Interestingly, the poster missed the point entirely. I didn't say they have the same opinion, only that they both hold extreme opinions, ones that leave little space for anyone or anything else.
First, "the poster" has a name: it's Karl.
Second, you did literally say that they have the same opinion: "two people who have convinced themselves of a truly extreme viewpoint on copyright." Two people, one viewpoint.
That may have been a simple grammar mistake, but you also lumped them in together, without differentiating between their viewpoints, their methods, or how they were convinced that their viewpoints are valid. All of these things are different, but you lumped them together as if they were completely the same.
There was clearly no misunderstanding here, and you're obviously trying to dredge up reasons to ignore the actual arguments I made.
When you do this, it's hard to take the rest seriously. Nonetheless, I will.
Third, their viewpoints are not "extreme." Lessig's views come from his years as a copyright scholar, represented the legal mainstream as it was before the 1990's, and are not far from the legal mainstream today. Paley's view on re-using others' material when creating art, is pretty much the view of the general public (despite the "educational" campaigns from copyright maximalists).
If you want to look at someone with "extreme" viewpoints, relative to the historical legal view or the current popular view, then you need to look in a mirror.
Third, it's simply a lie that they "leave little space for anyone or anything else." Lessig, for example, is one of the founders of Creative Commons, which offers a huge variety of licenses (commercial and noncommercial). It is the very epitome of "leaving space" for everyone.
Paley, on the other hand, is simply advocating personal "civil disobedience," and mainly talks about it as a private mental choice. Everyone else is completely free to think differently.
In fact, it would be more accurate to say that copyright laws "leave little space for anyone or anything else." Copyright laws are forced upon artists and the public through the power of state-sponsored force; Paley's and Lessig's views are not.
I meant. like JL, as in neither Np or JL will go down as great minds.
She's trying to be a crying rip-off artist (and succeeding).
She's not "crying," she's coming up with solutions that work for her.
Also, she produced a feature-length film that Roger Ebert rated 4 stars: " I was enchanted. I was swept away. I was smiling from one end of the film to the other. It is astonishingly original. It brings together four entirely separate elements and combines them into a great whimsical chord."
If she is a "rip-off artist," then the world needs more rip-off artists.
She is not going down as one of the great minds of the early 21st century intellectual property debate. (like Jarrod Lanier)
I hope you're joking. Lanier may have had some good ideas once, but now he's essentially a technophobe. Many people have woken up to the fact that he's been wrong about pretty much everything since 2006.
I think that Nina Paley sort of is on par with Larry Leesig [sic], two people who have convinced themselves of a truly extreme viewpoint on copyright.
First of all: the viewpoints of Nina Paley and Larry Lessig are not the same at all. Lessig is not a copyright abolitionist (no matter what copyright maximalists would have you believe).
Second of all: Paley, at least, is convinced of her view, because copyright has directly interfered with her creation of artistic works. She didn't "convince herself," she was convinced because working within the copyright system convinced her that it was wrong. It was the copyright system itself that convinced her.
Does copyright stop the flow of information? Generally no, because we still discuss what is copyright anyway (did you see the blahblach movie or did you real the new so-and-so book?).
Copyright law absolutely interferes with people who are trying to utilize copyrighted works for their own creation, and/or people who are trying to utilize copyrighted works for the purpose of general dissemination to the public. And since this sort of "collective conversation" is much of which drives culture, yes, it does stop the flow of information (or at the very least, the flow of expression).
It doesn't stop ordinary humans from talking about the works, that is true; it does stop ordinary humans from using the actual expressive works (by e.g. sharing a sample on YouTube). Or it would, if anyone cared whether they were infringing or not.
Except in exceptional cases, nobody wants to use copyright to stop distribution, they want to use it as a legal basis under which distribution can occur.
Plenty of people want to use copyright to stop distribution. There are plenty of copyright holders who outright state, often by writing Congress, that they should have the right to stop distribution for content-based reasons. Here's just one example:
Artists can, and should continue to be able to, deny a use that they do not agree with. For one, an artist should be able to turn down uses in connection with messages that the artist finds objectionable. [...]
For example, Melissa Etheridge is a known lesbian and animal rights activist. A compulsory license would allow someone to remix or sample her music into a new work filled with homophobic epithets, and she could not say "no". In the same way, a compulsory license would allow someone to remix or sample music by Ted Nugent, noted gun ownership advocate, for a song promoting stricter gun control without Nugent's pelmission.
Were this done directly by the government, this would be called "content-based censorship."
Also, the mere fact that copyright can only be licensed by those who can afford the license (however much it may be) means that copyright stops distribution. It doesn't stop all distribution, of course - but it does limit distribution to those with enough money to enter into deals with corporate rights holders.
