Re: Is Whatever getting flagged just for being Whatever?
In this case, I think the "race to the bottom" mudball is what prompted the flagging. It wouldn't be enough on its own to justify such, but in the context of Whatever's history, any slam at the site or the authors (as distinct from critical commentary on the substance of the article) tends to get an "assume bad faith" reaction.
It's apparently pronounced something like "Urr-doe-wan", believe it or not. I have no idea how the "g" gets into the spelling, but I've consistently heard it pronounced with the "w"-like sound in the news.
It's basically an expanded version of "more intense incentives require more extreme deterrents".
Imagine that you have Person A, Person B, and Person C.
Person A hates the class of persons to which Person C belongs, but not the class to which Person B belongs.
The sentence for the basic crime is (in theory and in principle) calculated so that if Person A wants to do something to Person B which would be considered a crime, the anticipated punishment should be enough to make Person A change his/her/etc. mind.
However, if Person A wants to do something to Person C which would be considered a crime, the established class-of-persons-based hatred means that Person A's motivation for going through with the crime is stronger than it would be in the case of Person B, so the anticipated punishment from the sentence for the basic crime may no longer be enough to make Person A change his/her/etc. mind.
As such, establishing a separate and more severe class of sentences based on the existence of the class-of-persons hatred should scale up the deterrent effect of the anticipated punishment to match the stronger incentive which that hatred provides.
It's entirely possible that this theory doesn't stand up in the real world, but I think that's the basic reasoning, and it has nothing to do with the crime being somehow "worse" because of the bias involved; it has to do only with the strength of the incentive to commit the crime.
When all needed services (including production) can be provided without employing people, that means there's no longer any need to require people to work in order to live.
We may never actually get that far, for various reasons not excluding simple entropy - but at some point, you really do reach a point where it makes more sense to give everyone a basic income than to leave those who can't find work with nothing to live on.
On the one hand, I recognize the importance of the per-market limitation on trademarks, and under that standard this dismissal appears to be correctly decided. I recognize also that in terms of avoiding undesirable results in future cases, this is almost certainly the right thing to do.
However, speaking as a consumer who does not live in (or anywhere near) that region of the world: if I ran across "Land O Lakes"-branded fishing gear, my first reaction would be "Are they the same people who make the butter?" or "What is a butter brand doing on fishing gear??". (Although I am aware of the presence of the apostrophe in "Land O' Lakes", I doubt that I would have considered its absence significant in this instance, prior to reading this article.)
As such, there does seem to be some chance of consumer confusion - not between products, but in terms of implied association and thus potential endorsement.
At risk of spoiling the joke, this looks like - of all things - a text-to-speech flub. He almost certainly meant "without my receiving a single sou", and that final word - which refers to an old French copper coin of tiny value - happens to be pronounced more-or-less identically to "Sioux".
In short: there's only one thing that might redress the increasing imbalance between what the government knows about us and what we know about the government: ubiquitous strong encryption. Laws are what the government shall not do. Encryption is what the government cannot do.
This seems interestingly parallel to a thought I've had for some time in a different context:
Copyright law is about restricting what you're allowed to do.
Either I'm misunderstanding what would happen here, or you are.
According to my understanding, in order to get this phone to install the modified code, it would have to be provided as an updated iOS image.
According to my understanding, when you replace or upgrade a smartphone OS version, you do so essentially wholesale; you drop in the entire OS image, replacing everything which was there before, not just the pieces which were changed.
If that's correct, then there would be no way to replace just the login-screen code; you would have to replace everything. It's possible (even likely) that the replacements for everything else would not be (significantly) different from what was there before, but there would be no way to verify that without looking at the source code.
Even if that's not true, I'm not certain that your apparent assumption that there would be logs of the OS-update process which would show enough detail to determine whether anything other than the login-screen code had been modified is accurate. Certainly I've seen no sign of such logs on the Android side of the fence.
Beyond that, even if we assume that it can be proved that only the program(s) involved with handling the login screen were modified, there's no reason why the login-screen program(s) could not (be modified to) include code capable of modifying other parts of the system - and I would be extremely surprised if there were enough logging to be able to catch it if they did.
