The FBI Can't Get Into The Dayton Shooter's Phone. So What?
from the time-to-exploit-some-deaths dept
A high-profile act of violence has brought FBI complaints about device encryption to the surface again. This has been a long-running theme with the agency, one amplified recently by domestic surveillance advocate/Attorney General William Barr. Barr claimed encryption was creating a more dangerous world for everyone. Barr’s claims echoed those of successive FBI directors. Both Barr and Wray continue to talk about device encryption despite having (so far) refused to update the number of encrypted devices the FBI can’t access.
As Barr warned in his rant against encryption, all it would take is one major attack to sway public opinion to the government’s side.
I think it is prudent to anticipate that a major incident may well occur at any time that will galvanize public opinion on these issues.
Well, the FBI is talking about encryption again with lawmakers. But with all due respect, Mr. Barr, this ain’t it, chief.
Top FBI officials informed congressional lawmakers this week that they have been unable to access the smartphone of the suspected gunman in the Dayton, Ohio, mass shooting, two sources told The Hill.
In a briefing about the weekend shootings in Dayton and El Paso, Texas, FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich told House Democrats that the agency is in possession of what’s believed to be Connor Betts’s primary phone but can’t open it because it requires a passcode, according to the two sources who took part in Wednesday’s briefing.
Two mass shootings in 24 hours could have provoked the public response Barr is looking for. But it didn’t. These shootings had nothing to do with encrypted devices, even if the FBI felt it needed to inform lawmakers it couldn’t get into a dead suspect’s phone.
The question is why the FBI needs to do this. Like its previous skirmish with device makers over the encrypted contents of the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone, this complaint features a dead suspect and the highly-dubious implication that there’s something of value contained in the locked device. There’s no investigation being impeded by inaccessible data. The shooter is dead and the shooting is over.
The FBI — and William Barr — likely truly believe encryption backdoors will make investigations easier and prevent criminal acts. But there’s nothing in the recent past that suggests their beliefs are well-founded. These are the speculations being used to undermine the security of millions of peoples’ devices. The only thing the government has to offer is the fact that sometimes phones produce usable evidence. But criminal acts were prevented and/or prosecuted for years before a large majority of the public decided to start carrying tracking devices loaded with tons of personal info with them wherever they went.
Then there’s the dishonesty: intellectual and otherwise. Most of what’s offered as arguments for backdoors is intellectually dishonest. The FBI’s failure to inform the American public about the true number of locked devices in its possession is the regular kind of dishonest. So is the assertion made by the FBI that it could be “months or years” before it can access the phone’s contents. Multiple companies offer devices that can (supposedly) bypass any device’s encryption, including the latest iPhones. The FBI and DOJ simply pretend these options don’t exist when talking to Congress, law enforcement agencies, and the general public.
Every tragedy is an opportunity. The FBI isn’t going to let these pass without attempting to capitalize on them. Unfortunately, it seems our country is capable of generating an endless amount of tragic opportunities. And it only takes one to give the government everything it wants.
Filed Under: chris wray, dayton, encryption, fbi, going dark, william barr
Comments on “The FBI Can't Get Into The Dayton Shooter's Phone. So What?”
They have a phone that they cannot get into, and regardless of whether or not it may contain useful information, the inability to get in is the burr under their saddle.
Re: Re:
Yea without the information that may purely exist in his phone and not anywhere else they won’t be able to figure out if he was that bad of a person! /s
But honestly tho, the hell are they looking for that is only on their phone? I know if anyone wanted anything useful out of my phone they can just as easily find it through my google account which is probably easier to gain access to through other means.
Re: Re:
Sorry to disagree.
The burr under their saddle is NOT that they cannot get into the Dayton shooter’s phone.
The real burr under their saddle is that they cannot get into YOUR phone. Any time. With no accountability or supervision.
So they should call Google
Since Google seems to find new iPhone exploits every other day.
Re: So they should call Google
Because Google has been hacking your phone again as part of the globalist conspiracy?
Re: Re: So they should call Google
No, as part of their efforts to research and eliminate security threats, you ingenuous twat.