It would be incredibly difficult (if not impossible) for artists to be able to get compensation for their works if they had no legal standing.
"Legal standing" does not mean "copyright." There are plenty of ways for artists to get compensated without holding the copyright to their works. Obviously, crowdfunding is one example, but even historically, the vast majority of artists did not hold the copyright to their works - think people who are work-for-hire, like graphic designers, actors, studio artists, etc. In fact, most artists have always been paid more if they were work-for-hire than if they signed away their copyrights for a commission (a.k.a. royalties).
The idea that copyright gives creators a legal right to leverage against publishers is a good one, in theory, but in practice it's not as significant as people think. For one thing, even without copyright, artists would always have "first publication" rights, and those can be (and usually are) more important than their post-publication monopoly rights.
For another thing, the fact that publishers (including labels, studios, etc.) are assigned the copyrights to thousands or millions of works, mean that they tend to have collective monopolies over entire markets. Aside from being destructive to artistic markets in general, this significantly reduces the bargaining power of creators within those markets.
So, while copyright may give creators rights, in order to bargain with copyright assignees, it eventually makes those barganing rights nearly inconsequential.
The result is what you see in the modern piracy economy, the only artists thriving are those who are willing to forego the creation process and instead work on the cult of celebrity, which pays far more. It's a stupid system where people pay more for a "personal appearance" of celebutards like a Kardashian than they do for a musician or writer.
This is exactly what has been happening since celberety existed. It has zero to do with a "modern piracy economy," whatever that is supposed to be.
Nina's problem I think is that she has never been on the other side with a product people widely pirate
Nina has, and does, encourage people to pirate her product. And they do - widely.
If there's anyone who has "been on the other side," it's her.
If all that effort went instead into artistic creation... opportunity costs, right?
Ironically, you're making her point for her. She - like many, many artists (especially professional creators) - spent far too much time considering if her use of a work is allowed under copyright law. The self-censorship, plus the multi-year legal wrangling with copyright holders, the hundreds of thousands of dollars required to license songs from the 20's and 30's, etc... all of these created "opportunity costs" that she didn't choose.
It was only by completely ignoring copyright law that she was able to put that effort into artistic creation.
She went over this later in the video, especially the part before she showed "This Land Is Mine." I suppose you didn't make it that far.
You very specifically mentioned bars, restaurants, and live venues.
All of which can be sued by the sound recording copyright holders, just like terrestrial radio stations are here. (Like terrestrial radio, they don't pay anyone but songwriter PRO's like ASCAP or BMI for the music they play.)
These aren't the people who have been suing at all, those people were Flo and Eddie, these people are ABS Entertainment.
Flo and Eddie are not (just) songwriters, and they are not suing as songwriters. They are (also) the copyright holders of the recordings (the "masters").
The basis of their suits, like the basis of ABS Entertainment's suits, is that they (as sound recording copyright holders) have public performance rights under state statutes or common laws. (Laws which are preempted by Federal copyright statutes for post-1972 sound recordings.)
(by the way 'mechanicals' ONLY refer to the copyright that is held in the sound recording, it is paid to the OWNER OF THE MASTER TAPE . They are never paid to the songwriter unless the songwriter is also the owner of the master tapes.)
That's not how the term is usually used. See e.g. this FAQ by HFA:
A mechanical license grants the rights to reproduce and distribute copyrighted musical compositions (songs) on CDs, records, tapes, ringtones, permanent digital downloads, interactive streams and other digital configurations[...]
A mechanical license DOES NOT grant the right to:
- Reproduce sound recordings, also known as “master use rights”.
Master use rights are required for previously recorded material that you don’t own or control. HFA doesn’t issue master use licenses. Master use rights can only be obtained from the owner of the master recording, usually a record company.
So they've been paying pre 72 songwriters all along.
True, but this article (and my comment) is about the sound recording copyright holders. (By the way, "mechanicals" usually refer to the royalties paid to songwriters whenever a song is reproduced "mechanically," say a CD or download.)
These are the people who have been suing under various state laws (both "common law" and statutory).
They have to do this under state laws, because under federal law, they do not have a copyright in public performances (other than for Internet radio).
Pre-1972 music will disappear because it will have to be paid for like post-1972 music?
Except that, for terrestrial radio, post-1972 music does not have to be paid for.
At least, not to the sound recording copyright holders. And since pre-1972 sound recording copyright holders, unlike post-1972 copyright holders, have a claim against radio stations (and bars, and restaurants, and live venues...) that has no statutory limits or rates, those radio stations (&etc.) will simply stop playing music rather than be sued for whatever amount the sound recording copyright holders want.
