More Thoughts On The Senate's SESTA Hearing

Legal Issues

from the what-is-the-plan-here dept

So far this week, we’ve explained why SESTA is such a bad bill and how it will create a massive chilling effect that could impact nearly every online service. And while the Senate hearing on the bill wasn’t as bad as we feared it would be, it certainly had its problematic moments — such as when the bill’s co-author, Senator Richard Blumenthal, argued that companies that couldn’t afford to moderate/filter everything should be prosecuted. However, in the days since the hearing, I’ve had a few thoughts about aspects of the debate that are, to say the very least, troubling.

“Do Something Now!”: While it was good to see many Senators at least pay lip service to the idea that the bill needed changes to not have massive unintended consequences for the entire internet, it was troubling the way they approached this process. Prior to the hearing, Emma Llanso wrote up a list of four important questions Senators should ask during the hearing — and none of them were asked. The key questions were fairly fundamental ones: what actual gap is there in the law and will this fix it? It was disturbing that no one seemed to discuss that at all.

After all, under CDA 230 today, nothing stops federal law enforcement from going after Backpage (other than if the DOJ doesn’t think Backpage broke the law). CDA 230 does not cover federal government law enforcement. Similarly, CDA 230 does not cover content “developed” by a company itself. So, if as many people claim, Backpage develops illegal content itself, it’s still liable. Finally, just a few years ago, Congress passed the SAVE Act, with the exact same stated intent: to carve a hole in CDA 230 to go after Backpage by making it a federal crime to advertise sex trafficking. That law hasn’t been used — and none of the Senators seem to be asking why.

Instead, there’s very much the traditional politician’s syllogism of “we must do something, this is something, we will do it.” A few times during the hearing, Senators demanded from the two opponents to SESTA that they provide better language if they’re concerned about this language. Notice the problem here: they were admitting that this language is problematic, but seemed to have no interest in understanding why or how to fix it — instead, demanding that others give them new language, with the implicit threat that if they don’t, this language will stay because this is “something.”

That may be all too common, but it seems like a dreadful way to make policy.

The knowledge standard is a mess: This is important, and got some discussion during the hearing, but not nearly enough. The “knowledge” standard in the bill is a complete and total mess. The supporters of the bill brushed it off as no big deal, often by misstating what the bill actually says. California Attorney General Xavier Becerra focused solely on the criminal standards for knowledge, saying he needed to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that there was intent, while NCMEC’s Yiota Souras insisted the knowledge standard was very narrowly tailored.

Both of them are wrong — in somewhat staggering and dangerous ways. Again, the actual text of the bill says the following:

The term ?participation in a venture? means knowing conduct by an individual or entity, by any means, that assists, supports, or facilitates a violation [of sex trafficking laws.]

This is problematic on multiple levels. First “knowing conduct” by itself is vague and not clearly defined. As Professor Eric Goldman suggested during the hearing, knowing conduct could just mean that a platform knows it’s doing something, but has no idea of the outcome. For example, if we knowingly allow users to post comments on our site — and someone uses that to post sex trafficking ads — even though we didn’t know they were posting sex trafficking ads, our conduct in enabling comments was “knowing.” If that sounds like a crazy scenario to you, fair enough — but shouldn’t the law state that much more clearly? Make it clear that the knowledge is not just of its own conduct, but that the conduct is specifically targeted at breaking the law.

The second problem with the knowledge standard is the claim that you can violate the law if your “knowing conduct” “by any means”… “assists, supports or facilitates a violation” of sex trafficking laws. As we explained earlier, assists, supports or facilitates is super broad. It’s possible to read this to mean that hosting a website where someone sets up a blog to advertise sex trafficking makes you automatically liable — even if you knew nothing of the actual content. After all, you did “knowing conduct” (hosting a website) and that website was used to “assist, support or facilitate” a violation of sex trafficking laws. We would not read the law this way, but as the language is currently written, it could very well be read that way.

And that means it will be read that way by someone. We’ve seen tons of civil lawsuits filed against deep-pocketed companies (and not so deep-pocketed companies) on a much more flimsy basis. If you don’t think a bunch of lawyers won’t be searching for such cases to bring, you haven’t paid much attention.

And these lawsuits can be very costly and time-consuming. Remember the Viacom v. YouTube case? That was an intermediary liability case that was almost entirely focused on the question of whether YouTube had the requisite knowledge to be liable (sound familiar?). And it went on for more than seven years before it was finally settled, rather than having a court issue a final ruling. With such a weak knowledge standard (even weaker than the DMCA’s that was fought over in the Viacom case), you can bet there will be long and costly lawsuits over just what the hell Congress meant by “knowledge.”

It’s fairly stunning and concerning that those pushing for the bill insist there’s no problem with the knowledge language. It’s as if they have no idea of the fairly recent litigation history over this very issue.

A lack of enforcement isn’t fixed by blaming intermediaries: As mentioned, nothing in CDA 230 stops the Justice Department from going after intermediaries if they break the law. When this was (barely) brought up during the hearing, one response was that the DOJ is either overwhelmed or isn’t doing its job — and by opening up prosecutions to state law enforcement, it would allow more of these kinds of cases to be brought. And while that may be true, that seems like a really weird way to solve the problem. If the true problem is a lack of willingness or resources by the DOJ to take on these cases, then why isn’t the discussion and legislation directly targeting that problem? Why isn’t there a discussion of allocating more resources, or finding out why the DOJ isn’t bringing these cases, and offering legislation or resources to solve whatever may be blocking action.

Instead, it seems like a very strange approach to say the answer to a lack of will or resource is… to make more companies liable.

A profound misunderstanding of CDA 230. This one bothers me quite a bit. If we’re talking about amending CDA 230, at least get the facts on CDA 230 right. Unfortunately, many Senators and some of the witnesses did not. There’s this incorrect belief that CDA 230 leaves no recourse for victims of sex trafficking. That is not even remotely true. The actual perpetrators of sex trafficking are still very much in violation of the law. And, again, if platforms actually develop illegal content themselves, then CDA 230 protections don’t apply.

Finally, so many of the Senators and commentators act as though because of CDA 230, no company does anything to moderate their platforms. This is laughable. Basic public pressure has lead most platforms to moderate their platforms thoroughly — and that’s one of the features of CDA 230, in that it says that any effort to moderate/filter your platform to remove content you don’t want to see (even if legal) does not attach any liability. SESTA changes that standard (even as its authors claim it doesn’t). Because of the “knowledge” standard, moderating content may now be seen as evidence of “knowing conduct.” So this effectively wipes out one of the most important tools that platforms have used to stop their platforms from being used for sex trafficking — and no one seems to want to acknowledge that.

Unless the supporters of this bill are willing to face up to these basic facts and problems with the bill, their headlong rush into “doing something” seems likely to cause a lot more harm than good.

Filed Under: cda 230, intermediary liability, knowledge, sesta