Remember kids, don’t copy that floppy!

So I think the AARC analysis is correct here.

The gist of the AHRA, even in RIAA v Diamond, was that portable music players were exempt from the various requirements of the AHRA basically because they only copied music via ordinary, standalone computers.

From the opinion (and remember that many of these terms have special definitions in the law that are not the same as the ordinary definition, but which control):

[12] The initial question presented is whether the Rio falls within the ambit of the Act. The Act does not broadly prohibit digital serial copying of copyright protected audio recordings. Instead, the Act places restrictions only upon a specific type of recording device. Most relevant here, the Act provides that “[n]o person shall import, manufacture, or distribute any digital audio recording device . . . that does not conform to the Serial Copy Management System [“SCMS”] [or] a system that has the same functional characteristics.” 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1), (2) (emphasis added). The Act further provides that “[n]o person shall import into and distribute, or manufacture and distribute, any digital audio recording device . . . unless such person records the notice specified by this section and subsequently deposits the statements of account and applicable royalty payments.” Id. § 1003(a) (emphasis added). Thus, to fall within the SCMS and royalty requirements in question, the Rio must be a “digital audio recording device,” which the Act defines through a set of nested definitions.

[13] The Act defines a “digital audio recording device” as:

any machine or device of a type commonly distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not included with or as part of some other machine or device, the digital recording function of which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use. . . .

[14] Id. § 1001(3) (emphasis added).

[15] A “digital audio copied recording” is defined as: [p*1076]

a reproduction in a digital recording format of a digital musical recording, whether that reproduction is made directly from another digital musical recording or indirectly from a transmission.

[16] Id. § 1001(1) (emphasis added).

[17] A “digital musical recording” is defined as:

a material object

(i) in which are fixed, in a digital recording format, only sounds, and material, statements, or instructions incidental to those fixed sounds, if any, and

(ii) from which the sounds and material can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.

[18] Id. § 1001(5)(A) (emphasis added).

[19] In sum, to be a digital audio recording device, the Rio must be able to reproduce, either “directly” or “from a transmission,” a “digital music recording.”

…

[21] The typical computer hard drive from which a Rio directly records is, of course, a material object. However, hard drives ordinarily contain much more than “only sounds, and material, statements, or instructions incidental to those fixed sounds.” Id. Indeed, almost all hard drives contain numerous programs (e.g., for word processing, scheduling appointments, etc.) and databases that are not incidental to any sound files that may be stored on the hard drive. Thus, the Rio appears not to make copies from digital music recordings, and thus would not be a digital audio recording device under the Act’s basic definition unless it makes copies from transmissions.

[22] Moreover, the Act expressly provides that the term “digital musical recording” does not include:

a material object

(i) in which the fixed sounds consist entirely of spoken word recordings, or

(ii) in which one or more computer programs are fixed, except that a digital recording may contain statements or instructions constituting the fixed sounds and incidental material, and statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in order to bring about the perception, reproduction, or communication of the fixed sounds and incidental material.

[23] Id. § 1001(5)(B) (emphasis added). As noted previously, a hard drive is a material object in which one or more programs are fixed; thus, a hard drive is excluded from the definition of digital music recordings. This provides confirmation that the Rio does not record “directly” from “digital music recordings,” and therefore could not be a digital audio recording device unless it makes copies “from transmissions.”

…

[25] The Senate Report states that “if the material object contains computer programs or data bases that are not incidental to the fixed sounds, then the material object would not qualify” under the basic definition of a digital musical recording.[fn5] S. Rep. 102-294 (1992), reprinted at 1992 WL 133198, at *118-19. The Senate Report further states that the definition “is intended to cover those objects commonly understood to embody sound recordings and their underlying works.” Id. at *97. A footnote makes explicit that this definition only extends to the material objects in which songs are normally fixed: “[t]hat is recorded compact discs, digital audio tapes, audio cassettes, long-playing albums, digital compact cassettes, and mini-discs.” Id. at n.36. There are simply no grounds in either the plain language of the definition or in the legislative history for interpreting the term “digital musical recording” to include songs fixed on computer hard drives.

