Well, it reminds me of the remark of a German politician, circa 1965, that he would not, under a democratic government, the Federal Republic (“ein Recht-Staat”), put up with with things which he had had to put up with under the Nazi regime (“ein Unrecht-Staat”).

I was impressed by something the English historian J.H. Plumb wrote about Watergate, and the JFK assassination conspiracy theorists, etc. He pointed out that it was all driven by the Vietnam War, and a cumulative sense of suppressed outrage. People accepted a “critique,” if you will, in which “dirty tricks” were the ultimate reason why their little cupcake had gotten himself killed in the Battle of Ia Drang (). And that mattered a great deal. The same thing is happening again, with the NSA, The anger is ultimately driven by the dusty soil of Iraq. Of course, the Nixon Administration’s characteristic response to criticism was burglary, which is an offense at common law. Again, looking in the memoirs of Jack Anderson, the great Watergate-era investigative journalist, I find that he just realistically assumed that his office might be burgled, and got his young men to make up a roster for guard duty. Very well, someone like Glen Greenwald, Anderson’s latter-day equivalent, needs to worry about encryption, but doing so is not really a big deal.

() Ia Drang, if you don’t know, is a godforsaken village, of no conceivable importance, in the central part of Vietnam, which was the scene of an indecisive battle, whose main function was to massage the egos of the respective generals. But “twas a famous victory.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ia_Drang

Wire-tapping has gone crazy with technology, with the NSA trying to tap everyone’s phone, instead of the small number of people whose phones would realistically yield intelligence useful either to a government or a political party (but who take cryptographic precautions to prevent this). Again, the basic fact is that real conspirators are men of few words. They usually worry at least as much about defectors and double agents as anything else, and keep real secrets fairly closely controlled, on a need-to-know basis. As we now know, there was a traitor inside WikiLeaks, but fortunately, Julian Assange’s policy was to redistribute all information fast, and not to be in the position of keeping more secrets than he strictly had to keep. So the traitor was not able to do much damage.

Now we come to the bug in the Ecuadorian ambassador’s office. Ecuador is not a very important country, and it is a long way from any British territory, and I doubt that its embassy has any real secrets vis a vis the British government. Ecuador basically needs a consulate in London, to deal with the interests of people who go to school in England, and suchlike, and the additional functions of an embassy are mostly decorative. I imagine their security was chronically lax. Probably, almost anyone could get in to see the ambassador, without any kind of credentials, because the ambassador was sitting there being very bored.

Uncontrolled NSA surveillance is practically related to an idea which has been running around in business, “data mining,” which at its most crudely ridiculous is the idea that if you can discover whether I drink Coke or Pepsi, you somehow have access to my innermost motivations. In short, it’s neo-Rumplestiltskin-ism, but it justifies a lot of expensive computer installations.What it works out to in practice is that little Jenny, age seven, is on the phone to her best friend Brenda, age six, talking about the usual subjects, and they are being listened to by ten secret agents, who are all pathetically convinced that the conversation must be a code for affairs of state.