Re: Re: Re: So they should call Google
Hey Hammy! WAVE
We need to open a dialog with the shooter and see his side of the story.
Re: Re: Re:2 So they should call Google
Posters above your comment are only referring to Google’s Project Zero. A security research team employed by Google to find zero days anywhere they can. Though they get the most news coverage when they find iOS zero days.
Re: Re: Re:3 So they should call Google
Posters above your comment are only referring to Google’s Project Zero.
I don’t believe that is completely accurate, as Zof is frequently complaining about the Google/Liberal/Globalist agenda.
But yes, that is a thing, and I am being a prick because of the tinfoil hats get on my nerves. 🙂
Re: So they should flush the toilet
Because someone left a huge steaming zof in it.
"Attorney General William Barr. Barr claimed encryption was creating a more dangerous world for everyone."
It’s not encryption that is making the world a much more dangerous place, it is people like William Barr that are making it so. I suggest that William Barr and friends all be equipt with backdoors to make investigations easier and prevent criminal acts.
Re: Re:
He already has a backdoor. It just haven’t been used often enough.
One person has been arrested for straw man purchases of firearm accessories used by the shooter. Perhaps evidence is on that phone that will help the prosecution, as well as perhaps evidence of others who may have assisted the shooter in some material way.
The casual dismissal by the author of this article of the phone as a source of evidence seems shortsighted.
Re: Re:
There is no such thing as ‘straw man’ purchases of accessories as there is nothing barring them from anyone. They are after him for an actual firearm violation.
Re: Re: Re:
They went after him for a stupid firearm violation. Possession of drugs (pot!) while in possession of a firearm, or, more accurately, lying on ATF Form 4473 (that’s the background check paperwork filled out at point-of-sale) about his use of drugs.
Regardless of one’s opinion about guns or pot it’s worth noting that the Feds very rarely charge people for lying on that form, even people who lie about being violent felons and are disqualified from firearms ownership for that reason. Each year there’s nearly 100,000 rejections at point of sale and each year the Feds charge only a few dozen people for lying on the form.
Getting this dude for possession of pot leaves a bad taste in my mouth when violent felons are lying on the form without consequence. I’m not a "gun nut" but this is what the NRA means when they say we need to enforce the laws we have.
Re: Re: Re: Re:
Actually, it was mushrooms, not pot, and he was growing them in his home. Right now the Left is screaming for increased background checks. Background checks are only as good as the information available, and unless someone has been busted for drugs, a background check will not show that they are currently abusing drugs or growing them in their home.
As the poster above me pointed out, it is ILLEGAL to falsify information on those forms, but it happens thousands of times every year and almost no one is ever prosecuted for it.
New gun laws won’t be any more effective than current gun laws if NO ONE WILL PROSECUTE PEOPLE FOR VIOLATING THEM!
Re: Re: Re:2 Re:
Umm, ok – are you in favor of background checks or not?
Re: Re: Re:2 Re:
That’s my point. Violent felons lie on that form nearly 100,000 times a year and are virtually never prosecuted. In this case they came across a dude with pot and mushrooms in the course of a different investigation and they busted his ass for it. I just can’t get that excited about mushrooms and pot. I’m sorry. If he was dealing heroin I could see getting him on this violation, but weed and shrooms?
I’m curious how exactly they established that he lied on the 4473. I’ve filled out the 4473 and marked the drug question "No" because that was the correct/truthful answer at the time. If years later I smoke a joint does that mean I lied on the 4473? My guess is the dude cooperated with the Feds because he was genuinely horrified by what his friend did and admitted to the violation himself, otherwise I can’t see how they would establish that timeline. Again, it leaves a bad taste in my mouth, someone trying to do the right thing is busted for what’s essentially a technical violation and has a lifetime as a convicted felon to look forward to.
Side note: HR8 is the background check bill. I’ve read the text and it seems perfectly reasonable to me as a gun owner, essentially any transfer except a temporary loan at a range/while hunting or to a family member (defined as aunts, uncles, siblings, children, parents and grandparents) has to go through a licensed FFL. I always did that regardless when I sold firearms because I didn’t want it coming back on my conscience if one of "my" guns was later used in a crime.
