Want To See How Easy It Is To Hack An Election?
from the have-a-look-see dept
One of the complaints that the e-voting firms have had about having independent security researchers testing the machines is that those tests are not in real world conditions. In fact, we had a commenter from one of the e-voting companies who insisted that these independent tests were useless because:
The point people often miss, which is left off of the conspiracy blogs, is that all of these 'hacking' attempts that are requested are made to do so in some sort of vacuum. In some obscure room where a gang of hackers get together and try to penetrate the system with unlimited resources. In any election, paper or fully electronic, there are procedural and security measures taken that complement and supplement the security features of the system itself. This is in addition to internal and system-independent, pre- and post-election audit features.That's really rather meaningless, because if it were true, then that info would also come out in those independent research reports. However, even that comment turns out to be untrue. As a few folks have submitted, some security researchers at UCSB have demonstrated not just how insecure Sequoia's e-voting systems are, but they've shown how easy it is to hack an election with a pair of videos that you can watch right here (if you're in the RSS feed, click through to see them):
The video also shows why paper ballots are hardly a solution, as the second video shows how the malware included in the software can be set to void out legitimate votes and replace them with fake votes, in a variety of different scenarios, almost all of which are likely to go undetected. This is a hugely damning report -- and it comes against a company that has fought so hard against having its machines tested by independent security experts. While some may say that this shows why they didn't want it tested -- it should concern anyone who believes in free and fair democratic elections that we're using such insecure voting machines.