They're paying nothing now, and it doesn't take a genius to see that they'll stop playing the music before they risk being sued for trillions of dollars.
So can you explain why nobody who committed copyright infringement has ever been charged with theft?
Oh, they have - and it was found not to be theft by the Supreme Court:
The phonorecords in question were not "stolen, converted or taken by fraud" for purposes of 2314. The section's language clearly contemplates a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the subject goods. Since the statutorily defined property rights of a copyright holder have a character distinct from the possessory interest of the owner of simple "goods, wares, [or] merchandise," interference with copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud. The infringer of a copyright does not assume physical control over the copyright nor wholly deprive its owner of its use.
When an injunction is sought against a service provider for the actions of its third-party users, that doesn't make the service provider a third party. The injunction is against the service provider directly.
And that is the type of injunction that the MPAA was seeking. The injunction didn't state that "MovieTube be required to transfer the domain names..." (&etc). It stated that "Registries and/or Registrars be required to transfer the domain names..." (&etc). The injunctions were directed at the service providers directly.
There is a fundamental difference between being the party enjoined and being a party bound by that injunction because it is in active concert with the party enjoined.
For the purposes of 512 safe harbors, there is not. "A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief..."
It is all-encompassing. If you have those safe harbors, it doesn't matter if you might be considered "in active concert with the party enjoined." Even if you are, you cannot be bound by any injunction whatsoever that falls outside of 512(j).
The safe harbors in 17 USC 512 place absolute limits on the injunctions that can be granted under Rule 65.
Of course, it doesn't make any difference, because courts have defined "active concert or participation" very narrowly. For example:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that: "Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order . . . is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise." This is derived from the common-law doctrine that a decree of injunction not only binds the parties defendant but also those identified with them in interest, in "privity" with them, represented by them or subject to their control. In essence it is that defendants may not nullify a decree by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders and abettors, although they were not parties to the original proceeding.
The activities carried out by the OSP's do not even come close to this level of involvement. There is precedent on this point:
David, Mary, and Lisa Blockowicz received an injunction ordering Joseph David Williams and Michelle Ramey to remove defamatory comments they posted about the Blockowiczs on www.ripoffreport.com (“ROR”), among other websites. Williams and Ramey never responded to the injunction, prompting the Blockowiczs to contact the websites on which the statements were posted to secure compliance with the injunction. Every website complied, except for ROR. The Blockowiczs asked the district court that issued the injunction to enforce it against Xcentric Ventures, LLC, (“Xcentric”) the host of ROR, and Ed Magedson, the website's manager, pursuant to Rule 65(d)(2)(C). The district court declined, and the Blockowiczs appeal the district court's decision. They argue that Xcentric and Magedson fit within Rule 65(d)(2)(C), and thus should be bound by the injunction, because they had “actual notice” of the injunction, and they were “in active concert or participation” with the defendants in violating the injunction by failing to remove the defamatory statements. We affirm: Xcentric and Magedson were not “in active concert or participation” with the defendants pursuant to Rule 65(d)(2)(C).
The point is that 512 doesn't apply to third parties such as Google since they're not being enjoined.
And that point is the one that is false. An OSP is, by nature, a third party. 512 only applies to third parties such as Google.
Being prevented from aiding an enjoined party is not the same thing as being enjoined.
If that "prevention" takes the form of a court-ordered injunction, then yes, those parties are being "enjoined." That's pretty much the definition of the word.
This was exactly what the MPAA sought. They referred to it specifically as "preliminary injunctive relief" in their filings.
Let's make something absolutely clear. If an OSP has 512 safe harbors, the only relief that any court is legally allowed to grant against that OSP is specified in 512(j). They cannot do anything more than that.
If a court-ordered action on that OSP is outside the bounds of 512(j), the court is acting unlawfully. You can call it whatever you like, try to redefine the term "enjoined" so that is only applies to named defendants, or whatever. But it's still unlawful.
The injunction against the defendants comes under 17 U.S.C. 502. The applicability of that injunction to those in "active concert or participation" with the enjoined defendants comes from F.R.C.P. 65.
Except that section doesn't nullify 17 USC 512. (Indeed, if an OSP is eligible for 512 protection, I doubt it would even be possible to claim that they are in "active concert or participation" with the third party.)
The 512 safe harbors don't mention anything about the OSP's themselves being named defendants (or not). It is all-encompassing: "injunctive or other equitable relief." There is no exception to that very, very clear statement; it's not "injunctive or other relief, provided that they are named defendants."
Simply put, any entity that has 512 safe harbors absolutely cannot have an injunction levied against them on account of infringement by their users - except as provided for in 512(j). This is black-letter law.