited times. When setting up my family's computers, I'd have to perform dozens of administrator actions, and each one caused one to three UAC prompts. Ever had to create a new folder in Program Files? That caused 2 that I remember - one to create the folder, and then one to rename it :-/ Even just looking at your own environment variables required administrator permissions. So I would enable the hidden administrator (which isn't bothered by the UAC), set it up, then disable the administrator and reboot.
Eventually MS moved the UAC boundaries to make it much less onerous, and I haven't needed to do that for a while now.
They already have tried. It was about to be foisted on us all. I think the only reason no one has bothered to fully break it was because nobody was insane enough to mandate its use. If it had been required on all telecommunications, you bet there would be cracks against the implementations (and possibly the algorithm itself) by now. Of course it's also quite likely that only criminals would know about it.
More like a choice between drinking arsenic and tossing a lit match on a powederkeg. Sure, someday we may find a way to counteract the slow poison. On the otherhand, sometimes things are so far gone the only sensible thing to do is reduce it to rubble and start over.
So which shall it be? Hillary "The Status is Definitely Quo" Clinton, and watch our nation slide even further towards a despotic empire from which it is increasingly more difficult to liberate ourselves? Or Donald "Fuck You, Brownskins" Drumpf, and watch a shitshow of a firestorm sprout up from every corner of the Earth?
It's quite simple really. If the author sends someone something using their pseudonym, and that something is legal, then that's OK - their right to privacy remains intact. No one need know about the search that turned up nothing, and as we all know it's impossible to have your rights violated if you don't know about it. But if that something is illegal then that pseudonym becomes an alias that, even this once, was intended to distance the real person from the crime, so the search is now legal and uncontestable. And another Bad Guy gets locked up.
Or, in the words of the Good Guys, "the ends justify the means". See?
Congress and the American people have always sought to strike the right balance between the rule of law and individual liberty. Several examples illustrate this point, including ... the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act in the early 1990s
Even if you ignore the fact that the "debate" surrounding CALEA mostly involved legislators listening to law enforcement lobbying (with compromise only resulting because telcos had similar lobbying weight)
Let's not forget it was the CALEA backdoor in the Vodafone network that was used by some still unknown party to spy on several Greek government officials.
Let's also note that not one of those examples was the '90s encryption debate in which the "other side" - the technologists - won, in part due to Skipjack and the Clipper Chip, a poignant demonstration that the government simply isn't capable of building a "secure, good-guy only backdoor".
Even if you buy the assertion that the cops are the good guys, every backdoor built into the systems has been used at least once (that we know of) by the "bad guys".
How many times do we have to drum this into their heads? Backdoors make everyone less safe.
Wait, you're replying to this guy, does that mean he's serious? I thought it was satire. Seriously. I LOLed almost all the way through it. I mean,
> On the overall scale of seriousness this kind of perjury registers rather low, almost as low as perjury before Congress by government officials while covering up systematic constitutional violations.
Well, maybe that part wasn't facetious. That one seems dead on.
I'm not quite so sure this is as good as it sounds. Unless there's a provision to block a corp from availing itself of a tribunal after the national courts have weighed in on the matter, all this does is tax the citizens twice when the corp exhausts the court system then takes the matter to the tribunal. If you deny the ability to avail itself of a tribunal after a court has adjudicated the matter then you have the original problem that corp sovereignty was meant to address. Even if you limit the corp's option of availing itself of the tribunal to cases where the national supreme court refused to acknowledge the merit of the corp's argument, well, there are many good reasons for things to turn out that way. I dont see any way to make an extra-juducial remittence process viable under all circumstance. All such systems are too easy to for one player or the other to game.
Corps just need to nut the fuck up and take the risks inherent in being subject to the laws of the land. You don't like the laws? You dont trust the government? Dont fucking go there.
I can't wait for these two "facts" to come head to head in a single court case. I wonder how the judge will resolve that conflict? I wonder if the defense lawyer will have the spine to pose the question?
> The "verbose" Java syntax suggests that "public static int max(int a, int b)" is coverable by copyright, while "def max(a,b)" isn't coverable by copyright? Is it the types on the arguments or the method return that makes it eligible, or the "public", or the "static"?
That gets even tricker when you take into account Python's optional type hints; so def max(a,b) isn't copyrightable, but def max(a: int, b: int) -> int is... ??
At this point even if it does get revealed, the DOJ can just claim that it has been retired and thereby prevent anyone from having grounds to sue. "No harm no foul" right? Wasn't one of the EFF suits dissmissed under this argument after the relevent portion of the PATRIOT act was "retired"? "Good job, you finally proved standing. But that section is going to sunset in a few months, so it's all good."
LOL or I weep for our future, hard to know which reaction is appropriate.
You make a good point at #2, which is why a lot of canaries require action to stay valid; either (as in the case of Reddit) by not existing prior to the annual filing (which gives it a lifetime of about a year), or a digitally signed message that clearly states it expires in (for example) 90 days.
This puts it on slightly more firm footing with regards to the theory that the government cannot *compel* false speech, it can only compel inaction (e.g.: silence). Although there is plenty of room to test the theory on how well a digital signature can be equated to attestation.