F-Secure Explains Why It Missed Spotting Flame, Despite Having Seen It Two Years Ago
from the cat-and-mouse dept
What this means is that all of us had missed detecting this malware for two years, or more. That’s a spectacular failure for our company, and for the antivirus industry in general.It's so rare to see someone admit to a mistake -- especially one that seems so big (even if it doesn't really impact most people outside of the Middle East. Part of the problem, he notes, is that spotting this kind of thing is just beyond what companies like his can do:
The truth is, consumer-grade antivirus products can’t protect against targeted malware created by well-resourced nation-states with bulging budgets. They can protect you against run-of-the-mill malware: banking trojans, keystroke loggers and e-mail worms. But targeted attacks like these go to great lengths to avoid antivirus products on purpose. And the zero-day exploits used in these attacks are unknown to antivirus companies by definition. As far as we can tell, before releasing their malicious codes to attack victims, the attackers tested them against all of the relevant antivirus products on the market to make sure that the malware wouldn’t be detected. They have unlimited time to perfect their attacks. It’s not a fair war between the attackers and the defenders when the attackers have access to our weapons.He later concludes: "We were out of our league, in our own game."
Antivirus systems need to strike a balance between detecting all possible attacks without causing any false alarms. And while we try to improve on this all the time, there will never be a solution that is 100 percent perfect. The best available protection against serious targeted attacks requires a layered defense, with network intrusion detection systems, whitelisting against known malware and active monitoring of inbound and outbound traffic of an organization’s network.
Of course, this is the nature of a security system that is based on reacting to threats, rather than preventing security holes and risks, as he more or less explains. In the end, there's a bit of a cat and mouse game going on here, and no one's going to be able to catch all malware. But as even Hypponen admits, the best solution is to rely on more than one method for trying to keep systems secure, rather than believing that there is a single bullet.