The only part I’d change is the section that says the Attorney General can’t regulate the fees the FFL can charge. I would cap the fee at $25-$30, enough to cover the cost incurred by the FFL but not high enough to represent a burden to private party sales.
Re: Re: Re:3 Re:
That seems reasonable to me. I just wish that enough other people thought the way you do.
Re: Re: Re:3 Re:
A few points to note;
"If he was dealing heroin I could see getting him on this violation, but weed and shrooms?"
The "war on drugs", especially the part making weed, for instance, a federal offense, has provided law enforcement an incredible lever to use in plea bargains. If you can nail someone down to years of hard time for possession with intent to sell over having a half-smoked joint in their pocket then you suddenly don’t really need actual evidence for what should reasonably be considered the heavier crime.
FBI: "Two choices – one, go to a maximum security prison with the real hard cases, for several years, over possession with intent to sell. Or plead guilty to manslaughter and get sent to a minimum security facility where you’ll be out on good behavior in half a year.".
Suspect guilty of owning a stash of pot: "…uhh, i guess i’ll take the rap for whoever DID kill the guy."
Being able to force anyone to plead guilty to anything over weed and shrooms is just that valuable a tool for law enforcement and the elected part of law enforcement (judges and DA’s) especially.
"I’m curious how exactly they established that he lied on the 4473."
He could have cooperated of his own free will, but having been caught with a federal drug violation, I’m pretty sure most sane people would just ask the feds "So. What do you want me to confess to?".
"…someone trying to do the right thing is busted for what’s essentially a technical violation and has a lifetime as a convicted felon to look forward to."
The possibility of plea bargaining combined with the status of DA’s often being elected means that in the wake of a sufficiently horrible crime, it is time to set aside the principle of fair and equal treatment under the law in favor of appeasing the future voters by slitting the throat of a suitable scapegoat.
There are plenty of fairly horrible legal and procedural flaws involved in this specific shit-show.
Re: The difference in opinion is on the price of the information
The FBI seems to think that accessing the information is free, others point out there is a price – both in dollars and in civil rights we sacrifice.
On previous cases, accessing data on encrypted phones came with a price tag of several hundred thousand dollars. Regarding the civil rights, a google search for "warrantless searches" or "civil asset forfeiture" will surface a myriad of examples illustrating how seemingly justified rights of police forces can spin out of control very quickly.
These days, many smartphones contain more private information than personal diaries, information that FBI and police have no business in accessing.
Certainly not for trawling expeditions. Since the war on terror started almost two decades ago, law enforcement have enjoyed an unprecedented expansion of powers, all the way to permission to torture suspects and record and search phone and internet traffic of large parts of population.
And all these powers have led to the arrest of – exactly no serious terrorist at all. Over nearly two decades. (Ignoring a number of fools that have been tricked by FBI agents into buying explosives sold to them by the FBI so the they could be arrested for, eh, buying explosives).
So perhaps it is time to review their approach to catching criminals. And stop giving them more powers with no justification other than "perhaps we might find something useful."
Re: Re:
"The casual dismissal by the author of this article of the phone as a source of evidence seems shortsighted."
Not really, no. For numerous reasons, one of which being that an ordinary track of the numbers calling or being called (info available from the phone company) will provide all evidence required.
Even were it otherwise, casual dismissal is the right thing. The same argument, you see, can be used to make the case that abolishing the need for warrants, right of legal counsel, human rights visavi suspects, are all going to provide FAR more evidence than ordinary police work.
Police work is either based on democratic principle or it’s no longer "police" work but dictatorship thuggery under a flimsy veil of presented respectability – examples of which are usually found in places like China or the old Soviet union.
"…the agency is in possession of what’s believed to be Connor Betts’s primary phone but can’t open it because it requires a passcode…" **
They left this part of the sentence out:
**but, luckily, we have a cache of hacking tools at our disposal and got into it.
But… but… if there was a backdoor, we could stop Connor Betts from ever murdering again…
Umm?
You’re questioning why they need to conduct an investigation? You don’t think trying to determine if the shooter had any outside assistance is a legitimate investigative goal? You don’t think trying to piece together a timeline and motive provides any benefit even if there were no co-conspirators?
