The Big Question: When Did The NSA Know About Heartbleed?
from the inquiring-minds... dept
Mr Seggelmann, of Munster in Germany, said the bug which introduced the flaw was "unfortunately" missed by him and a reviewer when it was introduced into the open source OpenSSL encryption protocol over two years ago.Later in that same interview, he insists he has no association with intelligence agencies, and also notes that it is "entirely possible" that intelligence agencies had discovered the bug and had made use of it.
"I was working on improving OpenSSL and submitted numerous bug fixes and added new features," he said.
"In one of the new features, unfortunately, I missed validating a variable containing a length."
After he submitted the code, a reviewer "apparently also didn’t notice the missing validation", Mr Seggelmann said, "so the error made its way from the development branch into the released version." Logs show that reviewer was Dr Stephen Henson.
Mr Seggelmann said the error he introduced was "quite trivial", but acknowledged that its impact was "severe".
Another oddity in all of this is that, even though the flaw itself was introduced two years ago, two separate individuals appear to have discovered it on the exact same day. Vocativ, which has a great story giving the behind the scenes on the discovery by Codenomicon, mentions the following in passing:
Unbeknownst to Chartier, a little-known security researcher at Google, Neel Mehta, had discovered and reported the OpenSSL bug on the same day. Considering the bug had actually existed since March 2012, the odds of the two research teams, working independently, finding and reporting the bug at the same time was highly surprising.Highly surprising. But not necessarily indicative of anything. It could be a crazy coincidence. Kim Zetter, over at Wired explores the "did the NSA know about Heartbleed" angle, and points out accurately that while the bug is catastrophic in many ways, what it's not good for is targeting specific accounts. The whole issue with Heartbleed is that it "bleeds" chunks of memory that are on the server. It's effectively a giant crapshoot as to what you get when you exploit it. Yes, it bleeds all sorts of things: including usernames, passwords, private keys, credit card numbers and the like -- but you never quite know what you'll get, which makes it potentially less useful for intelligence agencies. As that Wired article notes, at best, using the Heartbleed exploit would be "very inefficient" for the NSA.
But that doesn't mean there aren't reasons to be fairly concerned. Peter Eckersley, over at EFF, has tracked down at least one potentially scary example that may very well be someone exploiting Heartbleed back in November of last year. It's not definitive, but it is worth exploring further.
EFF is asking people to try to replicate Koeman's findings, while also looking for any other possible evidence of Heartbleed exploits being used in the wild. As it stands now, there doesn't seem to be any conclusive evidence that it was used -- but that doesn't mean it wasn't being used. After all, it's been known that the NSA has a specific program designed to subvert SSL, so there's a decent chance that someone in the NSA could have discovered this bug earlier, and rather than doing its job and helping to protect the security of the internet, chose to use it to its own advantage first.
The second log seems much more troubling. We have spoken to Ars Technica's second source, Terrence Koeman, who reports finding some inbound packets, immediately following the setup and termination of a normal handshake, containing another Client Hello message followed by the TCP payload bytes 18 03 02 00 03 01 40 00 in ingress packet logs from November 2013. These bytes are a TLS Heartbeat with contradictory length fields, and are the same as those in the widely circulated proof-of-concept exploit.
Koeman's logs had been stored on magnetic tape in a vault. The source IP addresses for the attack were 184.108.40.206 and 220.127.116.11. Interestingly, those two IP addresses appear to be part of a larger botnet that has been systematically attempting to record most or all of the conversations on Freenode and a number of other IRC networks. This is an activity that makes a little more sense for intelligence agencies than for commercial or lifestyle malware developers.