Why Might China And India Want To Strengthen National Intellectual Property Policy?
from the pay-attention-to-who's-talking dept
In the last post, we explained the numerous changes made to strengthen intellectual property in China and India. Yet, to many observers, it has not been enough. Governments, donors, academics and private industry encourage, some more subtly than others, China and India to “harmonize” their domestic intellectual property by strengthening regulations and enforcement.
The Vested Interests
According to the US-China Business Council, an industry group representing American companies operating in China, weak penalties, delayed enforcement and protectionist policies limit China’s ability to become a leading innovator (“Statement of the US-China Business Council” PDF). A survey of its members says intellectual property enforcement is China’s most serious shortfall in implementing WTO commitments, though 1/3 said it had improved. They advocate increased enforcement, more training for judges and prosecutors, public awareness campaigns and lower thresholds for criminal penalties.
The United States Trade Representative (USTR), too, condemns China’s IP regime. The USTR has placed China on the Priority Watch List of its annual “Special 301 Report” that evaluates the IP policies of dozens of countries. India, too, makes this list as a “significant concern,” though China is the primary country of concern (USTR Special 301 2008 Report). In the report, the USTR cites the US copyright industry’s estimate that piracy cost the United States $500 million in 2004 (USTR Special 301 2005 Report). Another estimate by the International Intellectual Property Association says that copyright piracy in 2008 in India and China cost the U.S. $1,096.2 million and $3,504 million, respectively (IIPA 2009 PDF). These sources also claim that counterfeiting reduces tax receipts and domestic growth. To combat this alleged threat to America’s economy, the USTR is actively working to increase global intellectual property standards through bilateral free trade agreements and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, currently being negotiated in secret (USTR Special 301 2008 Report).
These groups motives and facts should be viewed with caution - their statistics have been shown to be wildly innacurate and their motives dubious. There are others, however, who advocate for stronger intellectual property in China and India, and believe it to be in the best interest of the two countries. Under this thinking, promoting IP in China and India will further their ability to capitalize on international information flows and promote domestic innovation.
Most basically, the increased export opportunities available as a WTO member makes the adoption of new technologies profitable for more firms (Dutta & Sharma PDF). A recent study has shown that royalty payments for technology transfer, R&D expenditures and total levels of foreign patent applications all increase with intellectual property reforms (Branstetter 2006). One common line of thinking closely related is the belief that FDI will increase with stronger intellectual property. Executives at multinational corporations (MNCs) say that IP rules are a very important factor in deciding R&D locations – before investing substantially in new R&D, companies want to be assured that they will have the opportunity to recoup those costs through exclusive control of their innovations (Lanjouw 1997). China and India suffer from ineffective R&D – they devote a small share of labor and GDP to research, and in both countries much of the work is done by the government – so foreign investment in the sector could prove useful. India, especially, needs improvement in the commercialization of its patents (Dahlman 2005). It is argued that market incentives (via IP) would increase efficiency.
Unfortunately, the evidence is not clear-cut. A 2005 study found that IP laws have little discernible influence on the growth of R&D stocks, though the international transfer of and propensity to patent do seem to be influenced (Jaumotte 2005). Another study from the same year, though, shows that stronger intellectual property will improve the incentives for a foreign rights holder to enter emerging markets, but that it will also increase that firm’s market power, diminishing the ability of domestic firms to compete. However, technology has spillover effects, especially due to the disclosure required by patent applications, which can, in theory, make productivity gains from foreign firms available to domestic firms. Yet, although a 2004 study finds that FDI could theoretically lead to widespread gains in domestic productivity, because companies block spillover through various means, in practice, the sectoral gains are minimal. This is particularly worrisome for China and India because the sectors in which they presumably have some burgeoning capabilities will receive little benefit from international linkages.
One study found that increased intellectual property has a significant positive impact on the productivity of R&D, as measured by patents per dollar of R&D, though this metric is suspect because a patent does not necessarily translate into any economically or socially desirable outcome (Brahmbhatt 2007).
In the coming weeks, we'll discuss the likely downsides of increased intellectual property in China and India.
Other posts in this series:
- Do China And India Really Want Stronger Intellectual Property?
- A Brief History Of Intellectual Property In China And India
- Why Might China And India Want To Strengthen National Intellectual Property Policy?
- Why Increased IP In China And India Is Likely To Disproportionately Benefit The Developed World
- In China And India, Stronger Intellectual Property Is Unnecessary
- There Is No Harmony In A Patent Thicket
- The Way Forward On Intellectual Property For China And India