from the jobs-move-around dept
They have been trapped in a terrible mindset that they are in the business of selling newspapers. The leap from paper to digital may be vast, but to newspaper publishers, it seemed like vaulting to a different business entirely, one they were loathe to get into. No matter what kind of lip service newspapers paid to the digital transformation, the most prominent paywall model out there, that of the New York Times, still protects print subscriptions with a tiered digital pricing strategy – one so annoying that it motivated its former digital design director to complain publicly about the entire signup process.This is a really good point on multiple levels. Beyond the innovator's dilemma (and the key point of figuring out what the real product is), Smalera is also debunking one of the popular myths of the internet era: when you're selling a user's attention, companies will naturally abuse their users. What he notes is that companies that do this don't end up lasting through the long haul, because users get annoyed and go elsewhere. Even though it's become a common pejorative statement among neo-luddites to mock the idea that the "users is the product," one thing that is true when that happens is that the companies need to treat their users right, or they have a crappy product that they can't sell.
The lesson online media companies have taken from newspapers’ slow, public death is to move beyond the idea of selling the product. Online sites are selling their audience. It’s a simple twist of the equation, but one that changes everything about how a media company is run. A CEO who has realized that her audience – her customers – is the most important thing the company has will stop at nothing to give those customers what they want. Anything to make them feel as if they’re getting value from the company. And although she’ll monetize their aggregate value with advertisers and marketers, she’ll also protect them from underhanded sales pitches or confusing pricing strategies that infuriate the web-savvy.
Similarly, Mathew Ingram uses this to discuss why it's so difficult for legacy businesses to adapt, noting that it's difficult to change business models on the fly. Not only do you have to make big bets on new things, but you also have to keep the legacy business running while at the same time trying to undercut it with the new thing. It's why so many companies fail the innovator's dilemma test. Unless you have incredibly visionary leadership who can push a company through with a strong and clear vision of why the company must move in that direction, the magnetic appeal of trying to prop up increasingly obsolete businesses is just too strong.
But, the failure comes not because of some new "threat" or because of some kind of disgraceful activity (no matter how much legacy players try to describe it that way), but because corporate leadership chose to let others innovate, rather than supporting a plan of out-innovating themselves. Very, very few companies are willing to cannibalize their own business models -- but the failure to do that just means that someone else cannibalizes it for you.
And it goes way beyond news. The chart above shows some other key areas of disruption as well. That clump of retail, automotive, construction, banking, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and real estate represents prime feeding ground for the next decade of disruption -- much of which has already started. You don't necessarily see the corresponding growth points on the opposite side of the chart, but as with newspapers and online publishing, give it a few years, and those new jobs and industries will make their way up the chart, as the legacy players continue to shrivel up (and whine all the way down).