[26] RIAA contends that the legislative history reveals that the Rio does not fall within the specific exemption from the digital musical recording definition of “a material object in which one or more computer programs are fixed.” 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B)(ii). The House Report describes the exemption as “revisions reflecting exemptions for talking books and computer programs.” H.R. Rep. 102-873(I) (1992), reprinted at 1992 WL 232935, at *35 (emphasis added); see also id. at *44 (“In addition to containing an express exclusion of computer programs in the definition of `digital musical recording’. . . .”) (emphasis added). We first note that limiting the exemption to computer programs is contrary to the plain meaning of the exemption. As Diamond points out, a computer program is not a material object, but rather, a literary work, see, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[A] computer program . . . is a `literary work.'”), that can be fixed in a variety of material objects, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“`Literary works’ are works . . . expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such [p*1078] as books . . . tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.”) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language of the exemption at issue does not exclude the copying of programs from coverage by the Act, but instead, excludes copying from various types of material objects. Those objects include hard drives, which indirectly achieve the desired result of excluding copying of programs. But by its plain language, the exemption is not limited to the copying of programs, and instead extends to any copying from a computer hard drive.

…

[29] Under the plain meaning of the Act’s definition of digital audio recording devices, computers (and their hard drives) are not digital audio recording devices because their “primary purpose” is not to make digital audio copied recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3). Unlike digital audio tape machines, for example, whose primary purpose is to make digital audio copied recordings, the primary purpose of a computer is to run various programs and to record the data necessary to run those programs and perform various tasks. The legislative history is consistent with this interpretation of the Act’s provisions, stating that “the typical personal computer would not fall within the definition of `digital audio recording device,'” S. Rep. 102-294, at *122, because a personal computer’s “recording function is designed and marketed primarily for the recording of data and computer programs,” id. at *121. Another portion of the Senate Report states that “[i]f the `primary purpose’ of the recording function is to make objects other than digital audio copied recordings, then the machine or device is not a `digital audio recording device,’ even if the machine or device is technically capable of making such recordings.” Id. (emphasis added). The legislative history thus expressly recognizes that computers (and other devices) have recording functions capable of recording digital musical recordings, and thus implicate the home taping and piracy concerns to which the Act is responsive. Nonetheless, the legislative history is consistent with the Act’s plain language – computers are not digital audio recording devices.[fn6]

…

[30] In turn, because computers are not digital audio recording devices, they are not required to comply with the SCMS requirement and thus need not send, receive, or act upon information regarding copyright and generation status. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2). And, as the district court found, MP3 files generally do not even carry the codes providing information [p*1079] regarding copyright and generation status. See RIAA I, 29 F. Supp.2d. at 632. Thus, the Act seems designed to allow files to be “laundered” by passage through a computer, because even a device with SCMS would be able to download MP3 files lacking SCMS codes from a computer hard drive, for the simple reason that there would be no codes to prevent the copying.

[31] Again, the legislative history is consistent with the Act’s plain meaning. As the Technical Reference Document that describes the SCMS system explains, “[d]igital audio signals . . . that have no information concerning copyright and/or generation status shall be recorded by the [digital audio recording] device so that the digital copy is copyright asserted and original generation status.” Technical Reference Document for the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, II-A, P 10, reprinted in H.R. Rep. 102-780(I), 32, 43 (1992) (emphasis added). Thus, the incorporation of SCMS into the Rio would allow the Rio to copy MP3 files lacking SCMS codes so long as it marked the copied files as “original generation status.” And such a marking would allow another SCMS device to make unlimited further copies of such “original generation status” files, see, e.g., H.R. Rep. 102-873(I), at *47 (“Under SCMS . . . consumers will be able to make an unlimited number of copies from a digital musical recording.”), despite the fact that the Rio does not permit such further copies to be made because it simply cannot download or transmit the files that it stores to any other device. Thus, the Rio without SCMS inherently allows less copying than SCMS permits.

If the device in the car is itself copying straight from a CD (unlike the Rio), and is not a general purpose device (like the computers that ripped music for the Rio), AHRA probably applies to it.

This is why, even though it would be quite easy, you don’t really see basically single-purpose music players with recording functions