C’mon dude. I don’t agree with the FBI and AG on encryption, not even a little bit, but questioning the very need to investigate this? That’s an absurd overstatement even by the editorial standards of the Internet.
Re: Umm?
They do not need to get into the phone to obtain the call logs from the telcos, and those will give them a list of people they maybe want to talk to.
Re: Re: Umm?
iMessage wouldn’t show in telco logs. Neither would WhatsApp and similar applications. They’d also want to look at his photos, notes, etc. Some of that stuff might be in a Cloud account somewhere but a good portion of it won’t be.
It’s perfectly legitimate for them to want to get into a phone in an investigation like this. I truly don’t see why this desire on their part is remotely controversial. Their desire to weaken encryption is and should be controversial, for a variety of reasons, but I doubt any of you would be up in arms if the suspect had neglected to secure his phone and they searched it after the issuance of a warrant.
The dude killed nine people. The authorities are going to go over his life with a fine toothed comb to find out 1) Why and 2) If anyone helped him.
Re: Re: Re: Umm?
The complaint is that the phone is passcode protected, and if they want to easily bypass that they are removing the locks that sensible people use to protect their property. They way the authorities are going, nobody will be able to protect any account by use of a password unless it can be bypassed, and that becomes a world without any locks on electronic devices and online accounts.
Re: Re: Re:2 Umm?
It won’t happen. You think the financial sector would go for bypassable encryption? The healthcare sector? Hell, Hollywood? Those mofo’s are more invested in encryption than the NSA…..
I wish people would get perspective. Of course the FBI hates encryption that can’t be broken. It’s their job to investigate crimes and encryption makes that harder. Our State Police flipped the fuck out when Waze became a mainstream thing. All manner of arguments were levied against why it was a bad idea to let people track the cops, some legitimate, some pure FUD. Guess what? Waze is still a thing. It’s not going anywhere.
Society is a day to day tradeoff and balancing act. The FBI is pointing out a legitimate problem they face. That doesn’t mean they’re going to get what they want. There are too many interest groups — big and small — invested in cybersecurity. In the long term FBI employees will adjust to the new normal. Life goes on.
Re: Re: Re:3 Umm?
"That doesn’t mean they’re going to get what they want. There are too many interest groups — big and small — invested in cybersecurity."
I would normally state "That’s a given."
And then I consider the US past history of trying to war on encryption and the fact that Trump is president while the GOP, by and large, appears to have lost their marbles and half the democrats appear to be on board with the FBI on this one.
An enforced loophole requirement would, at best, mean the US loses every business engaged in software. Worst case, some cybersecurity industries do remain and try to work backdoors into important safety standards until it is proven in vivo what a shit idea that is when the next global trojan hits.
Re: Re: Re:4 Umm?
What history of "War on Encryption?"
The only thing that comes to mind for me is the debate in the 1990s and that was a combination of:
1) The law not keeping up with technology (export controls vs. the Internet)
2) Ill informed politicians.
We won that one and it hasn’t really been a mainstream debate since.
To the best of my knowledge there hasn’t even been a bill introduced in Congress, much less scheduled for committee meetings and actual floor votes. ????????♂️
Worrying about nothing, IMHO.
Re: Re: Re:5 Umm?
"What history of "War on Encryption?""
It was a bit more than just a debate. Yes, we "won" that one but it’s pretty telling the political will to do something batshit insane was so prevalent it took actual effort to get the politicians to back off from the equivalent of prohibiting mathematics and education.
"Worrying about nothing, IMHO."
I more or less rejected that as a concern as well. And then Australia tabled their insane backdoor legislation and I realized that todays political leadership in the west consists of…Trump.
So now I’m worried.
Re: Re: Re: Umm?
But one can hardly portray this as some new thing called "going dark" when such information wouldn’t have been available 20 years ago. I don’t recall any phone records associated with the Columbine shooting; probably there were only local calls that weren’t logged. Despite a constant increase in data since then, there’s little evidence it’s helped us stop/reduce mass shootings.
Re: Re: Re:2 Umm?
