Not true, a cut of the film removing the offending performance could have been uploaded without violating the new order, which was the point of making the distiction.
But Google could not have done that, because that would violate the filmmaker's copyright as an unauthorized derivative work (I doubt it would be fair use). The order was directed at Google if I'm not mistaken, so could not be followed legally - right?
Either the Justice Department has some big balls or they are grossly misinformed about their roll in our country.
Or they understand that nobody can really make them do anything. The executive branch is the only one with the power to arrest people and put them in jail, so members of that branch have no fear of that happening to them. The worst that could happen is something written on a piece of paper that goes against what they want, which they can then appeal.
What is being pressed forward here by the plaintiffs is the unconditional public release of what is ostensibly classified information involving subject matter that would almost certainly be used as anti-US propoganda by groups reaching out for the hearts and minds of terrorist wannabes.
You are missing the forest for the trees. The problem is not that this particular information should or shouldn't be classified, the problem is that the executive branch is claiming that nobody has the authority to override their decisions about classifying information.
The defendants further assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the right to record the police is “insufficiently defined.”
It's distressing, though not surprising, that the police viewpoint is that we have only those rights that are sufficiently defined. The proper approach is that the police have only those powers that are explicitly defined, and we have the right to do anything not explicitly proscribed by law. On re-reading this, it seems blatantly, stupidly obvious but apparently that is not how the NYPD sees it.
For instance, it may not apply in particularly dangerous situations, if the recording interferes with the police activity, if it is surreptitious, if it is done by the subject of the police activity, or if the police activity is part of an undercover investigation.
Particularly that fourth one - the exception for the subject of activity - is very disturbing. Bystanders are permitted to record the police, but the person police are questioning/harassing/tasing/beating/shooting is not? Is there some legal basis for that statement, because it sounds completely wrong, and I hope it is. Making surreptitious recording of police illegal (or at least not protected by the 1st amendment) also sounds bad, but not quite as bad.
With more and more sites moving towards HTTPS, it becomes more interesting to e.g. hack those certificates and recalculate the private key for all those public keys that are out there. It requires a lot of processing powers but it is not impossible.
I'm not a cryptographer, but with modern encryption and good key sizes, I don't think it's as simple as just using a lot of computing power*. The people making this stuff aren't stupid, and it's a lot easier to increase the key size than to increase computing power by a proportional amount, so I doubt the security people are sitting on their hands while computer power overtakes encryption security.
The obvious tinfoil hat answer is that government (NSA in particular) has far more computing power than is publicly known and can decrypt whatever they please, but I think some of the Snowden documents indicate that is not true. And if the NSA can't do it, who else might be able to?
* it's possible not all current SSL implementations use good algorithms and keys, I don't know.
So you're saying they could, acting as a trusted CA, create a fake certificate for (for example) google.com, and sign it and certify it as belonging to Google? As far as I know that would work if Verizon is trusted by your browser, but man, I hope that is beyond the pale even for them. I mean that is way worse than the tracking cookie thing. After recent developments, I'm fairly confident the FCC would come down on them hard for something like that when they got caught - and they would.
Verizon could easily just intercept the HTTPS traffic, decrypt it and re-encrypt it with their own SSL certificate you your browser would not know about the "attack".
Maybe I'm mistaken, but I don't think that's correct. Your ISP does not have the private key of the CA, so they could not decrypt the initial message. Then after that, both sides are using a secret key that Verizon also does not have, so again would have no way of decrypting traffic. Here's a question about it regarding proxies, and as far as I know, an ISP would be in the same boat:
They could use something like SSLStrip to change the HTTPS to HTTP, and then they would be intercepting HTTP traffic, but that would rely on nobody noticing that HTTPS connections aren't really HTTPS - the browser would show it as unsecured. They could also use a fake certificate, but that would also be obvious. I don't think they could do this covertly.
So, I think HTTPS just gives a fake sense of security.