I do a lot of consumer debt defense. Some of this includes medical debt lawsuits.
Interesting thing about medical debt: When did you agree to pay the specific amounts charged by the doctor?
Think of it this way—can you tell me another industry where you do not know, up front, what the rates or fees will be before you accept services or goods? Lawyers give you their hourly rates, for example. You get menus at restaurants. Plumbers and carpenters tell you hourly rates or flat fees up front.
And if you do not get these details up front, but they perform the services? Then you have a chance to negotiate the amount.
Typically, for medical services, you sign something where you agree to "pay what is not covered by my insurance company."
But this does not mean you agree to pay whatever the doctor wants you to pay. You still have room to negotiate what are the reasonable fees for this.
When you give thorough discovery requests targeting the question of whether the fees are reasonable, what the fees are for other patients and insurance providers, then you begin to get these medical debt collectors thinking twice about playing hardball.
Then again, it should never get to this point. It seems like doctors and their collection lawyers miss this fundamental aspect of contract law.
It's fun when you get a judge who understands this, as the collection lawyers do not. It stinks when you get judges who are lazy and just award judgments without listening to law or facts.
Even if a citation is copyrightable, which it probably is not (as it is predominantly fact, a method rather than an expression, and de minimis), use of the citation method for Zotero citation would be clear fair use and not a violation of copyright.
A good case on this was when Thomson West tried to claim copyright over the page numbers in cases. The court struck that down as copyrightable, and I think the logic would extend here as well.
I always astounds me the lack of common sense which comes into play in copyright matters.
Fair use is a limitation on the exclusive rights of copyright holders. It is not an exception to copyright. If you fairly use a copyrighted work, you are not committing infringement but being allowed to do so because of a fair use exception—fair use is non-infringement. See Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
Typically (but not always) "defenses" in the litigation process are excuses, justifications, or exceptions. In this sense, many argue fair use is not a classic "defense." Rather, it would be wrapped up inside other classic "defenses" such as "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." (If the facts alleged by the plaintiff show fair use, then they have failed to state a claim for infringement as fair use is not infringement.)
This is all highly technical legal and legal process jargon. It does not take away Anonymous Coward's correct statement that, in practice, Fair Use is used in a defensive posture and typically must be proven by the Defendant.
This implies that fair use is a classic defense, as the burden of proof that a defense exists is typically on the person raising that defense. Fair use would seem to fit that bill.
Re: Re: Re: No more A/B testing without IRB approval!
Or, based on Grimmelmann's reasoning, if you do A/B Testing to folks in Maryland. Federal funds is not a requirement under the Maryland law Grimmelmann relies upon.
Then again, you really have to look into the Code of Federal Regulations and its definitions—which are explicitly referenced in the Maryland law—to see what is covered and what is not. It's too late in a long day on an already long week for me to go trouncing through the CFR unless I'm getting paid for it, though.
This is what happens when judges like jailing folks
This is not surprising. A lower-court judge who sides with prosecutors on a warrant challenge is common. It would be news if he overturned it.
This doesn't mean the judge was wrong, and that the law was violated and the search must be suppressed. It was, and it the fruits of the illegal search should be suppressed.
However, this happens all the time. Trial judges looking at warrants often let the Fourth Amendment be trampled. So much so, one wonders whether these judges have even read the Fourth Amendment or any illegal search cases. Or if they just don't care and don't want to do their job.
Technically, you're arrested if you're cuffed and processed, and not allowed to leave an area. Whoever said that was "technically being detained" must be reading from the cop's handbooks because often get confused about when and how they can stop folks. A real easy bright line for most judges is when the cuffs go on.
It is also technically false arrest and false imprisonment.
Although, to make it even more confusing, the technical terms "arrest" and "detention" are different for some specific regulatory and procedural situations.
Nevertheless, as far as Constitutional rights are concerned, this was "technically" an arrest, plain and simple.
However, this could have been much worse. It appears the Supreme Court is hanging its hat on the "looks like a duck" rationale. As bad as that rationale is, this should not impact cloud services much.
Then again, trial courts can be stupid and read Supreme Court decisions in unexpected ways. So the problem for cloud providers is that the word "should" is in there, which means there is no bright line rule and any such business will expose a provider to certain litigation risks.
Terrible decision. But it could have been much worse.
"For all Freedom of Information Act requests, there is an exemption from said FOIA requests any and all public records, and said records are further exempted from the First Amendment. But not the Second Amendment. Because we like it if a gun is involved."