What is this "regular" piracy you talk about, is that the "regular" piracy in the eyes of the **AAs (you know, the those blokes who once claimed that ripping CDs was piracy), "regular" piracy in the eyes of your average consumer, or "regular" piracy in the eyes of Lawrence Lessig?
Given that the manpower of the NSA is actually quite limited, I see no reason why John Fenderson is incorrect. If I contact someone using what is advertised as his public key, even if the NSA runs a MITM against us, it would have to have a real human editing our conversation to prevent us from exchanging enough information to be able to detect the MITM attack. There is no way an automatic logger (which is all the NSA can afford to run against "Average Joe Who Is Probably Not A Terrorist Or Otherwise Interesting") is going to be able to prevent us from confirming our PK fingerprints.
I find the most likely reason that the lobster law is on the books is that the catch-wild-lobster lobby has more money than the (as yet unborn) raise-cultured-lobster lobby, rather than your (intentionally?) silly justification --- which, by the way could easily be extended to making it a crime to catch adult lobsters, since this behavior, if unregulated, could lead to over-catching and to the extinction of the species, thus depriving future generations of the ability to enjoy... er... watching them from scuba dives.
Raising cultured lobsters is a $100 million dollar industry in Vietnam (not without its own problems, however)...
And of course, recent events would lead one to think that it could well be that both of these industries will be largely put out of business by culturing lobster cells in large vats (if the combined lobster lobbies don't manage to make it illegal before that industry gets its product on the market).
The original case was dismissed in the Southern District of NY on that date, and I had started to be worried that this was just an attempt to blackmail the blackmailers and go for a quick settlement bid.
But it seems that the plaintiffs have refiled in California and are serious about this. Actually now that I think about it, Warner has little recourse but to fight, because any settlement out of court will be seen to be an admission of the weakness their claims, and will only lead to a never-ending succession of other challenges in reply to a demand for licensing fees.
(On an aside: I was happy that I found a new interesting case on which to use up my uncharged $15-per-quarter PACER allocation, but wow --- just downloading the whole docket used up over $1. I see I can download just a partial docket by searching by document numbers, but does RECAP have any automatic consolidation in place for these kinds of partial docket searches?)
Yes, but said customer would still be liable for any kind of judgment of the court, if, for example, the court found that the case was so frivolous that it wanted to award the other side's legal fees. Not very likely in the US, but still possible.
IANAL, but I suspect that US law disallows any kind of indemnification by a third party for such fees or other monetary liabilities.
> It's the conclusions that are wrong. So they should be.
Well, to be perfectly honest, the paper's main recommendation is that "scientists should learn more about statistics" --- one of the main causes is that research results concentrated on achieving the wrong statistical result ("p value").
Still, another reason behind the result was bias --- and this includes "publication bias" --- caused by journal publications accepting less papers with negative or merely replicative results because they are "less sexy" and worse for marketing. The move to (presumably less profit-driven) open access should actually cause this bias to decrease --- another, less talked about advantage to open access.
> And if it hasn't, it will just hold the data until
> it can crack it.
Unfortunately for the NSA, most modern ciphers are secure enough that it is unlikely that this kind of waiting is worthwhile. The only justification is that they might be able to later hack into an active suspect's computer(s) in order to discover the encryption key (or possibly use a side-channel attack like TEMPEST).
Ioannidis's well-accepted paper, if you actually read it, makes it clear that the reason for the conclusions he came to are not because 80% of research is executed by researchers who are intentionally committing fraud or academic misconduct of any kind. He doesn't even mention fraud as a significant cause.
Nice way to misrepresent the ramifications of an interesting piece of research.
If anyone had previously been considering running a darknet node, but was concerned over inadvertently aiding activities they did not approve of (whatever your personal "bete noir" is), these kinds of national initiatives (bans like Russia and China, fishing/snooping like US) may make it easier for them to decide in favor of the benefits of the darknet vs. whatever detriments they see in it.
I know it's for sure pushing me in that direction.
Hey, everyone, just think... if enough of us reply to this guy, we might manage to overload his self-admittedly minuscule brain capacity... and we would finally succeed in shutting up a troll merely by feeding him!
Widespread encryption versus current business models
If this revelation would cause people to adopt encryption widely (for example, browser plugins for encrypting and decrypting webmail), lots of companies (e.g., Google) would end up losing access to a lot of data.
OTOH, let's face the reality, it's probably not going to happen.
It's "law" enforcement, not "non-bitchiness" enforcement
One of the job requirements for a law enforcement officer is the ability to know the difference between bitchiness and illegality. Another requirement is the ability to control one's anger --- especially since a lot of their job is arresting people who don't.