Watching nameserver changes isn't an accurate measurement of registrar changes. ICANN and GoDaddy have the real stats.
Transfers In or Out:
If someone has an active GoDaddy account and moved their domain names between domaincontrol.com and another hosting provider's it will count as a +1 or -1 in either column without a registrar change even happening.
If a domain name is expiring but not yet deleted GoDaddy automatically changes domain names to use domaincontrol.com to show their park page and a message for the owner to renew. That's an easy +1 in the column for every domain name bought a year previously that people decided not to renew or forgot to pay on time.
If someone wasn't using domaincontrol.com for their nameservers servers(but another hosting provider's) and transferred their domain name to another registrar it wouldn't count toward Transfers Out.
By my count there are currently 13,434 online service providers in the Copyright Office's index.
Alternate Name Stats
8,311 have submitted at least one alternate name
3,443 have one alternate name
1,840 have two alternate names
918 have three alternate names
10,956 alternate name fees payed (current rate is $30 for every 10)
46,805 alternate names in total
Top Alternate Names Holders
1. Diageo North America Inc. (3,061)
2. CBS Radio Inc. (1,268)
3. Meredith Corporation (1,089)
4. Clear Channel Communications Inc. (921)
5. Viacom International Inc. (793)
A small sample I made of the PDF files in the index ranged from 70KB-170KB. Roughly estimated the index probably takes up between 1.5-2GB (not including their backups). For a 13,434 entry database with 46,805 aliases, a digital conversion would reduce the index's footprint to a few hundred megabytes(not including backups or the proposed revision database). A small database like that would make it easier for rightsholders to download a full list of current contacts.
One huge downside is that they'll be displaying email addresses in plaintext for the first time. This will increase the number of rightsholders using completely automated systems(web spiders attached to a DMCA notice mailer that hits on certain keywords) and of course spam in general. While I don't care much about the spam issue (99% of spam could probably be weeded out if emails not including the required electronic signatures were disregarded) an increase in bogus notices would have a net effect of slowing down processing times and increase the amount of non-infringing content taken down. There should be penalties for sending bogus notices before they go forward with this plan.
Lamar Smith put Google in a list of "lawful companies and websites" that have "nothing to worry about under this bill" before attacking them, all in the same press release that CCIA is most likely responding to.
Advertisers are getting search engine keyword data from Encrypted Google Search, not http referrer data. In 2009 they added a MITM script which lies between the results page and the site you are trying to visit. The second you click on a search result Google already knows. A few people have made userscripts to strip out the MITM script:
This data has a more prominent place in their search business than advertising since they can use its data to position search results somewhat in the order of "most clicked". They can position results today better than when they were using Google Analytics for the same purpose alone, since not every site on the internet uses Google Analytics.
By coincidence(?) this setup can also overcome the issues tracking when moving between SSL and Non-SSL pages. But only if the visitor came from Encrypted Google Search. If Bing or Yahoo were to start using encryption, AdSense users wouldn't be able to get that search engine keyword data from Google...
Re: I think what he means by lectureres losing jobs
That sounds similar to an on-campus scenario where an undergraduate course with a few hundred students is taught by a TA or TF. Besides grading essays and the like, anything that a professor is "overqualified" to do can be automated or passed off to someone else no matter where the class is taught.
The real problem with a union or a school blocking the expansion of online classes is that it's just not competitive. There are students who work, live out of state or live abroad that can't attend in person. There's also students who go to on-campus classes and wish they were somewhere else. Some of them end up dropping out. If one school doesn't embrace online classes their decision won't stop another school from doing it.
I thought the ripples looked off because they sort of stop right under the text, but looking at the original picture it's sourced from, I must say they did a pretty good job. Here's the original. (Found via TinEye)
Except Google isn't offering to hard-code site certificates at all.
They are offering to hard-code the new "HTTP Strict Transport Security" setting, which solves a different problem. HSTS just forces a browser to load a site via HTTPS all the time rather than HTTP. It doesn't need to be hard-coded. A site owner can set up a HSTS response header on their site themselves, and upon every subsequent reload of their site it will never attempt an unencrypted connection until the header expires. Most likely Google will end up only hard-coding a list of payment processors and banking institutions or remove hard-coding completely.
Seems like most of these problems involve one trusted root changing to another completely different one in the spoofed cert. Browsers should easily be able to throw up a red flag if the old CA doesn't match the new one. A user might click through it, but a graphical web of trust model should be implemented too. If a user in Iran is shown on a world map that the change is concentrated in Iran they would know some funny business is going on.
Debunking the "consumers are getting ripped off" argument
If that's really happening, wouldn't a central directory of verified sites be the best solution? Why hasn't that happened yet? Perhaps someone could come up with a new standard very much like the Google Safe Browsing Protocol or SSL Root Servers. The majority of the transactions left would be between counterfeiters and the people who actually want counterfeits. ICE and other customs agencies around the world are supposed to stop counterfeits from entering their countries regardless if they've shipped from online stores or not. When a counterfeiter can set up shop on a new domain name the next day it makes all of the seizures futile. They may even be making the problem worse because counterfeiters could expand to more domain names than what they would have originally planned on running, so if one goes down they're still running on backups and laughing all the way to bank.
ICE has said in the past that they order products when they're targeting counterfeiters online so they have physical evidence to support the seizures. All 10 of these domain names were online stores and that seems to be what happened. However I think a lot of the choices had more to do with trademark infringement than counterfeiting. There was repetition in the choices: "lacosteshoes"(x3), "puma"(x2), "newerahats"(x2). All 10 domain names have poor Alexa rankings. It may have been cheaper(for the companies at least) for ICE to seize rather hiring a UDRP panel.