The "going dark" phenomenon is a legitimate problem in the National Security/Counterterrorism arena. Traditionally, the United States and friends are much better at Signals Intelligence than we are at Human Intelligence. Go back to World War II and Enigma. Google "Zimmerman Telegram" and "Verona Project." Study the Washington Naval Treaty, specifically the part where the US and Great Britain pushed the Japanese as far as they were willing to go because we were reading their mail and knew what they were willing to accept and when they’d walk away.
That’s the stuff we know about. Parts of the Cold War haven’t been declassified yet. In a few decades we’ll learn about counterterrorism operations in the 1990s and 2000s and you can expect that Signals Intelligence was responsible for averted attacks that we never even knew about.
So yes, you can expect our intelligence and law enforcement community to be frustrated about widespread adoption of encryption. It makes their jobs much more difficult than they used to be. They’re human beings. I’d imagine technological changes that make your job more difficult frustrate the hell out of you. That doesn’t mean the genie is going back in the bottle. The genie can’t be put back in the bottle. I doubt you could pass domestic laws against encryption — there are too many monied interests who are invested in encryption and cybersecurity — and obviously we can’t stop foreign actors from using it under any circumstance.
The intelligence community will adjust. The law enforcement community will adjust. People hired today won’t be frustrated by widespread encryption because they’ll never have known any other world. Ill informed legislators that think we can outlaw encryption and/or mandate backdoors will be educated by a combination of reality and well monied interests (Big Tech, Big Finance, Healthcare, the list is endless…..) who are invested in encryption and cybersecurity.
Life goes on.
Re: Re: Re:3 Umm?
"Ill informed legislators that think we can outlaw encryption and/or mandate backdoors will be educated by a combination of reality and well monied interests (Big Tech, Big Finance, Healthcare, the list is endless…..) who are invested in encryption and cybersecurity."
And yet, Australias government did exactly this recently. Despite any attempts by finance, cybersecurity, and their own technology advisors to persuade them differently.
The problem with an "ill-informed legislator" is usually that that personage is an "ill-informed legislator". After the catastrophic legislation gets enacted the rest comes down to a face-saving exercise where the bad law remains while defended to the death by those who have staked all their political capital on upholding it.
Re: Umm?
Maybe I’m being a bit too careless in my phrasing. Sure, there’s an ongoing investigation, but whatever roadblock a locked phone has erected in front of the FBI does not have the compressed timetable of an investigation into, say, someone’s plans to engage in a mass shooting.
Putting together a timeline and establishing motive are important, but when the crime has already been committed, complaining that it will take "weeks or months" to crack a seized device is a bit much. And it probably won’t take that, not when there are companies offering phone-cracking tech at prices the FBI can easily afford. This is an attempt to create leverage from nearly nothing.
Re: Re: Umm?
See my other replies above.
tl;dr, Of course the FBI is going to bitch and moan, widespread encryption makes their job a lot harder than it used to be. It’s perfectly legitimate to point out the fact that we’re losing access to an investigative/intelligence tool that has actually saved lives and put bad people behind bars. Does that mean we try to put the genie back in the bottle? No. We couldn’t even if we wanted to.
Re: Re: Re: Umm?
Um, in your flyffy-nicey scenario, the one where you imagine that “ It’s perfectly legitimate to point out the fact that we’re losing access to an investigative/intelligence tool that has actually saved lives and put bad people behind bars,” can you provide even a single case where this is true-that busting the encryption of Americans phones/devices led to a trial, and conviction of an actual terrorist?
I wont hold my breath.
Because in all of these cases, after the fact, what we see is that the online “radicalization” is actually incessant bullying/escalating/rhetorical manipulation of these guys online and off, who eventually go ballistic.
These guys are attacked online by a sordid group of: retired law enforcement (LEIUs) and intel agents, police union hacks and hackers, DoD sponsored think tank flacks, Israeli and British and AU FIVEyes provocateurs, and all of this enabled by NSA warrantless surveillance of first amendment protected speech.
Then, these cunts trickle the manipulated conversations to law enforcement, who then opens an "investigation”of first amendment protected speakers, and cranks it up a notch, as they cyberstalk these men and boys online and off using community policing assets.