Really, if you're paranoid about every possible angle of attack and you don't trust the people who are in charge of the operation to do the right thing and be honest about their actions and motives, there is no way to be certain that the modified code has not tampered with the data on the phone other than to see - and possibly to experiment with - the code itself.
Minor nit: it's not "Id Software", or (as some in the comments have had it) "ID Software", but - as the quoted article correctly uses it - "id Software". The correct spelling of the name is with the first word in all lowercase.
To presume abandonment of server email after 180 days is like presuming abandonment of the contents of your safety deposit box (or your savings account) after 180 days.
That's surprisingly close to what was almost certainly the original analogy.
I strongly suspect that the original comparison was to, not a safety-deposit box, but a post-office box. The mechanics are much the same; mail comes in, it's put in the box, and from time to time the recipient comes and takes it out, to read and process as desired. If the mail is left in the box without being taken out for long enough, it's considered abandoned, and can be examined under the right circumstances. As long as the analogy holds, this treatment seems reasonable.
By contrast, in a modern E-mail system, you often no longer take mail out of the box; instead, you read it, sort it, and leave it there in case you want it later. The original analogy to a post-office box has broken down, and it is no longer reasonable to apply the same rules.
Unfortunately, since the entrenched interests benefit from applying the same old rules in this new situation where they no longer make sense, getting the rules updated to reflect the changes since the days of the original analogy has proved to be fairly difficult.
If I'm reading the thing correctly, what you've missed is that what is being sued over is not the photos, but the front pages.
The photos appeared on the front pages, and the photos were licensed for use in the book. If they had also put the photos all on one page, that would almost certainly have been OK, depending on the terms of the license - but that's not what they did.
What they did put all on one page (or more like two, if I have this right) is the actual front pages on which those photos appeared - not just the photos, but the surrounding context as well. That context is covered by its own copyright, and is not covered under the license.
Well, what he _means_ is clear enough; "because people can get (the same) video for free, there is less demand in the for-pay video market". I.e., by "demand", he is referring only to demand for the legitimate, for-pay offerings - which is an incomplete and shortsighted view of the overall supply-and-demand market, but is not incorrect or invalid as far as it goes.
I'm still catching up from months and months behind, but I want to say: I think this may be the most useful and insightful comment I've seen here yet. (And considering some of the competition, that's saying a fair bit.)
If we had a lot of individual courts, but all on the same level, then if one court (or group thereof) came to a different set of decisions from the others, there would be no way to resolve that split. You would wind up with "justice" and the law being defined differently depending on where you live. (We have that anyway, due to circuit splits and various other factors, but it would be much worse.)
If we had only one court, then there would be essentially no way for most people to get a hearing; there are far too many court cases for one court to have the time to hear them all.
On a structural level (leaving aside state vs. federal sovereignty concerns, among others), the existence of multiple levels of court can be seen as a matter of delegation. The top-level court has final authority as to what the court system judges the law to be, but it delegates authority to lower courts so as to have more people available to hear cases, and those courts in turn delegate authority to courts below them for the same reason.
That's not the way it's written in the law, but as far as I can see, it's more or less the practical reason for doing it that way.
The "corrupting influence of the profit motive" in this case manifests in the arbitration industry. The arbitrator might have the following line of reasoning:
* In the case before me, there are two parties: the company and the customer.
* The company will be involved in many arbitration cases in the future.
* If I decide in favor of the company, the company will be more likely to hire me again for those future arbitration cases.
* If I decide against the company, the company will be less likely to hire me again for those future arbitration cases.
* The customer will very likely never be involved in another arbitration case, no matter how I decide this case. Therefore, the customer is unlikely to hire me again, no matter how I decide this case.
* Therefore, if I decide against the company, I am likely to make less money in the future.
* Therefore, in order to make the most profit, I should decide in favor of the company - regardless of what the actual merits of the case may be.
This is an example of what is known as a "perverse incentive", where what is in the best interest of one of the parties to a transaction is in conflict with the design goals of the system which the transaction is a part.