These assets, which range from the Anti Defamation League and its networks of community spies, to others, like any/all who derive income from the Domestic Violence Industrial Complex ranging from womens shelter “advocates” to agents of the family courts and lical municipalities; and a host of nembers from Rotary club international, Lions Clubs, etc.
In the common vernacular, its called “organized gang stalking,” but in Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP) talks and literature, its called a “colliding parallel investigation.”
Threat assessment is this generations forensic fraud, and its goal is to create-not assess-threats,and the FBI is well aware of these targeted individuals long before they go on rampages, because of the above mentioned networks of spies, rats, and their guiding Judenrate.
So, again-can you cite a case or two where busting encryption of American citizens led to a trial, and a conviction?
Or, are you declining because you believe the above due process free policing, enabled by preemptive spying, is actually somehow Constitutionally based?
Then, maybe answer the question: why are the feds, et alphabet, so eager to webscrub these guys online trails of interactions with said provocateurs after the fact (and often at the direct request of Israeli government/FBI Tel Aviv branch) successfully hiding evidence of provocateurs and online "radicalization” from the public, while also whinging on about their lack of access to “evidence” on the guys private phones/devices?
But nothing in what you said validates your thesis. A big zero.
From thehill article:
How exactly would the lack of encryption have helped Barr prevent this shooting? This is pure fearmongering.
Easily done
They could easily send it to Pegasus, no? I’m pretty sure they claimed they can break into any recent phone.
Just one
"And it only takes one to give the government everything it wants."
9/11 gave us the Patriot Act. And we’re still trying to wipe that turd off of us.
Re: Just one
"9/11 gave us the Patriot Act. And we’re still trying to wipe that turd off of us."
More like "smearing that turd all over you". Patriot Acts I and II haven’t even been seriously challenged. If anything the US body politic is increasingly seeing them as tools to be expanded and utilized further.
The only debunking this line of argument requires:
However dangerous the world must have been when there were no smartphones for law enforcement to open at all.
re: we want our child porn back, thats why
re:The question is why the FBI needs to do this
…because the FBI, working with local agencies, and several other international/national agencies, are entrapping men and boys into a cycle of covertly distributed child pornography, which they slip into the "free” porn online.
Then, they use that planted porn to profile, target, harass and blackmail "suspects”who are first amendment/pro-constitution/pro second amendment.
Men and boys like Stephen Paddock, Adam Lanza, Robert Louis Dear, Devin Kelley, and a long list of "radicalized” recent shooters, child porn is a factor.
It is also part of the profile of CIA assets, starting with J.D. Salinger, and going forwards to many assassins and mass shooters.
So, obviously, there is a link between our covert radicalization/child porn distribution programs and manufactured terrorism.
So: we want our chilpornz back or DoXXZ!DD!U!
Looking at what is on the phone after the fact does what? There could be nothing at all on it anyway. Who cares. What teh FBI really wants is to be able to gain access onto your phone and cloud services 24/7 looking for keywords. Because after the fact doesn’t help, you want to catch people before they do something. This is what they really want. But they have to take things 1 step at a time.
They can already get into these phones. Nothing is 100% crack proof. One door/bug closes and another is found. Still for the tiny fraction of criminals with encrypted phones over the general population. It’s not worth putting the general population at risk for all kinds of crimes because of weak security.
The U.S. starts demanding Backdoors, guess what, every other country will want that same access. Now they can also spy on U.S. citizens. Along with Criminals in other countries screwing over U.S. citizens far more than they do now. It would do so, so much more harm than letting a tiny fraction of criminals get away with something because they couldn’t gain access to their phone. How about doing real police work, not being a lazy butt.
Re: Re:
Umm…
Australia is already doing it.
hummmm,,,
FB is there,
Email is there..
Everything is backed up on the net..
RESET THE PHONE and re download the DATA…STUPID.
Might loose abit of private chat, but GREAT chat progs, dont save anything. They have made them so after ?? time the msg go away..
That phone could contain a dormant cyber pathogen
Simple, because they don’t want to fork out the money needed like they ended up doing for the San Bernardino hack. Expensive, and doesn’t get them the precedent they wanted since at least 2016.